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Abstract 
 
Although it has long been portrayed as the nation’s ‘moat defensive’, recent 
examinations of Anglo-French rivalry during the long eighteenth century have 
revealed that the English Channel was, in reality, a highly permeable and 
vulnerable maritime border territory. Within this context, the Channel Islands 
assumed a strategic and tactical significance which was vastly disproportionate 
to their physical size, population or resources; emerging as what Morieux terms 
‘a lynchpin of control' over local shipping and trade. Although a great deal of 
research has been already undertaken – particularly in relation to the Channel 
Islands’ role as a base for commerce-raiding and intelligence gathering – much 
of this has covered the entire long eighteenth century. However, it was only 
during the Great French War that the British government embraced the military 
potential of the Channel Islands to the fullest; not only exploiting the inhabitants’ 
knowledge of the seas and intimacy with her ‘enemies’, but also transforming 
the archipelago into a chain of offshore fortresses. In addition, prior scholarship 
has often focused on individual aspects of the Channel Islands’ involvement in 
the Great French War; while local historians have tended to embrace the ‘Great 
Man’ approach, examining the period through the lens of the careers of local 
commanders. Consequently, this thesis seeks to provide a more complete 
picture of the Channel Islands’ role within Britain’s military and naval strategy; 
integrating an examination of local defence and security with several of already 
well-covered topics. Moreover, in light of the fact that existent scholarship has 
often centred upon ‘Great Men’, it is hoped that the thesis shall serve to better 
demonstrate the extent to which the celebrated achievements of Don, Doyle 
and D’Auvergne rested upon the efforts of a number of ‘unsung heroes’. 
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Chapter One – Introduction 
 
First proposed by Seeley in 1883, the concept of the ‘Second Hundred Years 
War’ is now widely used by scholars on both sides of the Channel as a standard 
framework for the study of Anglo-French relations during the long eighteenth 
century (c. 1685-1830).1 According to this model, the Great French War is 
depicted as the final act in a century-long struggle for ‘naval, colonial, 
commercial, financial and industrial supremacy’,2 and the inevitable result of 
colonial proxy-wars, espionage, and a military and naval arms race.3  Although 
recent scholarship has questioned the validity of this stereotypical image, the 
aftermath of the French Revolution is still often described as the ‘birth of 
‘modern’ or ‘total’ war’.4 As highlighted by Bell and Daly, the period was 
characterised by ‘an astonishing increase in the scope and intensity of warfare’5 
as ‘states and societies mobilised for war on an unprecedented scale’,6 while 
Malkasian observes that ‘new ideas of patriotism…brought the nation into war 
for the first time’.7 Similarly, the naval actions of the period may be regarded as 
marking the zenith of the ‘age of sail’,8 the post-1815 technological revolution 
witnessing the emergence of steam-powered, armoured warships.9 
                                                 
1 J.R. Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London, 1883), cited in R. Morieux, 
The Channel: England, France and the Construction of a Maritime Border in the Eighteenth Century 
(Cambridge, 2016) p. 1 
2 P. Harling, ‘A Tale of Two Conflicts: Critiques of the British War Effort, 1793-1815’, in M. Philp (ed.), 
Resisting Napoleon: The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot, 2006) p. 19 
3 M. Acerra and J. Meyer, Marines et Révolution (Rennes, 1988), cited in W.S. Cormack, Revolution and 
Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-94 (Cambridge, 1995) pp. 7-8; and A. Page, Britain and the 
Seventy Years War, 1744-1815; Enlightenment, Revolution and Empire (London, 2015) pp. 12-13 
4 Morieux, The Channel, p. 229 
5 D.A. Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare as We Know It 
(New York City, New York, 2007) p. 48 
6 G. Daly, ‘Plunder on the Peninsula: British Soldiers and Local Civilians during the Peninsular War, 
1808-13’, in E. Charters, E. Rosenhaft, H. Smith, (eds.), Civilians and War in Europe, 1618– 1815, 
(Liverpool, 2012) p. 210 
.7 C. Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport, Connecticut, 2002) p. 13 
8 L. Sondhaus, Navies of Europe: 1815-2002 (Abingdon, 2002) p. 6 
9 J. Black, War in the Nineteenth Century, 1800-1914 (Cambridge, 2009) pp. 71, 78, 81 and 85; and J. 
Black, Western Warfare, 1775-1882 (Chesham, 2001) p. 69 
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For the Channel Islands too, the Great French War should be regarded as a 
landmark moment in their history, particularly in terms of their strategic 
relationship with Great Britain. As has been acknowledged in a number of 
recent studies,10 the defeat of Napoleon and the birth of ‘modern’ war signalled 
the end of the Channel Islands’ ability of act as ‘strategic outposts off a 
frequently hostile European coast’.11 Following the loss of Continental 
Normandy in 1204 (see below), Jersey, Guernsey and her sister islands had 
assumed a prominent position on the Anglo-French maritime border; initially by 
providing safe harbour for vessels engaged in the cross-Channel wine and wool 
trades.12 However, as Jamieson observed, the expansion of the Royal Navy 
prior to the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14) and the emergence of a 
coherent British maritime strategy caused a dramatic shift in the dynamic of this 
relationship.13 Although the importance of the Channel Islands as a military 
asset had never been questioned,14 it was only during the eighteenth century 
that their exploitation took on an ‘offensive’ character. Not only were they 
regarded as valuable outposts (see sections i and iii), but it was during the 
Great French War that the Channel Islands enjoyed their heyday as an asset 
within the context of ‘economic warfare’ (see section ii).  
 
Consequently, while it would be impossible to argue that their possession 
represented a decisive factor in the outcome of the Great French War, it is the 
contention of this thesis that the Channel Islands conferred a significant local 
                                                 
10 G.S. Cox, ‘The Transformation of St. Peter Port, Guernsey, 1680-1831’ PhD Thesis, (University of 
Leicester, 1994) p. 187-188; and J.D. Kelleher, ‘The Triumph of the Country: The Rural Community in 
Nineteenth Century Jersey’ PhD Thesis, (University of Warwick, 1991) pp. 8-9 
11 R.M. Crossan, ‘Guernsey 1814-1914: Migration in a Modernising Society’ PhD Thesis, (University of 
Leicester, 2005) p. 1 
12 J. Sumption, Trial by Battle: The Hundred Years War I (London, 2010) pp. 454 and 471 
13 A.G. Jamieson, ‘The Channel Islands and British Maritime Strategy, 1689-1945’, in Jamieson (ed.), ‘A 
People of the Sea’: A Maritime History of the Channel Islands (London, 1986) p. 220 
14 Morieux, The Channel, p. 123 
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advantage upon whichever side could lay claim to their control. Although 
nineteenth-century writers frequently sought to depict the fortification of the 
Channel Islands as a military ‘white elephant’ – often citing the fact that Fort 
Regent cost more than £375,000 to build, yet never saw action15 – such 
arguments are possible only ex post facto. First and foremost, they ignore the 
consistent description of the Channel Islands by the civil and military authorities 
as ‘a valuable part of His Majesty’s Dominions’,16 as well as the fact that 
rumours of their capture – though quickly refuted – were sufficient to engender 
panic in the City of London.17 Nor was the belief in their military potential 
restricted to the British authorities: both Vauban and De Caux had advocated 
the fortification of Cherbourg as a safeguard against an invasion of the Cotentin 
from the Channel Islands.18 Likewise, in his treatise on the defence of Great 
Britain, Dumouriez19 observed that a naval force based in either Jersey or 
Guernsey posed a direct threat to ‘all communications and all traffic between 
the [French] Channel ports’.20 
 
However, while it is true that the central premise of this thesis is by no means 
original,21 and that several of the topics discussed herein have been the subject 
of extensive academic research (see below), a significant gap exists 
nonetheless within current scholarship. At present, it appears that no attempt 
                                                 
15 W. Davies, Fort Regent: A History (Jersey, 1972) p. 37 
16 TNA, WO 1/602, Small to Nepean, July 23rd 1794; WO 1/604, ‘General Order issued by Small’, March 
4th 1796; WO 1/607, States of Jersey to Dundas, May 1st 1798; and WO 1/608, Gordon to Hobart, 
September 27th 1801 
17 The Times, March 18th 1794 
18 Morieux, The Channel, pp. 113-114 
19 Although he had defected from the Revolutionary Army in 1794, Dumouriez had played a key role in 
the planning of the attempted invasions of Jersey in 1779 and 1781. See A. Franklin, M. Philp, K. 
Navickas, Napoleon and the Invasion of Britain (Oxford, 2003) pp. 61-62 
20 J. Holland Rose, A. Meyrick Broadley (eds.), Dumouriez and the Defence of England Against 
Napoleon (London, 1909) pp. 319-320 
21 A. King, ‘Relations of the British Government with the Émigrés and Royalists’ PhD Thesis, 
(University of London, 1931) pp. xviii-xix; and ‘Jersey: Centre D’Espionnage au Debut de la Periode 
Revolutionnaire’ RHM 9:15:3 (1934) 424  
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has yet been made to conduct a comprehensive study of the Channel Islands’ 
role in the Great French War, or to analyse the various aspects of their 
involvement in the context of contemporary strategic policy. However, not only 
is this study designed to demonstrate the extent to which the Channel Islands 
enhanced regional military and maritime operations against post-Revolutionary 
France, but it is also hoped that it shall have a significant impact upon the study 
of local history. Although the abovementioned studies carried out by Cox, 
Crossan and Kelleher have added greatly to our understanding of the 
transformation of the Channel Islands during the nineteenth century, many of 
the changes witnessed during that period were rooted in the events of the Great 
French War.22 Even by the middle of the nineteenth century, the complexion of 
life in the bailiwicks had been transformed beyond all recognition: a process 
which had, to a certain extent, been catalysed by the reforms introduced to 
protect the Islands from the threat of Republicanism. 
 
The Geography and Demography of the Islands 
 
Within his recent study of Anglo-French relations during the long eighteenth-
century, Morieux has argued that the Channel Islands played a prominent role 
in support of Britain’s policy of mare clausum, effectively serving as a ‘linchpin 
of control over the maritime border’.23 Throughout the long eighteenth century, 
the local privateering fleets – in company with a host of hired vessels and Royal 
Navy scouts – preyed upon French mercantile traffic passing in and out of a 
chain of ports from Cherbourg to Brest (see section ii).24 Moreover, the strategic 
significance of the Channel Islands was acknowledged by French naval 
                                                 
22 Crossan, ‘Guernsey 1814-1914’, p. 78 
23 Morieux, The Channel, p. 124 
24 P. Crowhurst, The French War on Trade: Privateering, 1793-1815 (Aldershot, 1989) pp. 70-71 
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strategists of the period; in 1734, De Caux had warned that vessels arriving 
from the Atlantic ‘had no option but to sail between the [English] ports of 
Portsmouth and Portland…and the [Channel Islands]’.25 However, it must be 
emphasised that the exploitation of the Channel Islands as a base for 
commerce raiding was complicated by the dangerous nature of local navigation; 
indeed, storms often forced British naval officers to withdraw from Channel 
Island waters.26 Moreover, while shipwreck was a frequent occurrence – on 
November 23rd 1798, seven vessels belonging to a convoy sailing from 
Bordeaux to Brest were lost in the Bay of Douarnenez27 – the Race of Alderney 
was particularly treacherous,28 as were the reefs and sunken rocks spread 
across the Bay of St. Malo.29 
 
As to their demographic makeup at the end of the long eighteenth century, both 
Jersey and Guernsey were characterised by an emerging rural-urban divide; 
one which was to grow increasingly visible throughout the Great French War 
and dominate local life during the nineteenth century. Even by 1914, the only 
significant areas of urbanisation were the towns of St. Helier in Jersey and St. 
Peter Port in Guernsey the smaller ports of St. Aubin, Gorey and Rozel in 
Jersey and St. Sampson in Guernsey, and the town of St. Anne in Alderney. Of 
the latter, only St. Anne exhibited the ‘nucleated’ pattern typical of British 
villages,30 but the privileged position enjoyed by the local fishing fleets during 
                                                 
25 De Caux, ‘State of the Coast of Basse-Normandie, with the Preparations and Improvements Which 
May Conveniently be Done for the Protection and Security of Trade, February 1st 1734’, cited in 
Morieux, The Channel, p. 124 
26 TNA, FO 95/606, D’Auvergne to Woodford, November 25th 1795; and SJA, L/F/95/B/9, ‘Letter from 
Don to ‘My Dear Sir’ Concerning Intelligence from D’Auvergne Concerning the Movement of French 
Troops, the Armament of Cherbourg and the Threat to Alderney’, October 27th 1811 
27 TNA, WO 1/922/5, ‘Translation of Intelligence from Brest’, December 30th 1796 
28 TNA, PC 1/117B, D’Auvergne to Dundas, December 19th 1795; and FO 95/612/43, D’Auvergne to 
Nepean, September 2nd 1800 
29 TNA, FO 95/617, D’Auvergne to Hobart, July 29th 1801 
30 Kelleher, ‘The Triumph of the Country’, pp. 42-44; and Cox, ‘Transformation of St. Peter Port’, p. 53 
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wartime (see chapter seven)31 provided the foundation for their emergence 
within nineteenth-century regional maritime commerce.32 Moreover, the 
emergence of an increasingly influential mercantile class (see section ii) 
encouraged tensions between the Islands’ urban commercial centres and the 
almost exclusively agrarian outlying parishes. This was exacerbated by the fact 
that the majority of the inhabitants of the latter seldom had any dealings with 
their counterparts in the towns, except in relation to the sale and exportation of 
produce and the periodic assemblage of the States.33 
 
Aside from the ‘rural-urban’ divide, the Great French War was also marked by 
increasing tensions between ‘native’ Channel Islanders and those regarded 
under local law as ‘foreigners’. As will become clear in later chapters, the civil 
codes of both bailiwicks shaped many aspects of their involvement in British 
military affairs; however, the disabilities against ‘strangers’ were particularly 
problematic, since the concept also encompassed all British citizens.34 Being at 
the centre of a historic international trade network (see chapter six) and well-
established as a refugee for those fleeing Normandy and Brittany in times of 
war (see chapter nine), the inhabitants were used to the presence of 
outsiders.35 However, the authorities in both Jersey and Guernsey remained 
strict in their attitudes towards the rights of temporary residents: for example, no 
‘foreigner’ was permitted to take lodgings in the Islands or marry a ‘native’ 
without the permission of the Lieutenant-Governor.36 Consequently, the 
                                                 
31 R. Morieux, ‘Diplomacy from Below and Belonging: Fishermen and Cross-Channel Relations in the 
Eighteenth Century’, PP 202 (2009) 86-87 
32 TNA, HO 98/31, Doyle to Hawkesbury, February 20th 1808; HO 98/15, Don to Ryder, February 17th 
1810; and SJA, A/A1/3, Letter of August 3rd 1810  
33 Cox, ‘Transformation of St. Peter Port’, p. 55 
34 Crossan, ‘Guernsey 1814-1914’, p. 184 
35 T. Thornton, The Channel Islands, 1370-1640: Between England and Normandy (London, 2012) p. 112 
36 BL, Add MS 37862, D’Auvergne to Windham, October 20th, 1796; and A.J. Le Cras, Guide to the 
Island of Jersey (Jersey, 1834) pp. 13 and 135 
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outbreak of hostilities in 1793 aroused a climate of fear and distrust respecting 
‘foreigners’ of any origin,37 including foreign garrison troops within the British 
service38 and natives of allied and neutral states (see chapter five). 
 
While the friction between the ‘native’ Islanders and the ‘foreign’ garrison 
caused problems similar to those experienced in most frontier outposts,39 the 
Channel Islands were also destabilised by tensions arising from differences of 
religious affiliation amongst the civilian population. Prior to 1499, when a papal 
bull had formalised their transference to the Diocese of Winchester, the Catholic 
Church in both Jersey and Guernsey had been administered from Normandy, 
within which they had formed part of the Diocese of Coutances.40 Together with 
the Channel Islands’ proximity to the French coast, this historic link ensured that 
the local experience of the Reformation was heavily influenced by French 
Calvinism,41 the bailiwicks being brought into union with the Anglican 
Communion only during the reign of Elizabeth I.42 However, while the majority of 
the inhabitants were members of the Church of England, the expansion of the 
Channel Islands’ trade connections during the eighteenth century had led to the 
establishment of small, yet significant, communities of Quakers (post 1742)43 
and Wesleyan Methodists (post 1775).44 In addition, the arrival of the first 
French émigrés in 179145 can be seen as having laid the foundations for the 
                                                 
37 SJA, L/C/68/A/1, Le Couteur to Connétable D’Auvergne of St. Ouen, December 28th 1799, and 
‘Circular from Le Couteur to the Connétables’, December 16th 1800  
38 See TNA, WO 1/419, Eton to Huskisson, Jersey, May 12th 1800 
39 D. Gregory, Malta, Britain and the European Powers (London, 1996) p. 265 
40 J.M. Hayden, The Catholicisms of Coutances: Varieties of Religion in Early-Modern France, 1350-
1789 (Montreal, 2013) p. 20 
41 Crossan, ‘Guernsey 1814-1914’, p. 174 
42 Kelleher, ‘The Triumph of the Country’, p. 35 
43 A. Hall, ‘History of the Quakers in Jersey’, ABSJ 28:3 (2003) 375-386 
44 C. Yrigoyen, and S.E. Warrick, Historical Dictionary of Methodism (Lanham, Maryland, 2013) p. 110 
45 The Times, March 9th 1791 
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reintroduction of Catholicism to the Channel Islands,46 the provisions of the 
various Relief Acts having not been introduced therein.47 
 
The Constitutional Relationship with Great Britain 
 
In addition to the aforementioned de jure distinction between ‘natives’ and 
‘foreigners’, the legislative structures of the Channel Islands exhibited a number 
of other traits which reflected their nature as a ‘border territory’. Rather than 
being derived from a single legal tradition, the judicial, legislative and executive 
machinery of the Channel Islands represented an intersection of English 
Common Law, Norman Customary Law and French Civil Law.48 Their 
constitutional status was no less ambiguous: the Elizabethan jurist Sir Edward 
Coke had described the Islands as being ‘parcel of the Crown of England, [but] 
not of the Realm of England’.49 This crucial distinction, underpinning the 
independence of the Channel Islands from the authority of Westminster (see 
chapters two, five and six) was rooted in the events of the thirteenth century, 
and particularly King John’s failure to repel the Franco-Breton invasion of 
Normandy (1202-04). Despite being beyond the scope of this thesis, an 
appreciation of the wider impact of this particular event is vital to understanding 
the complex political relationship which exists, even now, between the Channel 
Islands and Great Britain.50 
 
                                                 
46 Du Tressay, L’Abbe, Vie de Matthieu de Gruchy (Paris, 1868) pp. 136-137 
47 Cox, ‘The Transformation of St. Peter Port’, p. 100 
48 S. Farran, E. Örücü and S. Patrick Donlan (eds.), A Study of Mixed Legal Systems: Endangered, 
Entrenched or Blended (London, 2016) p. 7 
49 Sir Edward Coke, unidentified source, cited in P. Falle and P. Morant (eds.), Caesarea: or an Account 
of the Island of Jersey, The Greatest of the Islands Around the Coast of England, or the Ancient Duchy of 
Normandy (London, 1797) p. 217 
50 S. Mariani, ‘Jersey and the Public International Law Dimensions of Sovereignty’, JGLR 17:1 (2013) 20 
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During the first half of the thirteenth century, a number of conflicts were fought 
by the Kings of England and France for control of Normandy; however, in spite 
of the French conquest of Normandy, the Channel Islands remained firmly in 
English hands. Consequently, although the Treaty of Paris (1259) required  
Henry III to give up all claims to his Continental holdings,51 he was permitted – 
in his person as ‘Peer of France and Duke of Normandy’ – to retain the Channel 
Islands as a feudal possession.52 This near-unique arrangement53 also entitled 
the inhabitants to enjoy all the rights and privileges of English subjects without 
falling under the authority of the English Parliament;54 an advantage which was 
actively exploited by the islanders, contributing greatly to their economic 
prosperity.55 However, in the case of issues such as smuggling and 
impressment,56 the zeal with which the Channel Islanders defended their 
constitutional privileges often brought them into direct conflict with the British 
government (see chapter seven).57 Although these confrontations will be 
explored in greater detail in the main body of the thesis, it is advisable to 
provide a brief general summary of the causes of constitutional tensions.  
 
In essence, the difficulty arose from the inhabitants’ own identity as British 
subjects, particularly as expressed in 1771 by Guernsey’s then-Bailiff, William 
Le Marchant. In an official treatise on the Island’s law code, he had reiterated 
the status of the British monarch as ‘Kings of England, yet Dukes of Normandy’, 
emphasising that, unlike their counterparts in Britain, the Channel Islanders 
                                                 
51 Morieux, ‘Diplomacy from Below’, 91 
52 J. Everard and J.C. Holt, Jersey 1204: The Forging of an Island Community (London, 2004) p. 115 
53 The only other territory to enjoy this distinction is the Isle of Man. 
54 See P. Johnson, ‘Orders in Council and the Extension of Acts of Parliament to the Channel Islands’, 
JGLR 16:3 (2012) 280 
55 Morieux, The Channel, pp. 251-253 
56 R.W. Avery, ‘The Naval Protection of Britain’s Maritime Trade, 1793-1802’ DPhil Thesis, (University 
of Oxford, 1983) p. 51 
57 TNA, HO 99/3, Beckett to Don, May 18th 1809; and PC 1/4507, Doyle to D’Auvergne, December 28th 
1809 
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swore loyalty, ‘not as conquered or feudatory subjects, but as subjects of the 
Conqueror’.58 Therefore, the respective States Assemblies were considered 
answerable only to His Majesty in Council, to whom local Acts had to be 
submitted for review before being granted the Royal Assent,59 and whose ruling 
had to be sought before any constitutional changes could be made.60 Likewise, 
many Islanders looked upon their independence from Westminster as being 
nothing more or less than just reward for their historic fealty towards the 
Crown,61 as symbolised by the requirement of all male inhabitants to render 
unpaid service in the militia.62 Consequently, although the provisions of an Act 
of Parliament could be extended to the Channel Islands through the application 
of a parallel Order in Council,63 this power was rarely exercised, since it was 
often interpreted as transgressing the liberties of the Islands.64  
 
Despite the Islanders’ collective assurances of their loyalty, the inability of 
Westminster to exercise control over the affairs of the bailiwicks resulted in their 
continuing to be regarded as a potential security risk. In particular, fears that the 
Channel Islands might fall victim to the lure of republicanism or fifth-columnist 
activity65 were exacerbated by the inhabitants’ aforementioned attachment to 
their independence. Although the provisions of Magna Carta had not extended 
                                                 
58 W. Le Marchant, Rights and Immunities of the Island of Guernsey (London, 1771) p. 31 
59 ‘Order in Council Concerning Acts of the States of Jersey Dated April 18th 1785 and May 27th 1785’ 
and ‘Order in Council Concerning Acts of the States of Jersey Dated July 10th 1782, June 16th 1784 and 
October 5th 1785’, in SJA, L/C/67/J2/10-11, ‘Orders in Council Concerning Disputes Between the 
Lieutenant-Bailiff and Jurats and the Clergy and Constables’, June 2nd 1786 
60 Johnson, ‘Orders in Council’, 280 
61 TNA, HO 98/41, Le Mesurier to Dundas, February 19th 1793; and SJA, L/F/97/M2/39, ‘Letter to The 
Times from Philippe de Carteret, Greffier, Warning of a Possible French Attack on Jersey’, March 15th 
1794  
62 TNA, HO 98/9, Gordon to Pelham, March 14th 1803; and SJA, L/F/22/L/32, ‘Printed Account of the 
Trial of Philip Arthur for Absenting Himself from Military Drill on Sundays’, 1808 
63 Falle and Morant (eds.), Caesarea, p. 218 
64 TNA, HO 42/81/127, ‘Letter from the Clerk of the Privy Council to the Royal Court of Guernsey’, 
November 21st 1805; and PC 1/2298, ‘Petition Against [The Anti-Smuggling Act] As Far As It Affects 
Guernsey, From Daniel de Lisle Brock on Behalf of the States of Guernsey’, 1805 
65 TNA, HO 98/9, Gordon to Pelham, January 26th 1803  
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to the Channel Islands, the inhabitants’ historic privileges, as derived from the 
Treaty of Paris (see above) were believed to have been codified within the 
Constitutions of King John.66 Since the mid-nineteenth century, the lack of any 
documentary evidence67 has resulted in the dismissal of the Constitutions as a 
‘legal fiction’,68 but at the time of the Great French War, its supposed provisions 
formed an essential framework for the inhabitants’ relationship with Great 
Britain.69 In particular, its local legislative and judicial influence served to 
reinforce the status of the Channel Islands as a possession of the Crown, 
meaning that, unlike many other British territories, they were not made to suffer 
the forcible transplantation of an ‘unblemished’ alien political system.70  
 
Unfortunately, the faith placed by the Islanders in the privileges enshrined in the 
Constitutions gave rise to a crucial weakness within the local political system, 
one exacerbated by the intense parochialism of island society in general (see 
chapter five). Throughout the 1770s, calls for political reform had become 
increasingly vocal,71 with the Tory satirist Shebbeare producing a number of 
pamphlets72 specifically targeting Jersey’s Lempriere dynasty.73 However, both 
bailiwicks remained under the control of a powerful oligarchy, and this 
reinforces the double-edged nature of the Channel Islands’ relationship with 
Great Britain: while exemption from the authority of Parliament was regarded as 
                                                 
66 Falle and Morant (eds.), Caesarea, pp. 244-247; and J. Sullivan, Synopsis of the Constitutions, 
Charters and Privileges Granted to the Channel Islanders; Referring Especially to the Privileges 
Bestowed upon Them by their Norman Dukes (London, 1869) p. 12 
67 The Constitutions are, however, referred to in the Charters of Edward IV and Elizabeth I 
68 C. Le Quesne, A Constitutional History of Jersey (London, 1856), cited in M. Dun, ‘Crown Officers 
Review Part Two’ (Jersey, 2010) Para. Ten 
69 Sullivan, Synopsis, p. 13 
70 H.T. Manning, The Revolt of French Canada: 1800-1835, A Chapter of the History of the British 
Commonwealth (New York, 1962) pp. 28-29 
71 SJA, L/C/88/A/39, ‘Letter from Dr. John Shebbeare to Nicholas Fiott Concerning Philip Lempriere's 
Proposed Visit to Jersey and a Petition to the Crown against the 'Tyrants’ in Jersey’, April 24th 1772 
72 See J. Shebbeare, An Authentic Narrative of the Oppressions of the Islanders of Jersey, Two Volumes, 
(London, 1771); and SJA, L/F/22/L/21, ‘Printed Pamphlet Entitled ‘The Tyranny of the Magistrates of 
Jersey’’, 1772 
73 Alongside the De Carterets, the Lemprieres were one of the most powerful Jersey families. 
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a cornerstone of the bailiwicks’ economic prosperity (see chapter six), the 
majority of the population remained subject to the rule of a corrupt colonial 
autocracy.74 Indeed, while the Great French War did witness a number of 
attempts to alleviate much of the suffering which had been highlighted by 
Shebbeare, the Constitutions remained the cause of considerable upheaval 
within Island society. Just as colonial creole leaders protested against any 
attempt to restrict their trade and impose regular taxation,75 so the Channel 
Islands’ leading families adopted a similar stance against elements of British 
domestic policy which appeared to threaten their position (see chapter seven). 
 
The Internal Politics of the Islands 
 
In terms of their formal political structure, the Channel Islands are divided into 
two autonomous jurisdictions: the Bailiwick of Jersey, which includes several 
historically important reefs;76 and the Bailiwick of Guernsey, which includes the 
islands of Alderney, Sark, and Herm (see appendix a). However, while under 
the ‘nominal superintendence’ of Guernsey, the States of Alderney and the 
Chief Pleas of Sark retained a considerable degree of independence, especially 
in matters such as poor relief.77  While this general arrangement continues to 
this day, the Great French War witnessed a significant change in relation to the 
Channel Islands’ executive branch, as responsibility for local military affairs 
devolved to the respective Lieutenant-Governors. Even before the Great French 
War, the holders of the Governorships had not been ‘purely’ military personnel – 
                                                 
74 C.A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: the British Empire and the World, 1780-1830 (London, 1989) p. 205 
75 Ibid, pp. 77-78 
76 ‘Minquiers and Ecrehous Case, Judgement of November 17th 1953’, in Summaries of Judgements, 
Advisory Opinions and Orders of the International Court of Justice 1948-91 (New York, 1992) pp. 27-28 
77 R.M. Crossan, Poverty and Welfare in Guernsey, 1560-2015 (London, 2015) pp. 280-281 
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Conway, though an experienced soldier78 was still ‘a Whig politician of cabinet 
rank79 and a consistent critic of the American War of Independence’80 – but by 
1815, the Governorships had become little more than political sinecures 
bestowed upon military supporters of the British administration of the day. The 
Governors’ reduced importance with respect to the day-to-day functioning of the 
local executive machinery was ultimately demonstrated by the fact that the 
Governorships of Jersey and Guernsey fell into abeyance and the Governorship 
of Alderney was returned to the Crown in exchange for a pension. 
 
Due to the de facto honorific nature of their appointment, the vast majority of the 
wartime Governors – with the exception of the Le Mesuriers81 – were 
absentees; a typical example being John Pitt, 2nd Earl of Chatham, the elder 
brother of Pitt the Younger.82 Having served in a number of Cabinet positions,83 
Pitt was appointed to the Governorship of Jersey in 1807, but his various 
responsibilities as General Officer in Command of the Eastern District (1806-
14), and particularly as commander of the Walcheren Expedition (1809), meant 
that he spent little or no time in the Island. Even so, the Governors continued to 
take an active interest in specific issues relating to the defence of the Channel 
Islands; in September 1796, for example, Amherst – then Governor of 
Guernsey – assisted in ‘fast-tracking’ an application to the Board of Ordnance 
                                                 
78 Conway had seen action at Dettingden (1743), Fontenoy (1745) Culloden (1745) and Lauffeld (1747) 
during the War of the Austrian Succession, had served on garrison duty at Menorca (1751), and held the 
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Jersey (see appendix b). 
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the Southern Department (1765-66); and Secretary of State for the Northern Department (1766-68). 
80 C. Platt, Concise History of Jersey: A New Perspective (Jersey, 2009) p. 66 
81 The Governorship of Alderney was held by the Le Mesurier family as a hereditary title. See TNA, HO 
98/41, Le Mesurier to Dundas, March 17th 1793 
82 A detailed examination of Chatham’s career can be found in J. Reiter, The Late Lord Chatham: The 
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83 First Lord of the Admiralty (1788-94); Lord Privy Seal (1794-98); Lord President of the Council 
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for six 6-pdr guns, eight 24-pdr carronades and 300 barrels of powder intended 
for the batteries then under construction on the Island’s south coast.84 Similarly, 
when a dispute arose concerning the suitability of Major Dumaresq to succeed 
to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the militia regiment commanded by his brother,85 
Howard – then Governor of Jersey – desired to ‘obtain every proper information 
upon the subject’ and sought the consultation of the States.86 
 
As a result of the increasing prominence of the Lieutenant-Governors, the 
leadership of each Bailiwick during the eighteenth century might best be 
described as a ‘rule of two’, divided between the Bailiff (the Legislature and 
Judiciary) and the Lieutenant-Governor (the Executive). As highlighted above, 
the role of the latter was to exercise authority over all aspects of military life in 
his jurisdiction, to hold custody of the fortresses, and to exercise command of 
the troops of the garrison and militia.87 However, at the beginning of the Great 
French War, it remained customary for each Bailiwick to retain a ‘Commander-
in-Chief’ (see appendix b) who would exercise authority over the troops in the 
event of his absence, incapacity or death.88 With regards to the role of the 
Bailiff, this was outwardly identical in both Jersey and Guernsey: the office-
holder performing a dual function as both ‘President of the States’, and ‘Chief 
Justice of the Royal Court’.89 However, the aftermath of the Jersey Rebellion in 
176990 – specifically the promulgation of the Code de Loi, 177191 – had led to a 
                                                 
84 TNA, WO 1/604, Dalrymple to Huskisson, September 6th 1796 
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86 TNA, PC 1/117A/330, Howard to Pipon and Dumaresq, May 17th 1796 
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formal separation of powers in that Bailiwick, both with respect to the States and 
the Royal Court, and the judicial and legislative powers of the Bailiff.92 
 
Related to this tension between legislature and judiciary was the bailiwicks’ 
respective experience of party politics, a catalyst for much of the social disorder 
in the Channel Islands during the Great French War. In Guernsey, individual 
States members were, as today, elected as political independents, and had no 
formal partisan or party affiliation; however, demographic shifts at the end of the 
eighteenth century had created a number of de facto voting blocs. In particular, 
the expansion of St. Peter Port93 brought the ‘Sixties’ (the mercantile elite), into 
conflict with the ‘Forties’ (the commercial bourgeoisie),94 while the inhabitants of 
the town clashed with country folk on matters of taxation and proportional 
representation.95 This stood in stark contrast to the situation which existed in 
Jersey, where the latter half of the eighteenth century had witnessed the 
creation of a formal bipartite political system.96 Taking the pro-Establishment 
position were the Charlots, the supporters of Lieutenant-Bailiff Charles 
Lempriere; opposing them, the ‘Radical Reformist’ Jeannots,97 led by 
Connétable Sir Jean Dumaresq.98 Parochial allegiance to these factions was 
fierce, and physical intimidation commonplace: in 1803, for example, those 
rectors99 who voiced their support for Gordon’s attempt to introduce martial 
                                                                                                                                               
91 SJA, D/Y/P5/1, ‘Manuscript Copy of the Law Code of 1771, Together with Order in Council 
Approving the Code’, March 28th 1771 
92 Dun, ‘Crown Officers Review Part Two’, Para. Twenty-Three; and R.G. Le Hérissier, ‘The 
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93 F.B. Tupper, The History of Guernsey, (Guernsey, 1854) p. 248 
94 Crossan, Poverty and Welfare, pp. 21-22 
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96 Le Hérissier, ‘Government of Jersey’, p. 84 
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law100 were hung up in effigy outside the Royal Court, and a whip and halter 
were affixed to the gate of the Dean’s parsonage.101  
 
Again, since elections for both parochial and States officials would often be 
carried out at the door of the parish church after Sunday Eucharist, physical 
confrontation between the members of each faction were regarded as a natural 
part of the political process.102 Unfortunately, no examples have been found for 
the Great French War, but reports on Jersey’s elections for Jurat during the 
1820s103 reveal numerous instances of violent clashes, several of which 
developed into riots. During an 1821 contest, ‘the first man to vote Rose was 
belaboured with fists and umbrellas, and escaped, leaving his coat-tails in his 
assailants' hands’,104 while the Jersey Times reported that members of the 
electorate ‘seemed ready to dispute with their fists the triumph of their 
respective sentiments.105 Here, a comparison may be drawn both to the 
Canadian provinces and Great Britain, wherein electoral violence and bribery 
were to remain in evidence until the middle of the nineteenth century. In Lower 
Canada, for example, the elections of 1817 saw candidates hire armed thugs as 
‘enforcers’ and bribe their voters with bread, cheese and beer.106 Similarly, 
while electoral bribery occurred mainly in industrial centres such as Hull and 
Bristol,107 Saunders has calculated that over 190 incidences of electoral 
violence occurred nationwide during 1857-1880.108  
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Even with the development of party politics, the general environment in Jersey 
remained very much the same as in Guernsey, in that the practical business of 
both the States and the Royal Court remaining under the control of the Islands’ 
elite families. During the late 1760s, for example, Charles Lempriere – then in 
his nineteenth year as Lieutenant-Bailiff – had clashed repeated with his cousin, 
Moses Corbet, the future Lieutenant-Governor and a leading member among 
the Jeannots.109 Frustrated by the failure of the Charlots to enact reforms, 
Corbet had popularised the maxim that ‘the world shall perish before a 
Lempriere shall perform a deed of goodness’,110 and had presented to the Privy 
Council a petition listing the grievances of the Islanders.111 Ultimately, this 
rivalry served only to heighten the intransigence of the Charlots and exacerbate 
the reformist sympathies of the Jeannots,112 and even though the latter gained a 
majority in both the Royal Court and the States, politics in Jersey remained 
hamstrung by factionalism. As late as 1843, Coghlan declared that: ‘it seems an 
understood thing that what Monsieur Godfrey proposes, Monsieur Le Suer 
opposes; and what Monsieur Le Suer proposes, Monsieur Godfrey opposes. 
Thus [time] is wasted by their petty jealousies and eternal bickerings’.113 
 
The Channel Islands and the National ‘Power Structure’ 
 
Although mention has been made of the nature of the military hierarchy in the 
Channel Islands and the responsibilities of the senior officers, it is important to 
provide a clear overview of the relationship between the local chain-of-
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command and Britain’s overall power structure. As highlighted above, the Great 
French War was characterised by an increasing devolution of power from the 
Governors to their respective Lieutenants; both in relation to command of the 
garrison and militia114 and the management of civil issues such as the licencing 
of trade.115 However, while the success enjoyed by the respective Lieutenant-
Governors – particularly Gordon, Don and Doyle – is not in question (see 
section i), their increased independence did not develop into autonomous 
authority, and could serve as a flashpoint for confrontation. In January 1803, for 
example, the Home Secretary, Lord Pelham, was informed of a ‘general 
disquiet’ having arisen amonst the Guernsey militiamen; the cause of which was 
a decision to grant Sir Thomas Saumarez116 – then Inspector of Militia – an ex 
officio Colonelcy.117 Although Grey – then Governor of Guernsey – ‘professed 
much regard’ for Dalrymple, he not only disagreed with his Lieutenant’s 
management of the controversy, but when the latter proposed a solution to the 
Privy Council, Grey declared that he, ‘with much regret’, felt obliged to speak in 
opposition to the proposal.118  
 
In addition to occasional clashes with their absentee superiors, limitations 
placed on the authority of the Lieutentant-Governors had the potential to cause 
conflict with their colleagues in other branches of the armed forces. Although 
responsible for ‘all aspects of military life’119 within their respective bailiwicks, 
the Lieutenant-Governors exercised only limited control over the local naval 
forces. It is true that they were empowered to employ civilian vessels – typically 
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cutters – as auxiliary scouts (see chapter seven)120 as well as enforce 
quarantine regulations121 and pass judgement on applications for mercantile 
licenses.122 However, responsibility for the disposition of Royal Navy warships 
stationed in the Channel Islands rested solely with the Admiralty,123 and on the 
outbreak of war, it remained necessary for the Lieutenant-Governors to make a 
formal application – either directly or via the Home Office – for additional 
vessels to be dispatched from Portsmouth.124 Consequently, the commanders 
of the local squadrons remained wholly independent from the respective 
Lieutenant-Governors; Philippe D’Auvergne (at Jersey) answering directly to 
Whitehall, and Sir James Saumarez (at Guernsey) being subordinate to the 
commander of the Western Squadron.125 
 
Finally, while the authorities in the Channel Islands – both military and civil – 
served as the principal driving force behind the solutions to the various issues 
examined in this thesis, many of their initiatives required the formal approval 
and/or active assistance of the British government. In the case of the local 
fortification programme (see chapter three), proposals for improvements to the 
Islands’ coastal defences and requisitions for arms and stores had to be 
approved by the Master-General and Board of the Ordnance.126 Likewise, 
D’Auvergne’s distribution of government aid to the local émigré community was 
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carried out under the authority of the Secretary of State for the Home 
Department,127 while his direction of La Correspondence saw him acting under 
the direction of both the Foreign Office and War Office.128 However, the most 
explicit example of the British Government’s potential influence over the 
Channel Islands’ engagement in the War is provided by their reaction to the 
inhabitants’ involvement in the smuggling trade. From 1800, the Lords of the 
Treasury began to make serious attempts to force the Lieutenant-Governors to 
assist in its suppression,129 but it was not until 1809 that they agreed to seek a 
solution which was regarded as ‘consistent with the rights and privileges of the 
inhabitants of the Islands’.130 
 
While it is true that such political tensions between the Channel Islands and the 
British government occasionally gave rise to open conflict, such disputes did not 
alter the general opinion of the authorities at Westminster with regards the 
strategic importance of the Channel Islands. As D’Auvergne was to remind his 
superiors, ‘the utility to which the defensive naval force allowed to these Islands 
might be applied [arises] from their proximity to two of the most important 
French Maritime Provinces’.131 Likewise, Doyle warned of ‘the ruinous 
consequences that must follow from France being possessed of Guernsey’, 
highlighting its potential use to the enemy as an advanced base from which to 
attack ‘the great naval arsenals of Plymouth and Portsmouth’, and as a safe 
harbour for a ‘hoard’ of enemy corsairs.132 In addition, the local garrisons were 
often used as a ‘first-time deployment’ for newly-raised corps: in September 
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1794, for example, Small reported that the ‘raw recruits’ of the 78th and 80th 
Regts. of Foot had, in the course of only six months in Guernsey, ‘arrived at a 
pitch of discipline almost unexampled’.133 However, the use of the Channel 
Islands as a ‘training post’ remained a controversial point with the Lieutenant-
Governors (see chapter two), Don having complained that ‘the regulars in the 
Island are chiefly composed of recruits and boys’, calling for the addition of ‘at 
least 1,000 rank-and-file of stout able-bodied men’.134 
 
Some Notes on Existing Scholarship 
 
Although a small number of local academics135 have helped to raise the ‘profile’ 
of the Channel Islands, the traditionally Anglocentric nature of British history has 
meant that they have, as Moore observed, ‘slipped through the fingers of 
historical reporting’.136 This situation only began to change in the 1970s, when 
Ommer’s groundbreaking research into nineteenth-century trans-Atlantic 
trade137 coincided with the commencement of Jamieson et al.’s fourteen-year 
research project devoted to local maritime history. The latter is particularly 
significant, since it culminated in the publication of A People of the Sea: a work 
which – in spite of its flaws138 – has been widely acknowledged as one of the 
most comprehensive studies on the subject.139 In the thirty years since its 
publication, the ‘historical awareness’ of the Channel Islands has increased 
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considerably: for example, the issue of local privateering140 has received 
treatment from Raban,141 Starkey142 and Crowhurst.143 However, in spite of 
such developments, the only substantial general study of local history remains 
that produced by Balleine (see above); a work which, though praised for its 
‘meticulous references’ and ‘enormous industry’,144 has been criticised in recent 
years for its inclusion of several ‘unsupported assertions’.145  
 
With respect to local historiography, another serious weakness which has been 
increasingly acknowledged in recent years is that of the extent to which the 
German Occupation (1940-45) has been allowed to dominate historical 
discourse. Despite attempts to approach the British Isles as an ‘archipelago 
nation’, the Channel Islands continue to be discussed largely in relation to the 
‘unique phenomenon’ of their wartime experience, and specifically the Islanders’ 
‘predicament’ of being ‘torn between resistance and collaboration’.146 Amongst  
revisionist and counterfactualist historians, the Channel Islands have been 
treated as providing a model of a hypothetical ‘Nazi Britain’,147 and this has led, 
in turn, to the development amongst local historians of a perceived ‘moral 
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imperative’ to preserve an ‘authentic’ history of the Occupation.148 Indeed, many 
revisionist studies have been met with considerable hostility: in 1995, Bunting’s 
study of local collaboration and fraternisation caused a scandal even before its 
publication – the author being dismissed as an ‘ignorant foreigner’149 – while 
Nettles’ Jewels and Jackboots: Hitler’s British Isles led to the author being 
targeted by a hatemail campaign.150 
 
Although it must be acknowledged that the legacy of Occupation inflicted a 
‘deep and collective sense of trauma’ upon the inhabitants and has rendered it 
‘the defining moment of their modern history’,151 the dominance of that topic 
within local historical discourse has had a twofold negative effect upon local 
historiography. First, as Nicholas has observed, it is tempting for historians 
engaging in the study of other aspects of local history to seek to draw parallels 
with the Islanders’ experiences during the Second World War,152 a line which 
Machin adopts briefly in his review of A People of the Sea.153 Secondly, as a 
result of its having become ‘a key aspect in the inhabitants’ self-identity’154 the 
shadow of the Occupation has, as Ronayne observed, obscured the sacrifices 
made by the Channel Islanders in earlier conflicts. For example, in spite of the 
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fact that around 6,000 Jerseymen served in the armed forces during the First 
World War – more than 860 of these listed as killed or M.I.A. – it is only in 
recent years that the full story of the ‘Jersey Pals’155 has become publicly 
known. Indeed, Ronayne stated that ‘a search of local history shelves in the 
Public Library revealed nothing...on any aspect of Jersey in the First World War. 
It was as though written history had [leapt] from the Victorian era to the dark 
days of the Second World War’.156 
 
While it is not intended that this thesis should seek parellels between 1793-
1815 and 1940-45, it should be noted that attempts to preserve an ‘authentic’ 
account of the Occupation mirror the debate which has long dominated the 
study of the counter-Revolution (see chapter nine). Within traditional 
historiography,157 the royalist insurgency on both sides of the Loire has been 
presented as a source of ‘moral lessons’158 and a sacred aspect of local cultural 
heritage.159 During the nineteenth-century, hagiographical and polemical 
‘histories’ of the counter-Revolution160 popularised ‘short, simplistic discussions 
[of] atrocities and betrayals’,161 conflating documentary evidence of actual 
massacres162 with lurid urban myths.163 Referring to modern treatments of the 
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subject, Bell has claimed that ‘the Vendée has divided the people of France like 
nothing else except Vichy’, and that the erection of memorials in the region may 
be considered akin to commemoration of the ‘Lost Cause’ in the former 
Confederate States.164 Indeed, while Secher’s study of the destruction of one 
Vendéan village165 has been described as ‘deeply controversial’, ‘incendiary’, 
‘sloppily written’, and showing ‘little originality’,166 it has inspired several 
campaigns to have the War in the Vendée designated as an act of genocide.167 
 
A Local Variant of ‘Nelsonian Mystique’?  
 
Within recent scholarship, a number of attempts have been made to encourage 
a revisionist approach to the study of the naval conflict between Britain and 
France (see section ii). As highlighted by Davey, ‘Britain’s naval heritage has 
long been understood through the life and achievements of Nelson’, and ‘the 
remarkable allure of [her] greatest naval commander’ has all too often led 
historians to ignore the fact that the Royal Navy ‘produced many officers of 
considerable talent and skill’.168 Le Fevre and Harding’s British Admirals of the 
Napoleonic War, for example, examines the careers of fourteen contemporaries 
of Nelson169 whose contribution to the war at sea have been largely concealed 
beneath what Voelcker described as ‘the smothering blanket of Nelsonian 
mystique’.170 In the case of Sir James Saumarez, the celebrated Guernseyman 
not only played a prominent role in the defence of the Channel Islands (see 
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above), but also fought alongside Nelson at Cape St. Vincent and the Nile, won 
a small but crucial victory at Algeciras in 1801, and was given command of the 
Baltic Fleet (1807-12).171 However, despite being celebrated as a hero – both in 
the Channel Islands and in Britain as a whole172 – it was not until 1831 that 
Saumarez was granted the honour to which he considered himself entitled,173 
being elevated to the peerage as the First Baron de Saumarez.  
 
In the case of Algeciras, Saumarez’ expectations of reward were certainly 
unrealistic – St. Vincent, for example, is described as having met his protests 
with ‘astonished distain’174 – but it is clear nonetheless that the ‘mystique’ 
surrounding Nelson was cultivated largely by the man himself. After Cape St. 
Vincent, for example, the then-Commodore penned his own account of the 
battle for the benefit of the London papers, the accuracy of which was criticised 
– both in public and in private – by Admiral Parker.175 Similarly, the official 
report from the Nile failed to acknowledge Saumarez as de facto second-in-
command, while in a private letter to the Admiralty, Nelson refused to accept 
that Saumarez should receive any awards not also granted to Troubridge, who 
had run aground early in the action.176 It is little surprise, therefore, that an 1802 
edition of The Naval Chronicle should have decried ‘that ill-judged and 
overweening popularity which tends to make a demigod of Lord Nelson at the 
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expense of all other officers in the Service’.177 Within the context of this thesis, 
however, it is proposed to adapt the concept of ‘Nelsonian mystique’ to the 
Channel Islands, and assess the extent to which the legacy enjoyed by the 
Lieutenant-Governors – particularly Don – may be regarded as having arisen 
out of their ‘Nelsonesque’ deification during the late nineteenth century.178 
 
In a more general sense, the ‘immortalisation’ of Don and Doyle can be seen to 
have contributed greatly to the narrative constructed by local historians with 
respect to the ‘Great French War’. Just as the Battle of Jersey has been subject 
to a number of romanticised and exaggerated accounts,179 so the Channel 
Islands are often portrayed within local scholarship as having served as a 
bulwark against an invasion of Britain’s south coast. Coysh, for example, 
emphasises the fact that ‘the Islands faced the full force of the Napoleonic 
Empire’,180 while Burke described the local privateering fleet as sufficiently 
strong as to be counted amongst ‘the naval powers of the world’.181 Although in 
general agreement with the image of the Channel Islands as having constituted 
a series of fortified outposts on Britain’s vulnerable maritime border, it is 
intended that this thesis shall reveal their involvement in military and naval 
affairs to be far more nuanced. Fundamentally, this means challenging the 
‘traditional’ portrayal of Don and his colleagues as the driving force behind the 
provision of security against invasion,182 especially in relation to the fortification 
of the Islands (see chapter three). In particular, it shall be demonstrated that the 
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celebrated achievements of the Lieutenant-Governors were often founded upon 
the plans of their predecessors,183 and relied upon the support of less-
celebrated colleagues.184  
 
The final area in which the shadow of ‘mystique’ may be identified is in relation 
to the figure of Philippe D’Auvergne, Prince de Bouillon: an officer who, in 
common with Saumarez, is regarded as having been wrongly overlooked by the 
gaze of history.185 Within many accounts of the Channel Islands’ role in the 
counter-Revolution, D’Auvergne has been accorded a position of primacy: 
Gabory, for example, described him as ‘the channel through which passed 
almost all the funds intended for the Chouannerie and the Vendée’.186 Likewise, 
both Balleine187 and Ashelford188 portray D’Auvergne as the driving force behind 
La Correspondence (see chapter nine), although their respective biographies of 
the Jersey spymaster may be better described using Black’s concept of 
‘celebratory narrative’.189 As with the mythologisation of Nelson, the prominence 
given to D’Auvergne within the context of Jersey’s involvement in the counter-
Revolution is understandable, since amongst local historians, he has become a 
focal point for the pride felt by Jerseymen in their maritime past. Indeed, King 
and Pocock have described his life as ‘a most entertaining, readable, exciting, 
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romantic story’;190 one which, were it not so well documented, would likely be 
dismissed as a work of fiction.191   
 
Strategies for Engagement 
 
In light of the preceding summary of the issues surrounding both the general 
historiography of the Channel Islands and that of some of the specific topics 
with which this thesis is concerned, it is evident that this thesis divides naturally 
into three distinct themes. The first theme, comprising the first half of the 
following investigation, shall focus upon the issue of the wartime security of the 
Channel Islands and their exploitation by the British government as a focal point 
for ‘power projection’.192 The second theme, building on the scholarship of 
Raban, Starkey and Crowhurst, focuses upon the Channel Islands’ privateering 
and smuggling trades, as well as their role as an auxiliary partner in the Royal 
Navy’s blockade of the Channel ports. The final strand of the investigation, 
being concerned with the Channel Islands’ dual role in both espionage and 
counter-Revolutionary activity,193 is designed to expand upon a number of older 
works, locating the bailiwicks in the wider context of ‘covert warfare’.194 More 
importantly, just as recent revisionist scholarship has attempted to provide a 
‘demythologised’ portrait of Nelson, the final section of this thesis will provide an 
opportunity to adopt a similar approach to the traditional treatment of key figures 
such as D’Auvergne. 
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Having thus given a broad overview of the intentions of this thesis, it would now 
seem appropriate to outline the manner in which each of the three strands of 
the investigation are to be explored, and to highlight the various limitations of 
each approach. However, in light of pre-existing scholarship, a general 
observation may first be made: namely that, as illustrated by King’s 
aforementioned thesis, any of the several topics herein discussed could easily 
provide material for an entire doctorate.195 As such, it must be emphasised that 
none of the following chapters purports to provide an exhaustive coverage of its 
central theme; rather, it is hoped to integrate each theme into an overarching 
narrative, and thus provide a comprehensive picture of the Channel Islands’ role 
in the Great French War. Furthermore, while it has been possible to draw upon 
extensive archival material held both in the Channel Islands196 and Great 
Britain,197 funding has been insufficient to allow visits to either the Service 
Historique de la Défense or the Archives Nationales. As far as possible, this 
deficiency has been compensated for through the use of the latter depository’s 
digitised archive, particularly in terms of the documentation which it holds 
relating to proposals for the invasion of the Channel Islands (see chapter three).  
 
With respect to the appropriate restriction of the investigation of each topic 
according to time-frame, this is particularly relevant to the discussion of the role 
of the Channel Islands as a conduit for the transmission of British aid to the 
royalist insurgency (see chapter nine). As Buffinton asserts, the royalist 
movement was at its zenith during the period 1793-5, and enjoyed a position of 
dominance in the west and south of France only for as long as the Republicans 
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remained ‘inefficiently organised and commanded’.198 This view has been 
reinforced by subsequent investigations: Sutherland and Tilly having concluded 
that ‘any successes the [chouans] enjoyed were conditional upon external 
factors’,199 meaning that the execution of Charette in late March 1796 ended 
‘formal’ royalist activity south of the Loire.200 Thereafter, the insurgency in the 
western provinces was almost exclusively guerrilla in character: a shift reflected 
both in Hoche’s reports to his superiors,201 and his issuing of the Instruction for 
Those Troops Employed in Fighting the Chouans.202 However, chouan activity 
continued to destabilise the Western Provinces until 1808203 – thereby acting as 
a ‘third column’ in the region204 – the failure of the Pichegru/Cadoudal 
conspiracy in 1804 is generally regarded as having heralded the end of British 
interest in the insurgency (see chapter nine).205 
 
The case for examining the relationship with the royalists beyond Knight’s ‘end-
point’ is founded upon the work of Ashelford: for all its romanticisation of 
D’Auvergne, it highlighted nonetheless the continued importance of the Channel 
Islands as an intelligence conduit.206 In particular, the regular passage of 
confidential agents between the Breton coast and Jersey ensured a steady 
supply of detailed information concerning enemy preparations at Cherbourg, 
Dislette, Carteret and Granville, as well as the re-deployment of enemy troops 
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to other theatres of war (see chapter eight).207 However, in spite of the potential 
value of such intelligence, D’Auvergne warned his superiors that chouan chiefs 
in London were encouraging these men to act in ‘an irregular and insubordinate 
manner’.208 Consequently, upon the official reformation of La Correspondence, 
it was ordered that no royalists or chouans should be permitted to cross from 
Jersey to London without a formal application being made to the British 
government.209 Despite such restrictions, D’Auvergne’s agents continued to 
provide the British Government with valuable information regarding Napoleon’s 
overall strategy210 and the redistribution of French manpower,211 while 
communication with the squadrons based in Guernsey Roads212 proved 
invaluable in the context of the decision to adopt a loose blockade of the French 
ports (see chapter seven).213 
 
As to the examination of the activities of the Channel Islands privateers, it is 
reasonable to allow this aspect of the thesis to span the entire period of the 
Great French War. As illustrated by Jamieson et al, legitimate maritime 
professions such as fishing, trading and privateering were carried out in tandem 
with the more underhand – but equally profitable – business of smuggling 
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woollens, wine, brandy and tobacco into Cornwall and Devon.214 Consequently, 
the Islanders openly resisted the British government’s attempts to bring the 
latter under control, submitting petitions against both the installation of customs 
agents and the unilateral extension of the Anti-Smuggling Acts of 1805 and 
1807.215 Ultimately, privateering and smuggling were regarded by many of the 
Islanders – not least those whose commercial interests lay in merchant shipping 
– as nothing more or less than a sensible alternative to their ‘standard’ 
peacetime occupations. As such, there was not a single year during the Great 
French War when the Channel Islands privateers were not actively engaged to 
a greater or lesser degree. Indeed, records of their activities – including value, 
number and frequency of prizes – have all survived in sufficient numbers in 
order for us to draw valid conclusions as regards their impact upon enemy 
commerce and trade. 
 
Likewise, the bulk of extant scholarship on privateering in the Channel theatre 
during the Great French War sets a clear precedent for extending our coverage 
across the entire period. Crowhurst, for example, adopts this timeframe in all 
four of the works cited herein – including two which predate the publication of A 
People of the Sea216 – as do Meyer, Podger and Saunders in their respective 
studies of local commerce raiding.217 Furthermore, it is important not to overlook 
the above-mentioned research carried out by Raban, since although it is 
focused on the mid-eighteenth century rather than the Great French War, this 
nonetheless provides valuable context with respect to the earlier development 
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of the Channel Islands privateers. Indeed, while it would be inappropriate to 
recount in detail the role of the local commerce raiders in earlier conflicts, 
Raban’s research highlights an important caveat which must be borne in mind 
when assessing the impact of privateering on the war at sea. While many of the 
privateers operating out of British and French ports were armed merchantmen 
whose captains were empowered by letter-of-marque to make opportunistic 
captures, a far greater proportion of Channel Island vessels were smaller craft 
intended specifically to engage in commerce raiding (see chapter six). 
 
As for the most appropriate timeframe for the examination of the various issues 
which are to be examined under the umbrella of the Channel Islands as fortified 
outposts, a degree of differentiation must be employed. For example, while the 
first decade of hostilities was dominated by the need to improve the combat 
effectiveness of the militia,218 and those to bolster the defence of the Islands 
spanned the entire period,219 the modernisation of the local roads was confined 
to the years following the Peace of Amiens.220 Even with military improvements 
having been initiated during the earliest years of the war, it is unavoidable that 
the majority of the attention of this section shall fall upon the period 1806-15, 
this period having been characterised by the greatest degree of concert 
between the local commanders.221 However, it must also be noted that this 
aspect of the investigation shall also embrace several of the issues which were 
hinted at within the discussion of the Islands’ demography and political 
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environment. As outlined above, there remained considerable differences 
between the bailiwicks in terms of their political and social structure, 
consequently, it shall be necessary to approach this aspect of the following 
examination by treating each as a separate entity. 
 
Notes on Key Sources 
 
Before commencing with the investigation , it shall be useful to highlight the 
most important primary material with which the thesis seeks to engage, and the 
sections to which they are most relevant. With respect to the main thrust of this 
thesis – namely the fortification of the Channel Islands and their transformation 
into the ‘Gibraltar of the Channel’ – the bulk of primary research material will be 
drawn from local archival sources and from a variety of collections at The 
National Archives. Not only do these provide access to official correspondence 
between the respective military commanders and their superiors at the War 
Office and Home Office, but the local archives are particularly useful in that they 
hold records which reveal the direct impact of the fortification of the Channel 
Islands upon the civilian population.222 As for the the efforts made to improve 
the efficiency of the Islands’ militia forces, the Jersey Archives reveal an 
especially important source. The sole-surviving ‘militia letter book’ of Sir John 
Le Couteur presents a highly detailed record of the reform of the Jersey Militia 
between 1799 and 1804,223 offering vital evidence in support of the view that the 
success of Don and Doyle owed much to the efforts of their less well-known and 
less-celebrated predecessors. 
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Similarly, although the examination of the Channel Islands’ involvement in the 
war at sea will make extensive use of the material held in London – particularly 
the Admiralty records – a number of valuable supplementary sources will be 
provided by local archives.In terms of the activities of the local privateers, the 
surviving minutes of the Jersey Chamber of Commerce will be of considerable 
value,224 as shall the records of local merchants such as Carteret Priaulx, now 
held at the Priaulx Library, Guernsey. Such material will provide much-needed 
context for data already compiled by Crowhurst and Starkey,225 allowing for the 
engagement in a comparative study of the activities of the Channel Island 
privateers. Not only will it be possible to assess the effectiveness of their 
operations in relation to those vessels based in English ports, but comparisons 
will also be made possible with the Breton and Norman corsairs. As for the role 
of the Channel Islands as a support for the Royal Navy’s blockade war, primary 
material within the local archives is much more limited. However, this is 
compensated for by material held in the National Maritime Archive, Greenwich, 
as well as a large number of dispatches and letters already published in 
secondary literature.226  
 
Finally, in terms of the existent primary material in support of the investigation 
into the ‘covert war’ element of our study, this is largely shared between local 
and national collections. This is particularly true in the case of the Channel 
Islands’ role as a base for espionage and intelligence gathering, since the 
majority of the actual reports generated by D’Auvergne during his command of 
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La Correspondance in Jersey have survived in TNA.227 By contrast, the material 
held in the SJA mainly deals with subsidiary documentation generated as a 
result of these reports, and shall be used primarily to illustrate effect of 
D’Auvergne’s activities at the local level.228 A similar situation exists in relation 
to the Channel Islands’ involvement with the counter-Revolution, since the 
material held in the local archives concerns only the very early days of the War, 
specifically the year 1793.229 By contrast, TNA holds a vast collection of official 
reports submitted by D’Auvergne to the Privy Council, War Office, Foreign 
Office and Home Office, as well as much of his private correspondence, and 
this is supplemented by a good deal of material held at the British Library. 
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Section I – The Development of the Channel Islands as a Military Stronghold 
 
Chapter Two – Manpower, Training and Efficiency 
 
Referring to the British Army during the 1780s, Glover has argued that, while it 
may be possible to identify a number of good officers and competent regiments, 
‘it may still be questioned whether taxpayers ever supported a more useless 
body of men’.230 As for the force which existed during the 1790s – particularly 
that deployed to Den Helder in 1799231 – Bartlett has described it as having 
been plagued by ‘obvious shortcomings’, deficient in leadership, training, supply 
and transportation’, and rife with disease.232 While it may be imagined that 
troops posted to the Channel Islands – being mainly concerned with garrison 
duties – remained isolated from many of these issues, the reality is that both the 
regular troops and local militiamen shared in almost all of the hardships facing 
their counterparts on the ‘front line’. Moreover, as emphasised by the respective 
Lieutenant-Governors, the Channel Islands were far from being insignificant 
‘sugar islands’ to be filched as bargaining chips;233 indeed, they were ideally 
positioned so as to exert control over the enemy’s regional mercantile traffic 
(see section ii). Small’s reports as Lieutenant-Governor of Guersey typified this 
view, outlining as they did his intention that the troops and inhabitants might 
employ ‘mutual and animated efforts’ to ‘secure tenaciously the possession of 
this important territory to its lawful sovereign’.234 
 
                                                 
230 R. Glover, Peninsular Preparation: Reform of the British Army, 1795-1809 (Cambridge, 1963) p. 118 
231 C.J. Fedorak, ‘In Defence of Great Britain’: Henry Addington, the Duke of York and Military 
Preparations against Invasion by Napoleonic France, 1803-04’, in M. Philp (ed.), Resisting Napoleon: 
The British Response to the Threat of Invasion, 1797-1815 (Aldershot, 2006) p. 94 
232 K.J. Bartlett, ‘The Development of the British Army during the Wars with France, 1793-1815’ PhD 
Thesis, (University of Durham, 1998) pp. 10 and 22 
233 Harling, ‘A Tale of Two Conflicts’, p. 19 
234 TNA, WO 1/604, Small to Dundas, January 9th 1796; Small to D’Auvergne, January 21st 1796 
 47 
Therefore, as well as demonstrating the success with which the local authorities 
dealt with the abovementioned deficiencies, this chapter will also investigate the 
means by which they moulded their disparate troops into an efficient combined-
arms corps. Prior to 1796, the organisation of the defence of the Channel 
Islands was undermined by a rapid turnover in personnel: between 1793 and 
1796, five men served as Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey, while Jersey came 
under four different Commanders-in-Chief (see appendix b). By contrast, the 
appointment of Gordon and Small as ‘Lieutenant-Governor and Commander-in-
Chief’ of their respective bailiwicks heralded a period of considerable stability; 
indeed, Gordon’s sudden death in 1806 – though mourned by the troops under 
his command235 – did not disrupt improvements to the local defenses (see 
chapters three and four). However, in spite of their fiercely-guarded 
constitutional freedoms,236 the Channel Islands remained within the British 
sphere of influence; consequently, the innovations and reforms that became a 
feature of local military life during the Great French War mirrored broader 
changes within British military culture.237 Indeed, since the Lieutenant-
Governors were invariably ‘career’ officers238 – many with experience of 
garrison service239 – they were able to draw upon a wealth of practical 
experience as well as abstract knowledge of developments in military theory. 
 
Estimating the Islands’ Manpower – The Militia 
 
As with many aspects of Channel Islands life, the origins of the local militia can 
be traced back to at least the medieval period. During the reign of Edward III, 
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the ‘Warden of the Islands’ – an archaic title for the Governor240 – had been 
empowered to mobilise ‘all men capable of bearing arms’, and lead them 
personally into battle against any invader.241 Despite various modifications, the 
spirit of this order had endured throughout the centuries, and although the late 
eighteenth-century militiaman was – in terms of outward appearance – radically 
different to his medieval forebears, the laws and traditions underpinning his 
service were broadly similar. For example, the original order given by Edward III 
was echoed in an Order in Council of April 22nd 1778: the Governor, his 
Lieutenant, or the de facto Commanding Officer being granted the power to 
embody both the militia and artillery ‘for the benefit of the service’.242 In addition, 
Jersey’s ‘Code of 1771’ had reaffirmed the practice of weekly militia drill for 
every native male aged thirteen or over,243 the ‘active force’ being composed of 
those aged between seventeen and sixty-five.244 However, it should be noted 
that the concept of a ‘militia reserve’ was not proposed until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, when men between the ages of thirty-three and forty-five 
were permitted to request exemption from general service.245  
 
On paper, the strength of the local militia appears considerable: in early 1793, 
the official returns for Jersey listed 3,844 men – including 1,309 ‘line infantry, 
light infantry and grenadiers’ and 298 artillerymen246 – while in 1800 returns or 
Guernsey listed 3,158 men and 445 lads.247 However, in spite of the relatively 
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small numbers involved, contemporary estimates for the strength of the 
Channel Islands’ militias can be considered as no more accurate than those 
drawn up for the regulars and auxiliaries.248 Although a number of censuses 
appear to have been carried out during the eighteenth century, none has 
survived in its entirety, and even in the better-preserved examples, the 
information provided is often haphazard.249 Ultimately, reliable census data is 
available only from the latter part of the period under investigation, Island-wide 
‘military’ censuses having been conducted under the superintendence of Don 
and Doyle in 1806 and 1815.250 Moreover, it must be emphasised that the 
abovementioned figures provide only the ‘paper’ strength of the militia: by 
contrast, official correspondence reveals that the number of ‘effectives’ in each 
force was much lower. For example, it was revealed that the authorities in 
Jersey were able to call upon no more than 1,825 militiamen in 1793251 and 
1,700 in 1797,252 while even in 1807, Guernsey’s militia could count on ‘only 
about 2,000 men.253  
 
In spite of this apparently significant difference between their ‘paper’ and ‘actual’ 
strength, the true impact of such a disparity may be only truly seen by judging 
the Channel Islands militia against its contemporaries. As has been already 
highlighted, the inhabitants were compelled by law to render military service, a 
form of de facto conscription which was then unknown in any other part of the 
British Isles. However, while individual militiamen can be seen to have treated 
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this obligation with deep solemnity (see chapter five), the fact remains that the 
force existed only as a part-time body, and thus remained – like the British 
volunteers, an essentially ‘civilian’ force.254 While service in the militia was 
viewed as a fundamental aspect of the Channel Islanders’ patriotic duty to their 
‘Duke’, this was often treated as being secondary in importance to the demands 
of local agriculture.255 Likewise, the inhabitants’ dependence on the sea was 
acknowledged as the cause of an even greater drain upon the militia’s actual 
manpower; the number of seafaring men in the ranks leading to ‘an almost daily 
fluctuation’ in drill attendance.256 For example, the Jersey returns of January 
1793 reveal that of the 1,155 ‘mariners’ then serving in the ranks, 634 had been 
granted leave in order to go to sea,257 while 519 men are listed as having ‘gone 
to sea’ in March 1803.258  
 
While it is likely that a significant proportion of the militiamen thus absent from 
drill would have been engaged in the local fishing industry, it must also be noted 
that local privateering ventures also absorbed a large number of these 
‘mariners’.259 Though many of the larger vessels sent out by the more 
prominent local merchants may have been manned by multi-national crews, the 
vast majority of privateers were small craft, and likely crewed exclusively by 
‘natives’ (see chapter six). In addition, the Channel Islands’ status as a free port 
enabled trade with both neutral and enemy states to be carried on far more 
openly than in the remainder of the British Isles,260 while industries such as the 
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trans-Atlantic cod trade continued to prosper until at least 1800.261 According to 
the Chamber of Commerce, more than 1,500 Jerseymen were involved in this 
venture, over half of whom remained in Newfoundland during the summer 
months, and were thus absent from Jersey for up to half the year.262 Moreover, 
both the steady decline of Guernsey’s investment in the Gaspé fisheries263 and 
the threat of competition from the French colony of St. Pierre and Miquelon264 
served to stimulate further investment. This is demonstrated by the fact that by 
1807, the number of mariners absent from militia drill at any one time had 
reached a peak figure of between 700 and 800 men,265 and even by 1811, 
remained above 600 men.266  
 
However, in spite of the abovementioned disparity between ‘paper’ and 
‘effective’ strength, the situation in the Channel Islands compares favourably 
with that in other British bases of the period. In Malta, for example, General 
Pigot was first given permission to raise a voluntary militia force in 1801, yet out 
of a civilian population267 of around 96,500,268 barely 600 men could be induced 
to join the ranks.269 Similarly, although the population of Sicily – excluding 
Palmero – already exceeded 1.3 million, a British-sponsored effort to form a 
militia corps in 1809 struggled to attract more than 1,500 men from outside the 
capital.270 Even basing the calculations on ‘actual’ rather than ‘paper’ strength, 
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and taking into account that the latter two forces relied on voluntary, not 
compulsory enlistment, both bailiwicks can be seen to have compared 
favourably to their Mediterranean counterparts. This was especially true of 
Jersey, where the actual strength of the militia represented 8.75% of the 
population,271 compared to figures of just 0.8% for the Maltese and 0.1% for the 
Sicilian militias.272 Only Madeira may be seen as having eclipsed them: in 1801, 
soon after the British assumed responsibility for its defence, the island’s 
defence force was found to include 15,000 ‘well-trained, excellent [militiamen]’, 
or 23% of the local population.273 
 
Closer to home, it may also be seen that the Channel Islands’ militias compared 
favourably to the bench-mark set by Britain, whose ‘home defence’ needs were 
met by an unwieldy mixture of compulsion and volunteering. Certainly, the 
greatest difficulties arose from the volunteers and the yeomanry: not simply 
because of their widely-assumed ‘dubious levels of commitment’,274 but also 
due to the fact that both forces more than doubled in size – to 116,000 men and 
22,600 men respectively – in response to the 1798 invasion scare.275 It must 
also be remembered that many of the volunteers refused to commit to anything 
more than the defence of their own neighbourhood,276 and that the 130,000 
men of the militia and fencibles also frequently resisted government 
organisation initiatives, especially at the local level.277 Moreover, the 
promulgation of the Militia Act was attended by disorder in a number of 
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localities: confusion over the terms of service gave rise to rioting, and radicals 
attempted to exploit such disturbances for political gain (see chapter five).278 By 
the summer of 1798, the whole force amounted to 268,600 men, or 2.26% of 
the population: however, it must be remembered that the British militia – unlike 
the Channel Islands’ force – also functioned as a direct ‘recruiting service’279 for 
the regular army.280  
 
Estimating the Islands’ Manpower – The Regulars 
 
While Craig was by no means alone in acknowledging the efforts made by the 
local authorities to produce ‘a well-ordered militia, capable alone of defeating 
any enemy’,281 the ‘backbone’ of the local defensive force was provided by a 
dedicated force of regular troops. For example, following the collapse of the 
planned French invasion of Jersey (see chapter three), the ‘paper strength’ of 
the garrison was increased from approximately 1,900 men282 to 4,366 men, of 
whom 3,967 were considered fit for ‘active service’.283 To put this in some form 
of context, this latter figure was more than double the size of the garrison of 
Jersey at the time of de Rullecourt’s attempt to capture the island in 1781,284 
although it should be noted that this expansion was not sustained. Over the 
following years, the number of regulars stationed in the Channel Islands was, 
like the militia establishment, prone to fluctuation; either because of a perceived 
lessening of the immediacy of the enemy threat (see chapter three), or because 
                                                 
278 J.R. Western, The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century; the Story of a Political Issue, 1660-1802 
(London, 1965) pp. 290-291 and 301-302 
279 In 1808, 27,505 British Militiamen transferred to the Regular Army. 
280 C.D. Hall, British Strategy in the Napoleonic War, 1803-15, (Manchester, 1992) pp. 1, 5-6 
281 TNA, HO 98/3, Report on the State of the Jersey Militia, March 15th 1793 
282 SJA, L/F/97/M2/39, De Carteret, Greffier, to The Times, March 15th 1794 
283 SJA, L/F/106/A/1, ‘Returns for the Garrison of the Island of Jersey’, April 1st, 1796 
284 L. Downie and D. Ford, 1781: The Battle of Jersey (Jersey, 2012) p. 16 and Tupper, History of 
Guernsey, p. 414 
 54 
troops were needed more urgently in other areas.285 For example, the returns of 
January 1795 record 2,270 regulars as either on active duty, in quarters or in 
hospital; while the recruiting parties which arrived soon after included ‘a number 
of old, infirm and diseased men’ who, if they could not be incorporated into the 
invalids (see below), were to be returned to England.286 
 
Even taking account of the problems of injury and disease, a comparison with 
contemporary bases in the Mediterranean reveals that the Channel Islands 
were, once again, in a favourable position. For example, successive British 
commanders had expressed the opinion that the defence of Malta could be 
assured only by a force of approximately 10,000 troops, yet the entire garrison 
between 1801 to 1815 never significantly exceeded 4,000 men.287 Similarly, 
although the arrival in 1799 of two weakened Irish regiments and three British 
regiments from Portugal was to raise the garrison of Minorca to a wartime peak 
of 6,500 men, Fox would later complain that only 3,500 men could truly be 
relied upon.288 Even Sicily – defended by a garrison of at least 14,000 men in 
1807 – was regarded as being 12,000 troops short of the number required for 
guaranteed security,289 while the second occupation of Madeira (1807-1814) 
involved a British force of only 3,600 men.290 However, the Channel Islands also 
proved superior in relation to the quality of their senior officers: in contrast to the 
experience possessed by Gordon, Don and Doyle,291 Gregory’s study 
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highlighted that Bourcard292 ‘never once [left] Palermo and knew nothing of 
[Sicily’s] resources’, while Guillichini293 was ‘ignorant of military matters’ and 
‘quite unsuited to command’.294  
 
In addition to a strong ‘core’ of truly ‘regular’ troops, it must be remembered that 
the vast majority of garrisons also included a variety of auxiliaries which might 
be called upon in the event of invasion. In both Jersey and Guernsey, this force 
was chiefly comprised of ‘invalids’; men who – in company with units such as 
the 3rd Royal Veterans Battalion – were charged with ‘manning the coastal 
towers and batteries’.295 According to the above-mentioned garrison returns, 
Jersey’s invalid regiments in 1796 included 753 men (with sixteen wanting for 
completion),296 while during the previous year, the establishment for Guernsey 
had been raised to 518 men (with fifty-three wanting for completion).297 As for 
the various ‘foreign’ regiments which were stationed in the Channel Islands at 
different points of the War,298 these will be properly investigated in relation to 
issues of public order (see chapter five), since they were not formally included 
within the garrison itself. However, it should be emphasised that none of these 
‘supernumerary’ forces exhibited the deep-rooted indiscipline observed in 
traditional mercenary corps; in Minorca, for example, the Spanish garrison of 
1798 included 1,500 Swiss-Germans, of whom 600 defected to the British.299 
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An Illusion of Security – Disruption within the Island Garrisons and Militia 
 
However, while it is clear that the mid-1790s found the Channel Islands in a 
comparatively strong position in terms of raw manpower, the experiences of the 
local population during the American War of Independence had given rise to a 
potentially fatal sense of overconfidence. Taken at face value, the two attempts 
which had been made to capture Jersey during 1779-81 had given the 
impression that the island was all but impervious to anything short of a 
combined assault with infantry, artillery and naval forces.300 In 1779, for 
example, the Prince of Nassau-Siegen had attempted to land at St. Ouen’s Bay, 
but his naval escort had been unable to get close enough inshore to support the 
disembarkation, and the assault was easily repulsed by a combination of 
artillery fire and musketry.301 As for De Rullecourt’s invasion in 1781, this had 
been rather more successful – the French having gained control of St Helier 
and obtained the formal surrender of the Island302 – but neither Major Peirson 
nor Captain Mulcaster303 had accepted the terms. The resultant Battle of Jersey 
– in which both Peirson and De Rullecourt were killed – had been won by the 
British troops in less than an hour, and at the cost of less than eighty-five 
casualties, while the French had lost seventy-eighty killed, seventy-four 
wounded, and 417 made prisoner.304  
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In light of the apparent precedent set by these events, and boosted by 
reinforcements received from Britain (see below), the authorities in the Channel 
Islands had responded to reports of a planned French attack by declaring their 
intention to give any such attempt ‘a proper reception’.305 Even so, they were by 
no means blind to deficiencies amongst the regulars: both in terms of general 
breakdowns in discipline (see below),306 and the ever-present problem of 
desertion.307 Though incomplete, the records of the Lieutenant-Governors 
certainly indicate a stead rate of attrition: the period January 1802 to May 1803 
saw at least seven cases of desertion,308 while at least twelve occurred between 
January 1807 and February 1811.309 Included in this latter figure are two 
instances of mass desertion in early 1808: eight men of the 67th Regt. of Foot 
having fled from Guernsey,310 and an unspecified number of men having 
deserted the Jersey garrison.311 Most troublesome, however, was the 2nd/60th 
Regt. of Foot: a corps formed largely from French deserters and prisoners of 
war312 which was sent to Jersey in October 1807,313 and on return from the 
Peninsula, was posted to Guernsey. As Schwanenfeld highlights, officers in this 
battalion314 employed an especially brutal system of punishment,315 and  after 
only  two months, Doyle declared himself ‘embarrassed’ to report that twenty-
three men had deserted.316 
                                                 
305 SJA, L/F/106/A/1, ‘Intelligence Reports on French Activities’, undated, 1794 
306 TNA, PC 1/3418, ‘Petition Against the Behaviour and for the Withdrawal of the 8th Regt. of Foot’, 
undated, 1792 
307 Hall, British Strategy, p. 7 
308 SJA, A/C1/1, General Orders of June 1st 1802, December 12th 1802 and May 15th 1803  
309 SJA, A/A1/2, Letters of January 27th 1807 and March 26th 1808; A/A1/4, Letter of February 21st 1811; 
A/A1/5, Letter of March 4th 1812; A/A5/2, Letters of October 22nd 1808, June 16th 1809 and July 
(undated), 1809; and A/A1/3, Letter of January 23rd 1810 
310 GSG, A/IV/80/1, Letters of March 5th and March 6th 1808 
311 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of May 1st 1808 
312 GSG, A/IV/80/1, Letter of September 8th 1809  
313 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of October 9th 1807 
314 He mistakenly refers to the 8th/60th Regt. of Foot  
315 S. Schwanenfeld, ‘The Foundation of British Strength: National Identity and the British Common 
Soldier’ PhD Thesis, (Florida State University, 2007) p. 89 
316 GSG, A/IV/80/1, Letters of July 6th and September 8th 1809  
 58 
Although the local inhabitants occasionally proved willing to assist individual 
deserters in evading the military authorities (see chapter five), large-scale 
breakdowns in control encouraged no such reaction. Indeed, at the start of the 
Great French War, many Guernseymen could still recall the events of 1783, 
when a number of ‘disenchanted’ men of the 83rd Regt. of Foot, freshly arrived 
from southern England, had incited around 500 men of the 104th Regt. of Foot 
to mutiny.317 While this outbreak appears to have been unique in the history of 
the Channel Islands, the mass expansion of the local garrisons in 1793-4 
appears to have resulted in a dramatic increase of ‘low level’ acts of indiscipline 
within the garrison. In Jersey, a captain, sergeant and three privates of the 70th 
Regt. of Foot were convicted of ‘unsoldierly conduct’,318 while in Guernsey, 
Lieutenant Thompson of the Dumbarton Fencibles and another officer were 
both found guilty of similar offences.319 In addition, the local officer corps can be 
seen to have been troubled by a number of violent altercations: between 1793 
and 1799, at least three officers were killed in duels;320 Ensign Blood of the 
2nd/18th Regt. of Foot was cashiered for brawling;321 and Sergeant-Major Calden 
and Lieutenant Denham were both convicted of insulting their superiors.322 
 
In addition to disruption caused by military indiscipline, it must be remembered 
that the regular troops of the Channel Islands’ garrison – in common with the 
army as a whole – consisted of men who were more than willing to extract their 
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means of subsistence from civilians.323 Consequently, while a number of 
‘notorious and extreme crimes’ were committed against the inhabitants (see 
chapter five), the majority of offences – as with rural communities in Great 
Britain324 – may be better classified as acts of ‘plunder’.325 In 1801, a report 
from Alderney highlighted that in the two years since the expansion of the 
garrison, not less than 310 sheep and 37 lambs had been stolen from the 
inhabitants, along with at least fourteen acts of burglary and numerous thefts of 
poultry and vegetables.326 Likewise, low-level pillaging was also evident 
amongst soldiers stationed in Jersey and the crews of warships stationed in 
Guernsey Roads; residents in both Gorey and St. Peter Port complaining of the 
theft of bed-sheets, clothing, livestock, vegetables and firewood.327 On 
campaign in the Peninsula, Wellington had promised to punish such ‘amateur 
banditry...in the most exemplary manner’,328 the authorities in the Channel 
Islands can be seen to have done likewise, condemning looters to suffer 
flogging, imprisonment and/or banishment.329  
 
As with their counterparts in other branches of the armed forces,330 the 
authorities in the Channel Islands were also faced with the consequences of 
widespread drunkenness; an issue which compromised both the effectiveness 
of the troops and their relationship with the civilian population. In 1798, for 
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example, Major Vavasor331 was found guilty of having been repeatedly 
intoxicated whilst in command of Elizabeth Castle, as well as having drunkenly 
threatened the officer in command of St. Aubin’s Fort.332 While incidences of 
disorder occasioned by intoxication were common throughout both the army 
and navy,333 the situation was exacerbated in the Channel Islands by  an 
overlap with local smuggling (see chapter seven).334 By the later years of the 
war, not only were the men encamped at Le Dicq, Jersey, described as being 
‘beset by constant drunkenness’,335 but a widespread black market trade in 
spirits – involving both troops and civilians – had been established throughout 
the Island. Troops quartered at Grouville were found to be purchasing 
unlicensed liquor from the inhabitants of Gorey Village,336 the mess-men at St. 
Ouen’s Barracks were caught selling part of their corps’ liquor ration,337 and a 
number of unlicensed publicans had set up illicit ale-houses.338 
 
However, it is the Islands’ militia forces, more so than the regular troops, which 
can be seen to have suffered from an internal crisis at the outbreak of the Great 
French War. Conway had long involved himself in the military affairs of the 
bailiwicks, and the plan of defence which he had proposed shortly after his 
appointment as Governor of Jersey (see appendix b) dominated local strategic 
thinking until the end of the war.339 However, while his scheme outlined several 
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key improvements to the infrastructure of the bailiwicks340 – not least the chain 
of coastal towers which bear his name341 (see chapter three) – it betrayed a 
significant blind-spot. Although the mutiny of the 104th Regt. of Foot had 
revealed the importance of maintaining the militia as a ‘combat-ready’ force – a 
lesson later reinforced by the Battle of Jersey – Conway’s plan gave little or no 
thought to the need for improvements in training or equipment. Instead, he had 
entrusted the defence of the Channel Islands to more ‘traditional’ means, 
assuming that strong fortifications and a large garrison would provide a 
sufficient defence against both external and internal threats.342 Consequently, 
not only did the militia remain hampered by an archaic model of training and 
drill,343 but the expansion of the garrison served to disguise its various 
shortcomings as an aspect of local defence (see below).  
 
Fortunately, the outbreak of war in 1793 appears to have forced the military 
authorities in both bailiwicks to recognise the extent of their negligence towards 
the militia, and the fundamental error of relying purely upon the regulars and 
fixed defences. Certainly, the coastal forts and batteries were far from obsolete 
– as Doyle remarked, ‘I deem it expedient to guard against worst by having my 
fortresses properly supplied’344 – but it was regarded as essential to adopt a 
more ‘aggressive’ defensive policy. This shift in emphasis was driven, not only 
by an increasing awareness of the hostile intentions of the French towards the 
Channel Islands (see chapter three),345 but also by fears concerning the openly 
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pro-Republican stance of the Jeannots (see chapter five).346 Within the new 
strategic framework, the fixed defences would serve only as a means to disrupt 
the approach and/or disembarkation of the enemy, while the task of actually 
opposing their infiltration of the countryside would fall to the garrison and 
militia.347 As Don observed: ‘heavy batteries may be of some use, [but] the 
security of the Islands depends on having the means to oppose and repel the 
enemy at the water’s edge’,348 while Doyle scorned his predecessors for having 
‘confined their [attention] to the fortresses’.349 
 
Training – The Emergence of ‘Military Pedagogy’ 
 
With respect to the reform of the Channel Islands’ militia, the key feature of this 
process was a shift from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ defence: however, any conclusions 
drawn regarding the effectiveness of these measures must take account of the 
fact that the troops never came into direct contact with the enemy. Although a 
significant number of Jersey’s militiamen could lay claim to a degree of combat 
experience, the majority of these men would have fought in no engagements 
other than the Battle of Jersey. Moreover, as has been already noted, the 
relative ease with which victory had been secured in 1781 had the unfortunate 
secondary consequence of disguising the need for introducing improvements to 
the militia (see above). By 1793, the impact of the resultant stagnation had 
become all too apparent: the consensus amongst senior officers being that the 
Islanders could be relied upon only if the enemy failed to secure a beachhead, 
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and ‘would not stand after the first check’.350 Even Craig, who praised Conway 
for his having ‘brought [the militia] to a considerable degree of perfection’, was 
forced to admit that it was naïve to expect part-time soldiers to ‘abandon their 
houses and families’ to the depredations of the enemy ‘and shut themselves up 
in an outpost to share the fate [of the regulars]’.351  
 
Despite the extent of such scepticism concerning the value of the Channel 
Islands’ ‘citizens in arms’, the immediacy of the French threat (see chapter 
three) led to a recognition of the need for ‘zealous co-operation’ and ‘uniform 
cordiality and harmony’ between the Militia and the Regulars.352 As was 
highlighted at the start of this chapter, the British Army as existed at the 
beginning of the Great French War was far from fit for purpose; the previous 
three decades having witnessed ‘all kinds of deviation’ from the standard drill 
manual. According to Glover, this problem had become so widespread that it 
would have been virtually impossible for a brigade of troops to successfully 
execute ‘any one combined movement, or the various parts of it, on the same 
principle’.353 This is not to say that tactical innovation was unwanted by the 
British Army, but rather to acknowledge that such inventiveness could be 
employed only amongst those troops who possessed a firm grasp of the 
fundamentals of military practice.354 Consequently, the primary focus of military 
reform in the Channel Islands during the 1790s was the formulation of a more 
practical and efficient approach to drill, though the pace of reform was slowed 
considerably by the ‘double-edged’ nature of the local Militia Law. 
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Although it has been already noted that compulsory military service was upheld 
by the inhabitants of the Channel Islands as a mark of patriotism (see chapter 
one), it is interesting to note that this attitude was in evidence even amongst the 
local Quaker and Methodist congregations. Indeed, while certain related 
practices, such as Sunday drill, served as a source of discontent amongst 
Dissenting militiamen (see chapter five), the majority of the corps remained 
convinced that the Law served as proof of their ‘unshaken loyalty and 
attachment to their Sovereign’.355 However, much as the purchase system and 
other forms of patronage sustained the careers of regular officers who ‘neither 
knew nor cared for their duties’,356 so the nature of the local Militia Law served 
to shield poor-quality officers and NCOs from disciplinary action. In the case of 
Madeira, Sicily and Naples, the British were able to summarily dismiss 
incompetent members of the local officer corps; described, repectively, as ‘quite 
ignorant of the meaning of military discipline’),357 ‘disaffected and disloyal’,358 
and ‘either useless or the subject of ridicule’.359 By contrast, it was required by 
the Militia Law of both Jersey and Guernsey that ineffective officers and NCOs 
be brought to trial before the Royal Court, their removal from command being 
possible only on the occasion of a guilty verdict (see below).360 
 
In spite of this obstacle, efforts to improve the training of all troops in the 
Channel Islands can be seen to have gathered momentum after 1795, when 
Gordon succeeded Balcarres as Commander-in-Chief of Jersey and Small 
entered his third year as Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey. By this time, senior 
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officers within the British army had become firmly polarised on the subject of 
military theory. On the one hand were the ‘Prussians’, led by the Duke of York, 
Sir David Dundas and Sir William Fawcett; on the other, the ‘Americans’, led by 
Earl Cornwallis, General Simcoe, Sir William Howe and Sir Charles Grey.361 
The former school – emphasising the training of infantrymen to carry out 
precise, well-practiced manoeuvres both in massed ranks and in the heat of 
battle362 – dominated British military thought until 1797, whenproposals were 
put forward for the creation of special battalions of light infantry.363 However, 
criticisms of the ‘Prussian’ method had been advanced since at least 1785, 
when Cornwallis had described it as ‘ridiculous’, ‘mechanical’ and ‘erroneous’, 
and had claimed that ‘the worst General in England would be hooted at for 
practicing [such manoeuvres]’.364 
 
Within the Channel Islands too, it is clear that the new ‘American’ doctrine was 
growing in popularity amongst the military authorities, the most telling evidence 
being Small’s General Order of April 5th 1795. Referring both to the regulars 
and militia, he declared that the men were no longer to be ‘harassed’ with 
‘complicated and intricate manoeuvres’, but instead taught only those deemed 
‘indispensably necessary...on real active service’.365 This initial plan was 
elaborated upon by Gordon in 1800, when he observed that the existing drill 
system remained ‘prejudicial to the service’, since the men continued to 
exercise en masse. Adopting the principle that ‘awkward men are never so well 
taught as when they are by themselves’, he proposed that ‘those as understand 
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their exercise should form one great squad, while the rest should be divided into 
[smaller] squads and drilled by smart officers‘.366 In June 1807, Don extended 
this approach to the training of the ‘Boys’, it being ordered that those ‘who do 
not attend drills on the days appointed, are awkward or who misbehave under 
arms’ would be required to muster for additional instruction on Sundays, under 
the supervision of a dedicated drill sergeant’.367 This reflected the reformation of 
training practices with the British Army as a whole: in May 1795, the Duke of 
York advised that summer training camps should set aside one day per week 
for the training of men judged to be ‘negligent or irregular in their exercises’.368 
 
The other key element of drill reform in the Channel Islands concerned the 
improvement of the training of the ‘Boys’: a practice which, while it has since 
been portrayed as ‘an unpleasant, bibulous trade in children’,369 represented a 
valuable apprenticeship for those destined to join the parish regiments. Indeed, 
when consulted by the new Lieutenant-Governor in 1806, Le Couteur praised 
the late Gordon for his having recognised the ‘great advantage’ which might be 
derived from requiring all boys over the age of thirteen to participate in the 
weekly drill. In 1799, for example, Don’s predecessor had convinced the States 
to meet the cost of appointing three sergeants – in addition to ‘three militia 
officers, paid by His Majesty’ – to assist in the training of the Boys.370 The 
importance of this move may be demonstrated by the fact that a similar scheme 
had been vetoed in 1796, on the grounds that paying ‘native’ drill sergeants was 
both ‘inconsistent with local law’ and ‘likely to prejudice the privileges of the 
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Island’.371 However, the initiative also revealed Gordon’s willingness to work in 
conjunction with his subordinates: the Colonels of the Militia having advised him 
that the existing drill sergeants were both ‘insufficiently qualified’ and ‘too much 
connected [to the Islanders] to drill and instruct the ‘Boys’ properly’.372  
 
While it remains unclear as to whether the reforms of 1799 had any immediate 
effect, it is evident that by 1807, a number of significant improvements had been 
introduced with respect to general militia training, the most important of these 
relating to the appointment of drill sergeants. In an effort to guarantee both 
discipline and efficiency, it was decided that all new appointees would be 
required to have obtained a prize for drill within the ranks of the ‘Boys’, and that 
priority would be given to ‘the respectable farmers and tradesmen’ who were 
fluent in both French and English.373 Likewise, the new drill manual was 
designed not only to provide instruction in ‘the military air and carriage, step and 
march’, but also to train the Boys in the use of their arms in accordance with the 
manual exercise, platoon fire exercise, artillery exercise, and cavalry 
exercise’.374 In October 1812, further demonstration was provided of the efforts 
of the Commanders-in-Chief, in conjunction with their subordinates, to tackle 
the matter of the ‘Boys’ drill. Following consultation with Lieutenant-Colonel 
Touzel,375 Don recommended that those aged between fifteen and seventeen 
should be exercised in a dedicated ‘battalion’, and though the size of this group 
naturally fluctuated, its strength in 1813 stood at 353 rank-and-file.376 
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Specialisation – the ‘American’ Influence 
 
Although there had been considerable debate as to whom credit should be 
given for having convinced the ‘Prussians’ of the importance of light infantry 
training to the future of the British army, it is clear that by 1798, significant 
progress had been made.377 Likewise, the view of the auxiliary forces as 
representing little more than a recruiting-ground for the woefully under-strength 
line regiments (18,800 men were wanted in 1796) was being increasingly 
challenged. In light of French successes on the Continent, the emerging 
‘American’ school envisaged a system wherein the militia and volunteers might 
supply a 60,000-strong reserve, supported – in the event of invasion – by a 
force of irregulars.378 However, while the early ‘Americanisation’ of Britain’s 
defensive strategy was driven from the top down – chiefly by the formerly 
‘Prussian’ Dundas379 – the process in the Channel Islands was initially reliant 
upon ‘grassroots’ innovation. In 1797, for example, Guernsey’s West Regiment 
of Militia set out a proposal for the creation of a company of chasseurs; a force 
modelled, not on the Militia’s existent light companies, but rather on the elite 
marksmen employed by the French army.380  
 
However, while large-scale ‘Americanisation’ did not emerge in the Channel 
Islands until long after its popularisation in Great Britain, it should be noted that 
the inhabitants – as with the men of the ‘Experimental Corps of Riflemen’381 – 
were regarded as being naturally suited to this new form of warfare. Not only 
                                                 
377 Bartlett, ‘The Development of the British Army’, p. 174; and Glover, Peninsular Preparation, p. 129 
378 Cookson, British Armed Nation, pp. 29-30 
379 See D. Dundas, Plan and Proposals for Rendering the Body of the People Instrumental to the General 
Defence of the Country, in Case of Invasion (London, 1798) 
380 SJA, L/F/08/L/17, ‘Rules for a Company of Chasseurs in the West Regt. of Militia’, May 14th 1797 
381 Schwanenfeld, ‘National Identity and the British Common Soldier’, pp. 31 and 73 
 69 
had Gordon permitted a considerable degree of latitude with respect to the finer 
points of drill,382 but in accordance with the ‘American’ emphasis on light 
infantry,383 had ordered that all militia ‘Lads’ aged fifteen and over be instructed 
in the use of the cavalry carbine.384 This initiative was built upon by Don, who 
concluded that, since is was ‘the custom of the Island for every boy, as soon as 
he is able to carry a fowling piece, to go out shooting small birds’, the older 
Lads might ‘render essential services as sharpshooters’.385 To this end, he 
entered into consultation with Le Couteur, who informed him that there were 
already some 250 Lads who might, in the event of an invasion, be attached to 
the parochial regiments as marksmen.386 Moreover, his praise of the Lads’ 
‘strength and expertness in exercise’ clearly convinced the British government 
that the scheme was a viable defensive investment, since the chosen recruits 
were armed and equipped at their expense, not that of the local treasury. 
 
Based on Don’s assessment, it is possible to argue that he sought to implement 
a similar form of ‘national mobilisation’ which Dundas had envisaged in 1798,387 
as well as encourage the form of military ‘specialisation’ which had underpinned 
the formation of the rifle corps.388 Since any invasion of the Islands was likely to 
devolve into ‘a war of raids rather than battles’, Don was provided with ample 
motivation to ensure that the Boys should be transformed into a force capable 
of acting as ‘an integral, if not decisive, factor in any contest’.389 Nor does the 
Commander-in-Chief’s plan appear to have been without merit, especially if 
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considered in the context of weight of numbers. According to Don, the number 
of recruits subject to the above-mentioned summer exercises was never less 
than 700,390 and at least a third of these were judged each year as being 
capable of acting as ‘skirmishers, sharpshooters, or light infantry’.391 Moreover, 
the figure appears to have remained fairly constant throughout the War: in 
1810, 832 ‘Lads’ are recorded as having been exercised over the course of the 
summer, and 250 were found fit for service.392 It should be noted, however, that 
since the bulk of those selected were aged between sixteen and eighteen, there 
would have been a significant annual turnover in manpower, the older Lads 
being required to join their respective parochial regiments. 
 
Whatever the shortcomings of such a force may have been, it remains evident 
that this method for creating an ‘irregular’ force was broadly consistent with 
British military thinking. However, in light of the extensive contact between the 
Channel Islanders and the chouans (see chapter nine), it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that Don and his colleagues may have drawn inspiration from the 
tactics employed by the royalist warbands. Despite the fact that the counter-
Revolutionary insurgency had been almost entirely suppressed by 1804, these 
guerrillas had forced the Republican troops to pay a high price for their final 
victory, which was achieved only after the adoption of the strategy of colonnes 
infernales.393 In addition, it should be emphasised that while the completion of 
the military roads significantly improved the efficiency of local troop movement 
(see chapter four), the internal topography of the Channel Islands – especially 
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with respect to the rural parishes394 – continued to resemble the bocage.395 The 
strategic benefits of this terrain were quickly recognised by both Don and 
Doyle,396 who proposed that in the event of a withdrawal, light troops might turn 
‘every rising ground, ravine, bank, wall, hedge and tree’397 into a firing position 
from which to protect troops setting up roadblocks.398 
 
The other ‘support unit’ which can be seen to have been brought to its zenith 
during Don’s tenure was the militia artillery, which underwent considerable 
reform in terms of their equipment. Although Small had heaped praise upon the 
Royal Guernsey Artillery in 1793, declaring, ‘there is no corps that I ever saw 
more expert or better marksmen with their field pieces’,399 the requirements of 
the bailiwicks changed dramatically over the following fifteen years, particularly 
after the opening of the military roads. With a greater potential for the effective 
deployment of mobile artillery, Don recommended that the strength of the 
garrison artillery be increased to three brigades, and the parochial ordnance be 
replaced, the existing pieces being ‘of a very old pattern, [carrying] only twenty-
eight rounds’.400 Similarly, he took steps to adapt existing armament to serve 
more general purposes: for example, the militia’s signal guns – being of 
sufficient calibre to inflict meaningful damage on enemy vessels – were 
mounted on traversing platforms.401 Likewise, the coastal artillery was 
rebalanced and/or strengthened, the supernumerary artillerymen were formed 
                                                 
394 Davies, Coastal Towers, p. 48 and ‘Translation of an Account of the States Sitting of December 23rd 
1806’, reproduced in Sullivan, General Don, pp. 32-33 
395 TNA, PC 1/117B, D’Auvergne to Dundas, March 16th 1796 
396 North, ‘General Hoche and Counter-Insurgency’, 530 
397 SJA, A/A1/2, Letter of August 7th 1806  
398 Sullivan, General Don, p. 17 
399 TNA, WO 1/603, Small to Amherst, January 5th 1795 
400 SJA, A/A1/2, Letters of June 30th and July 24th 1806 
401 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of September 27th 1807 
 72 
into detachments equipped with 6-pdrs, and the Town Battalion of Militia 
Artillery – a battery of four 6-pdrs – was converted into a car brigade.402 
 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the role played by several miscellaneous 
units which were well established in the Channel Islands by the end of the first 
decade of war. First, although the Islands’ hinterland was quite unsuitable for 
cavalry, it appears nonetheless that the local gentry shared the desire of their 
English counterparts to prove themselves as ‘doing their bit’ with respect to the 
demands of national defence.403 Following the pattern of units formed by the 
county gentry404 in the wake of the French landing at Fishguard,405 the mid-
1790s witnessed the formation of the Jersey Royal Horse and the Guernsey 
Light Dragoons. As in the case of British volunteer cavalry units, neither force 
received any Government assistance: all ranks were required to furnish their 
own horses and accoutrements and maintain their arms and uniforms, and the 
members of each corps decided upon an appropriate system of punishment.406 
Another key initiative introduced at this time was the augmentation of the local 
Invalids: soldiers who were unable to perform front-line duty, but who – being 
capable of service as artillerymen – manned the castles, forts, Conway Towers 
and coastal batteries.407 In 1796, a force of 107 invalid artillerymen408 from the 
Royal Military Hospital Chelsea was attached to Jersey, effectively adding 
another company of artillerymen, and freeing up militiamen for other duties.409 
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Arms and Equipment 
 
Although it was Don who first put forward the maxim that the defence of the 
Channel Islands depended upon possessing ‘the means to oppose and repel 
the enemy at the water’s edge’,410 the necessity of providing the militia with 
adequate arms and equiment had been recognised some two decades earlier. 
In 1792, increasing tensions between Britain and France had led Jersey’s 
‘Committee for the Defence of the Island’ to issue a new set of regulations to be 
followed by all militiamen in respect of the maintenance of their arms. For 
example, a fine of twenty-four sous411 was to be levied against any man who 
failed to maintain his equipment, while any man found to have ‘in any manner 
disposed of’ his arms or accoutrements would be liable, on appeal, for either the 
value of the item(s) or a fine of twenty Livres.412  However, the effectiveness of 
such punishments relied upon the appointment of trustworthy officers to 
oversee the care of the regiments’ arms; indeed, an inspection of Jersey’s 
militia arsenals in 1801 resulted in three regimental quartermasters being 
reduced to the ranks. At Grouville, it was found that many of the muskets were 
‘corroded with rust and ruined forever’; at St. Saviour, that they were ‘by no 
means in good condition, with seven wanting repairs’; and in the arsenal of a 
third Regiment, that there were ‘at least ten shockingly neglected [muskets], 
with the carbines also in bad order’.413 
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Aside from the local failures in terms of arms maintenance, it is also evident that 
the British Government had long neglected to provide the Channel Islands’ 
Militia with up-to-date clothing and accoutrements. Again, it is evident that 
problems of supply were no less evident than with respect to the Regular 
Army,414 and while Gordon was praised for his ‘favourable opinion’ and ‘kind 
intentions’, the situation facing him was certainly serious. According to the 
report that he received from the ‘Colonels of Militia’, the men had received no 
new uniforms or other essential clothing since 1791, while basic necessities 
such as belts and ammunition boxes had not been replaced since 1780.415 
Indeed, while a reliance on ‘antique’ accoutrements may not have been as 
fundamental a handicap as a shortage of serviceable firearms, the Militia 
officers nonetheless regarded the re-equipage of their troops to be of 
paramount importance for the defence of the Island. This sentiment was echoed 
by Gordon in a subsequent report, in which the British government was advised 
that ‘if the evident advantage and security which the Island enjoys from this 
useful body of men’ was to be maintained, then the issuing of new clothing and 
accoutrements should be regarded as a matter of ‘the utmost necessity’.416 
 
In spite of this increased pressure from below, it was not until after Don 
assumed command that serious improvements appear to have been made with 
respect to the militia’s arms and equipment. Under a new set of regulations 
issued to the regimental quartermasters, all articles delivered to the arsenals 
were to be ‘accurately examined’, and any found to be in poor condition were to 
be ‘promptly repaired or replaced’. In order to offset the additional workload, the 
quartermasters to be exempted from all other forms of military service, and 
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entitled to a salary of up to twelve Livres per company under their jurisdiction, 
as well as a government allowance of twenty-four Livres towards the cost of any 
repairs.417 The necessity of such inducements can be clearly seen when one 
examines the reports from the inspections which gave rise to the new 
regulations; the situation being yet more unsettling than that uncovered by Le 
Couteur in 1801 (see above). Between November 1806 and January 1807, no 
less than 885 muskets and twenty-eight carbines were found to be in an 
‘unserviceable’ condition, and it was only through the assistance of the Master-
General of the Ordnance that these were promptly replaced.418 
 
Enforcement of Discipline 
 
With respect to their concept of militia duty, the general attitude of the men of 
the Channel Islands Militia may be considered analogous to the ‘parochialism’ 
evidenced by Britain’s volunteers, militiamen and yeomanry.419 As has been 
already mentioned, it was the general belief amongst the inhabitants that their 
duty to the Crown lay in the defence of the bailiwicks, and that the Constitutions 
granted them exemption from overseas service and/or impressment420 (see 
chapter six). Likewise, the volunteer movement was characterised by a strong 
sense of ‘local defence’: even during the ‘crisis years’ of 1792 and 1798, no 
more than ten percent of the men who enlisted in these corps agreed to serve 
beyond their own districts.421 As for the fencibles and yeomanry, it was 
generally perceived that their role was not one of ‘national defence’, but rather 
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to relieve the regular army from the burden of peacekeeping duties (see chapter 
four).422 In addition, it is important to emphasise that the Channel Islands’ 
militias, like these latter corps, were under the command of local gentry, and 
looked upon ‘active service’ as being subject to the demands of the changing 
seasons. Just as Jersey’s militiamen could legally surrender their arms in order 
to go fishing (see above),423 yeomanry officers such as Lord Somerville proved 
reluctant to allow their men to be mustered during harvest time.424 
 
In spite of such broad similarities, a number of important distinctions existed 
between the local militiamen and the British auxiliaries, most notably in relation 
to the means by which the respective forces obtained manpower. As highlighted 
by Cookson, ‘the British armed nation did not arise out of a society that was 
highly militarized, either in terms of the social esteem given to military men, or 
actual military participation by the elite’.425 By contrast, it has been already 
noted that the Channel Islands’ militia – both in terms of the individual soldiers 
and the institution – were regarded by the inhabitants as a fundamental symbol 
of their historic relationship with the British crown, and the foundation of their 
unique constitutional privileges (see chapter one). Consequently, while the 
British militiaman was selected by ballot, obliged to serve for only five years, 
could gain exemption by enlisting in the volunteers,426 or could pay for a 
substitute427 to serve in his place, his counterpart in the Channel Islands was 
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obliged to spend virtually his entire life in the ranks.428 Indeed, while an Order in 
Council of 1798 permitted the local Methodists to absent themselves from 
Sunday drill,429 a further ten years were to elapse before the right to cite 
‘objections of conscience’ as grounds for exemption was extended to members 
of the Church of England (see chapter five).430  
 
In terms of the enforcement of discipline, many of the issues which plagued the 
Channel Islands’ militia regiments were, at the very least, similar to those faced 
by their British counterparts. For instance, just as the volunteers were 
undermined by social and political rivalries which ‘spilled over’ from civilian 
life,431 so Jersey’s militiamen often found themselves blurring the line between 
the military and civilian sphere. As was explained at the start of this thesis, the 
period immediately prior to the Great French War had been dominated by the 
polarisation of local politics, and the emergence – in Jersey at least – of a 
recognisably bipartite political system.432 However, while this divide had a 
significant impact in terms of local social stability (see chapter five), it was 
exacerbated by the parochial structure of the militia, and the fact that most of 
the members of the States or the Royal Court also held commissions as 
company or field officers. Consequently, not only could Sunday drill be readily 
exploited as an arena for political grandstanding or intimidation in support of 
one or other of the competing factions, but ‘civil’ trials in the Royal Court 
became courts-martial in all but name. As Le Cras observed, even when the 
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case being heard was wholly unconnected to military affairs, it was by no 
means unusual to find that the accused was a member of the regiment 
commanded by one or more of the Jurats on the bench.433 
 
Problematic though this situation may have been, it is evident that the ability to 
call upon the assistance of the civil powers presented the authorities with a 
useful solution to a more serious difficulty; that of maintaining effective discipline 
amongst a force which was only partially subject to military law.434 In the case of 
the Channel Islands, the ‘Code of 1771’ punished a number of offences relating 
to Sunday drill,435 although the fact that the sanctions consisted only of 
‘pecuniary fines’ drew criticism from some ‘professional’ officers.436 However, 
two supplementary ordnances were passed during the initial years of Gordon’s 
tenure which reinforced this central piece of legislation, both being signed into 
law in April 1793. The first has been already mentioned in relation to the issue 
of arms maintenance, but is also noteworthy as having forbidden militiamen 
either to go to sea or to exchange regiments without the permission of a 
superior officer.437 The second key ordnance, in an effort to counter the 
instances of drunkenness frequently witnessed amongst garrison troops,438 set 
out restrictions on the purchase of alcohol by all military personnel, regardless 
of rank or branch of service. Not only were tavern-keepers forbidden – on pain 
of a fine of 200 pounds sterling – to sell liquor to the troops without a license, 
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but soldiers required permission from a commanding officer in order to 
purchase alcohol from taverns, cabarets or maisons particulières’.439 
 
Forms of Punishment 
 
What is particularly noteworthy with respect to these subsidiary regulations is 
that, in spite of the militiamen being subject to the full force of the civil law, no 
attempt seems to have been made to replace the local system of fines and 
imprisonment with more ‘traditional’ military punishments. Certainly, such a 
move would have been perfectly feasible: though in decline in Britain since the 
1720s,440 ‘judicial corporal punishment’ remained in use in the Channel Islands 
throughout the Great French War. This was particularly true in the case of 
offences such as housebreaking, theft, sexual assault, and failure to comply 
with terms of banishment; the standard punishment in each case being a 
flogging by the public executioner.441 However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
the reluctance to introduce flogging as a ‘standard’ punishment for the  Channel 
Islands’ militia arose from the fact that the socio-economic status of the rank-
and-file rendered financial punishment far more effective.442 Indeed, while 
Brown – then Lieutenant-Governor of Guernsey – may have protested that only 
formal military discipline might ‘bring them to any great perfection’,443 it must be 
remembered that the Islanders all served without pay.444 Consequently, at a 
time when even a skilled labourer in St. Helier might earn only twenty-one 
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shillings per week,445 any disciplinary fines incurred would consume a 
significant proportion of the average militiaman’s meagre income.  
 
Aside from the financial pressure which might be brought to bear upon 
recalcitrant militiamen, the public perception of the nature of militia service as a 
‘mark of loyalty to the sovereign’ also served to discourage suggestions of the 
adoption of corporal punishment on a wider scale.446 Instead, reports of a build-
up of troops on the neighbouring coast were occasioned by reassurances of the 
inhabitants’ ‘inviolable attachment to the best of Kings and to the British 
government, under whom [they have] enjoyed inestimable advantages for many 
years’.447 However, as has been already noted, what is most interesting with 
respect to the issue of discipline is the extent to which the ‘principle’ of 
compulsory militia service was supported by those Islanders who subscribed – 
at least officially - to a policy of conscientious objection. For example, while the 
Quakers as a whole were to face persecution in both bailiwicks for their open 
opposition to the bearing of arms,448 at least some Friends continued to muster 
with their regiments when required (albeit in peacetime).449 Similarly, in spite of 
their official opposition to Sunday drill, the Methodists maintained that they were 
willing ‘to do with cheerfulness every necessary military duty’, to be ‘placed in 
the front of the Battle’, and to ‘devote any time on the common weekdays to 
learn the military exercise’.450 
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Regardless of the level of patriotism exhibited by the Islands’ population, it is 
clear from the surviving militia disciplinary records that strict forms of 
punishment remained necessary. In November 1799, for example, the nightly 
inspections of the coastal guard-posts and towers revealed no fewer than five 
separate instances of dereliction of duty within twelve days. These included: 
one instance of a sentry being ‘surprised’ while asleep at his post; three 
instances of the guard being found entirely absent; and one instance of the 
guard being found to be in possession of unserviceable muskets.451 Nor did the 
situation improve in the following year: in March 1800, five ‘Chiefs of the Guard’ 
were summoned before the Royal Court in order to answer for having been 
absent from their posts.452 Likewise in April, one of the Masters-at-Arms was 
fined for having been A.W.O.L. from training – he was later found to have gone 
fishing453 – while in May, four Boys of the Town Battalion were charged with 
having ‘behaved in a disobedient and improper manner’ at the weekly drill.454 
The most notable incident, however, occurred in August, when a number of 
half-pay officers refused to undertake militia duty455 at a time when the force 
could only reliably count upon 2,000 rank-and-file for active service.456 
 
Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that the employment of a financial 
rather than corporal system of punishment was not without its supporters in 
Britain; as Thompson observed, ‘next to the press gang, flogging was perhaps 
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the most hated of the institutions of Old England'.457 In Parliament, the practice 
was chiefly opposed by a mixture of Whigs and Evangelicals,458 who decried 
flogging as being ‘as unnecessary as it was cruel and disgraceful’,459 and 
protested that it ‘ought [not] to be inflicted on any person who had not entirely 
forfeited all pretensions to honour’. Indeed, the Channel Islands may be 
regarded as having served as a ‘test case’ for military reform: Whitbread having 
made reference to the gaol of St. Helier as the only one ‘crowded with soldiers 
imprisoned...in lieu of flogging’.460 However, while the post-1811 alterations to 
the Militia Act were to render the British auxiliaries subject to the same 
punishments as their counterparts in the bailiwicks,461 this did not entirely 
silence the ‘Traditionalists’. Although the maximum number of lashes that could 
be awarded by courts-martial was fixed at 300 – commutable, on appeal, to 
‘indefinite service abroad’462 – it was still widely believed that, with respect to 
the Militia – ‘nothing but the terror of the lash’ could ensure compliance.463 
 
Troop Health 
 
Important though it may have been to ensure a high standard of discipline 
amongst both the regulars and the militia, the Commanders-in-Chief were also 
quick to recognise the need to improve the general health of the troops under 
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their command.464 Again, attempts had been made in previous years to improve 
the general situation: most notably in 1779, when Conway had requisitioned 
both the civilian hospital – which also served as the poor house – and a country 
house for the use of the troops.465 Although such a policy had met with success 
in Malta and Madeira, where the military had been able to take over numerous 
monasteries and religious houses,466 few private buildings in the Channel 
Islands offered the requisite amount of habitable space. Indeed, while 
construction on Fort George had commenced before the American War of 
Independence, this complex – intended as a replacement for the antiquated 
Castle Cornet – remained only partially complete in 1792.467 Moreover, while 
the construction of new barracks at St. Ouen and Grouville provided 
accommodation for around 1,400 troops,468 less than ten years elapsed before 
the ‘evil situation’ of these facilities made it necessary for them to undergo a 
significant refit and a partial reconstruction.469  
 
In addition to the provision of ‘official’ accommodation, the expansion of the 
local garrisons also led to an attempt by the military authorities to implement the 
policy which had been formerly adopted by Conway.470 The day after the 59th 
Regt. of Foot arrived in Jersey in January 1793, Falle informed Dundas that he 
had summoned an emergency meeting of the States, and that he would 
‘endeavour to procure the Hospital for the troops’,471 but it is evident that the 
idea was not greeted with a positive reception. Over two months later, no 
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progress had yet been made on the issue: Craig having informed Dundas that 
he would ‘take some favourable opportunity of giving the States to understand 
how dissatisfactory their conduct has appeared to His Majesty’.472 Moreover, 
the official response from the Privy Council – despite its ‘businesslike’ tone – 
made it clear that the failure of the States to accord with the Lieutenant-
Governor’s proposal risked a serious breakdown in relations between Jersey 
and Westminster. Not only was it said that the transcript of the proceedings had 
been read with ‘no small degree of concern’, but the conduct of the States was 
described as having ‘not tended to impress His Majesty’s mind with the most 
favourable opinion of their sentiments, or of their gratitude for that regard to 
their welfare which His Majesty on all occasions has shown’.473  
 
As was the case in the majority of contemporary military bases, the close 
proximity of the garrison and the civilian population created an ideal vector for 
the spread of a variety of infectious diseases. In 1775, an outbreak of dysentery 
– referred to by contemporaries as the ‘Bloody Flux’ – amongst the Highlanders 
quartered at Fort George had spread to the local population, and by 1778-79, 
had reached epidemic levels throughout Guernsey.474 Similarly, the various 
reinforcements sent to the Channel Islands during the early years of the Great 
French War were often weakened by infection; ‘a fatal disorder’ being reported 
amongst the 82nd, 109th and 112th Regts. of Foot475 and a ‘dangerous epidemic 
distemper’ amongst the 45th, 3rd/60th, 92nd, 94th and 102nd Regts. of Foot.476 It is 
unclear as to what diseases were present, but it was stated that the 109th Regt 
‘though much mended, til continues to lose men’, while the 92nd, 94th and 102nd 
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Regts. ‘could not, and will not for several months to come, produce one hundred 
men fit to use their arms’.477 In light of these issues, some of Don’s earliest 
actions in Jersey included: a full inspection of the island’s barracks, the 
construction of new troop hospitals at Grouville and St. Ouen,478 and the 
introduction of regular fumigation, inspection and white-washing of facilities.479  
 
The pressing nature of these latter reforms – particularly the sanitisation of the 
barracks and hospitals – may be further illustrated through reference to 
additional reports submitted by Don in the months after his assuming command 
at Jersey. In late 1806, he decried the state of the hospital of the 101st Regt. of 
Foot, highlighting ‘the impossibility of accommodating all of the sick in the 
hospital and barracks’ at a time when no less than sixty officers, ncos and rank-
and-file were either sick or injured.480 Similarly, the hospital attached to the 
barracks at St. Ouen was reported as having been constructed ‘for only thirty 
patients; forty less than allowed in the King’s Regulations’, even though the 
complex was designed to accommodate up to 700 troops.481 Furthermore, it is 
likely that such issues were exacerbated by a lax attitude to troop health 
amongst the officer corps, Don exhibiting – at least in the early years – a 
particularly critical opinion of certain of his subordinates. For example, following 
the deaths of a lieutenant and seven privates at the St. Lawrence barracks 
between December 1806 and March 1807, Don argued that the losses could 
have been prevented by the implementation of recommendations made several 
months earlier by the regimental staff surgeon.482  
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Perhaps more dangerous than the local spread of disease was that of imported 
sickness: a problem to which the Channel Islands – by virtue of their vibrant 
maritime trade – were particularly exposed. Throughout the eighteenth century, 
the local government had been forced to take action against such threats, 
establishing quarantines against plague in 1711 and 1720, and undertaking 
mass inoculations against smallpox in 1755 and 1786.483 However, it was the 
Great French War which ultimately revealed the danger posed to the security of 
the bailiwicks by external diseases, particularly as a result of the regular rotation 
of the garrison. In May 1808 for example, the 2nd/34th Regt. of Foot reported an 
outbreak of ophthalmia which was found to have originated at the unit’s 
previous barracks at Hilson,484 and which became so extensive in the following 
years that a number of farm buildings had to be requisitioned as isolation 
barracks.485 Similarly, April 1810 found the 2nd/8th Regt. of Foot decimated by 
Walcheren Fever,486 leaving Jersey dependent on the 4th Garrison Battalion and 
the 3rd Royal Veterans Battalion for its defence;487 moreover, the outbreak soon 
spread to other units, with the 27th and 77th Regts. of Foot both being reported 
as ‘very sickly’ and severely reduced in strength.488 
 
While these appear to have been the only large-scale epidemics to have 
affected the Islands’ garrisons during the period under discussion, Don’s tenure 
also witnessed a number of small-scale outbreaks which jeopardised the 
effectiveness of the troops. For example, in March 1807, twenty-three men of 
                                                 
483 Cox, ‘The Transformation of St. Peter Port’, pp. 72-75 
484 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of May 28th 1808 
485 SJA, A/A1/4, Letter of September 12th 1811 
486 Considerable debate surrounds the modern identification of ‘Walcheren Fever’. However, it is likely 
that it was combination of malaria, typhus, typhoid and dysentery, rather than a single disease. See M.R. 
Howard, ‘Walcheren 1809: A Medical Catastrophe’, BMJ 319 (1999) 1642-1645 
487 Although the 2nd/57th, 2nd/62nd and 2nd/96th Regts. of Foot were also stationed in the Island at this time, 
they were described as being ‘mere skeletons’. 
488 SJA, A/A1/3, Letters of April 24th and August 9th 1810 
 87 
the 34th Regt. of Foot were listed as suffering from ‘intermittent fever’489 – most 
likely a form of malaria490 – while in May 1808, 123 men of the 2nd/47th Regt. of 
Foot were reported sick,491 with forty-four remaining ‘inactive’ five months 
later.492 Although such numbers may appear insignificant, it must be 
remembered that the paper strength of the garrison was, as a matter of course, 
vastly at odds with its active manpower. In a report of April 1807, both the 3rd/1st 
and the 2nd/90th Regts. of Foot were both seriously deficient: not only could they 
furnish only 150 and 250 ‘active’ men each, but ‘raw recruits’ accounted for 
seventeen and sixty-one percent of their respective strengths.493 This serves to 
emphasise the fact that the Channel Islands were commonly employed as a 
‘proving ground’ for inexperienced regular troops; in both 1807 and 1808, the 
Jersey schuyts494 (see chapter seven) were regularly reported as having 
brought recruits from the Isle of Wight’.495 
 
In closing the subject of troop health, at least some mention must be made of 
the issue of food supplies: a topic which – as with matters of discipline – will be 
examined in greater detail with respect to its relevance to the maintenance of 
public order (see chapter five). Again, the Channel Islands appear to have 
compared favourably with contemporary bases: while Minorca remained almost 
entirely dependent on Sardinia, Italy and Sicily496 – the latter of which was 
‘scarcely [able to] produce enough to feed itself’497 – Jersey’s trade balance 
remained strong. Indeed, the records reveal that 1806 was a particularly 
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successful one for the Island’s merchants: 600 tons of potatoes, 833 pipes and 
705 hogsheads of cider, and 765 cattle being exported to Britain, partly for the 
use of the army.498 Furthermore, it is evident that Don took particular care to 
ensure the adequate provisioning of the troops: both by securing the regular 
import of supplies from Britain499 and collating regular returns of stores of meat, 
dairy, grains and spirits.500 In addition, both Fort Regent and Elizabeth Castle 
were well-provisioned: the former holding six months’ rations for 2,000 men,501 
and the latter (in mid-1813) with 336 barrels of flour, 850 bags of biscuit, 1,684 
bushels of pease, 450 barrels of pork, and 6,682 gallons of rum.502 
 
However, while it is clear that the military authorities ultimately succeeded in 
their attempts to secure and maintain an adequate stockpile of provisions, due 
recognition must be given to the role played by the Royal Navy in safeguarding 
the transport of supplies. The first half of the Great French War had found the 
Channel Islands under considerable pressure: in March 1797, the French 
corvette Tantick captured a convoy503 transporting cattle and oats to 
Guernsey,504 while another vessel transporting cattle to Jersey was captured in 
June of the same year.505 Thus, it became necessary for several vessels on the 
Channel Islands’ station to be diverted from other duties in order to serve as 
convoy escorts; in December 1799, for example, the Spiteful (brig, 14 guns) and 
the hired vessel Rowcliffe (cutter, 18 guns) were detached from service with La 
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Correspondence.506 While it is impossible to given any indication of the exact 
impact of the measure with respect to the safeguarding of covoys between the 
south coast of Britain and the Channel Islands, some indication may be given 
by reference to studies of British merchantmen. As highlighted by Davey, 
estimates for the period 1803-15507 have suggested that only 0.6 percent of 
British ships sailing as part of a convoy were lost to the enemy, compared with 
6.8% of those vessels that sailed without the protection of a naval escort.508 
 
Overall Assessment 
 
Taken in isolation, it is evident that manpower alone provided the Channel 
Islands with little more than a theoretical or ‘illusory’ level of security: had the 
French succeeded in effecting an invasion such as that envisioned in 1794 (see 
chapter three), it is likely that they would have met with success. As has been 
said, only around 2,000 militiamen and 4,000 regulars could be counted upon at 
any one time for the defence of either Bailiwick; by contrast, the spring of 1794 
saw a force of 20,000 infantry assemble on the opposite coast.509 While it 
remains purely conjectural as to whether such a large body of men could have 
been transported to the bailiwicks, it is worth recalling that De Rullecourt’s initial 
landing force in 1781 had consisted of only 1,500 men, with artillery in 
proportion. It was only by a series of fortuitous accidents (from the perspective 
of the defenders) that he had been prevented from landing the majority of these 
forces, and had Corbet been captured a few minutes earlier, no ‘official’ alarm 
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could have been sent to the garrison.510 On that basis, even if Rossignol had 
been able to land only 5,000 men in each Bailiwick, rather than the projected 
10,000, it is likely that they would have proved more than sufficient to secure 
both Islands, especially if provided with artillery and naval support. 
 
However, while it is true that the men of the local militia were never regarded as 
the equal of the regulars, their importance in relation to the defence of the 
Channel Islands should not be dismissed out of hand.511 This is particularly true 
with respect to Don’s years in command of Jersey, when so many ‘active’ men 
were pressed into service on the military works and roads (see chapters three 
and four). With priority being given to the completion of these improvements, 
the pressures of garrison duty were increasingly being felt by ‘reserve’ 
regiments dominated by raw recruits and old soldiers (see above). The potential 
risk of over-reliance on the service of such men is illustrated by the medical 
reports of the 3rd Royal Veterans Battalion; in spring 1808, only the first two 
companies were ‘fit for castle duty only’, the remaining eight being 
recommended for ‘manning the coastal towers’.512 Moreover, a significant 
numbers of garrison troops were regularly found to be wholly unfit for service: in 
April 1802, eleven men were discharged from the 43rd Regt. of Foot in 
Guernsey,513 while in June 1810, a total of 112 men of the Jersey garrison were 
similarly dismissed from His Majesty’s Service.514 
 
In light of these various factors, it is clear that the garrison of the Channel 
Islands was often considerably under strength, its manpower reduced by 
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disease, secondment, and the transfer of men to overseas service. Within this 
context, the Channel Islands militiamen can be seen to have played a vital role 
as a secondary line of defence, and while the force that mustered in 1793 may 
have been dismissed as a liability,515 their effectiveness as a fighting force had 
changed beyond all recognition by 1815. Indeed, it is appropriate to adapt 
Bartlett’s conclusion with respect to the regular army, and state that the men 
over whom Don and Doyle exercised command bore only a superficial 
resemblance to their forebears.516 At a review of the island’s militia regiments in 
early 1813, both Lieutenant-Governors expressed their ‘entire satisfaction’ with 
the ‘discipline and conduct’ of the troops,517 while an inspection of Jersey’s 
‘Battalion of Boys’ found that the men were ‘[able to] move through the exercise 
and evolutions...with an extraordinary degree of accuracy’.518 However, it is 
particularly interesting to note that improvements to the militia were noted even 
by French commentators; in 1805, De Beauchamp519 described Jersey as being 
defended by ‘8,000 men of excellent militia…all preparing with ardor for the 
coming war, and well-attached to the British government’.520 
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Chapter Three – The ‘Big Guns’: Forts, Towers and Batteries 
 
As well as overseeing the creation of an effective, well-armed defensive force, it 
was also necessary for the local authorities to ensure that the Channel Islands’ 
coastal fortifications were likewise placed in good order. Although such 
defences had been a feature of the local landscape since the seventeenth 
century,521 the majority of these – particularly the fortresses of Mont Orgueil and 
Elizabeth Castle (Jersey) and Castle Cornet (Guernsey) – had been rendered 
obsolete by the start of the Great French War (see below). Unfortunately, in 
making an assessment of the level of success achieved by the local 
Commanders-in-Chief with respect to the modernisation of the Channel Islands’ 
‘heavy’ defences, it is likely that any conclusions drawn shall prove 
inconclusive. As is the case with contemporary fortification programmes 
undertaken in the southern counties of England – particularly Kent and Sussex 
– it must be acknowledged that the planned improvements to the Channel 
Islands’ defences were not fully realised until after 1815. Consequently, as with 
the assessment of the reform of the local garrisons and militia (see chapter 
two), consideration must be given to the fact that the fortifications were never 
tested against a determined assault,522 and most never fired a shot in anger.523 
 
Unfortunately, the fact that the Channel Islands remained untroubled by 
‘glorious sieges, victories or proud failures’,524 gave rise to the belief – popular 
amongst nineteenth-century writers – that the fortifications represented a 
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‘squandering of resources’ and an ‘injudicious expense’.525 However, this view 
was based upon the erroneous assumption that ultimate victory over France 
had been inevitable, a myth strengthened by the traditional presentation of 
Trafalgar as having ended the threat of invasion from the Continent.526 In reality, 
‘most naval personnel understood that British command of the sea was neither 
secure nor permanent’, and by 1807, the strength of the sea fencibles – the 
maritime volunteer force created in 1803 to assist in coastal defence – stood at 
approximately 15,000.527 Ultimately, the anxiety felt by British ministers with 
respect to national security was salved only after news reached London of the 
total failure of Napoleon’s Russian campaign.528 Prior to 1812, Horse Guards 
continued to plan for a potential landing by up to 300,000 enemy troops:529 an 
assessment based on the fact that the French Navy had been growing ‘both in 
size and ambition’ since 1808, at which time Napoleon possessed at least 
eighty ships-of-the-line (see chapter seven).530 
 
Moreover, any claim that the fortification of the Channel Islands can be 
dismissed as a ‘white elephant’ is further undermined by the fact that a number 
of valuable improvements had been set in motion even before the outbreak of 
the Great French War. By 1793, the initial chain of Conway Towers around the 
coast of Guernsey had been completed, and twenty-two out of thirty-two towers 
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planned for Jersey had likewise been constructed,531 and their potential value 
was highlighted by the reaction in Britain to a number of erroneous reports of 
French attacks on the Channel Islands. In late April 1793, news reached 
Plymouth that ‘a violent cannonade’ had been heard off Jersey and that the 
local alarm beacons were lit; in response, the 11th and 25th Regts. of Foot, in 
company with 100 artillerymen, made ready to launch a counterattack, and a 
cutter dispatched to verify the report.532 Likewise in March 1794, The Times had 
‘the pleasure to contradict...in the most unequivocal terms...a very general 
report [which] prevailed in the City that Jersey was taken by the French’, 
although it was acknowledged that there remained ‘every reason to suppose’ 
that such an attack was imminent.533  
 
However, while it is clear that the British government regarded the threat to the 
Channel Islands as both imminent and severe, the situation ‘on the ground’ in 
1793 was far from secure. According to Falle, not only was the Jersey garrison 
supported by only seven companies of invalids and one thousand effective 
militiamen, but the Island possessed ‘no place of strength to which we could 
retire [in the event of an attack] until the arrival of succour’.534 Moreover, in spite 
of both the Committee for the Defence of the Island and the States of Jersey 
having petitioned the British government for additional troops and ships,535 the 
response from Whitehall was far from desirable. While recognising the ‘very 
satisfactory’ report given by Dundas concerning the militia, it was regretted that 
‘the various services now to be performed, both naval and military, will 
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not…admit of compliance with the wishes of the inhabitants’,536 an observation 
echoed by Saumarez, then stationed off Guernsey in command of a small 
squadron.537 Although this force was certainly a valuable addition to the local 
defences, the pressure then facing the Royal Navy was such that in the opinion 
of the future admiral, he might rely upon the reinforcement of only ‘an old sixty-
four’ and an unspecified number of frigates.538 
 
The Fortification of the Coasts: Pre-Existing Defences 
 
As has been already mentioned, the fortification of the Channel Islands during 
the Great French War was rooted in the programme of innovations drawn up by 
Conway in 1778; however, the implementation of the earlier programme had 
relied heavily upon funding from the British government.539 While the Channel 
Islands had received £10,000 per annum during the American War of 
Independence, such funding fell away rapidly in peacetime, decreasing to 
£4,000 in 1784, £1,100 in 1785 and Nil in 1786.540 It is true that the British 
government still met the cost of maintaining the garrisons and supplying arms 
and accoutrements to the militia (see chapter two), but improvement of the 
fortifications was regarded as being of secondary importance. Consequently, 
while the fifteen coastal towers commissioned for construction in Guernsey (see 
appendix d) were completed by 1779,541 work on Fort George – commenced in 
1780 – slowed to a crawl. Although intended to replace the antiquated Castle 
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Cornet,542 the fort remained only partially completed by 1803,543 and the 
shortage of wartime funding and labour meant that several improvements 
proposed in 1809 were not commenced until 1811.544 Even so, sufficient 
progress was made that a report of 1803 described Fort George as having been 
‘considerably strengthened’, the most important improvement being the 
construction of a bombproof tank capable of holding 12,000 gallons of water.545 
 
The lack of peacetime funding likewise rendered the defences of Jersey sorely 
lacking at the opening of the Great French War: of the thirty-two coastal towers 
which had been commissioned in 1778, only ten of these had been completed 
by the end of the American War.546 Furthermore, the withdrawal of financial 
support between 1783 and 1792 meant that only thirteen of the remainder were 
ever built, and the last of these was not operational until 1797.547 Similarly, 
while a number of other important additions were made to the defences of 
Jersey during the latter part of the eighteenth century, these differed from the 
construction of Fort George in that they were focused on reinforcing, rather than 
replacing, obsolete fortifications. For example, St. Aubin’s Fort and Elizabeth 
Castle – both of which provided protection to the Island’s principal harbour – 
were given additional support on the landward side by the construction of three 
Conway Towers, and on the seaward side by a battery at Le Bût (two 24-pdrs 
and two 12-pdrs).548 However, it was not until 1797 that either the Fort or the 
Castle received replacements for the antique armament with which they had 
been supplied since 1742; the former received six 24-pdrs and seven 6-pdrs, 
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while the latter not only received new guns, but its complement was increased 
to sixty-six pieces of ordnance.549 
 
The aftermath of the invasion of 1781 was also noteworthy for having 
encouraged the fortification of a number of other key sites in Jersey, particularly 
those small bays wherein an enemy might conduct a discrete, small-scale 
landing. For example, the defences of Rozel Bay – used heavily by smaller 
merchant craft – were upgraded by the addition of two batteries: one at the 
existing militia guardhouse of Le Câtel; the other on the headland of Le Nez de 
Guet (see map m). Similarly, the existing defences of Bouley Bay – highly 
accessible to small, shallow-draught vessels – received extensive modifications 
in the early years of the Great French War, since L’Etacquerel Fort (on the 
eastern flank) and Fort Leicester (on the western flank) were not mutually 
supportive (see map m). Both constructed in the 1740s, the armament of these 
forts had long been rendered obsolete; as a result, the former had its six small-
calibre guns replaced with two traversing 24-pdrs, while the latter was equipped 
with a pair of 12-pdrs. This new armament, together with the single 12-pdr gun 
mounted at the militia guardhouse, created an interlocking field of fire, while 
L’Etacquerel Fort was also rendered near-impregnable by the addition of a ditch 
twenty-one feet deep and twelve to twenty-four feet wide.550  
 
Finally, while it may not have been on the scale of Fort George, it is important to 
highlight the fact that the years before the Great French War had seen crucial 
work undertaken with respect to the fortification of the Town Hill. Though often 
regarded as the greatest achievement of Don’s tenure as Lieutenant-Governor, 
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the later development of this site – particularly the construction of Fort Regent –  
was inspired by earlier work overseen by Conway, with the assistance of 
Captains Mulcaster and Evelegh.551 These men not only organised the 
construction of two redoubts overlooking the town of Saint Helier,552 but had 
also produced the first plans for the complete fortification of both the Town Hill 
and South Hill (see map g). Indeed, it was not for another twenty years that 
Elizabeth Castle was acknowledged to have ceased to be ‘a formidable 
defence’ in the face of modern artillery,553 and even in 1811, Don remained 
convinced that it might serve as ‘a post of the greatest importance’ in support of 
Fort Regent.554 However, while it is true that many of Mulcaster’s 
recommendations were incorporated into Don’s later plans, and that the 
respective designs are relatively similar (see maps h and i), it must be 
acknowledged both were obliged to work within the topography of the site.555 
 
The Purpose of the Defences 
 
Based on the sheer volume of surviving intelligence reports (see chapter eight), 
is clear that the Channel Islands’ proximity to the Breton-Norman coast allowed 
them to be exploited as a base from which to monitor enemy activity. In August 
1794, for example, a convoy of 140 enemy vessels was sighted off Alderney, 
and Le Mesurier declared that it was ‘very probable that [Saumarez] must have 
destroyed many of them had [he] not been called away that day’.556 Similarly, 
intelligence communicated by D’Auvergne in December 1801 reported that 
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preparations were being made at Brest for an expedition to St. Domingo: 20,000 
men, fifteen line-of-battle ships and an 84-gun ship being already assembled, 
with four frigates and 1,200 men en route from Le Havre.557 Naturally, however, 
this advantage could be enjoyed only as long as the Channel Islands remained 
in British hands, and it was observed that they particularly vulnerable to assault 
from a number of points on the enemy coast (see chapter seven).558 Moreover, 
in common with Sicily559 and the south coast of England,560 the multiplicity of 
small bays around the coast of the Channel Islands made it difficult to predict 
where the French might attempt a landing.561 Consequently, the local 
fortifications were designed not only to provide support for the defenders, but to 
convince enemy agents – believed to be active in both bailiwicks562 – that any 
invasion would be met by concentrated, overwhelming firepower.563 
 
Due to the potential vulnerability of the Channel Islands to multiple 
simultaneous assaults and the hazardous nature of local navigation,564 efforts 
were made to incorporate natural features – reefs, currents and rip tides – into 
plans for the improved coastal defence.565 One of the best examples of the 
synthesis of natural and man-made fortification is provided by the Conway 
Tower constructed on La Rocco, a tidal island approximately half a mile off 
Jersey’s west coast, on the southern flank of St. Ouen’s Bay. As was 
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highlighted in a report submitted to the States of Jersey, the position of the 
tower not only protected ‘the most favourable part of the bay’ from attack, but 
also enabled the garrison to deliver interlocking fire in conjuction with several 
existing shore batteries. Moreover, since the stretch of St. Ouen’s Bay to the 
north of Le Rocco was screened by ‘extensive beds of rugged rocks’, it was 
concluded that no enemy would be able to land on Jersey’s west coast without 
first subjecting the new tower to ‘a long and continued attack’.566 This picture 
was replicated at all of the island’s various bays: by 1811, Jersey’s coastal 
towers and batteries were manned by a total of 1,555 troops, including 460 
garrisoned in the fortresses, and 425 in the towers.567  
 
While it is thus evident that the Channel Islands were potentially able to bring a 
tremendous volume of firepower to bear against any potential invader,568 it must 
be remembered that the fortifications were not designed to provide an entirely 
‘passive’ form of defence. Rather, it was the clear intent of the successive 
Commanders-in-Chief to ensure that, should the enemy affect a landing, the 
fortifications would be able to provide ‘active’ defence in conjunction with line 
infantry, light troops and field artillery. This strategic vision was formulated most 
explicitly by Doyle in 1802, when he spoke of the need to defend the Channel 
Islands ‘from the threshold to the citadel’, treating the coastal forts and batteries 
as the outworks of a great fortress.569 Just as the Martello Towers constructed 
in Kent and Sussex were not intended to prevent a landing, but rather inflict 
‘immense slaughter’ in support of artillery and cavalry,570 so the Conway Towers 
were designed to ‘soften up’ an attacking force and buy time for the 
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organisation of a counter-attack. However, it must be noted that the Jersey 
towers, having been built several years after the Guernsey examples, were 
constructed to a far more complex design (see appendix d), reflecting an 
attempt by the engineers to respond to technological developments.571  
 
With respect to the Guernsey towers, it is likely that the simplicity of their design 
and the rapidity of their construction were both prompted by the fact that St. 
Peter Port remained – even after the Great French War – the only deep-water 
anchorage in the Channel Islands (see chapter six). By contrast, although a 
number of Conway Towers had been constructed in Jersey by the end of the 
1770s, the attempted invasions of 1779 and 1781 (see chapter two) appear to 
have persuaded the authorities in that island to modify Conway’s original 
design. Unlike the Guernsey towers, which were built of brick, with walls four 
feet thick, and with a sloped base to deflect artillery fire, the Jersey towers were 
built of granite, had walls eight feet thick, and were protected by four 
machicolated galleries.572 Moreover, although the Guernsey towers were 
eventually provided with a roof-mounted 18-pdr carronades,573 it would seem 
that they were never intended to serve as anything more than what would now 
be termed as ‘pill-boxes’.574 By contrast, Craig’s 1793 report provides clear 
evidence that the Jersey towers were viewed as being capable of serving as 
fortresses in their own right, albeit that it would first be necessary to make 
several modifications to their armament.  
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In order that the men garrisoned in the towers might be able to stop, rather than 
simply delay, an advancing enemy, Craig recommended that each should be 
provided with a single piece of ordnance capable of pouring ‘a rapid and heavy 
fire of canister shot, easily managed, and directed at any point’. At the very 
least, it was suggested that a 12-pdr carronade would answer the purpose 
‘extremely well’, but he observed that a Cohorn mortar575 mounted on a 
carriage, ‘would perhaps be still better’.576 As may be seen from Conway’s 
reply, the recommendations received almost universal approval, each tower 
being provided with a Cohorn – capable of firing shells to a distance of 1,400 
yards – and two 1-pdr swivel guns with a range of 1.5 miles. Moreover, while 
Conway warned that the addition of machicolated galleries to all the towers 
would incur great expence, and that they would be effective only if ‘built with 
solidity’,577 it is evident that such concerns were outweighed by the desire for 
additional protection against mining, since all the Jersey towers received this 
modification (see appendix d). Indeed, that Craig’s modifications were 
perceived a significant improvement is illustrated by Don’s assessment of the 
towers, the new Lieutenant-Governor describing them as providing ‘every 
advantage in checking and resisting the advances of the enemy’.578  
 
In general terms, placement of the Conway Towers closely mirrored that of 
England’s Martello Towers: just as the latter had been erected ‘five or six 
hundred yards apart, and in the most advantageous landing places’,579 the 
former fortifications were concentrated in the most vulnerable bays. In Jersey, 
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for example, they were built chiefly in St. Aubin (three towers), Grouville (six 
towers) and St. Ouen (three towers), providing additional protection for the 
island’s largest and most heavily-used harbours (see maps j, k and l). However, 
both Don and Doyle also authorised the construction of six ‘true’ Martello 
Towers – three each in Jersey and Guernsey – in order to reinforce key 
strategic points around their respective coastlines. In Guernsey, the three 
towers were built on the east coast, one each at Rocquaine, L’Erèe and 
Houmet, while those constructed in Jersey were situated on the south coast, 
protecting not only St. Aubin’s Bay, but also the southern approaches to St. 
Ouen’s Bay and Grouville Bay.580 The ability of these latter towers to bring 
interlocking fire to bear against an approaching enemy is particularly well 
demonstrated by Icho Tower; its field of fire overlapping with that of Le Hocq, 
Platte Rocque, and Seymour Towers, as well as seven coastal batteries.581 
 
Given that the Martello Tower came to be employed in both the Channel Islands 
and the British Isles as a whole, it is necessary to understand how their 
strategic use was affected by local considerations. In Sussex and Kent, for 
example, the new towers were intended not only as safeguards against 
invasion, but also as a means to reinforce the men of the preventative water 
guard and the riding officers in their efforts to suppress local smuggling (see 
chapter seven). Both these forces were corrupt, ill-disciplined, and poorly 
equipped:582 as late as 1809, the former possessed only thirty-nine cutters and 
sixty-two smaller boats,583 while each riding officer was tasked with patrolling 
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fifty square miles, both night and day, with only a sabre and a pair of pistols with 
which to defend himself.584 Though smuggling was possibly an even greater 
problem in the Channel Islands – both Don and Doyle appeared desirous to 
suppress the practice585 – it is evident that the Martello Towers were regarded 
as a purely ‘military’ asset. This was demonstrated by the rejection of a 
proposal to build a tower on Rousse Rock in St. Brelade’s Bay: despite the fact 
that such a fortification would ‘command all the passages into the Bay’,586 Don 
concluded that an escarpment, breastwork and battery would provide sufficient 
protection against an assault from that quarter.587 
 
The Invasion Threat: Real or Imagined? 
 
In order to form accurate conclusions as to the effectiveness of the fortification 
of the Channel Islands during the Great French War, the question must first be 
asked: ‘were the Islands in any real danger?’ While it is true that the invasion of 
Britain had been fatally undermined even before Trafalgar,588 the threat posed 
to the Channel Islands after 1805 was far less clear-cut. While critics of the 
fortification of Kent and Sussex ridiculed the idea that Napoleon might evade 
the British blockade (see chapter seven), the Channel Islands remained 
dangerously exposed due to their lack of dedicated naval protection during the 
autumn and winter.589 The severity of the continuing threat was highlighted by 
successive Commanders-in-Chief, who pledged to ‘give the French a proper 
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reception’590 and ‘put everything in the best form possible’591 to ‘oppose any 
hostile attempt to assail this important and valuable post’.592 Even after 
Trafalgar – the news of which caused Doyle to claim that ‘the late glorious naval 
victories have given [these Islands] increased security’593 – French preparations 
on the opposite coast remained a cause for concern. Not only did Napoleon 
pour vast resources into rebuilding his shattered navy – setting an ‘ambitious 
goal’ of constructing 150 ships-of-the-line594 – but the Battle of Jersey (1781) 
had demonstrated that it would be entirely possible for the French to invade the 
Channel Islands without the support of a battlefleet.595  
 
The correspondence of the respective Lieutenant-Governors provides further 
evidence of the severity with which the local authorites viewed the French threat 
during the post-Trafalgar period. Just over a month after the battle, Doyle 
warned that Dielette – only twelve miles distant from Alderney and Guernsey – 
had undergone sufficient improvements to enable it to accommodate a large 
force of gunboats. He also expressed his frustration that two regiments (to the 
amount of 1,300 men) had been removed from the garrison so soon after 
Saumarez’ squadron had been reduced to the extent that he could ‘no longer 
spare a frigate to watch the port of Cherbourg’.596 Similar concerns were 
expressed by Don, who predicted that in the wake of Trafalgar, the French must 
necessarily ‘confine their attacks against…Jersey and Guernsey, and the 
[English] coast opposite Boulogne’.597 Likewise, he declared that ‘the only 
effect’ of the 1808 Orders in Council had been that of ‘drawing the enemy’s 
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attention towards these Islands’,598 and that as late as 1809, Jersey and her 
sister islands ‘must be constantly exposed to unexpected and sudden 
attacks’.599 Although it is true that such concerns were not unique to the 
Channel Islands,600 they were rendered more ominous in this case by the 
difficulty of summoning large numbers of reinforcements from Britain, which 
might take more than a day to arrive (see below).601   
 
Although many scholars have advanced the claim that Napoleon ‘never 
seriously contemplated invading Britain after 1805’, relying instead on ‘costly 
and inefficient indirect means to attempt to defeat her’,602 contemporary opinion 
was clearly at variance with this assessment. Throughout the post-Trafalgar 
period, both Lieutenant-Governors remained convinced of Napoleon’s belief 
that the conquest of the Channel Islands would provide a potential solution to 
his inability to wrest local maritime superiority from the Royal Navy.603 In 1806 
and 1809 respectively, Don and Doyle expressed concerns that the French 
might seek to exploit Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney as ‘stepping-stones for an 
army destined to invade England’, and specifically for attacks on key towns and 
ports on the south coast.604 Unbeknownst to the Lieutenant-Governors, the 
Committee of Public Safety had indeed approved of such a scheme as part of 
the plan for the 1794 invasion, it being suggested that the bailiwicks might be 
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used as a base from which to attack the Isle of Wight.605 In addition, the 
militarization of Cherbourg served to reignite invasion fears:606 in 1813, a 
passenger recently landed from Caen reported that Napoleon ‘had taken a view 
of the Channel Islands from Jerbourg and Flamanville, and been particularly 
inquisitive respecting Alderney’.607 
 
The Planned Invasion of 1794 
 
Throughout the closing months of 1793, the Committee of Public Safety 
received a number of proposals for the invasion of Great Britain and the 
Channel Islands.608 Although the majority were rejected, the decision was taken 
on September 22nd to assemble 100,000 men for an expedition to Britain,609 and 
only the Quiberon Mutiny and the royalists’ crossing of the Loire (see chapter 
nine), forced the suspension of the operation.610 In its place, the decision was 
taken for an attack to be launched against the Channel Islands:611 command 
being divided between General Rossignol – commander of the Armée de 
l’Ouest – and Rear-Admiral Cornic.612 Although much smaller than the aborted 
invasion of Britain – only 20,000 men were to be involved613 – the plan serves 
as proof that the Channel Islands were viewed by the French as strategically 
important. Unfortunately, it is an episode which – save for a pair of articles 
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published in the ABSJ and TSG – appears to have attracted but little attention 
within English historiography,614 and this lack of coverage obscures the severity 
with which the threat was treated by the British government. As has been 
already shown, 2,000 additional troops were committed to the Channel Islands 
in 1794 alone (see chapter two),615 and this was largely in response to the 
perceived heightened risk of invasion. 
 
Although Bisson’s article provides a useful summary of the documents 
pertaining to the planned invasion,616 critical engagement with the source 
material is limited. For example, while he states that ‘large forces were 
assembling [in Cherbourg] under a cloak of secrecy’, and that by 1794, ‘the 
military preparations were almost complete’,617 he fails to address the viability of 
the plan from the French perspective. However, the wider evidence nonetheless 
supports De Saumarez’ conclusion that the plan of 1794 had been adopted with 
serious intent of success; not least a report of December 1793, in which Dundas 
highlighted an unusually high concentration of French naval forces off the coast 
of Guernsey.618 Moreover, January 1794 saw a large number of escort craft 
sent from Noirmoutier and Cherbourg to St. Malo,619 and it is likely that these 
were the craft listed in the abovementioned secret correspondence between 
Rossignol and Bouchette (see appendix c).620 Most significant of all, intelligence 
received at the start of February 1794 revealed that a force of four frigates and 
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at least three smaller vessels was making ready at Cherbourg,621 while at Le 
Havre, all the local fishing boats were being commandeered, and eighty or 
ninety transports were reported as having assembled in the harbour.622 
 
French Preparations and Manpower 
 
According to the orders issued by the Committee for Public Safety on January 
31st, 1794, the assault on Guernsey – specifically the bombardment of Castle 
Cornet – was to require the support of four ships-of-the-line, while a fleet of 
fishing boats would be commandeered to act as landing craft. As for the assault 
on Jersey, this was to involve two ships-of-the-line, four frigates, two corvettes, 
two razées – tasked with the subjugation of Mont Orgueil and Elizabeth Castle –  
with the invasion force itself being transported on board between twelve and 
seventeen smaller vessels.623 Of greater interest is the correspondence which 
passed between Rossignol and Bouchette, the Minister for War: a collection 
which – more than any other source – reveals the true extent of the danger 
which faced the Channel Islands in the spring of 1794. With respect to the 
personnel involved, not only was the Commander-in-Chief a veteran of the War 
in the Vendée, but Cornic was a naval officer of considerable experience, 
having served during the Seven Years’ War and the American War of 
Independence.624 Furthermore, several prominent officers were to be seconded 
to the expedition: Captain Saint-Laurent, a skilled artillery officer and engineer; 
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Generals Moulin, Barazer and Crublier – all described as ‘good Republicans’ – 
and the fanatical Billaud-Varenne,625 one of the ‘architects’ of the Terror.626  
 
In order to facilitate his assembly of the desired invasion force of 20,000 
infantry, 200 to 300 cavalry, and 200 artillerymen, Rossignol had been granted 
sweeping powers over the maritime districts of north-west France.627 Not only 
was he able to order the secondment of all the engineers within his sphere of 
command, but he was permitted to commandeer anything which he considered 
necessary to ensure success, even men and equipment not under his 
immediate command’.628 Indeed, while De Saumarez claims that he ‘had little 
taste for the enterprise and little faith in its success’,629 it appears nonetheless 
that Rossignol was determined to rectify the inadequacies in the force under his 
command. For example, upon discovering that he had access to only eight of 
the twelve howitzers required by the original plan, he requisitioned two 8-pdr 
guns and two 12-pdr guns to make up the shortfall, claiming that these were ‘of 
much greater value for the operations’. Similarly, after reporting that many of the 
troops, ‘even those in battalions detailed for the expedition’, possessed 
‘exceedingly defective’ muskets and bayonets, he ordered that replacements be 
sent from the arsenal at Rennes, also requisitioning ‘all the guns’ stored at Vire, 
Avranches and Pontorson’ (see map c).630 
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With respect to the troops themselves, the Committee had expressed a desire 
that these should be drawn from ‘battalions which had served in the French 
Islands or aboard ship, and that there should be no battalions of conscripts or 
without experience of fighting’.631 However, the requisitioning of units such as 
the 67th Regt. – including a company of engineers and an ammunition convoy – 
and the grenadiers of the 82nd Regt., as well as a total of eleven battalions from 
Brest, Dieppe, Le Havre, Cherbourg and Granville, caused considerable 
disruption. In particular, Generals Vialle and Thureau – commanding the 
divisions from which these units were drawn – complained bitterly of the fact 
that they were only able to replace these men with raw recruits.632 Moreover, 
while Rossignol argued that the local conscripts were ‘accustomed from youth 
to a way of life which will make up for their lack of wider experience’,633 he could 
not change the fact that ‘courage, dash and fanatical belief’ could never make 
them good seamen.634 Even in areas where the Levée en Masse – intended to 
raise 350,000 men635 – did not produce widespread disaffection, it proved 
difficult to find men with maritime combat experience,636 and Rossignol was 
forced to draw troops from St. Malo, Fougeres and Rennes (see map d).637 
 
The Response in the Channel Islands 
 
In spite of these various problems, February 19th saw Rossignol confirm that his 
force of 20,000 men – with artillery in proportion – was ready to embark,638 and 
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the sheer size of this force would certainly have posed a significant threat to the 
security of the Channel Islands. However, French preparations did not go 
unnoticed: on March 8th, an emergency session of the States of Jersey heard 
that 10,000 troops were assembled at St. Malo, that warning had been sent to 
the Channel Squadron, and that ‘every means of preparation, defence and 
vigilance was to be adopted’.639 Moreover, concerns over a possible French 
invasion had been raised as early as April 1793, when the captain of the Hope 
spy cutter had succeeded, by means of subterfuge, in obtaining the release of 
eleven men then being held under embargo at Cherbourg.640 According to the 
independent testimonies of four of the men, Monsieur Paguiel – Adjutant Major 
of the 4th Battalion de la Charente – had let slip of a plan to launch an invasion 
of Guernsey; a force of 10,000 men and between twelve and fourteen gunboats 
having been assembled for the purpose.641 Fortunately for the Channel Islands, 
the outbreak of disorder in Brittany forced the authorities in Cherbourg to 
postpone the embarkation,642 with one company of artillery and two regiments 
of volunteers having been ordered to march against the chouans.643 
 
As to the 1794 expedition, the fact that his force did not sail for Chausey until 
late March, one month later than had been originally planned,644 proves that this 
project was fatally undermined by the French government’s failure to take 
account of the logistical problems faced by Rossignol.645 Furthermore, it is clear 
that many of the French troops became aware of their having lost the 
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advantage of surprise,646 Gabory having noted that at least one battalion of 
French troops muntinied, the men protesting that ‘the English fleet keep the 
sea’.647 However, while it is certainly true that the authorities in the Channel 
Islands professed confidence in their ability to repulse any attack from the 
adjoining coast, there were a number of other reasons for the abandonment of 
the plan. Most significantly, the difficulty of supplying Brest by land forced the 
French to devoting all available naval resources to the safeguarding of the 
expected grain convoys from America (see chapter eight).648 In addition, 
mirroring the events of the previous April, an outbreak of chouan activity obliged 
Rossignol to detach part of his 20,000-strong invasion force to reinforce or 
replace the garrisons of towns from which men had been sent on counter-
insurgency expeditions.649 
 
Whatever the reason for its failure, the invasion threat in 1794 was of 
considerable consequence to the Channel Islands, for it prompted the British 
government to provide them with the level of naval support for which the 
inhabitants had for two years petitioned.650 In November 1793, Saumarez was 
stationed in the Guernsey Roads, being ordered both to reconnoitre the French 
coast and maintain communications between the Channel Islands and 
MacBride’s fleet.651 This latter force had been ordered not only to carry out 
attacks on enemy convoys passing Alderney and Guernsey,652 but had been 
intended to support the landing of a British force in support of a royalist attack 
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on either Caen or Granville (see chapter nine).653 Further reinforcement of the 
Channel Islands’ naval forces arrived after February 1794, when the States of 
Jersey succeeded in gaining the support of D’Auvergne in persuading the 
Admiralty to station a force of light vessels and gun-boats off Gorey.654 
Unfortunately, the response was once again slow – the squadron was not 
deployed until September 1794 – and D’Auvergne complained that both the 
flagship Nonsuch (third-rate, 64-guns) and five of the gunboats were reported 
as being ‘very poor sailors’. To resolve this problem, it was necessary to hire 
three local armed luggers at the rate of 10s per month per ton, and £4.10.0 per 
month per man,655 as well as order three new gunboats and the Bravo (sixth-
rate, 28 guns) to be sent from Spithead.656  
 
However, the most significant result of the invasion scare – whether or not it can 
be said to have posed any ‘real’ threat – was the fact that it underlined the 
ability of the Channel Islands to act as forward outposts, and marked a distinct 
shift in terms of the French view of the bailiwicks. Whereas past attacks, such 
as that led by De Rullecourt, had been intended solely to neutralise the Islands’ 
privateering fleet,657 both the Expedition of 1794 and subsequent plans show a 
focus on subjugation and conquest. According to Rossignol’s orders, the 
capture of the Channel Islands was to have resulted in the disarming of the 
inhabitants, requisitioning of war material, and the imprisonment of military 
commanders and prominent civilians.658 Even after the abandonment of the 
1794 invasion, the British continued to suspect that the Channel Islands might 
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be exploited by the French as the target for diversionary attacks,659 and the 
records of the Directory indicate that such an assault was planned to coincide 
with the Expedition to Ireland (1796).660 Similarly, reports of significant troop 
concentrations in St. Malo – estimates ranging from 15,000 to 50,000 men661 – 
were often accompanied by speculation that an attack on the Channel Islands 
would serve as ‘a feint to cover their real project’.662 
 
Fort Regent: The Last Line of Defence 
 
Throughout the Great French War, the principal aim pursued by the authorities 
in the Channel Islands was to prevent the enemy from establishing a beachead 
on any part of the coastline. In 1807 alone, Don drew a total of £2,850 from the 
British government in order to complete the fortification of the Jersey’s most 
vulnerable bays, many of which might be infiltrated by a small force transported 
by flat-bottomed or shallow-draught boats.663 However, as has been already 
mentioned, the strategic vision implemented in the Channel Islands during the 
latter half of the Great French War was twofold; not only was it necessary to 
create a formidable ‘first line’ of defence, but also a ‘citadel’ capable of 
withstanding a protracted siege.664 Once again, this was consistent with the 
strategy adopted in Britain: between Selsey, Sussex and Cromer, Norfolk, the 
coast bristled with fifty batteries and redoubts, while forts were constructed at 
Eastbourne, Dymchurch and Harwich, and it was proposed to construct Martello 
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Towers at 143 sites between Littlehampton and Great Yarmouth.665 However, 
most important of all were the developments which took place at Dover – with 
the fortification of the Western Heights and the reinforcement of the Castle – 
and Chatham, with the construction of Fort Pitt and Fort Clarence.666 
 
With respect to the construction of Fort Regent itself, the strategic importance 
both of the Town Hill and South Hill had long been acknowledged: during the 
Civil War, for example, Parliamentarian troops had constructed a battery on the 
site for the purpose of bombarding Elizabeth Castle. Similarly, a proposal 
submitted by the Committee for the Defence of the Island in 1787 had included 
a plan for a battery or other fortification on the South Hill – primarily as a means 
to provide Elizabeth Castle with supporting fire667 – and it is likely that this is the 
‘citadel’ shown on the ‘Bouillon Map’ of 1799 (see map e). However, in spite of 
the fact that the town of St. Helier had no significant landward protection, plans 
for the construction of a fortress and various auxiliary buildings on Town Hill – 
some tabled as early as 1796668 – met with resistance from the inhabitants.669 In 
March 1792, the land-owners and inhabitants had determined ‘not to sell or 
dispose of their property rights on the [Town] Hill, under any pretext or at any 
price’; a decision reaffirmed in January 1796 by ‘the majority of the Assembly of 
the Vingtaine de la Ville’.670 Consequently, although an Act was passed on July 
20th 1796 concerning the sale of the Town Hill to the Crown for the sum of £466, 
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13s 4d, this decision – along with a corresponding Act relating to the South Hill 
– was not confirmed until May 4th 1803.671  
 
In terms of providing an explanation for the change of heart which brought 
about the end of this lengthy impasse, it is reasonable to conclude that many of 
the proprietors of the town – especially members of the growing mercantile 
class – were swayed by financial rather than patriotic motives.672 While the 
discussion of the Islanders’ attitude to militia service has provided clear 
evidence of their desire to prove themselves loyal to their sovereign (see 
chapter two), it is clear that winning support for the fortification programme 
required a far more pragmatic line of argument. Thus, when Humfrey finally 
announced that ‘the difficulties that arose respecting our obtaining possession 
of the north part of the Town Hill…are done away’673 – the Procureurs having 
resolved that ‘it entirely rests with [the Commander-in-Chief] to accelerate the 
views of government’674 – this by no means represented a successful ‘appeal to 
patriotism’. Indeed, both Humfrey and Gordon issued independent assurances 
that the surrender of the land would be accompanied by ‘a fair and adequate 
compensation for its value’,675 and a civil action brought against the latter in 
August 1804 – reveals that the inhabitants were determined to ensure that this 
promise was upheld.676  
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More importantly, the inhabitants’ acceptance of the sale of the Town Hill was 
secured by an arrangement for the Procureurs to take an active part in the initial 
stages of the fortification programme, and to meet directly with Humfrey in order 
to calculate the appropriate compensation for each landowner. Thus, it was 
agreed that the proprietors would ‘at any time be ready to attend [the officer] 
appointed to mark out the ground’,677 and that Gordon, for his part, would do 
‘everything necessary’ to ensure that the Procureurs remained ‘in possession of 
the knowledge they required’.678 The effectiveness of this approach was 
demonstrated by the passing of an Act of the States in May 1805: it being 
confirmed that ‘the proprietors of the Vingtaine are satisfied with the decision of 
the voyeurs’, and that the former could make ‘no future claim whatever on 
government’.679 As to the concerns expressed with respect to the projected cost 
of the project, it must be noted that the final sum was comparable to that 
expended on similar projects undertaken in the south-east of England. While 
the cost of Fort Regent has been reckoned at between £307,382680 and 
£375,203681, contemporary estimates for the construction of eighty-eight 
Martello Towers between Seaford and Eastware Bay proposed a total of 
£221,000, while it was reckoned that £402,999 had been expended on Dover 
Castle and the Western Heights.682  
 
Overall, the comparable costs of the construction of Fort Regent and the 
improvements to Dover Castle reflect the fact that both were intended to serve 
as the ‘citadel’ of a vast network of defences; however, Jersey’s new fortress 
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also compared favourably with its counterparts in terms of armament. By 1815, 
Dover Castle mounted 231 pieces of artillery,683 while the final armament of Fort 
Regent included forty-seven 24-pdr guns, twenty-one 18-pdr guns, twenty-six 
12-pdr guns, and thirty 24-pdr carronades.684 Although the total complement 
would not be installed until 1815, it was reported in September 1811 that the 
citadel’s guns were sufficently numerous as to cover both the harbour and town 
of St. Helier and the heights to the north and west (see map e).685 Even in May 
1810, it had been possible for over sixty pieces of ordnance to be installed in 
the partially-completed Fort, including eight 24-pdr guns, eighteen 18-pdr guns, 
five ‘long’ and seven ‘medium’ 12-pdr guns, seventeen 24-pdr carronades, two 
13-inch mortars, and four 10-inch mortars.686 By contrast, the armament of Fort 
George at the end of the Great French War consisted of only twenty-four 
cannon of all calibres, four mortars and a single carronade,687 while the 
armament of Fort Ricasoli in Malta in 1807 comprised of only ten 24-pdr guns, 
twenty-two 24-pdr carronades and four 13-inch mortars.688 
 
The Labour Force 
 
As was stated in the first section of this chapter, the shadow of Don’s reputation 
has obscured a number of other key individuals, without whom the massive 
fortification programme could not possibly have succeeded. Of these, it is 
Humfrey – OCRE from 1800 to 1814689 – who is perhaps the most important: 
Davies having described him as ‘an extremely capable and conscientious man’, 
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and ‘a very fine engineer, [who] rose to high rank primarily because of solid and 
competent perseverance’.690 Likewise, Davies has characterised his 
relationship with Don as ‘a lucky encounter that enabled [the latter] to fulfil most 
of Conway’s intentions’;691 Humfrey being given the task of organising the 
enormous manpower required to complete both the fortifications and the military 
roads (see chapter four). Just as 1797 had seen nearly 3,000 militiamen 
employed on the works at Dover,692 so the fortifications in the Channel Islands 
relied heavily on military labour: in 1808, the 2nd/58th and 76th Regts. of Foot 
contributed 300 men each; while the entirety of the 2nd/57th Regt of Foot was 
pressed into service.693 Thereafter, it was ordered that at least 600 soldiers and 
230 military artificers694 should be seconded from the garrison each year,695 but 
even with ‘every man off duty, excepting recruits…employed in various working 
parties’, Don considered it necessary to ask for 400-500 additional men.696 
 
In the context of this labour shortfall, Humfrey’s organisational abilities were 
ably demonstrated: despite the 2nd/83rd Regt. of Foot having been ordered to 
Jersey in 1807,697 a report of March 1809 revealed that only 1,348 rank-and-file 
of the garrison’s central division were fit for service.698 While the employment of 
so many fit and able troops may appear to have had serious implications for 
local defence, the risk was lessened by the requisition of 150 military artificers, 
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200 miners and forty blacksmiths from southern England,699 as well as an 
unknown number of civilian masons, miners and bricklayers from London.700 In 
order to justify such measures, the senior officers in both bailiwicks were able to 
call upon a precedent which had been established during the early phases of 
the construction of Fort Regent. First, in order to ensure that the garrison would 
have access to a secure water supply, it had been necessary to sink a well 
through the Town Hill to a depth of 235 feet; an undertaking which had required 
the services of a large number of masons, blacksmiths, miners and labourers 
from the garrison.701 Secondly, the departure from Jersey of the 3rd/1st and 
2nd/3rd Regts. of Foot in 1807 had led Don to complain of having been ‘thrown 
into great embarrassment from the want of masons and blacksmiths’, and 
obliged to requisition replacements from Guernsey.702 
 
Lines of Communication – The Island Telegraph 
 
Although it is clear that the abovementioned fortifications would have presented 
a formidable obstacle to any projected invasion, it must be remembered that 
their true potential could be realised only if the troops garrisoned therein were 
able to coordinate their operations. Moreover, while vessels stationed at 
Guernsey, Alderney or Sark were ideally placed to raise the alarm, it was still 
estimated that between twelve and twenty-four hours would elapse before the 
news of an attack of the Channel Islands reached Spithead, Portland or 
Plymouth.703 Consequently, while initial support for the creation of the inter-
insular signal system – both from the Committee for the Defence of the Island 
                                                 
699 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of March 4th 1808 
700 SJA, A/A1/3, Letter of December 24th 1810 
701 Gibb, Myers, and Corbet (eds.), Fort Regent, p. 24 
702 SJA, L/F/95/A/21, ‘Letter from Don Asking for Masons and Blacksmiths’, August 29th 1807  
703 TNA, HO 98/3, Conway to Anon, March 1793 
 122 
and the Admiralty – had focused on the need to protect the Islands’ merchant 
fleet,704 it was later recalled that the system’s military value had been quickly 
recognised.705 As early as July 1794, Waugh – then Deputy-Governor of 
Alderney – declared that a ‘fixed’ code of signals would be ‘of infinite use to the 
King’s Service’,706 while in January 1796, Gordon and Small approached the 
Admiralty with a proposition for the construction of three ‘relay stations’, one 
each to be sited on Jersey, Guernsey and Sark.707 At the same time, Small 
advised D’Auvergne that he had ‘instantly and without hesitation adopted [the] 
general Code of Signals for our mutual guidance and security’, and gave his full 
support to ‘a general telegraphical communication’ between the bailiwicks.708  
 
In selecting the most suitable position for each of the signal stations, the 
authorities in the Channel Islands made judicious use of available high ground: 
the Jersey posts, for example, included Mont de la Ville in the south; Mont 
Orgueil in the east; Grosnez in the west; and Rozel in the north.709 However, the 
first ‘generation’ of inter-island signal stations were little more than an ad hoc 
measure, the guards at each station being provided with only a single signal 
beacon and a light 6-pdr with two blank cartridges as a means by which to raise 
the alarm.710 Furthermore, though sited close to the Conway Towers and 
guardhouses, the first-generation stations were not provided with any 
supporting batteries, breastworks or other integrated defences. Instead, it was 
assumed that the report of the gun or the lighting of the beacon would be picked 
up by the other posts, initiating either an Island-wide mobilisation of the militia or 
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the summoning of naval assistance from Guernsey.711 Finally, in addition to the 
simplicity of their communications equipment, the temporary nature of these 
early signal stations was to be the direct cause of a major defensive weakness 
following the collapse of the Peace of Amiens. In spite of their construction 
having been justified by reference to the concerns of the local mercantile 
community,712 the entire series of signal posts was dismantled in 1802, their 
contents being sold off to raise funds ‘for the public good’ and the stations 
rented out to private tenants.713  
 
The Island Signal Stations – The Permanent System 
 
As a result of the abovementioned steps, the collapse of the Peace of Amiens 
left the Channel Islands highly vulnerable to a surprise attack: indeed, over a 
month was to elapse before the system was rendered fully operational.714 Even 
in 1804, several of the signal posts remained unfit for purpose,715 the men 
‘having no shelter...and being obliged to [remain] exposed to the ravages of the 
weather’,716 and later accounts show that the correction of this problem would 
have required significant funds. In 1809, for example, repairs to the signal post 
at Fort Saumarez were recorded as having amounted to £145 5s 1d, while the 
cost of building a new signal station at Jerbourg – including ‘a new house for the 
use of the officer’ – was estimated at £271 15s 4d.717 Given that intelligence 
reports passed almost daily between Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney, and 
between the Channel Islands and the vessels of the Royal Navy (see chapter 
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eight),718 it seems strange that Gordon did not attempt to establish permanent 
signal stations in the first instance. Not only would such a system have been 
invaluable in peacetime, but precedent had been set in Great Britain through 
the actions of the Admiralty. At a time when the Channel Islands still relied on 
flag signals for inter-insular communication,719 the first telegraphic semaphore 
had been established between Deal and London, and soon after, the system 
had been extended to cover vast swathes of southern England.720  
 
However, even if Gordon’s prefabricated alarm posts seem primitive by 
comparison, the early network of alarm posts provided a crucial framework for 
later developments.721 In order for improvements to be made to the ‘first 
generation’ system, extensive trials were conducted, the ‘traditional’ methods of 
alarm guns and beacons being combined with semaphore telegraph and flag 
codes. As a result of incorporating these various techniques, it was argued that 
complex messages could be communicated efficiently at any time or tide,722 and 
the trials drew praise both from Don and Captain Dumaresq, a naval officer 
assisting on the project.723 Even so, while it enabled much faster transmission 
of information,724 the new telegraph still could not operate efficiently in fog, 
heavy rain or high winds;725 in addition, the construction of new coastal batteries 
in March 1809 necessitated the relocation of at least one of the Jersey signal 
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posts.726 As a result of such deficiencies, it was often the case that Don was left 
with ‘no intelligence whatever [from] Cherbourg or any of the opposite ports’, 
meaning that the local packets and scouts remained a valuable asset within the 
context of local security.727 For example, the schuyt Rose was ordered to 
maintain ‘a constant guard during the night or foggy weather [and] keep a boat 
in readiness to follow any craft which may refuse to bring to’, her commander 
being authorised to seize and detain such vessels on suspicion of ‘belonging to 
or being in the employ of the enemy’.728  
 
In closing this brief discussion of the signal stations, it would be wise to draw 
attention to the fact that their very existence highlights the continued strategic 
importance of the Channel Islands. As late as October 1811, news reached 
Jersey concerning the reinforcement of Cherbourg and a ‘more than usual 
vigilance along the opposite coast’,729 but the local authorities had long 
appreciated the value of the local telegraph as a means of providing advanced 
warning of an expedition. In 1808, it was estimated that news of a French 
breakout might be communicated to Saumarez’ squadron in as little as thirty 
minutes,730 and that the completion of the Sark relay station might allow 
communication between Jersey and Guernsey to be conducted in as little as 
fifteen minutes.731 Similarly, the signal stations were so equipped as to permit 
the sending of messages both in the local code and the ‘official’ Admiralty code, 
enabling communication with both merchant and Royal Navy vessels,732 while a 
local pilot was appointed for the purpose of providing twice-daily reports of local 
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sea and weather conditions.733 Finally, it should be noted that the signal stations 
helped to supplement the intelligence picture received from agents operating ‘in 
every port from L’Orient to the Texel’734 (see chapter eight), especially when 
poor weather conditions disrupted local maritime traffic.735  
 
‘The Gibraltar of the Channel’? 
 
In his report of 1793, Craig had given voice to the high level of optimism which 
already existed amongst the local military authorities with respect to the security 
of the Channel Islands. Referring to the Conway Towers, he predicted that 
these fortifications would prove invulnerable to assault by infantry, artillery 
bombardment or undermining, and that ‘a dozen resolute fellows, properly 
armed and supplied’ might hold each fort against ‘ten thousand of the 
enemy’.736 Certainly, the capture of the Torra di Mortella in 1794 provided a 
clear precedent for this prediction: the tower – used as a template for the British 
‘Martellos’ – was captured only after two days’ heavy fighting, and resisted a 
bombardment by two frigates.737 However, while the fortifications constructed 
during the 1790s were doubtless formidable, both Don and Doyle shared the 
view that too much faith had been placed in the ability of the bailiwicks’ ‘natural 
defences’ to disrupt an enemy landing, as well as the speed with which a relief 
force might be sent from Britain.738 Based on the evidence presented above, it 
is clear that the transformation of the Channel Islands into the ‘Gibraltar of the 
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Channel’ envisaged by Don and Doyle was only fully achieved during the latter 
half of the Great French War. 
 
Indeed, while it is certainly true that the defences constructed prior to 1793 
provided a measure of protection in the event of an attack, it was only once they 
were provided with supporting batteries that it became possible for the 
defenders to bring to bear overwhelming mutually-supportive fire. Likewise, 
although the coastal defences may have been able to disrupt an enemy landing 
and delay his advance,739 only the construction of Fort Regent and Fort George 
allowed the garrisons the option of retreating before overwhelming numbers and 
making preparations for the arrival of reinforcements from Britain.740 In addition, 
the conversion of the local signal posts to the telegraphic system was vital for 
ensuring the efficient coordination of defensive operations; according to Don’s 
estimate, he was now able to obtain ‘in ten minutes’ such information as would 
take a despatch rider ‘several hours’ to communicate.741 However, as 
sophisticated as the complementary forms of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ defence may 
have been, an ultimate appreciation of their effectiveness cannot be gained 
without also taking due consideration of the manner in which the construction of 
the military roads enabled troops and fortifications to act in concert.  
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Chapter Four – The Military Roads: ‘The Mark of a Civilised Nation’ 
 
While the efforts made to improve the combat effectiveness of the garrison and 
militia (see chapter two) prove that the security of the Channel Islands was not 
entrusted to bricks and mortar alone, the troops’ true potential could be realised 
only if they were able to deploy efficiently against an enemy. For example, in 
drawing up a plan for the opposition of an enemy landing in St. Ouen’s Bay, 
Gordon argued that they should be met in the first instance by ‘advanced corps 
of 3,800 infantry, 1,000 cavalry and 200 artillerymen, with twenty-two pieces of 
ordnance’.742 However, he gave no explanation as to how such a large body of 
troops was to be either assembled promptly or marched with haste through the 
maze of country lanes which, prior to the opening of the military roads, provided 
the only means of crossing the interior of the island.743 A similar problem also 
prevailed at Alderney, since although the militiamen were described as 
‘particularly expert in the management of the guns’, and able to ‘fire red-hot shot 
as coolly as any regulars from Woolwich’, it was acknowedged that they must 
‘remain dispersed all over the Island’.744 As a result, it can be seen that the 
improvements made to the coastal defences during the 1790s – while a 
significant contribution to the security of the Islands – had the unfortunate effect 
of obscuring the need to make better provisions for the movement of troops. 
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The Situation Prior to the Arrival of Don and Doyle 
 
In general, it appears that the state of the Channel Islands’ roads at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century mirrored the situation which had prevailed 
in Scotland prior to 1724, and the commencement of the road-building scheme 
pioneered by Wade and Caulfield.745 Excluding the numerous farm tracks and 
footpaths which criss-crossed the hinderland of the country parishes, the 
existing road system was based around three types of highway, known in the 
local patois as the chemins du roy (King’s Roads) chemins de huit pieds and 
chemins de quatres pieds.746 Although these were all accessible to carts and 
wagons, and each had at least one footpath in order to accommodate 
pedestrians,747 they were nonetheless considered unsuitable for military use. 
With the exception of the chemins du roy, the roads were insufficiently broad to 
permit the passage of more than a single cart at one time, gensages (lay-bys) 
being provided at regular intervals to admit over-taking and passing by carts 
and wagons.748 However, as Don was quick to observe, even the chemins du 
roy were of insufficient quality to admit the passage of field artillery, and a 
column of men would find it almost impossible to alter their line-of-march in 
response to the changing dispositions of the enemy.749 
 
Consequently, while it is true that the post-War period saw Don and Doyle 
romanticised in the local press (see chapter one), the celebration of their 
achievements by no means overstated the crisis which had existed on their 
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arrival in the respective bailiwicks.750 During a speech to the landowners of St. 
Peter Port, Doyle suggested that Guernsey’s roads were in so poor a condition 
that the island was being allowed to ‘languish some two hundred years behind 
the rest of civilised Europe’.751 Although D’Auvergne had described the majority 
of roads in contemporary Normandy and Brittany as ‘deep and much cut 
up...heavy and wet’, the French had already begun to develop a network of 
chemins ferré (paved highways) in these regions.752 This reflects the significant 
technological gap which existed between the Channel Islands and their 
neighbours; Britain and France reaping the benefits of the revolutionary road-
building techniques pioneered by engineers such as Trésaguet753 and 
Telford.754 Indeed, while the military roads constructed under Don and Doyle 
drew upon these new methods – particularly in terms of improved drainage – 
these ‘modern’ techniques would not become standard with respect to local 
road-building until the advent of Macadamisation in the 1820s.755  
 
In addition to being too narrow to permit the prompt redeployment of troops, the 
Channel Islands’ roads also suffered from exceedingly poor drainage: flanked 
by steep banks and ditches and lacking any proper paving, they were often 
rendered impassable by heavy rain, snow or ice.756 Even in the urban centres of 
St. Helier, St. Aubin and St. Peter Port, the situation was little better: the 
cobbled streets were more durable in construction, but the small channel set 
into the centre of the roadway as a conduit for rainwater, seawater and refuse 
often became obstructed by debris. Not only did this provide a natural breeding-
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ground for disease, but it meant that the urban roads, like those in the rural 
parishes, were highly susceptible to flooding; according to Johnson, the roads 
of St. Peter Port were 'appalling, narrow and tortuous’, as well as extremely 
steep, and impassable in stormy weather.757 However, the inhabitants of the 
Channel Islands remained resistant to the improvement of the road network: in 
particular, it appears to have been widely assumed that the poor state of the 
roads would serve as a means of securing St. Helier and St Peter Port against 
attack. In spite of the detailed arguments presented by the Lieutenant-
Governors, a group of self-appointed ‘experts’ argued that an invading force 
would simply get lost in the country lanes, their artillery and baggage being 
unable to advance inland.758 
 
In order to discredit such misguided arguments, Doyle was able to refer to the 
writings of theorists such as De Saxe, whose Art of War,759 and also highlight 
the extensive road-building programmes already undertaken by the French and 
British governments.760 Consequently, he resolved to go on the offensive: in a 
public speech to the leading inhabitants of St. Peter Port, the Lieutenant-
Governor denounced the ‘worthy gentlemen who so kindly favour us with their 
lectures on tactics, [yet fail to] take the whole of the plan into consideration’.761 
However, not only did they appear ignorant of the need to ‘place the roads in 
the best possible state to permit their brave and ardent defenders to move with 
the greater celerity to defend their shores’, but Doyle also observed that these 
‘worthy gentlemen’ had engaged in a deliberate campaign of misinformation. 
Despite the extensive reform of the Channel Islands’ military forces and coastal 
                                                 
757 P. Johnson, A Short History of Guernsey 4th Edition, (Guernsey, 1994) pp. 45-46 
758 Ibid, p. 52 
759 M. De Saxe, Art of War: Reveries and Memoirs (London, 1811) pp. 68-73 
760 J. Black, European Warfare, 1660-1815 (London, 1994) pp. 155-156 
761 ‘Speech of Major-General Doyle’, reproduced in full in Sullivan, General Don, pp. 18-19 
 132 
fortifications (see chapters two and three) members of the Island’s elite were 
alleged to have encouraged rumours that the new military roads would provide 
the enemy with easy access to the interior. Moreover, Doyle publically mocked 
his critics’ attempts to engender a ‘moral panic’, it having been put about that 
the construction of ‘good roads’ capable of carrying heavy carriages would 
expose the inhabitants of the rural parishes to ‘luxury and extravagance’.762 
 
As this chapter will demonstrate, Doyle and Don were justified in heaping scorn 
upon those who criticised their desire to implement the British government’s 
policy with respect to the military roads. First and foremost, Conway’s initial 
plans for local defence (see chapter three) had been much influenced by De 
Saxe’s theories,763 and it would seem that the criticisms voiced by members of 
the local elite arose – like protests in Britain against the Militia Act (see chapter 
five) – as a result of a misunderstanding of these principles. For example, while 
he had warned that an army on the march might well be disrupted by bad roads, 
and rendered vulnerable to ambush,764 De Saxe had at no point argued that 
such a state of affairs should be relied upon as a means of defence. As Doyle 
observed, should an overwhelming enemy oblige the local troops to retreat, it 
was likely that the latter would become ‘entangled in the very trap proposed for 
the enemy’.765 Similarly, while it was true that a single broken-down cart might 
stop a column of troops ‘for many hours’,766 it must be remembered that the 
majority of the local inhabitants were often ill-acquainted with the roads outside 
their own parishes.767 Consequently, they would have been just as liable to get 
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lost or bogged down in the country lanes, surrendering the advantage to the 
enemy troops, many of who would have experienced such conditions during 
operations against the Vendéans and Chouans (see chapter nine).768   
 
Again, a comparison between the Channel Islands and the island bases of the 
Mediterranean serve to demonstrate the erroneous nature of the criticisms put 
forward by the local elite. Just as the chemins of Jersey and Guernsey were 
rendered impassable to cavalry or artillery in wet weather, so the roads in Malta 
were often found to be so dusty in dry weather that it was almost impossible to 
ride or even walk on them without choking.769 Similarly, although the eighteenth 
century had witnessed the construction of several military roads in Sicily, these, 
in common with the Channel Islands’ chemins de roi, were too few in number to 
be of significant benefit. Moreover, Gregory has estimated that the condition of 
the former had deteriorated to such an extent that it cost more to transport 
goods to Palermo from the interior of Sicily than it did to send them on to 
markets in Paris or London.770 As for Corsica, the construction programme 
which had been implemented following the French occupation served as a clear 
illustration of the benefits of good-quality roads, both with respect to local 
defence and the enforcement of public order (see chapter five). Following the 
construction of the military roads, significant progress had been made in the 
suppression of Corsican banditry,771 and although the Channel Islands did not 
experience this problem on the same scale, the chemins were acknowledged 
nonetheless as a haven for criminals.772 
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The Causes of Stagnation – Legal Structures 
 
In addition to the abovementioned resistance to the construction of the military 
roads, earlier neglect of this aspect of the defence of the Channel Islands arose 
from the lack of legislative support in either bailwick, and a consequent reliance 
upon ‘ancient’ customs. Despite reforms to Jersey’s penal code (see chapter 
one), no attempt was made before the Great French War to modernise the laws 
governing highway maintenance; instead, each Midsummer’s Day saw the 
performance of the Branchage, a ceremony which had been carried out in the 
island since the medival period.773 Each of the Connétables, in company with 
his junior officers, would rendezvous in turn with the Bailiff, Viscount – the 
Executive Officer of the Royal Court – and three or more Jurats; they would 
then process through the chemins of the parish, with fines being issued against 
any landowner whose trees or hedges had overgrown the path. In addition, 
should any of the chemins themselves be found to be in an unacceptable state 
of repair, the costs of putting them right would be met through the levying of 
fines against the parish assembly.774 However, due to the fertility of Jersey’s 
soil, the actual effect of the Branchage was minimal: so rapidly did vegetation 
grow during the late summer that by the eighteenth century, it had become 
necessary to conduct a second Branchage in the autumn.775 
 
As for Guernsey, highway maintenance in that island was enforced by means of 
the Chevauchée de se Majesté: essentially a secular version of the inspection 
which had, in the medieval period, formed part of the preparations for the 
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Eucharistic Procession on the feast of Corpus Christi. Although the Reformation 
had stripped away the religious context of the practice, its basic purpose 
remained the same; to enable heavy fines and other punishments to be levied 
against any landowner who had permitted the public roads to fall into 
disrepair.776 However, a number of crucial differences existed between the 
Chevauchée and the Branchage: not only was the former conducted on a 
triennial rather than annual basis, but instead of surveying all the roads in the 
island, the Chevauchée inspected only the chemins du roi.777 Consequently, not 
only does there seem to have been no other form of ‘official’ highway 
maintenance in Guernsey, but the Chevauchée was rendered yet more 
problematic by the fact that its coverage embraced only a very small number of 
the Island’s roads on each occasion. Moreover, it appears that the Chevauchée 
had long been observed with little seriousness in the rural parishes: even by the 
eighteenth century, it was treated as little more than a public holiday, 
occasioning disorder and raucous behaviour.778 
 
In spite of the difficulties caused by this lack of effective legislative machinery, 
Don and Doyle were by no means the first commanders-in-chief to expend any 
energy in trying to improve the state of the local roads. Indeed, Gordon’s 
records reveal that at least some attempt had been made during the final 
decade of the eighteenth century to compensate for the lack of any ‘official’ road 
maintenance. Recognising the inadequacy of the Branchage, the Lieutenant-
Governor had enlisted the help of the Connétables in ensuring that more 
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regular, albeit ad hoc, inspections were carried out in the rural parishes. The 
importance of this simple measure was seen as early as May 1803, when it was 
discovered ‘a great number of trees in many parts of the Island’ were 
obstructing the roads, and ‘causing a nuisance by stopping the passage of 
artillery’.779 Likewise, Gordon was quick to recognise that the country lanes 
were ‘totally unsuitable for the rapid movement of troops’,780 and although he 
may not have suggested the construction of proper military roads, he 
nonetheless attempted to compensate for this weakness. Not only did he 
prioritise the maintenance of the chemins de roi that connected Grouville, St. 
Helier and St. Clement,781 but he also extended the authority of the 
Connétables over the parochial road committees,782 then a subdivision of the 
Police Honorifique (see chapter five). 
 
As for measures enacted in the aftermath of the construction of the military 
communications, the most important addition to the local legislative framework 
took place in April 1812, when Don presented the a complaint to the States of 
Jersey respecting the island’s ‘Code of Road Laws’. According to the 
Lieutenant-Governor, the existing legislation was ‘extremely defective in several 
essential points’, and he announced that a special Committee would be 
appointed for the purpose of drawing up a revised version.783 The coverage of 
the new Code was extensive, but the most important innovation was the 
strengthening of the laws relating to the Branchage, in that the minimum fine for 
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any infraction being set at 1s 6d, with no statutory upper limit.784 However, it 
should also be noted that the officer of Voyer (Road Inspector) now became a 
compulsory position, and any man who refused to comply with an order to 
render service could be fined by the Connétable.785 Finally, although no explicit 
mention is made in the first edition of the new Code, Le Cras states that it had 
become standard practice by the 1830s for a portion of all fines to be given over 
to the Committees,786 and it is possible that such measures had been 
introduced by Don as a means of funding road maintenance. 
 
The Causes of Stagnation – Social Factors 
 
Although the promotion of the military road scheme had been recognised by 
Doyle as one of his most important tasks, opposition from the inhabitants made 
it impossible for him to make any progress, and as late as 1809, the condition of 
the local roads remained untenable.787 However, while the States of Guernsey 
was eventually forced to admit that a lack of adequate legislation had allowed 
the condition of the roads to deteriorate for almost a century,788 it is possible 
that a number of social factors had also encouraged a lack of development. 
First and foremost, the social and economic situation in the Channel Islands at 
the end of the eighteenth century meant that the majority of the inhabitants – in 
common with their counterparts in Sicily and Malta789 – simply saw no reason to 
improve the roads.790 At the close of the eighteenth century, the economy of the 
Channel Islands was almost exclusively agrarian, with a smattering of cottage 
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industries such as textiles, brewing and cooping; consequently, the vast 
majority of the native inhabitants remained tied to the land, with many living out 
their entire lives within the parish bounds.791 Such isolationism was reflected in 
the inhabitants’ respective reasons for opposing the military roads (see below), 
with the rural islanders focusing on the destruction of their property, and their 
urban counterparts placing far more emphasis on the likely cost.792 
 
Even with the emergence of the Channel Islands as entrepots for trade with 
North America, the Mediterranean and the Baltic, there was little in the way of 
internal traffic,793 and with so little contact between the rural and urban 
islanders, suspicion and distrust were inevitable. Aside from their political 
disagreements (see chapter one), the inhabitants of St. Peter Port, St. Helier 
and St. Aubin looked upon the rural parishes as being dangerous and wild, 
rarely, if ever, venturing into the countryside.794 Conversely, the labouring 
classes in the country parishes regarded the emerging urban bourgeois and 
merchants as both failing to ‘pay their way’ in terms of taxation and actively 
conspiring with the rural elites to manipulate local market prices.795 Again, this 
situation paralleled that which existed in the Mediterranean: in Malta, the urban 
population regarded their rural compatriots as being ‘little better than savages’, 
while in Sicily, the inhabitants of the capital were often dismissed by their 
compatriots as ‘wretched and corrupt’.796 However, the tensions in the Channel 
Islands were exacerbated by the significant rural-urban migration which had 
dominated the second half of the eighteenth century; between 1727 and 1800, 
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the population of St. Peter Port increased by 152.9%, while that of Guernsey as 
a whole increased by only 82.1%.797 
 
Aside from the intransigent attitude fostered by intense parochialism, it is also 
evident that the inhabitants of the rural parishes regarded the improvement of 
the Islands’ road system as a potential threat to traditional local life. As 
mentioned at the start of this chapter, Doyle came under criticism from moralists 
who suspected that modern roads would tempt the populace into extravagant 
habits.798 While such fears may seem ridiculous or trite, it is clear from Doyle’s 
own records that they were taken extremely seriously by a small but vocal 
section of Guernsey’s rural elite. In seeking to counter the moralist argument, 
the Commander-in-Chief expressed his understanding that such fears were 
linked implicitly to the belief that good quality roads would lead to a greater 
instance of highway robbery and other forms of violent crime.799 Certainly, such 
crimes were far from unknown in the Islands,800 but the idea that better-quality 
roads would exacerbate the problem could be readily disproved through 
reference to the Continent. As has been already stated, the development of 
good quality roads had facilitated the suppression of banditry in France and 
Italy,801 meaning that ‘modern’ roads could be advocated both as a benefit for 
the defence of the bailiwicks and the maintenance of law and order. 
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Ignorance of Military Theory 
 
In addition to these ‘moralist’ protesters, the Channel Islands’ country parishes 
also provided the main support base for a group of enthusiastic but ill-informed 
amateur strategists who sought to acquaint Don and Doyle with their opinions 
respecting the reform of the roads. As has been already mentioned, the 
compulsory nature of local militia service, together with the fact that all officers 
and ncos had served as privates in their early years, ensured that all men, 
irrespective of rank, attained the same degree of basic training.802 However, 
while attempts to educate the militiamen in the basics of military strategy and 
encourage independence of thought amongst company-grade officers and ncos 
may have greatly improved the efficiency of the militia (see chapter two),803 it 
also served as a double-edged sword. In particular, it must be remembered that 
this education was carried out within the ‘part-time’ structure of the militia drills 
rather than through a dedicated military college, creating a large number of half-
informed amateur strategists who, while having the best interests of the Islands 
at heart, nonetheless caused their respective Commanders-in-Chief a great 
deal of angst.804 Just as the Ancien Régime saw over fifty schemes proposed 
for the invasion of the Channel Islands – the majority of which were never put 
into operation805 – so Don and Doyle were flooded with comments and criticism 
over the government’s plan for the defence of the bailiwicks.806 
 
The chief problem caused by these amateurs was that, while they may well 
have been driven by a desire to ‘do their bit’ with respect to local defence, their 
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actions served only to delay the implementation of the plans already approved 
by government. More importantly, not only were the criticisms of the military 
roads built upon a fundamental misunderstanding of their purpose, but they 
appear, in many cases, to have wilfully misrepresented the nature of the road 
scheme (see above). In addition to the erroneous claim that the poorly-
maintained chemins might serve as a trap for an invader, it was also assumed 
that the French would be wholly ignorant as to the nature of the local roads, and 
particularly those leading to St. Helier and St. Peter Port. However, while 
Dumouriez – architect of the 1771 Invasion of Jersey – may have deserted from 
the Army of the Republic in April 1793 (see chapter three), it is likely that other 
veterans of that campaign remained in its ranks. Moreover, even if the frequent 
reports of French spies and double-agents807 had no basis in reality, it must be 
remembered that many of the Breton-Norman conscripts swept up by the 
French army would have enjoyed frequent peacetime contact with Channel 
Islands, either as merchants or labourers.808 
 
As Doyle observed in his abovementioned speech, if the existing state of the 
chemins offered a tactical advantage outweighing that provided by good-quality 
roads, the enemy would not be adopting the techniques of Telford or Trésaguet, 
but would be ‘narrowing or breaking up their roads‘.809 Overall, therefore, the 
chief error on the part of his critics appears to have stemmed from a belief that 
any advantages offered by the military roads would be more readily apparent to 
the enemy than the defenders. Consequently, both Don and Doyle took care to 
emphasise that the new roads formed only one aspect of a much broader 
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scheme of defence, providing as a means by which the Islands’ various 
fortifications and batteries might be combined into a single network.810 In 1809, 
for example, Don proposed the creation of three ‘grand military stations’ – one 
each at St. Ouen’s Heights, St. Aubin’s Bay and Grouville Heights – with 
smaller stations at Noirmont, Greve de Lecq, Sorel Point, Bonne Nuit, Bouley 
Bay, Rozel, and St. Catherine’s Bay. Following their connection, along with that 
of the military roads, it was predicted that ‘the divisional corps [might] aid each 
other’, and that ‘troops of every description might advance with rapidity to any 
point menaced or attacked’.811 
 
However, the most significant measure adopted by Don and Doyle in their 
attempt to discredit opposition was that of inviting members of the States to 
attend the garrison and militia field exercises, allowing their critics to see for 
themselves the value of the military roads. The first such demonstration was 
held in December 1806, following the completion of the military road between 
St. Helier and Grouville,812 but a far more detailed picture is provided by a report 
of the exercises of May 1808, held on the new road between Third Tower (St. 
Aubin) and the Parish Church of St. Ouen. Having been mustered in St. Aubin’s 
Bay, the troops813 were ordered to repulse an attempted landing on the northern 
flank of St. Ouen’s Bay and engage in a systematic search for any enemy 
detachments which might have succeeded in getting inland. Then, it being 
imagined that the enemy had been checked and that their remaining forces 
were attempting to land at St. Aubin, an order was given for the artillery and 
cavalry to detach from the main column, conduct a countermarch, and oppose 
                                                 
810 SJA, A/A1/2, Letter of August 7th 1806 
811 SJA, L/F/106/A/1, ‘Report Submitted by Don to ‘Gentlemen Unknown’’, August 13th 1809 
812 SJA, A/A1/2, Letters of December 25th 1806  
813 No record exists as to how many troops were involved, but the Militia Horse Artillery, Militia Light 
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the new attack.814 As with the exercise of 1806, the conclusion of Don and his 
colleagues was emphatic: ‘the speedy transport of artillery and troops to the 
different parts of the coast…must appear so clearly to every person who was 
present…that it is unnecessary to make any [further] comment’.815 
 
More Widespread Opposition  
 
As has been mentioned, opposition to the construction of the military roads in 
Guernsey was particularly vocal: the final ‘supplementary communication’ – a 
périphérique (ring-road) around the coast of the island – was not completed 
until 1812.816 Although initial construction in Jersey was more rapid – the 
military road between St. Helier and Grouville Bay being opened only months 
after Don’s arrival817 – the network as a whole remained incomplete by the time 
that he departed for Gibraltar in 1814.818 In both bailiwicks, the main catalyst for 
opposition to the military roads was provided by a combination of ignorance and 
misunderstanding concerning the prospective value of the scheme, both in 
relation to local defensive needs and the socio-economic benefits which might 
be derived from a modernised road system. When, for example, the editors of 
the Jersey and Guernsey Magazine wrote a belated eulogy to Don in 1837,819 
they asked their readers to recall ‘the many prejudices he had to overcome, and 
the difficulty he had in persuading the country people that good roads were to 
their advantage’.820 However, it must be acknowledged that the inhabitants also 
resisted the construction of the military roads on economic grounds, and that 
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their fears of increased taxation were adjudged by Johnson to be ‘the most valid 
reason’ for opposition to the roads.821  
 
Beginning with the objection on the grounds of damage to property, it is true 
that the construction of the military roads entailed the buying-up of a 
considerable amount of private land. Since they were designed to permit the 
deployment of troops to the most likely landing-places by the most direct 
route,822 it was necessary that the new roads be built as straight as possible, in 
the manner of Roman roads. Although the chemins du roi could serve as a 
template for the new roads,823 the chemins du huit pieds and chemins du 
quatres pieds were too narrow and winding to be of any use in this respect, and 
those crossing the path of the new military roads were simply demolished. 
Moreover, a system similar to enclosure824 was employed to permit the military 
roads to cut across private land: a policy which was implemented primarily in 
the northern parishes of Jersey and the parish of St. Brelade.825 In Guernsey, 
the destruction of private property was less problematic, since only two principal 
military roads were constructed; one running from St. Peter Port to Vazon Bay, 
and the other from St. Peter Port to L’Erée Bay.826 Although this difference in 
scale was a natural consequence of Guernsey being only two-thirds the size of 
Jersey, it also reflected the fact that the former possessed far fewer points at 
which an enemy might be able to land in strength.827 
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Turning to the matter of expense, there are a number of reasons as to why this 
was considered to be one of the more logical objections entertained on the part 
of the local population, and why, therefore, is was treated with greater 
seriousness by the Lieutenant-Governors. First and foremost, in addition to the 
need to drive the new roads across privately-owned land, the construction of the 
military communications was dependent upon a number of other civil 
engineering projects, all of which entailed costs to the public purse. Jersey, for 
example, was crossed in a north-south direction by several streams and brooks 
(see map p), and while none was comparable to the fast-flowing rivers in 
Corsica,828 it was still necessary for their courses to be diverted in order to 
protect the new roads from the ever-present risk of flooding.829 For example, 
although the stream in question was so shallow as to be able to be crossed on 
foot,830 the construction of the new military road at St. Aubin’s barracks required 
the building of a wall to divert the stream running down from Westmount. Not 
only did this serve to protect the new road from being flooded, but it also 
prevented the stream from overflowing into the barrack privy, reducing the 
potential for the outbreak of disease amongst the troops (see chapter two).831  
 
However, possibly the most important piece of civil engineering to take place in 
the Channel Islands during the Great French War was the reclamation of the 
Braye du Valle, a tidal channel which then separated the Clos du Valle from the 
rest of the Parish of Vale. The daily flooding of the Braye led to the creation of a 
salt marsh approximately 814 Guernsey vergées (0.5 square miles) in area,832 
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and although the resultant saltpans had been exploited by a number of local 
merchants,833 it presented Doyle with three serious problems vis-à-vis local 
defence. Firstly, the area was totally unsuitable for the construction of a military 
road, since even at low tide, the only access to the Clos du Valle was via three 
small fords.834 Secondly, the tidal island of Clos du Valle – if occupied by an 
enemy force of sufficient strength as to hold it against assault – could be easily 
transformed into a secure position from which to bombard the northern flank of 
both the town and harbour of St. Peter Port.835 Finally, the daily flooding of the 
Braye meant that the Clos du Valle might be rendered secure – especially at 
high tide – against a land-based assault, providing an enemy with a base from 
which to mount an attack on the rest of the Island.836  
 
As with the construction of the military roads themselves, the draining of the 
Braye attracted significant opposition: both from the owners of the saltpans – 
who stood to lose a major source of income – and the landowners who were 
forced to surrender valuable cultivable land. Again, Duncan records that the 
protests made against the project were an example of ‘the most ignorant 
opposition from those who benefited the most from it’,837 but Doyle appears to 
have adopted a similar approach to that which he had employed in 1803 (see 
above). Working on the principle that, when properly informed of all the relevant 
facts, his critics would quickly find themselves in agreement with the 
government’s proposals, Doyle addressed the principal inhabitants of Vale at a 
public meeting,838 and it is recorded that his ‘tact and perseverance’ carried the 
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day.839 However, it is likely that a considerable incentive was also provided by 
the amount of compensation which was paid out to those affected by the 
scheme. While the saltpans were purchased from Messrs. Hardy and Le 
Mesurier on September 15th 1805 for the sum of £1,750, a further £1,500 was 
awarded as compensation on January 26th 1806 to the principal landowners of 
the parish, which included the Marchant, Sau(s)marez, and Dobrée families.840 
 
Financing the Military Roads 
 
The reclamation of the Braye was of great value in terms of the defence of 
Guernsey: just as Dover’s northern flank was screened by fortifications on the 
Western Heights,841 so fortifications on the Braye could now support those on 
the Clos du Valle in defence of St. Peter Port. Indeed, the stretch of coast 
bordering Ancresse Common was the most heavily defended outside of St. 
Peter Port itself; of the fifteen Conway Towers built in Guernsey during 1778-79, 
six were situated in Ancresse Bay, while two more flanked the western end of 
the Braye.842 By 1815, these defences had been augmented by the construction 
of Pembroke Fort and Le Marchant Fort (mounting three 24-pdrs and six 24-
pdrs respectively) as well as four coastal batteries in Ancresse Bay (mounting a 
total of three 24-pdrs, nine 20-pdrs and one 9-pdr).843 In addition, while the 
measure itself was by no means universally welcomed, the reclaimed land was 
subsequently sold off for £5,000, this sum being gifted by Doyle to the States of 
Guernsey on the condition that it was used to finance the construction of the 
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island’s military roads.844 Although the issue of funding was acknowledged by 
the Lieutenant-Governor as having gained the greatest credence amongst the 
population, he dismissed it nonetheless as ‘a raw head and bloody-bones held 
out…in order to scare the people’.845  
 
In the same way that amateur military theorists were not shy in putting forward 
their own recommendations for the defence of the Islands, it appears that a 
small number of the abovementioned ‘worthy gentlemen’ appointed themselves 
as financial advisors to the States. While it is possible that their calculations 
represented a genuine attempt to estimate the total cost of the military roads, 
the sums which they arrived at were quickly dismissed by Doyle and his 
colleagues as being wildly inaccurate. Indeed, one commentator claimed that 
the roads would cost £1,500 per mile, while another – a man who the 
Lieutenant-Governor described as having ‘out-Heroded Herod’ – predicted that 
the total cost might reach £50,000’. In addition to these ill-informed critics, Doyle 
identified the existence of another group of detractors: men who – while not 
publicly opposed to the idea of the military roads – declared that the scheme 
should be funded entirely by voluntary subscription, rather than through 
taxation. Although subscription had already proved successful in Alderney – in 
1798, Le Mesurier had funded the purchase of four 9-pdrs and two 6-pdrs by 
means of a ‘public and voluntary fund’846 – public taxation was rendered yet 
more unpopular by a rumour that each inhabitant would be required to pay as 
much as 2s 6d per quarter.847 
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Although it is perhaps easy to understand why such widespread objection 
should have arisen with respect to the tax, it is also clear that Doyle was fully 
justified in describing the general population as having been misled by ‘a raw 
head and bloody bones’. First and foremost, the public speculation as to the 
overall cost of the military roads was vastly at odds with the actual figure: for 
example, even after taking account of the need to compensate the landowners, 
Don’s official estimate for the military road between St. Helier to St. Aubin gave 
a figure of only £7,000.848 As for Guernsey’s two military roads, Don’s estimates 
placed the total cost at no more than £2,000 each, including compensation, with 
annual maintenance costs of £20 per mile,849 and even the highest estimates 
put forward by the States of Guernsey set the cost of the entire road project at 
only £8,773, exclusive of compensation.850 Consequently, it can be seen that 
the cost of the Channel Islands’ military roads was comparable to that of the 
1,100 miles of military roads constructed in Scotland in the wake of the Jacobite 
Risings.851 During the mid-eighteenth century, estimates for the maintenance 
costs of both the Highland and Lowland roads fluctuated between £18 and £25 
per mile, while during the 1810s, the cost was estimated at between £7 4s and 
£11 16s per mile.852 
 
Overall, many of the objections raised with respect to the employment of an ad 
hoc tax proved to be just as misplaced as those raised over the construction of 
the roads themselves. Again, Don and Doyle were able to cite a clear precedent 
for the implementation of a tax: during the latter half of the eighteenth century, 
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the States of Jersey and Guernsey had used this method to raise funds for a 
number of local projects. The most important – at least within the context of this 
thesis – were the construction of a new prison in each Bailiwick (see chapter 
five) and the completion of the new breakwater for the harbour at St. Peter Port 
(see chapter six).853 Furthermore, in spite of the abovementioned rumours that it 
would be necessary to levy an income tax of 2s 6d per quarter, Doyle was able 
to demonstrate that this was yet another wild over-exaggeration, and that the 
sum required of each rate-payer would not exceed 9d per quarter.854 Even with 
the sizeable disparity between the two figures, it was estimated that this tax, if 
raised over 134,000 quarters – two years, based on a population of 16,750 
taxpayers – would still generate more than £5,000 towards the total cost of the 
road scheme.855 Again, the comparison with Scotland shows up favourably: 
according to an Act of 1819, the Treasury was obliged to find a sum of £5,000 
for the upkeep of the Highland roads, but this is believed to have equated to 
one quarter of the overall cost.856 
 
In addition to the States and the inhabitants having a ‘shared responsibility’ to 
meet the cost of the Channel Islands’ military roads, the cost of implementing 
the scheme was also met through the provision of several thousand pounds 
from both the British government and private investors. In April 1807, for 
example, the King personally granted £1,000 to the military roads project in 
Jersey, a sum equal to that drawn on the Treasury during the same month for 
the maintenance of the island’s towers and batteries.857 Similarly, although the 
States had advanced £2,020 3s 6d towards the construction of the second of 
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Guernsey’s military roads (see above), it was announced that the British 
government had allotted the Engineers a budget of £10,000 for the upkeep of 
the road system as a whole.858 At the same time, both Don and Doyle were also 
employing a number of cost-cutting measures to decrease the strain on the 
public purse, particularly the employment of the inhabitants as a conscripted 
labour force. As explained above, the inhabitants of each parish were required 
to assist in the upkeep of the roads,859 while Gordon had employed working 
parties from each Vingtaine to assist in the repair of defences damaged by bad 
weather.860 This latter system was both expanded and formalised in the later 
years of the Great French War:861 by 1807, the working parties had been placed 
under the command of officers of the Police Honorifique, and were grouped into 
‘divisions’ commanded by militia officers.862  
 
Finally, it must be noted that several ‘conventional’ methods were employed to 
reduce the cost of the military roads: in addition to the above-mentioned tax, it 
was decided to capitalise on the Islands’ extensive trade in Portuguese wines 
and French wines and spirits, increasing import duty on these items by 3d.863 
Furthermore, in line with a suggestion made by those inhabitants who had 
spoken in opposition to the use of general taxation, both Don and Doyle agreed 
to allow the setting up of a public subscription. According to the former, the 
money so raised allowed the communication from St. Aubin to St. Helier to be 
completed ‘without any charge against [the British] government or the States’.864 
Most innovative, however, was Don’s decision to use a public lottery as a 
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means to ‘seize upon the mind of a speculative Jerseyman’: even after 
deducting £60,000 in prizes and approximately £1,200 in running costs, the 
lottery still raised £10,800 for of the military roads.865 Unfortunately, no record 
has survived to show how the profits were distributed, but given that Don 
estimated the total cost of the military road between St. Helier and St. Aubin at 
no more than £7,000,866 it is reasonable to suggest that at least part of this profit 
was used to fund the other military roads in the island. 
 
The last great ‘cost-cutting’ measure employed with respect to the construction 
of the military roads was one which had been employed with great effect in the 
Scottish Highlands;867 namely, the use of military working parties to assist the 
contracted civilian labour force. By the time that construction of the military 
roads was underway in 1809, a similar system was already familiar to the 
Channel Islands’ garrisons; regimental working parties being employed, along 
with the military artificers and engineers, in the construction of Fort Regent (see 
chapter three).868 In the case of the military roads, detachments of garrison 
infantry were deployed in all parts of the Islands: in June 1810, for example, a 
party of forty-three men was posted to the military communication from Mont 
Felard to St. Lawrence, while fifty-three men assisted with the construction of 
the road from Bouley Bay to St. Helier.869 The following year, similar 
detachments were tasked with the repair of the military roads in St. Ouen’s Bay 
and St. Lawrence,870 and in 1812, further parties spearheaded work on the 
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smaller communications at Grouville, Le Hocq and Archirondel.871 Not only did 
the use of conscripted military labour represent a significant saving,872 but it 
enabled the roads to be constructed at great speed, the communication 
between St. Aubin to St. Helier being built in only four months.873 
 
The Effectiveness of the Military Roads – Binding Together the Defences 
 
In terms of the advantages provided by the military roads, the resultant mobility 
afforded to the troops was of crucial importance: not least because, in the event 
of an enemy landing, the coastal defences were intended only to delay the 
disembarkation of an enemy force (see chapter three). As with the south coast 
of England, it was perceived that the rapid arrival of infantry, cavalry and field 
artillery via the military roads would, in company with the towers, allow for the 
infliction of mass slaughter upon that enemy.874 As Don observed, the coast of 
Jersey was ‘extremely well calculated for the combined movements of cavalry 
and infantry’,875 and the abovementioned field exercises provided ample 
evidence – albeit theoretical – that the roads would enhance significantly the 
mobility of the local troops. Moreover, while no actual invasion took place, it is 
still possible to make reasonably accurate predictions as to the manner in which 
the various elements of the Islands’ defences would have been enabled to 
coordinate their operations in the event of an enemy invasion. This is achieved 
primarily by comparing the routes of the principal roads with the placement of 
the various defences and other facilities which had been constructed earier in 
the war (see chapter three). 
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The largest and most important of the military roads constructed in Jersey were 
the three which joined together to create a continuous line of communication 
from St. Ouen in the west to Gorey in the east, via the towns of St. Aubin and 
St. Helier.876 As Don had observed in 1806, the benefits of the new military 
roads would facilitate ‘the speedy transport of artillery and troops to [all] the 
different parts of the coast’,877 however, the road from St. Aubin to St. Helier – 
running along the landward side of the pre-existing defences878 – had the 
additional benefit of enabling troops to pass between the two towns at any time 
of day. Prior to the construction of this road, the extensive sand dunes inland of 
the bay had forced both military and commercial traffic to cross from St. Aubin 
to St. Helier via the beach; a route which, like the fords across the Braye du 
Valle in Guernsey (see above) was impassable at high tide. In total, eighteen 
military roads were constructed in Jersey (see map p), but in Guernsey, the final 
programme (see map o) was smaller even than that which Doyle had 
envisioned, his original proposal having called for four main roads to be built 
between Fort George, L’Ancresse, Rocquaine and Vason.879  
 
Of the military communications constructed in Jersey, the majority of these were 
of secondary importance, in that they assisted in the defence of the plethora of 
smaller bays which indented the coast. Although previous descents on the 
Island had targeted the larger bays on the western and southern coasts (see 
chapter three), the success with which smugglers had operated out of the 
isolated northern bays demonstrated that these might easily allow for the 
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landing of diversionary attacks.880 According to Don, there were seven points 
around the coast of Jersey where the enemy might make a landing,881 and the 
‘second rank’ military roads provided a key solution to the problem of defending 
these isolated stretches of coast. In terms of strategic value, however, the most 
important of the ‘minor’ military roads were those which connected St. Helier to 
St. John and St. Martin,882 since these communications served as access 
routes to the four small bays which had received the greatest amount of 
reinforcement since 1792. In the former parish, Bonne Nuit was defended by 
three batteries mounting a total of four 12-pdrs and two 18-pdrs,883 and Grève 
de Lecq by a Conway Tower and two batteries mounting four 12-pdrs and two 
6-pdrs.884 In the latter parish, St. Catherine’s Bay was defended by three 
Conway Towers and three batteries mounting three 24-pdrs and four 18-pdrs, 
and Rozel Bay by five batteries mounting two 12-pdrs and five 6-pdrs.885  
 
However, in order to maximise the defensive advantages of the military roads, 
both Islands were provided with a number of smaller communications to replace 
the chemins du huit pieds et quatre pieds. Unlike the main ‘military roads’, these 
were not designed to permit the passage of large or mixed-arms columns, but 
for more specialised purposes; for example, a series of small communications 
was built in Jersey to connect the twelve parish churches.886 This circulatory 
route served the dual purpose of providing the militia regiments to access their 
respective arsenals887 and permitting the militia artillery – whose guns were 
stored at the parish churches – to be deployed in strength against an enemy 
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886 SJA, L/F/106/A/1, ‘Report by General Don to ‘Gentlemen Unknown’’, August 13th 1809 
887 SJA, A/A1/6, Letter of September 16th 1810 
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landing.888 Similarly, a number of ‘infantry communications’ were built in both 
islands – the intention being to provide skirmishers or light troops with the 
means to rapidly reinforce the most likely points of assault889 – the most 
important of these being a circulatory route around the coast of each island.890 
In addition, two infantry communications were built in Jersey: one from Mont 
Orgueil Castle to Grosnez Point, the other from Petit Port to Noirmont Point;891 
while an artillery communication connected St. Ouen’s Bay, St. Brelade’s Bay 
and Greve de Lecq across the sand-dunes of Le Quennevais.892 
 
Finally, at least some mention is required of Alderney – dubbed variously the 
‘Gibraltar of the Channel’ and the ‘Buckler of England’893 – since although few 
records survive pertaining to the construction of its military roads, the island was 
of vital strategic importance (see chapter three).894 As Don emphasised, not 
only did its coastal defences help to protect the approach to Guernsey’s 
northern coast, but it also served as a base from which scout vessels could 
monitor French shipping (see chapter eight).895 Alderney was by far the closest 
island to the enemy coast,896 and a number of small-scale raids in the early 
months of the war897 had demonstrated its vulnerability to an expedition akin to 
that mounted against Jersey in 1781.898 As a result, the first of the two military 
roads constructed in Alderney (see map n) led from the town of St. Anne, in the 
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centre of the island, to Braye Harbour on the north coast, the largest and most 
accessible anchorage. This was defended by York Battery – mounting ten 18-
pdrs, two 6-pdrs and two howitzers – along with Grosnez, Rozelle and Braye 
Batteries, which mounted a total of one 32-pdr, seven 18-pdrs, seven 9-pdrs 
and two 9-pdr carronades.899 As for the second road, which ran along the length 
of the island, this facilitated the reinforcement of Longis Bay,900 defended by a 
total of two 32-pdr guns, six 20-pdr guns, three 18-pdr guns, seven 9-pdr guns, 
two 6-pdr guns, two 32-pdr carronades, two 24-pdr carronades, and one 6-pdr 
carronade.901 
 
The Final Assessment of the Roads 
 
In order to assess the success of the construction of the military roads, it is 
necessary to turn again to the vision of Don and Doyle for the defence of the 
bailiwicks; namely, that each island should be able to act both as an 
independent fortification902 and as part of an integrated system.903 Certainly, the 
military roads can be seen to have been implemented with total success, and – 
more importantly – at a cost which was far below the forecast made by the 
government, the taxpayer, and those scaremongers who cast the roads as a 
lavish ‘white elephant’. Not only did they provide the defenders with access to 
every point on the coast which might be targeted by the enemy, but more 
importantly, they enabled infantry, cavalry and artillery to work in concert with 
the static defences.904 Moreover, it was now possible for the defending forces to 
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move with a greater degree of speed and mobility to meet an attack, and to 
make complex alterations to the line and direction of march without having to 
contend with a maze of narrow roads.905 Consequently, the completion of the 
roads also enabled the full military exploitation of the signal stations, since not 
only would the local commanders be kept constantly updated as to the enemy’s 
movements,906 but they would be able to redeploy the local troops in response 
to the changing threat.907 
  
In addition to these strategic and tactical benefits, the military roads also 
assisted in meeting the Commanders’ objectives in improving troop health: as 
Davies notes, almost every foot of coastline in both bailiwicks was now 
accessible to infantry, even when fully laden with equipment.908 As a result, 
even in cases where they might be faced with a vastly superior force – the main 
concern which spurred critiques like Inglis909 – the defenders would still be fit to 
engage the enemy in a pitched battle.910 Such an advantage was vital, and not 
only because the vulnerability of the Channel Islands to simultaneous assault 
from multiple directions might oblige the defenders to fight several skirmishes in 
turn. The need for such provision was further exacerbated by the high numbers 
of sick and injured men recorded among the garrison in 1806 and 1807, as well 
as by the fact that a large proportion of the defensive force was comprised of 
invalids and veterans unfit for service in the field (see chapter three). Ultimately, 
the issue of troop health is the most telling factor in proving the advantage of 
the military roads, and it is the one factor which none of the contemporary critics 
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of the scheme appear to have considered. Although disease continued to 
trouble the garrison throughout the War,911 the elimination of the need to use 
either the old chemins or the sewer-like cobbled streets of St. Helier, St. Aubin 
and St. Peter Port significantly helped to contain future outbreaks.912 
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Chapter Five – Security and Internal Stability 
 
In light of various measures adopted by the British government over the course 
of the Great French War, it is clear that, regardless of their changing fortunes in 
other theatres, the risk of invasion from the Continent continued to occupy a 
dominant position with respect to strategic policy. In 1796, the Supplementary 
Militia Act had sought to raise an additional 60,000 men,913 and by 1804, the 
strength of the militia had increased to 85,000 men,914 similarly, between 1798 
and 1804, the volunteers expanded from 116,000 to 380,000 men.915 More 
importantly, while critics emphasised the enormous cost of the auxiliary force – 
£200,000 per annum for the sea fencibles – and mocked the troops as having 
‘no other use than to calm the fears of old ladies’,916 it must be remembered that 
the threat of invasion continued until 1812 (see chapter three). Indeed, while 
some recruits may well have treated enlistment in the auxiliary force as a 
chance to ‘escape [from] drudgery and mundane obligations’, experience ‘a 
pleasurable sense of risk and imminent drama’, or simply indulge ‘fantasy and 
wishful thinking’, such men would have been in the minority.917 With respect to 
the majority of auxiliaries, it is far more likely that they were – in the words of 
Major-General Sir John Moore and General John Maitland – ‘not at all dismayed 
at the prospect of meeting the French’, and motivated by ‘every degree of 
attachment to their country’.918 
 
                                                 
913 Colley, Britons, p. 302 
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Consequently, while it is true that the ultimate security of both Great Britain and 
the Channel Islands rested upon the regular army, Royal Navy and coastal 
fortifications, it would be a mistake to dismiss the auxiliary forces as having no 
value within the context of national or local defence. In February 1806, Keith 
reported that 2,500 invasion craft were assembled at Boulogne, and estimated 
that these might be able to transport as many as 169,000 men;919 while as late 
as 1811, Horse Guards envisaged that it might prove necessary to recruit up to 
400,000 militiamen as a safeguard against invasion.920 Indeed, while their 
potential value in the face of an enemy invasion may have been questionable, 
the various auxiliary forces were acknowledged nonetheless as a vital resource 
within the context of internal security and public order. As highlighted by Colley, 
recruitment for the volunteers relied heavily upon ‘tales of French oppression 
and atrocities in other lands’, and the message that ‘only [the recruits] could 
prevent similar evils from befalling their own shores’.921 In addition, the 
‘spectres’ of fifth columnists, radicals and spies were ever-present,922 and the 
‘hostile resentment’ which characterised the treatment of British radicalism prior 
to 1793 soon gave way to legislation designed to control aliens and crush 
‘traitorous correspondence’ between Britain and the Continent.923  
 
Far from acting as a ‘moat defensive’ isolating Great Britain from the rest of 
Europe, the English Channel acted far more in the manner of a ‘selectively 
permeable membrane’. While both the French and British governments took 
extensive steps to control migratory traffic, the maritime border continued to be 
crossed – both in peace and war – by spies, merchants, refugees, prisoners 
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and a host of other ‘special interest groups’ who were either permitted or 
encouraged to circumvent such restrictions (see section iii). Within this context, 
the Channel Islands occupied a key position as a ‘border gateway’: a strategic 
function which dated back to at least 1483, when Pope Sixtus IV had issued a 
bull conferring neutrality upon the bailiwicks. As Governor of the Habsburg 
Netherlands (1531-55), Mary of Hungary had complained that the English had 
exploited the situation ‘in order to barter freely with the French as often as they 
like, wiithout hindrance or restriction of any sort’.924 Moreover, while this 
particular loophole had been closed by William III, the privileges enjoyed by the 
Channel Islands under the Constitutions (see chapter one) meant that they 
retained de facto free port status.925 Consequently, not did they act as an 
entrepot for ilicit high-duty goods (see chapter seven), but subject to provisions 
laid down by the respective Lieutenant-Governors,926 the citizens of hostile 
powers were able to use the Channel Islands as a ‘back door’ into Britain.927  
 
Policing and Law Enforcement 
 
Although the dangers posed by migration were felt more keenly in the Channel 
Islands than in the remainder of the British Isles, this chapter will demonstrate 
that many of the threats to the internal security of the respective jurisdictions 
were broadly similar. The point at which the two situations may be seen to have 
diverged is with respect to the resources available for dealing with these 
threats, and more specifically, those which might be called upon – in the 
                                                 
924 Morieux, The Channel, p. 251 
925 Crossan, Poverty and Welfare, p. 12 
926 TNA, HO 98/3, Nepean to Falle, January 20th 1793 
927 SJA, A/C1/1, General Order of May 11th 1803; TNA, FO 95/615, Letter of July 28th 1803 and ‘Request 
for Information Concerning ‘Foreigners’, and Especially Irish Nationals’, April/May 1804; and SJA, 
A/A1/1, Letter of January 30th 1808 
 163 
absence of a ‘professional’ police – to assist in the enforcement of law and 
order. As mentioned above, the auxiliary forces were viewed by the British 
government as a vital asset within the context of maintaining law and order, and 
this has given rise to the traditional perception of eighteenth-century 
peacekeeping as one of ‘the subjugation of the people by military force’.928 
However, while the official response to popular protest has been often depicted 
as a combination of ‘savagery’ and ‘spectacular incompetence’,929 it must be 
remembered that the authorities – particularly when faced with a large-scale 
riot930 – possessed few options besides calling upon the assistance of the local 
soldiery.931 Even when – as during the 1796 Militia Riots – the civil powers 
responded by enrolling ‘special constables’ or other ad hoc officers,932 the 
volunteers and/or yeomanry continued to be regarded as the principal means of 
‘suppressing riot and tumult’.933 
 
In the Channel Islands too, the local military forces – including the garrison, the 
militia, and the various auxiliary corps (see chapter two) – were often called 
upon by the civil powers in order to assist in the enforcement of law and order 
or the apprehension of criminals. In June 1795, for example, reports of ‘a 
barbarous and wantonly cruel murder’ led to the Royal Guernsey Light 
Dragoons – then numbering at least fifty men934 – being ordered to undertake 
both daytime and night patrols of the rural parishes.935 However, while the 
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concept of a ‘professional’ police force would not gain popular support in the 
Channel Islands until the 1850s, the local authorities possessed a significant 
advantage over their British counterparts, in the shape of a formal, though 
unpaid, civil law enforcement body.936 Overall responsibility for parochial law 
and order fell to the Connétable, although subtle differences existed with 
respect to their duties in each of the bailiwicks. In Jersey, the ratepayers of 
each parish elected a single Connétable, to whom was given the authority to 
preside over the Enditement – the parochial court – and command the parochial 
division of the Police Honorifique (see below).937 By contrast, each of 
Guernsey’s parishes elected two officers – the ‘Senior Constable’ presiding over 
the Douzaine (parish council) and the ‘Junior Constable’ assisting in local 
policing – with St. Peter Port also appointing four ‘Assistant Constables’.938  
 
With respect to Jersey’s Police Honorifique – which continues to exist alongside 
and act in cooperation with the modern States of Jersey Police – the origins of 
this force may be traced to the medieval period. In the late thirteenth or early 
fourteenth century, each parish had been empowered to create a body of men 
to ‘pursue wrongdoers, keep watch at night, guard prisoners in custody, and 
ensure that suspects seeking refuge in the parish churches did not escape’.939 
By the time of the Great French War, these parochial corps had evolved into a 
paramilitary organisation: the Connétable and Centeniers being akin to field 
officers; the Inspecteurs and Procureurs to staff officers; the Vingteniers to 
ncos; and the Officiers du Connétable to privates.940 In terms of manpower, the 
number of Centeniers and Vingteniers in each parish was proportional to the 
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population – the former varying from two to six – while in 1804, the number of 
Officiers  was set at twenty-four for St. Helier, fifteen for St. Brelade, and twelve 
each for the other ten parishes.941 In addition, the Loi Sur Les Assemblés 
Paroissales (1804) brought about an important change with respect to the role 
of the Vingteniers and Officiers du Connétable, since they were granted full 
powers of arrest within their respective Vingtaines.942  
 
Foodstuffs and Provisioning 
 
Within previous discussions of social disorder in Great Britain in the eighteenth 
century as a whole, the 1760s have been frequently identified as ‘the most 
remarkable decade of industrial disputes in the whole [period]’.943 Between 
1763 and 1765, weavers and miners in the northern counties of England 
engaged respectively in periodic machine-breaking and fire-setting, while the 
weavers of London ‘stormed through the streets, attacking persons and 
property’.944 Likewise, successive poor harvests during the middle of the 
decade led to spiralling bread prices, with 1768 witnessing not only widespread 
provincial riots, but also a wave of strikes and demonstrations amongst many 
London trades’.945 In the Channel Islands too, the 1760s witnessed some of the 
most significant events of the pre-war period, with the Jersey Rebellion (1769) 
having served as the catalyst for the introduction of the ‘Law Code of 1771’ (see 
chapter one). However, the significance of that event lies not only in its political 
implications, but also in its serving to highlight the fact that public disorder in the 
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Channel Islands – as with contemporary incidents in rural England – focused 
primarily on local grievances.946 Prompted by a series of failed harvests, the 
insurrection was fundamentally a protest against the exportation of corn 
supplies to Britain,947 the landowning elite being accused of having sought to 
artificially inflate local market prices.948 
 
Although the Jersey Rebellion was an exceptional event within the history of the 
Channel Islands, it illustrated nonetheless the influence of local agricultural 
trends upon wider social and political affairs. Consequently, while the issue of 
food supply has been already addressed in relation to ensuring the health of the 
garrison (see chapter two), the issue may also be discussed in terms of its 
providing ‘insurance’ against domestic instability. Indeed, an examination of 
local import figures provides some indication as to why the bailiwicks remained 
largely untroubled by the food riots which swept Britain during 1795-96, 1800-01 
and 1809-10.949 At the beginning of the Great French War, Jersey’s population 
exceeded 30,000950 – partly because 1791-3 had witnessed the arrival of 
several thousand French émigrés (see below) – and despite the strength of 
local agriculture, the economic strain was considerable.951 By August 1794, 
Guernsey’s flour stocks were almost spent – it being said that even the most 
affluent families had been without bread for a fortnight952 – and D’Auvergne was 
required to take under convoy a ‘fleet of victuallers’ laden with flour for the relief 
of the inhabitants.953 In addition, the Jersey Chamber of Commerce was 
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granted permission to hire ‘two fast-sailing vessels’ at a cost of £120 per month 
for the purpose of transporting regular supplies of cattle to the Islands,954 while 
a similar contract was negotiated for the delivery of surplus flour and grain.955 
 
In spite of such efforts, the Channel Islands remained highly dependent upon 
outside economic assistance throughout the Great French War; not least as a 
result of the depredations inflicted on local convoys.956 Immediately after the 
declaration of war, seventy British ships had been detained in French ports,957 
but due to their proximity to the enemy coast, the Channel Islands suffered 
especially heavy losses at the hands of both privateers and warships. By March 
1795 alone, a total of forty-three Jersey vessels had been captured by the 
enemy, including a Newfoundland convoy under protection of HMS Castor 
(frigate, 32 guns). These vessels had been intercepted on May 9th 1794, during 
the preliminary stages of the ‘Glorious First of June’, and although five had been 
recaptured by Howe while in pursuit of Villaret-Joyeuse, the British commander 
had been unable to spare any men to form prize crews. Consequently, Howe 
had ordered for the vessels to be burned, meaning that the total losses incurred 
by Jersey’s mercantile fleet during the first twenty-five months of the Great 
French War amounted to 892 men and 3,301 tons of shipping.958 In order to 
reduce the impact of this shortage on the inhabitants, the British government 
authorised the export of sheep, oxen, cattle, corn, grain, meal, flour, bread, 
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biscuit and pease,959 while ‘occasional supplies of live bullocks and sheep’ were 
procured from sympathetic Breton-Norman merchants.960 
 
Even with such arrangements in place, it must be remembered that the 
transportation of these supplies – as with those intended for the local garrisons 
(see chapter two) – required the support and protection of the Royal Navy, and 
particularly the vessels on the Channel Islands’ station. In February 1793, the 
merchants of Jersey had warned that ‘if there is not a supply of flour in the 
course of eight days there will be none in the Island’, and petitioned the 
Admiralty to both raise an embargo against eleven local vessels961 and appoint 
a warship to escort them to the bailiwicks.962 Likewise in April 1794, the 
abovementioned HMS Castor had been appointed to escort ‘ten or twelve 
vessels laden with flour’ from Cowes to the Channel Islands,963 and it appears 
that similar arrangements were made thereafter on an annual basis. In April 
1797, for example, D’Auvergne is recorded as having acted as intermediary 
between the Jersey Chamber of Commerce and the Admiralty, leading to an 
agreement that the Island’s fishing vessels should be escorted to Spithead or 
Torbay, and there fall in with larger trans-Atlantic British convoys.964 Although it 
is unclear as to the strength of the vessel appointed to this duty, a letter of April 
1799 records the Beaver (ship-sloop, 14 guns) having been sent from Spithead 
to convoy Jersey’s fishing fleet from thence to Newfoundland.965 
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However, in order to gain a complete picture of the stress placed upon local 
food supplies, it is not only necessary to take account of the French émigré 
community, but also the significant number of ‘camp followers’ who 
accompanied the expanded garrison (see chapter two).966 Although accurate 
records do not exist until the latter half of the Great French War, several 
military-style returns of the women, ‘boys’ and ‘girls’967 were taken during Don’s 
tenure as Lieutenant-Governor. In May 1809, for example, the Jersey garrison 
was recorded as being accompanied by 2,588 ‘followers’: 1,170 women, 701 
girls and 717 boys.968 As an indication of their likely impact on the Island’s 
economy, plans for the provisioning of Fort Regent were based upon the need 
to supply foodstuffs for only 2,000 men,969 in spite of the militia returns for 
December 1809 having recorded a strength of 3,740 men.970 Once again, the 
Channel Islands’ status as free ports can be seen as having offered a means to 
alleviate the strain on local resources, since it allowed merchants to circumvent 
the blockade instituted by the Orders in Council (1807). Moreover, since 
licensed wartime trade with the enemy permitted the importation of flour, meal, 
grain and wine from French ports in exchange for spirits and other ‘luxury’ 
products,971 the Channel Islands once again avoided the effects of the poor 
harvests which swept much of Britain during 1810-11.972 
 
Likewise, although 1812 saw the passage of an Act requesting that 2,500 
quarters of flour to be imported each year from Britain to Jersey, and a supply of 
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1,500 quarters of grain negotiated for the inhabitants of Guernsey,973 French 
ports continued to be exploited as a source of additional supplies. For example, 
the accounts of the Jersey merchant Charles Chevalier reveal that a single 
shipment of April 1812 brought into the Island ten tons of provisions, including 
‘corn, grain, meal, flour, seeds, fruit and wine’.974 However, the ability of the 
Islands to bypass the Continental System did not eliminate their dependence on 
British sources. Mirroring the actions taken by Gordon in response to the food 
shortages of 1795, Don personally secured two separate imports of one 
thousand live sheep, as well as an allowance of twenty tons of wine at 
government expense.975 In addition, similar importations of livestock had 
previously been arranged in 1808 and 1810 – on both occasions ‘for the supply 
of the troops and the inhabitants in general’976 – and it was said that both 
groups had experienced ‘great advantage’ as a result.977 Finally, it may be 
observed that such legitimate imports were further supplemented by the 
captures made by local privateers, the Channel Islanders enjoying continual 
success throughout the war (see chapter six). 
 
Religious Tension, Social Disruption – The Growth of Conscientious Objection  
 
As highlighted by Stevenson, outbreaks of violence during the eighteenth 
century often resulted in Britain’s religious minorities – chiefly Catholics and 
Dissenters – being seized upon as convenient scapegoats.978 During the 
Gordon Riots, for example, Lord George Gordon and his colleagues ‘appeared 
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to license the mob to attack Catholic property’, while during the Priestley Riots, 
the half-hearted response of the magistracy ‘virtually indicated to the population 
that the Dissenters were fair game’.979 Although no similar riots occurred in the 
Channel Islands, local religious tensions nonetheless ran deep: Catholicism, 
Calvinism, Methodism and Quakerism all being regarded as ‘alien’ doctrines 
imported by ‘foreigners’ (see chapter one). While the impact of anti-Catholic 
sentiment shall be addressed at a later point, tensions between the local 
Protestant denominations found considerable expression within the context of 
the debate over conscientious objection. At the start of the Great French War, 
militia service in the bailiwicks was considered obligatory for all native-born 
Islanders and naturalised citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation (see 
chapter two).980 Moreover, in common with the British yeomanry and 
volunteers,981 the local militia were regarded as a symbol of the inhabitants’ 
loyalty to the Crown, so the Channel Islands witnessed none of the rioting 
sparked by the passage of the Supplementary Militia Act (1796).982  
 
Within the Channel Islands, the ‘prime movers’ with respect to conscientious 
objection were the Methodists and the Quakers: though never as numerous as 
in Great Britain or Canada, these embryonic communities were regarded 
nonetheless as a serious threat to the established social order. In 1798, for 
example, the Dean of Jersey accused local Dissenters of ‘teaching their 
disciples to treat...the Church of England with a contemptuous disrespect’, while 
Gordon decried their preaching of conscientious objection as ‘a doctrine 
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adverse to the safety of the Island’.983 Moreover, the States of Jersey had 
sought to legalise the banishment of any man who failed to attend Sunday 
Drill,984 and although the measure was refused Royal Assent, the Privy Council 
did not wholly dismiss the sentiment behind this legislation. While the official 
ruling was that it was ‘impossible [at this time] to approve an Act of such 
severity against any body of His Majesty’s subjects, however misguided they 
may be’, indication was given that ‘a case of more excessive necessity and 
danger’ might necessitate a revision of the Council’s judgment.985 Similarly, 
although a petition on behalf of the Methodists of Guernsey and Alderney had 
secured their right to exemption from Sunday Drill,986 no such provision was 
enacted with respect to Guernsey’s Quakers, who continued to face arrest and 
imprisonment for non-attendance at drill.987  
 
As for conscientious objection among members of the Church of England, a 
‘test case’ was provided by Philip Arthur, a private in the South-West Regt. of 
the Jersey Militia. Although declaring himself ‘attached to no sect of Dissenters, 
but a member of the Church of England by Law Established’, Arthur asserted 
his belief that Sunday drill was a violation of God’s command to ‘remember the 
Sabbath and keep it holy’. Moreover, he claimed that the obligation of Sunday 
training was not derived from any written law, but was simply a customary 
practice, and that any militiaman - regardless of their religious affiliation – could 
request to attend drill on another day of the week.988 Initially, the authorities 
rejected this claim, arguing that permitting the militia to exercise on weekdays 
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would disrupt the work of Jersey’s farmers, fishermen and labourers,989 and as 
a result, Arthur was fined and imprisoned.990 However, he lodged an appeal 
against his sentence, providing the Privy Council with a detailed critique of the 
prosecution’s case, and highlighting that ‘no law, act or ordinance enforcing 
military service on Sundays has been adduced’.991 Ultimately, the Privy Council 
found in favour of Arthur, and as a result of the trial – which became a cause 
celebre – an Order in Council was issued to the effect that all militiamen might 
petition the Royal Court for a grant of exemption from Sunday drill.992 
 
The Émigré Community – Initial Reception 
 
While the final decade of the eighteenth century saw the Jeannots gain a 
majority in both the States and the Royal Court (see chapter one), their radical 
manifesto did not extend to the free exercise of religion. In contrast to the British 
government, which had increasingly recognised the political expediency of 
Catholic emancipation,993 the authorities in the bailiwicks continued to look upon 
adherents to the Roman Rite as posing a direct threat to the Anglican 
establishment.994 Moreover, as a result of the Channel Islands’ legislative 
independence (see chapter one), the British government could not – as they 
had done with respect to Ireland – pressurise the States into adopting a local 
version of the relief acts passed by Westminster.995 Consequently, while the 
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émigrés who arrived in 1791 were ‘reasonably well received’996 it is reasonable 
to assume that this attitude was encouraged by the fact that the majority of 
these refugees were of Breton-Norman origins,997 and thus shared ancestral, 
economic and social ties with their hosts.998 By contrast, not only did later 
groups of émigrés originate from as far afield as Paris, Bordeaux, Poitiers and 
Tours,999 but D’Auvergne was bombarded by complaints that their leaders, 
rather than seeking to integrate into the local community,1000 continued to 
behave ‘as if they were at Versailles or Fontainebleau’.1001   
 
According to a report of February 1794, Balcarres estimated that ‘upwards of 
4,000 Frenchmen, [including] about 2,300 clergy’ were then resident in the 
Channel Islands as a whole,1002 while De Beauchamp estimated that 1,200 
priests and several hundred members of ‘the nobles and privileged classes’1003 
had settled in Jersey.1004 Although accurate census data is unavailable before 
1806 (see chapter two), it may be estimated that the total population of the 
Channel Islands in 1795 – exclusive of émigrés, but inclusive of all other 
‘foreigners’ – stood at just under 43,000.1005 At the time of Guernsey’s first 
census, eighty-seven percent of inhabitants were classified as ‘natives’,1006 and 
assuming that this statistic was also true of 1795, this yields a ratio of one 
émigré to every nine ‘native’ islanders. Clearly, this large influx of refugees 
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placed a serious burden on the local economy: even in February 1792, it was 
reported that the émigré presence in Guernsey had caused the price of butter to 
double from 7d per lb to 14d per lb.1007 Likewise, March 1793 saw the Bishops 
of Bayeux, Tréguier and Dol – the leaders of the émigré community in Jersey – 
complain to Craig of ‘the great scarcity of provisions and the congruent high 
price of every necessary of life’.1008  
 
Although their availability as a scapegoat for economic problems has been often 
highlighted as a significant cause of the hardening attitude towards the 
émigrés,1009 it is also necessary to take account of the controversy which 
surrounded Fr. Matthieu de Gruchy.1010 As King notes, the initial tolerance of 
the émigré clergy had been conditional upon their refraining from making any 
attempt to convert the inhabitants or otherwise challenge the authority of the 
Church of England.1011 However, de Gruchy openly flouted this agreement, 
providing covert spiritual instruction to Elizabeth and Marie-Louise Gaudin and 
their housemaid Mary Mollet – the Gaundin sisters being received into the 
Catholic Church on February 19th 1794 – as well as at least fifteen other ‘native’ 
converts. Consequently, when a petition denouncing the émigrés was submitted 
to the Police Honorifique, de Gruchy’s name was ‘at the head of the list’, and his 
critics sought to employ the local militia laws as a means by which to force him 
to halt his activities.1012 Although the local authorities had accepted that Canon 
Law forbade the émigré priests to bear arms,1013 it was claimed that de Gruchy 
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– being both a native Jerseyman and a landowner – was still obliged to muster 
with the militia, and on March 6th 1794, he was summoned the Royal Court.1014  
 
However, this stratagem ultimately failed: immediately after his trial, de Gruchy 
travelled to London, and having secured an audience with Conway, received an 
official exemption from militia service.1015 Not only did this allow de Gruchy to 
return to Jersey without fear of further prosecution, but it is clear that he and his 
associates enjoyed even greater success in spreading the Catholic faith 
amongst the inhabitants. So great did the number of converts become that the 
States of Jersey attempted to pass an Act authorising the deportation of ‘all 
those Catholics...who had dared to attack the principles of the Protestant 
Religion so happily established in this Island.1016 Although Balcarres persuaded 
the States that such a move would be viewed by the Privy Council as ‘offensive 
and uncandid’, he reported that ‘even the moderate members...are inclined to 
think that the residence of such a large body [of Catholics] in so small an Island 
is a great oppression upon the people’.1017 With respect to de Gruchy, the 
matter was finally resolved as a result of the conversion of Elisabeth and Susan 
Pinel, their brother Thomas being summoned before the Royal Court in March 
1795.1018 Although not identified as one of the priests responsible for instructing 
the Pinels, it was understood that the prosecution was ‘principally directed 
against de Gruchy’, and the émigré leaders took the decision to send him to 
Southampton as Chaplain to the Irish troops stationed there.1019  
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Official Treatment and Public Perception of the Émigrés 
 
Despite the tensions which characterised much of the 1790s, reports of the 
excesses of the Revolution finally encouraged a more compassionate attitude to 
the plight of the émigrés; a shift which was evidenced by the creation of both 
government and publicly-funded relief programmes.1020 More elaborate 
schemes were also proposed: in late 1792, the Comte de Botherel solicited 
Jersey’s merchants to fund the creation of an émigré colony in Canada,1021 and 
in 1798, the Comte de Puisaye sailed from England with forty-one men, an 
appeal being launched for additional ‘Gentleman Volunteers’.1022 In exchange 
for seven years’ labour and military service, these men would receive ‘English 
pay and allowances’, as well as a land grant of 200 acres after completion of 
their service.1023 Despite of the success of such schemes, the majority of 
émigrés appear to have become firmly established within the Channel Islands, 
since even when the threat of invasion was at its height, relatively few took the 
decision to relocate to ‘safer’ communities in Great Britain. During the crisis of 
1793 (see chapter three), only 500 émigrés complied with an order to ‘quit’ the 
bailiwicks,1024 while during the invasion scare of 1796-7, only 350 of the lay 
émigrés in the Channel Islands relocated to England, in this case joining the 
large number of their fellow countrymen residing in London.1025  
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In contrast to the attitude of the general inhabitants, the official policy towards 
the émigrés appears to have remained fairly constant throughout the war: rather 
than bearing any open hostility, the Islands’ civil authorities accepted their 
presence as a ‘necessary evil’. While the States remained officially responsible 
for ensuring the welfare of the refugee population in their respective bailiwicks, 
this duty eventually devolved upon D’Auvergne, in spite of his being already 
swamped by his responsibilities towards the Admiralty and the War Office.1026 
Although his work with the émigré community frequently concerned matters of 
espionage and covert warfare (see chapters eight and nine), it must be 
emphasised that D’Auvergne’s primary responsibility in this area concerned the 
management and distribution of relief.1027 Between February 1794 and January 
1810, the émigrés residing in Britain received over £2,952,746 in government 
assistance, distributed under the auspices of the Home Office,1028 while in the 
Channel Islands, a similar role was performed by the Comité de Secours de 
Jersey. According to D’Auvergne’s records, this organisation oversaw the 
distribution of £122,031 in aid between 1794 and 1801 – 126,000 individual 
payments being made to approximately 1,500 individuals1029 – but steps were 
also taken to secure the cooperation of émigré leaders, permission being given 
for them to set up schools1030 and healthcare provisions.1031  
 
Overall, the reluctance of the authorities to intervene directly in the affairs of the 
émigré community was demonstrated by the legal response to their increasing 
visibility in the Channel Islands. As has been mentioned, neither States 
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Assembly had given any thought to the introduction of a local equivalent to the 
Papists Act (1778) or the Roman Catholic Relief Act (1791), although some 
concessions were eventually granted to the Catholic community. However, 
while these measures included allowing the émigré clergy to minister to their 
own countrymen, they had little effect in dispelling public suspicions concerning 
the intentions of the émigrés in general.1032 Moreover, the compromise and 
accommodation offered by the States proved little more than a ‘false front’: the 
minutiae of the concessions ensured that persecution continued unabated, 
particularly amongst the Islands’ Anglican elite. For example, while it was now 
legal in Britain to attend Catholic sacraments and convert to the Roman Church, 
‘native’ Channel Islanders were forbidden to do so, and were likewise forbidden 
to marry Catholics without first obtaining the permission of the Lieutenant-
Governor.1033 According to the aforementioned report, anti-Catholic prejudices 
were supported by the majority of States’ Members: Balcarras observing that 
they ‘represented the émigrés’ transgressions in such glaring colours and with 
such assiduity as to produce universal hatred against them’.1034 
 
The nature of anti-Catholic prejudices in the Channel Islands can be best 
demonstrated through a brief reference to the treatment of the émigrés in the 
local press, and especially the pro-Jeannot journal Gazette de L’Ile de Jersey. 
Reflecting the pro-Revolutionary views of its political sponsors,1035 the pre-war 
years had witnessed the publication of several articles hostile to the French 
royalists and the Catholic Church,1036 and despite being obliged to issue a 
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retraction,1037 the editors made little effort to moderate their rhetoric. As late as 
April 1791, a pair of articles had appeared in La Gazette praising France as ‘the 
pride of all the peoples of the world’, and denouncing the British press for 
‘attacking the most free and generous nation in the world’.1038 Although no 
outcry occured on this occasion, such rhetoric – as with that aimed at émigrés 
settling in Somerstown and Saint George’s Fields1039 – created a hostile 
environment for the refugees, and potentially jeopardised the British 
government’s attempt to maintain neutral towards the Republic.1040 Certainly, 
fears of violence between Islanders and émigrés were justified: in June 1791, it 
was reported that several French refugees in Jersey had been ‘roughly handled’ 
by the inhabitants after being discovered celebrating Mass, and it was rumoured 
that a number had been injured or killed.1041 
 
A more serious antagonisation of relations between the émigrés and the 
inhabitants occurred in Jersey during September 1792, when rumours emerged 
of a plot by a number of royalists to use the island as a base from which to 
support an invasion of Brittany. Following an comprehensive search, several 
thousand muskets, six barrels of ammunition, four field guns and a supply of 
cartridges were seized on the orders of the Leiutenant-Governor and placed in 
the arsenal at Elizabeth Castle.1042 That the discovery of this plot ‘gave fresh 
bitterness to the growing hatred of the French’1043 is evidenced by Dundas’ 
declaration that ‘the situation of the émigrés in general becomes more and more 
embarrassing’, and the fact that Falle was empowered ‘to punish…in the most 
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exemplarly manner’ any acts of violence against them.1044 Indeed, a spate of 
crimes against the émigrés had been reported in the country parishes, with 
several having been ‘grossly insulted and severely beaten’, and a number of 
inhabitants having declared their intent ‘on the first signal of alarm, [to] secure 
all the émigrés and confine them in the Churches’. Most serious from the 
perspective of local defence, a number of militiamen openly denounced ‘all 
Frenchmen as alike, and equally suspected’ and were reported as having 
‘[refused] to mount guard…whilst they have an ‘enemy’ in the interior’.1045 
 
Suspicions of a ‘Fifth Column’ 
 
During the 1780s and early 1790s, the emergence of groups such as the 
Society for Constitutional Information and the London Corresponding Society 
had become a serious concern for the British government.1046 In 1793, the Alien 
Office was established: its remit being to investigate domestic security threats, 
conduct clandestine intelligence operations, and – insofar as was necessary – 
engage in continental espionage.1047 According to Stevenson, the atmosphere 
in London had, by this time, become ‘one of near panic’, with reform 
campaigners being almost universally dismissed as ‘Jacobins’ and treated as 
‘objects of suspicion, persecution and outright attack’.1048 Moreover, the growing 
number of émigrés in the City sparked fears that ‘an army of Jacobins...was 
plotting with home-grown radicals’,1049 prompting the government to pass the 
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act (1794), Seditious Meetings Act (1795) and the 
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Treason Act (1795).1050 Although the French government later permitted 
passports to be issued to individuals who agreed to ‘leave France and go live 
under a foreign government’,1051 many such persons came under suspicion of 
being engaged in espionage. In 1809, an émigré was confined to Elizabeth 
Castle under ‘double sentries’, and four others were arrested by the Connétable 
of St. Helier,1052 while in 1813, Don reported the presence of a priest ‘strongly 
suspected to be in the pay of Bonaparte’.1053   
 
Thoughout the Great French War, local fifth columnist activity – real or imagined 
– remained a significant security issue: in early 1797, for example, it was found 
that ‘many anonymous and incendiary writings…animating sedition and 
revolt…after the example of the French’ had been published in Jersey’. Having 
concluded that current laws ‘do not suffice to prevent, suppress and punish 
effectively so dangerous a society’ the States took immediate steps to pass ‘an 
Act designed to counteract tumultuous and riotous assembly’.1054 Likewise in 
1803, while the majority of Islanders were described by Gordon as being 
‘attached to His Majesty’s sacred person and government’, the Lieutenant-
Governor warned against the activities of ‘a few persons of the lowest class’ 
who he suspected of being ‘perverted to French principles’.1055 As a result of 
such suspicions, repeated attempts were made to control the movement of 
‘foreigners’: in December 1800, for example, the Connétables were instructed to 
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set up parochial registers1056 of all ‘foreigners’, including ‘Englishmen, lay 
émigrés, priests, and women and children of ‘foreign’ origin.1057 Similarly, a 
declaration of January 1802 ordered the repatriation of all Frenchmen who had 
arrived in the Islands since the signing of the ‘preliminary peace’,1058 though an 
exemption was made available to those French citizens or émigrés ‘known to 
maintain commercial businesses in St. Aubin or St. Helier’.1059 
 
It must be acknowledged, however, that such orders did little more than enforce 
restrictions which had been in place against foreigners in the Channel Islands 
since at least the early seventeenth century1060 and re-affirmed under the Code 
de Loi de 1771. As has been already noted, no ‘foreigner’ could take up 
residence in the Island or marry a ‘native’ without the permission of the 
Lieutenant-Governor (see chapter one), but a ‘native’ woman who married a 
‘foreigner’ illegally also risked the loss of her dowry.1061 Such precedents 
enabled the local authorities – at least during the Peace of Amiens – to rid 
themselves of a minority which was considered both undesirable and a risk to 
local social stability. Since they had failed – allegedly – to report themselves to 
the Lieutenant-Governor before seeking lodgings or employment, the more 
recently-arrived émigrés could be simply rounded up by the Police Honorifique 
and repatriated. Furthermore, any inhabitants who had given shelter or aid to 
these illegal aliens without first advising the authorities were likewise ordered to 
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appear before the Royal Court for their failure to comply with ‘that part of the 
law, the strict observance of which is crucial to the security of this Island’.1062 
 
Suspected Enemy Spies and their Accomplices 
 
Even after the émigré community was firmly established in the Channel Islands, 
suspicions lingered that a proportion of them might be spies in the service of the 
French Republic or might prove to be otherwise sympathetic to the enemy in the 
event of an invasion. According to intelligence received from D’Auvergne in 
August 1796, the French authorities were actively seeking to encourage the 
émigrés to act as a fifth column, offering a ‘reintegration of civil rights’ to any 
such persons as would willingly join an invading army.1063 Likewise, there is 
ample evidence to suggest that the pro-Revolutionary sentiments expressed by 
readers of La Gazette in December 1792 – when they had offered to act as 
bodyguards for French republicans arriving in Jersey1064 – were not quashed by 
the outbreak of war. Indeed, a report of 1800 revealed that ‘a kind of Jacobin 
Club’ had been established in St. Peter Port, and that the meetings were being 
attended by not only émigrés, but also members of the Russian units then 
temporarily stationed in the Channel Islands (see below).1065 While it is 
impossible to gauge the extent or nature of local Radicalism, they almost 
certainly would have adopted a position similar to those London Radicals who 
defended the Jacobins as ‘enlightened friends of liberty [who had been] 
provoked into violence by the supporters of tyranny’.1066 
 
                                                 
1062 SJA, L/C/68/A/1, ‘Circular from Le Couteur to the Connétables’, January 28th 1802 
1063 TNA, PC 1/117B, D’Auvergne to Dundas, August 29th 1796 
1064 Gazette de L’Ile de Jersey, December 22nd 1792 
1065 TNA, WO 1/419, Eton to Huskisson and Count Wormzow, February 25th 1800 
1066 Harling, ‘A Tale of Two Conflicts’, p. 22 
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As might be expected, open suspicion towards French citizens flared up once 
more with the outbreak of the Napoleonic War, this time encouraged by three 
key events in Napoleon’s early years as First Consul. Of primary importance 
was his decision to grant the émigrés a partial amnesty: a move which, in late 
1800, had led to the legal repatriation of around 52,000 men, women and 
children.1067 Second, the Concordat with Pope Pius VII – signed in 1801 – had 
recognised Roman Catholicism as the de facto religion of the majority of the 
French population and, together with the General Amnesty of April 26th 1802, 
had left all but 1,000 of the most extreme émigrés at liberty to return from exile. 
Unsurprisingly, many of the émigrés who had established themselves in Britain 
and the Channel Islands during the 1790s accepted Napoleon’s terms: of the 
5,621 émigrés receiving assistance from the British government in 1800, only 
800 remained by the end of 1802.1068 However, given that those émigrés who 
chose to take advantage of the amnesty were potentially returning to France 
with a detailed knowledge of the geography and defences of the Channel 
Islands, the authorities were desirous to guard against the possibility that 
Napoleon might seek to secure their services as spies.  
 
Consequently, the renewal of hostilities in May 1803 led to a number of new 
restrictions being placed upon the movements of French citizens then resident 
in the Islands. In general, these new regulations mirrored policies enacted by 
Napoleon towards British diplomats and other government officials,1069 and 
included measures such as the introduction of identity cards, the impounding of 
                                                 
1067 J.N. Heuer, ‘Family Bonds and Female Citizenship: Émigré Women under the Directory’ in H.G. 
Howard and J.A. Miller (eds.), Taking Liberties: Problems of a New Order from the French Revolution to 
Napoleon (Manchester, 2002) p. 66  
1068 Bellenger, ‘Fearless Resting Place’, p. 215 
1069 E. Sparrow, Secret Service: British Agents in France, 1792-1815 (Woodbridge, 1999) pp. 269-270 
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French boats and the arrest of French seamen.1070 However, while the coastal 
patrols were instructed ‘not to interfere with legal trade carried on by any vessel 
[or] confine or make prisoners of any person unless [there is] just cause to 
consider him a spy’,1071 several other orders indicate a ‘McCarthyist’ stance on 
the part of the authorities.1072 For instance, any French citizen returning to the 
Island following deportation, or failing to produce an identity card, was to be 
interrogated,1073 and no émigré – even those of native origin – was to be 
permitted to enlist in the Militia.1074 Finally, it should be noted that several local 
officials were placed under suspicion of aiding and abetting enemy agents: in 
December 1803, for example, the Connétable of St. Saviour was brought before 
the Royal Court on a charge of having given quarter to a corsair.1075  
 
With respect to La Correspondence, although this organisation shall be treated 
to far greater examination with respect to the matter of espionage (see chapter 
nine), it should be noted that several events connected with its operation served 
to validate the suspicions of the local authorities towards the émigrés.1076 Most 
notable among these is the mass compromising of D’Auvergne’s network in 
1808, following the capture of Prigent and Bouchard, since it appeared to reveal 
that at least some of the most trusted émigrés valued their own lives more 
highly than the royalist cause.1077 However, while Balleine argues that there is 
‘no doubt’ that both men revealed everything they knew of La Correspondence, 
and put up only minimal resistance to their captors,1078 Hutt asserts that there is 
                                                 
1070 SJA, L/C/68/A/1, ‘Circulars from Le Couteur to the Connétables’, May 18th and 25th 1803 
1071 SJA, A/A1/2, Letter of January 14th 1807 
1072 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of August 25th 1808 
1073 SJA, L/C/68/A/1, ‘Circular from Le Couteur to the Connétables’, November 11th 1803 
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1075 Ibid, Le Couteur to the Connétable of St. Saviour, December 27th 1803 
1076 Hutt, Chouannerie and the Counter-Revolution, Vol. II, pp. 468-469 
1077 Guerrin, ‘L'Arrestation de Prigent’, 311-331 
1078 Balleine, The Tragedy of Philippe D’Auvergne, pp. 115-116 
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little, if any, contemporary evidence to suggest that Prigent actively sought to 
betray his colleagues.1079 Even so, it is evident that the émigrés who worked 
with La Correspondence were by no means free of suspicion: following the 
Peace of Amiens, those who sought to remain in Jersey were granted 
exemption from deportation only after D’Auvergne had provided them with 
written references to the Lieutenant-Governor.1080 
 
What should be emphasised, however, is that the years after 1797 saw a 
hardening of the attitude towards all non-native residents of the island, 
irrespective of their nationality or place of origin, two ‘case studies’ being 
provided by Le Couteur. The first incident, which occurred in 1799, saw two 
Swedish refugees arrive in St. Helier: although they claimed to have been 
shipwrecked off Guernsey, the fact that they had been allowed to remain ‘at 
large’ without being reported to the Lieutenant-Governor led to their being 
arrested as potential spies.1081 That same day, the boat in which they had 
arrived was impounded, the Swedes were returned to Guernsey under armed 
guard for interrogation, and the local man who had given them shelter was 
summoned before the Royal Court to face trial.1082 The second incident, which 
occurred in the aftermath of the formation of the Second League of Armed 
Neutrality,1083 concerned the obligatory registration and inspection of all 
Swedish and Danish vessels entering Channel Islands’ ports. Although the 
bailiwicks’ free port status left them open to vessels belonging to members of 
the League, the local authorities continued to treat the incoming traders as a 
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potential security risk; the Swedish vessels Intrepid (6 men, 80 tons), Axmax (7 
men, 164 tons) and Victoria (14 men, 200 tons) all having been found to be 
carrying French property.1084 
 
Clashes of Culture: The Case of the Russian Soldiers 
 
In addition to the security risks which the Channel Islands faced as a result of 
the permeability of the maritime border, their fiercely-guarded independence 
also served as the direct cause of their being caught up in the aftermath of the 
disastrous Anglo-Russian invasion of the Batavian Republic.1085 A total of 
17,593 men had been sent by Tsar Paul I to participate in the failed Helder 
Expedition,1086 and the survivors had been unable to sail for home before the 
onset of winter and the closing of the Baltic ports, leaving the British with a 
serious problem. In light of the 1798 Rebellion, a proposal to allow the Russians 
to overwinter in Ireland was rejected by the Lord Lieutenant, Marquess 
Cornwallis, and the Mutiny Act (1689) forbade the landing of foreign troops in 
Britain unless they were in British pay. However, since the Channel Islands 
were not bound by the provisions of the above Act (see chapter one), the most 
obvious and convenient solution – from the British perspective – was to allow 
the Russians to overwinter in the bailiwicks.1087  Consequently, the local 
authorities were forced to contend with a variety of security issues arising from 
the presence of several thousand additional aliens, one muster role1088 having 
                                                 
1084 SJA, L/C/68/A/1, Le Couteur to the Swedish and Danish Consuls, January 20th 1801 
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recorded a total of 6,714 Russians in Jersey1089 and 6,403 in Guernsey,1090 with 
837 men still expected to arrive.1091 
 
According to Tucker, ‘considering the number of men involved and the haste 
with which their needs had to be met, the sojourn of the Russians went 
remarkably well’,1092 but the presence of such a large number of foreign troops 
presented a number of significant challenges. Accommodation was especially 
problematic, since while it was hoped that the General Hospital and a system of 
‘disposable barracks' might prove sufficient,1093 it was also suggested that the 
withdrawal of the Loyal Irish Fencibles might ‘make an opening for six or seven 
hundred men’.1094 As Gordon observed, not only would such a measure have 
led to ‘a considerable diminution of the strength of the British force’, but the 
uncertain steadiness and unfamiliarity of the Russian troops led him to conclude 
that ‘the defence of the Channel Islands cannot with safety be entrusted to 
[their] discharge’.1095 Furthermore, while a vote of thanks passed by the States 
of Jersey praised the ‘uncommon good behaviour’1096 by which the Russian 
troops had ‘obtained the unanimous suffrage of the approbation of the 
Islanders’,1097 it is evident that this glowing testimony was little more than an 
attempt to preserve good relations with the Tsar. As Stevens observes, ‘one 
can hardly imagine how such a small community managed to absorb such  
                                                 
1089 240 Officers; 5505 Combatants; 783 Non-Combatants; 56 Private Servants and 130 Non-Effectives 
1090 215 Officers; 5309 Combatants; 765 Non-Combatants; 26 Private Servants and 88 Non-Effectives 
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1092 Tucker, ‘The Russians’, 259 
1093 TNA, WO 44/79, Gordon to Huskisson, December 17th 1799 
1094 Ibid, ‘Report Regarding Accommodation for Russian Troops in Jersey’, December 26th 1799 
1095 Ibid, Gordon to Huskisson, December 17th 1799 
1096 SJA, L/F/106/A/1, ‘Vote of Thanks Concerning the Russian Forces in Jersey’, 1800 
1097 The Times, July 17th 1800 
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numbers [of foreign troops]’,1098 and ample evidence can be found to show that 
the Russian presence caused consternation amongst many of the inhabitants.  
 
First and foremost, a medical examination found a significant proportion of the 
Russians to be afflicted by an ‘alarming and evil prospect [which] necessitated 
the performance of quarantine’,1099 a measure which would have exacerbated 
the abovementioned problem of food provision.1100 Moreover, it was reported 
that the Russians billeted in Grouville caused much disorder,1101 many of the 
men being so starved and desperate that they resorted to stealing food from the 
inhabitants – particularly on market days – and were seen to eat candles, soap 
and lamp oil’.1102 As to low-level friction with the inhabitants, this was largely the 
result of a ‘clash of cultures’: in May 1800, for example, many local women 
described their ‘shock’ at seeing the Russians ‘running naked about the 
countryside’, and it was ordered that guards should thereafter be posted to 
supervise their bathing.1103 It is likewise evident that the Islanders were both 
fascinated and terrified by the appearance of the Cossacks, the elite Russian 
cavalry whose ‘very tall and formidable [physique]’ was enhanced by a dashing 
uniform, which was hung about with a fierce array of weapons.1104 However, in 
cases where the Russians were suspected of having committed criminal 
offences against the Islanders,1105 the ‘clash of cultures’ model provides 
                                                 
1098 Stevens, ‘Further Light on the Russians’, 329 
1099 TNA WO 44/79, Dr. Jackson to Dalrymple, December 19th 1799 
1100 The daily hospital ration was: 1.5 lbs of bread; 5 ozs. vegetables; 4 ozs. grain; 0.75 ozs of salt; 1 gill 
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1102 Stevens, ‘Further Light on the Russians’, 329 
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1104 The Times, December 10th 1799 
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insufficient explanation, and the violent encounters which so often followed such 
incidents represented a directly threat to British relations with the Tsar.1106 
 
Perhaps the most serious incident involving the Russian troops occurred in 
December 1799, when two Russian soldiers were accused of having raped a 
young woman in St. Peter Port, and a third was suspected of carrying out a 
second attack.1107 Unfortunately, even in cases of capital offences, the Russian 
officers refused to accept that their troops were answerable to any authority 
other than Russian military law,1108 and refused to comply with any order – even 
those given by their commanding officers – to surrender the accused to the civil 
authorities.1109  Indeed, Colonel Durnovo was described as having treated the 
incident ‘in a jocose manner [and] as a mere bagatelle’,1110 and although the 
alleged rapists were ultimately compelled to answer before the civil powers, it 
was feared that failure to secure a conviction would spark a riot. Moreover, the 
danger was exacerbated by the inhabitants’ militia training, Eton having advised 
that ‘the people – if they do not see such an outrage punished – are well-armed, 
[and liable] to take revenge on every Russian they find straggling out of the 
district of their cantonment’.1111 Fortunately for Anglo-Russian reliations, the trial 
dragged on until the reopening of the Baltic in June 1800, by which time ‘the 
subsequent behaviour of the whole Russian corps’ had caused the inhabitants 
to adopt ‘the strongest predilection in their favour’, and it was decided to ‘leave 
it to the Russians themselves to punish or take no notice of the crime’.1112  
 
                                                 
1106 SJA, L/C/68/A/1, Le Couteur to the Procureur, February 23rd 1800 
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Relations between the Garrison and the Civilian Population 
 
Although the matter of ‘internal’ discipline had been already discussed in 
relation to their reliability as a defensive force, it is necessary to provide a more 
detailed examination of the public response to disruptive and criminal behaviour 
amongst the garrison. With respect to desertion, it appears that the inhabitants 
were often sympathetic towards individual offenders, offering them sanctuary, 
aiding their escape, and occasionally engaging in violent altercations with the 
civil and military authorities.1113 In 1811, for example, a deserter from the 26th 
Regt. was reported as having been given shelter at the Half Moon Inn, Trinity, 
and the proprietor was subsequently brought before the Royal Court for having 
aided and abetted his ‘rescue’.1114 Similarly, James Le Fait of Gorey was 
prosecuted in 1812, both for concealing a deserter from the 2nd/96th Regt. and 
for having engaging other inhabitants in an attempt to ‘forcibly prevent his 
arrest’ by the Police Honorifique.1115 Likewise in Guernsey, it was reported that 
two deserters from the Racehorse were ‘rescued’ from the custody of the 
Connétables of St. Peter Port in July 1808, although in this case, the 
subsequent investigation found that the men in question had been illegally 
impressed1116 from a local fishing vessel (see chapter two).1117  
 
As the Channel Islands were assumed to present potential deserters with fewer 
opportunities for escape than either ‘mainland’ ports or garrison towns, it is 
natural that the British government should have viewed it as an ideal post for 
                                                 
1113 Ibid, Le Couteur to the Procureur, February 23rd 1801 
1114 SJA, A/A1/4, Letter of February 21st 1811 
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the Royal African Corps, one of its penal regiments.1118 Although responsible for 
a wave of burglaries,1119 the most notorious crime connected to this corps was 
the murder of Olympe Mahy, a seventy-four year-old mother of ten, by Private 
Robert Wilson, alias Wood, in 1808.1120 Described by the local press as a 
‘monster’ who had ‘committed several other crimes in England’,1121 later 
accounts also describe how he had plotted to escape custody by killing the 
priest sent to visit him and switching places with the victim.1122 However, capital 
crimes were by no means limited to the penal corps: several are recorded as 
having been committed by members of the garrison regiments, with no 
distinction as to rank. In late 1794, a corporal of the 32nd Regt. of Foot was 
imprisoned in Elizabeth Castle to await execution for murder,1123 while in 1809, 
an unnamed soldier who had raped a local woman was flogged by the ‘common 
executioner’.1124 In addition, it appears1125 that George Weston, Paymaster of 
the 2nd/96th Regt. of Foot, was court-martialled for the rape of a fellow 
soldier,1126 while in Guernsey, Lieutenant Greenwell and Ensign Jackson 
brought charges of assault against two of their fellow officers.1127 
 
As well as the conduct of the British troops, it is necessary to carry out a brief 
examination of the problems which arose in Jersey as a result of the presence 
of several regiments of Dutch soldiers, these having been stationed in the island 
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as additional reinforcement for the garrison. Although no accurate returns have 
survived, it is known that ‘three regiments’ of Dutch infantry were stationed in 
Jersey by 1802,1128 and a comparison with other units shows that their likely 
combined strength was not less than 1,600. According to returns for the British 
fencible regiments attached to Jersey’s garrison, these corps mustered an 
average of approximately 550 men,1129 while the two émigré regiments raised in 
the island reached a combined strength of 1,191 men.1130 As with the Russian 
troops, the response of the local authorities to offences committed by the Dutch 
soldiers was tempered by the need to maintain cordial relations with one of 
Britain’s allies, and offenders – as far as possible – were punished1131 according 
to Dutch military law.1132 Moreover, while Gordon praised the ‘uniform good 
discipline and orderly behaviour’ of the Dutch troops,1133 fears of drunken 
altercations between British and Dutch soldiers during a ‘day of celebration’ in 
March 1802 had led the Lieutenant-Governor to forbid the former to go near the 
Dutch barracks or associate with the troops.1134  
 
Stability Maintained: The Avoidance of Disorder 
 
Although public disturbances and riots were commonplace in eighteenth-
century Great Britain, the period spanned by the Great French War was a time 
of particular upheaval. Manchester witnessed food riots in 1795 and 1800, 
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industrial riots in 1808, and a general breakdown of order in 1812, while London 
was the scene of food riots in 1794, political demonstrations against the Duke of 
York in 1806, and industrial protests throughout the period.1135 However, while it 
is clear that the Channel Islands were likewise threatened by various forms of 
disorder, it is also evident that – even accounting for differences in scale – the 
bailiwicks remained comparatively stable. Fundamentally, this can be attributed 
both to the means of law enforcement available in the respective jurisdictions, 
as well as the relative numbers requiring to be controlled. In Great Britain, the 
local authorities were often faced with ‘mobs’ whose ranks were swelled by 
inhabitants of multiple districts, and their frequent use of military force often 
resulted in ‘a chain of persecutions for murder against justices and soldiers’.1136 
By contrast, the existence in the Channel Islands of organised law enforcement 
bodies such as the Police Honorifique – combined with the rarity of ‘island-wide’ 
disorder – meant that the forces of law and order were able to smother potential 
riots and violence by weight of numbers. 
 
Indeed, while the economic pressures occasioned by an expanded garrison and 
the presence of a large community of refugees were felt far more acutely in the 
Channel Islands than in Great Britain, the resultant strain on food supplies was 
averted thanks to judicious management on the part of the authorities. While 
some attempts were made to stimulate discontent amongst the population – the 
émigré community and foreign troops being a convenient scapegoat for rising 
food prices1137 – the Islands’ fundamentally stable economy, combined with a 
shift in public opinion, neutralised this threat. Moreover, in spite of the political 
tensions which developed in both Jersey and Guernsey, the obligation of militia 
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1136 Stevenson, Popular Disturbances, p. 108 
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service acted as a crucial focal point for the expression of patriotic sentiment, as 
demonstrated by the fact that even conscientious objectors and pacifists 
supported the existence of that force. As for the tension which arose between 
the civilian population and the various British and foreign regiments stationed in 
the Channel Islands, while it is true that this occasionally spilled over into open 
disorder, such incidents remained exceptional. Both in Jersey and Guernsey, 
the authorities can be seen to have employed a well-balanced mixure of military 
discipline, the civil judicial machinery and careful negotiation in order to manage 
security issues as quickly as possible, minimising their wider impact.  
 
Finally, it must also be noted that the fundamental problem of feeding the 
population and garrison during times of scarcity were solved by means other 
than the importation of supplies. Although the Channel Islands’ Newfoundland 
convoys were highlighted by the Chamber of Commerce as constituting a 
‘[source of] provisions absolutely necessary for the existence of the inhabitants’, 
they could not be relied upon exclusively.1138 As has been already highlighted, 
the local merchant ships were particularly favoured as targets by the corsairs of 
St. Malo and Cherbourg, and the necessity of obtaining naval escorts frequently 
delayed both the departure of the trans-Atlantic fleet and the arrival of supplies 
from Great Britain.1139 In light of such problems, the Channel Islands’ privateers 
may be regarded as having played a critical – albeit indirect – role in the 
maintenance of public order; not only because they served to boost morale,1140 
but also because condemned cargoes often provided a source of additional 
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food supplies. In 1800, the States of Guernsey declared the island ‘indebted’ to 
the its privateers for having brought in three prizes carrying 500 tons of Spanish 
wheat, the distribution of which was described as having ‘relieved [the 
inhabitants] from a state of scarcity’.1141 Similarly, the cargoes of the Duguete 
Erwertung and the Drie Enegheit were put up for sale in Guernsey and Jersey 
in 1806 and 1808 respectively, the cargo of the former including 470 casks of 
red wine, and that of the latter an additional twenty casks of the same.1142  
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Section II – The War at Sea 
 
Chapter Six – ‘A Nest of Vypers’ 
 
As observed by Jamieson and Morieux, the long eighteenth century (1685-
1830) was characterised by a significant shift in the position of the Channel 
Islands within the context of Anglo-French maritime rivalry. With the expansion 
of the Royal Navy, Great Britain gained the ability to directly challenge French 
dominance at sea, and the Channel Islands emerged as ‘a creative piece of 
[Britain’s] wider maritime strategy’ rather than a potential ‘defensive liability’.1143 
Thus, while their proximity to the French coast had allowed both bailiwicks to 
emerge in the medieval period as key staging-posts for cross-Channel 
merchant traffic – specificially the wine and wool trades1144 – this natural 
advantage could now be exploited for offensive purposes. Consequently, while 
many senior officers may still have echoed the words of Philip Falle,1145 and 
warned ‘how greatly it would prejudice the safety and honour of [Great Britain], 
should [the French] become masters of the Islands’,1146 far more emphasis was 
placed upon their potential as a focal point for regional maritime control. In a 
particularly strongly-worded letter, Saumarez was instructed to ‘acquaint Lord 
Chatham that if ever the French effect a landing here, it will be too late for His 
Lordship to wish that he had appointed a sufficient squadron for the protection 
of the Islands, and what may be deemed of infinite more consequence, the 
[disruption] of the enemy’s convoys’.1147 
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from Below’, 91 
1144 Moore, The Other British Isles, p. 222 
1145 Falle had acted as a ‘Special Envoy’ from the Channel Islands to the court of William III. 
1146 Morieux, The Channel, p. 124 
1147 SROI, SA 3/1/2/3, Letter of August 18th 1794 
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Although the Channel Islands could never offer the British the same degree of 
strategic support as corresponding bases in the Mediterranean (see chapter 
two), their potential as a base for offensive maritime operations was readily 
apparent. In December 1793, for example, a large number of French 
merchantmen were sighted off Alderney, and Earl Moira – then stationed in 
Guernsey – advised that ‘several frigates’ detached from the Channel Squadron 
might ‘stand a good chance of cutting [them] off…and distressing the enemy 
exceedingly’.1148 Similarly, the abovementioned letter to Saumarez included the 
prediction that ‘if ever the French take the Islands…they will station such a force 
here as will prevent our having them ever again in our possession. Both them 
and us will then know the value of keeping them’.1149 As Knight observed, while 
the convoys passing along the east coast of Britain ‘[carried] most of the heavy 
goods required in London, and upon which the supply of the army and navy 
depended’, French privateers ‘never slackened their efforts to capture British 
cargoes and ships’ in all quarters.1150 With respect to the ‘swarm’ of corsairs 
operating out of Cherbourg and St. Malo, Royal Navy vessels stationed in the 
Channel Islands were ideally placed to disrupt their activities (see chapter 
seven),1151 while the local privateers either assisted in this endeavour1152 or 
carried out their own attacks on enemy commerce.1153 
 
 
                                                 
1148 SJA, L/F/08/A/26, Moira to MacBride, December 26th 1793 
1149 SROI, SA 3/1/2/3, Letter of August 18th 1794 
1150 Knight, ‘British Defensive Strategy at Sea’, pp. 93 and 95 
1151 TNA, WO 1/922/85, D’Auvergne to Dundas, March 31st 1797; HO 69/12/9, Dalrymple to Bouillon, 
June 21st 1797 and HO 69/17/43, De St. Croix to D’Auvergne, March 25th 1797 
1152 The vast majority of the mauvais corsairs operating out of the bailiwicks during the Great French 
War were ‘private ships-of-war’ – vessels specifically intended to operate against enemy merchantmen 
and coasters – with the remainder being made up of local merchantmen whose captain was empowered by 
letter-of-marque to make opportunistic captures during trading voyages. 
1153 TNA, ADM 1/223, Saumarez to Heron, March 2nd 1807 
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During the decades prior to the Great French War, the Channel Islands 
privateers had expanded rapidly, both in terms of overall numbers and average 
displacement. While the average local privateer during the War of the Austrian 
Succession had displaced 61.5 tons burthen, this had increased to 77.1 tons 
burthen during the Seven Years War and 95.2 tons burthen in the American 
War of Independence. As to the Islands’ individual share in commerce raiding, 
these three conflicts witnessed a considerable increase in Jersey’s participation 
– from 34.1% to 48% – while Alderney also emerged as a minority stakeholder, 
its share of the trade increasing from 1.2% to 11.65%.1154 Given this rate of 
growth, it is unsurprising that Dumouriez described the local privateers as ‘the 
despair of France’, describing them as ‘capturing a great number of vessels and 
destroying all communication and commerce between [our] ports before we can 
adopt any precautions’.1155 Their success in previous conflicts was likewise 
cited by the local authorities as proof of the privateers’ strategic value, as when 
Doyle claimed that the American War of Independence had seen the Guernsey 
privateers destroy shipping and cargo valued at £1,500,000.1156 Although the 
veracity of such a claim is unknown, the Resolution, Hector, Lord Amherst, and 
Triumph brought in prizes worth £193,963 in 1779, and that 1782 saw the 
Alderney privateers take prizes valued at £212,381.1157 
 
In terms of the years before 1793, Raban and Jamieson have highlighted that 
the Seven Years War saw the Islanders cruising as far as the Spanish coast,1158 
however, the majority of prizes taken during the mid-eighteenth century were 
seized between the latitudes of Ushant and the Gironde. Taking a random 
                                                 
1154 See Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise 
1155 Rose, Broadley (eds.), Dumouriez and the Defence of England, pp. 319-322 
1156 TNA, WO 55/1549/6, ‘Doyle’s Report re. Guernsey and Alderney’, undated 
1157 Carey, The Channel Islands, p. 141-142 
1158 Raban, ‘The Profits of Privateering’, 300-301 
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sample of one hundred vessels condemned to Channel Island privateers during 
the American War of Independence, Jamieson found that almost two-thirds 
were taken in the Bay of Biscay, whereas only seven were taken in the vicinity 
of Ushant, and only eleven between Brest and Le Havre.1159 This pattern would 
be emulated during the ‘Great French War’: although the records of the 
Guernsey firm Carteret Priaulx indicate that some of their privateers cruised to 
ports as distant as Lisbon, Cadiz and Gibraltar,1160 the majority of their vessels 
continued to hunt far closer to home. In general, the trend was a result of 
necessity rather than design: as has been already mentioned, the vast majority 
of Channel Islands privateers were not only ‘private men-of-war’, but also 
comparatively small vessels. According to Meyer’s study, only 53.5% of the 
Guernsey vessels and 36.5% of the Jersey vessels deployed between 1793 
and 1815 exceeded 100 tons burthen, and it is likely that many of these larger 
vessels would have only rarely ventured beyond local waters.1161 
 
A Portrait of the Channel Island Privateers, 1793-1815 
 
While the eighteenth century may have witnessed a steady increase in the 
average size of the Channel Islands’ privateers, a considerable disparity 
continued to exist between individual vessels, both in terms of crew size, 
armament and tonnage. During the American War of Independence, Jersey’s 
privateers had included Diligence, (fifty tons burthen, forty men, six 2-pdr 
carriage guns and eight swivel guns),1162 Surprize (eighty tons burthen, thirty 
                                                 
1159 Jamieson, ‘The Return to Privateering’, pp. 168-169 
1160 PLG, Uncatalogued, Robertson and Schon (Gibraltar) to Carteret Priaulx, March 29th 1805, and Anon. 
(Falmouth) to Carteret Priaulx, April 23rd 1805 
1161 Meyer, ‘The Channel Islands Privateers’, p. 183 
1162 SJA, L/C/60/E5/1, ‘Letters of Marque Awarded to John Fiott of the Diligence’, August 26th 1778 
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men, six 3-pdr carriage guns and six swivel guns)1163 and Hero (one hundred 
tons burthen, sixty-five men, ten carriage guns and four swivel guns).1164 
Similarly, the privateers fitted out at Jersey during the Great French War 
included vessels as large as Neptune (138 tons burthen, forty-five men, 
fourteen carriage guns),1165 and as small as Lightning (five tons, two swivel 
guns) and Prince William (five tons, four swivel guns).1166 However, such 
examples mark the extremes of the scale: far more typical were Success (fifty-
one tons burthen, thirty men, six 4-pdr carriage guns)1167 and Lottery (twenty-
four tons burthen, eighteen men, two 2-pdr carriage guns).1168 Consequently, 
the Jersey vessels were, at least in terms of size, comparable to the ‘swarm of 
small French privateers’, reported by Royal Navy officers as being between 
fifteen and thirty-five tons burthen.1169 
 
In spite of the Channel Islands’ increased use of ‘deep water’ privateers over 
the course of the eighteenth century, a key distinction must be highlighted 
between the local vessels and British privateers in general. As has been already 
stated, the vast majority of vessels deployed by the Channel Islanders were of 
less than 100 tons burthen, and the vast majority were ‘private men-of-war’ 
rather than ‘letter-of-marque’ merchantmen.1170 This stands in stark contrast to 
overall trend: while Starkey concludes that some 3,605 privateers were 
deployed from all British ports – including the Channel Islands –  between 1793 
                                                 
1163 SJA, L/C/60/E5/2, ‘Letters of Marque Awarded to Philip De Gruchy and Edward Le Couteur of the 
Surprize’, December 20th 1780 
1164 SJA, L/C/60/E5/3, ‘Letters of Marque Awarded to John Fiott and Philip Le Couteur of the Hero’, 
January 24th 1782,  
1165 SJA, L/C/60/E5/5, ‘Letters of Marque Awarded to Theo Ambrose of the Neptune’, May 16th 1800 
1166 Meyer, ‘The Channel Island Privateers’, p. 175 
1167 SJA, L/C/209/C1/2/13, ‘Letters of Marque Awarded to Philip Payn of the Success’, December 4th 
1807 
1168 SJA, L/F/67/A/1, ‘Letters of Marque Awarded to Francis Journeux of the Lottery’, November 29th 
1797 
1169 Avery, ‘The Naval Protection of Britain’s Maritime Trade’, p. 18 
1170 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise p. 35 
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and 1815, only 391 (10.85%) of these were ‘private men-of-war’.1171 The 
incongruous nature of the Channel Islands’ vessels serves to illustrate the 
extent to which their involvement in privateering – while ubiquitous throughout 
the long eighteenth century1172 – was dictated by the almost exclusively 
agrarian local economy. Prior to the opening up of new South American 
markets in the latter years of the war,1173 trans-Atlantic trade was limited to the 
triangular cod trade,1174 and although the Islanders did trade extensively with 
Continental Europe, the vast majority of vessels thus engaged were of only 
relatively small tonnage.1175 
 
A further restriction of the type of vessels deployed from the Channel Islands –
one which receives little acknowledgement amongst local historians – arose 
from the Islands’ involvement in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. As highlighted by 
Ford, any involvement of the bailiwicks in this sector appears to have been 
largely indirect, Islanders being part-owners or captains of British slaving ships 
registered in the Channel Islands or supplying essential goods and services 
such as pilots.1176 As a result, the Islands had little or no need for large-scale 
investment in the types of vessels used by merchants in Bristol or Liverpool, 
and which might be readily converted into ‘letter-of-marque’ traders.1177 Since 
these were designed only to carry out opportunistic attacks during the course of 
an ordinary trading voyage (see above), they had to be sufficiently large to carry 
a ‘prize crew’ in addition to their normal cargo and supplies.1178 This is not to 
                                                 
1171 Starkey, ‘A Restless Spirit’, p. 132 
1172 TNA, HO 98/9, Gordon to Pelham, March 20th 1803  
1173 Cox, ‘Transformation of St. Peter Port’, Abstract 
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1175 Duncan, A History of Guernsey, p. 249 
1176 D. Ford, ‘A Respectable Trade or Against Human Dignity?’, THM 2 (2006) 6-10 
1177 See G. Williams, History of the Liverpool Privateers and Letters of Marque (London, 1897) 
1178 Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise p. 35 
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say that the Islanders did not send out any such vessels:1179 rather that their 
numbers were curtailed by the fact that neither Jersey nor Guernsey housed a 
dedicated shipbuilding industry until the early 1820s (see chapter ten).1180 As a 
result, large merchant vessels operating out of the Channel Islands were 
typically built ‘on contract’ in British or American shipyards, as in the case of 
Lion,1181 and Sarnia,1182 or were re-commissioned prizes, as in the case of 
Ceres1183 and L’Invention.1184  
 
The Channel Islands’ Privateersmen – What Motivated Them? 
 
Given the popularity of privateering amongst the inhabitants of the Channel 
Islands, the question must be asked: why did ‘the people of the sea’ undertake 
these ventures? Referring to traditional French historiography, Best and 
Crowhurst have both highlighted the entanglement of myth and reality which 
have ‘muddied the waters’ with respect to the motivations of the privateers and 
their armateurs. In general, it has been usual to depict privateering as either ‘the 
optimistic illusion [of] a tolerable substitute for real naval power’, a legitimate 
aspect of naval strategy, or the work of zealous patriots and fortune hunters.1185 
Similar interpretations have been put forward concerning the British and 
Channel Island privateers: Podger characterises the latter as having been a 
mixture of ‘chancers, gamblers, and patriots’,1186 while Black argues that the 
former were motivated by ‘a fusion of patriotism and profit’.1187 Similarly, Ritchie 
                                                 
1179 Jamieson, ‘The Channel Islands and Smuggling’, p. 213 
1180 A. Podger, ‘Jersey’s Shipbuilding Industry’, ABSJ 18:2 (1962) 229-35 
1181 Jamieson, ‘The Channel Islands and Smuggling’, p. 215 
1182 Meyer, ‘The Channel Island Privateers’, p. 175 
1183 Podger, Nest of Vypers’, p. 165 
1184 Meyer, ‘The Channel Island Privateers’, p. 175 
1185 Best, War and Society, p. 145; Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, p. 1 
1186 Podger, Nest of Vypers, p. 169 
1187 J. Black, Britain as a Military Power, 1688-1815, (Oxford, 1999) p. 100 
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emphasises that, even by the Great French War, ‘commerce-raiding or preying 
on private property at sea was still regarded as a legitimate war aim’,1188 while 
Meyer focuses on the manner in which ‘the Channel Islanders [remained] a 
veritable thorn in the mercantile flesh of France’.1189 
 
For those inhabitants who embarked upon privateering ventures during the 
‘Great French War’, a number of motivations might be considered. Certainly, the 
glamorous image and the prospect of personal enrichment would have played a 
significant role for many of the Islands’ seamen, as well as those farmers and 
labourers who supplemented their income through seasonal fishing and inter-
insular trade. According to Best, the French corsairs cultivated the image of 
fighting ‘a dashing maritime guerrilla war’ and provided the general population 
with several ‘maritime folk-heroes’,1190 and there is clear evidence that the 
Channel Islands’ privateers attained a similar status in the eyes of the local 
inhabitants. In 1793, for example, an Act was passed by the States of Jersey 
which forbade local privateers from firing their cannons while either entering or 
leaving port, indicating that it was customary at this time for captains to ‘salute’ 
the population when embarking on or returning from a cruise.1191 Similarly, the 
reputation garnered by privateers in previous conflicts encouraged emulation: 
the Le Mesuriers of Alderney and the Careys and Dobrées of Guernsey had 
become rich and powerful during the mid-eighteenth century, and much of their 
wealth had derived from privateering ventures.1192 
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It is certainly true that, for these prominent armateurs, privateering brought in 
vast profits: as mentioned above, eight vessels from Alderney had generated 
£212,381 in prize money during 1782, and all eight captains were in the employ 
of John Le Masurier (see appendix b).1193 Unsurprisingly, a certain degree of 
‘professional’ jealousy existed between the privateers and their counterparts in 
the Royal Navy and merchant fleet, and the success of the fortunate few gave 
rise to the myth that ‘fat profits [had] been made at the expense of both navy 
and nation’.1194 In reality, however, the majority of local armateurs – as with 
their counterparts in Britain and France – found that privateering brought little 
reward, and their cruises often resulted in considerable losses. During the 
Seven Years War, for example, Jerseyman Pierre Labey had seized around 
£1,000 in prizes, but Raban’s analysis of his accounts revealed that he would 
have been fortunate to see £50 profit – exclusive of wages – per cruise.1195 
Moreover, Raban calculated that over half of Jersey’s privateers operating 
during the Seven Years War ended their cruises in the hands of the enemy, and 
that even successful armateurs such as the Dobrée-Carey consortium often 
struggled to turn a significant profit.1196 
 
Consequently, it can be seen that the exploits of figures such as Thomas 
Pickstock (Herald), Peter Duval (Vulture) and John Knight (Maria) were wholly 
exceptional;1197 captains had a far greater chance of returning empty-handed, 
out-of-pocket,1198 or imprisoned at Valenciennes or St. Nazaire.1199 Even so, it 
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appears that a sufficient number of captains generated profits modest enough 
to maintain the impression that privateering was a viable business venture for 
the islanders during wartime, albeit on a sporadic basis. This is illustrated by the 
short but successful careers of captains such as P. Hamon (nine prizes in 
1793), G. Aubin (seven prizes during 1797-8), J. Aubin (four prizes in 1798), 
Torré (eleven prizes during 1798-9), Knight, (thirteen prizes during 1799-1800), 
and Le Bair (five prizes during 1799-1800).1200 The brief nature of these 
ventures likely arose from the fact that many vessels were able to engage in 
only a handful of cruises before the owners were forced to withdraw them from 
service for repair or to be broken up.1201 Even in the case of Daniel Hamon, the 
most successful of the Islands’ captains, his haul of prizes1202 was amassed 
over the course of three comparatively short cruises, which in turn were spread 
over a period of thirteen years (1797-1801, 1803-06, and 1809-10).1203 
 
Overall, Hamon’s cruises resulted in the loss of 2,300 tons of French shipping, 
including three full-rigged ships of around 300 tons burthen; however, it was by 
no means guaranteed that such prizes would bring significant reward. Nor does 
the size of the vessel appear to have affected the chances of securing captures: 
the Mars of Guernsey (20 guns, 130 men) had been one of the largest 
privateers operating out of the Bailiwicks during the American Revolutionary 
War, but its sole prize was valued at only £250.1204 Such a scenario was no less 
frequent amongst the Malouin privateers, of whom Robert Surcouf was perhaps 
the most skilled and experienced, having been at sea since the age of 
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thirteen.1205 Even he struggled to turn a profit as an armateur: between 1803 
and 1814, only thirteen of the fifteen cruises undertaken by his eleven vessels 
resulted in any captures, while one of these was laid up without taking any 
prizes, and five incurred considerable losses. This record is reflected in 
Surcouf’s accounts: the bulk of his net profit of 202,216 LF being generated by 
a single cruise, and indeed the capture of a single prize, valued at 280,384 
Livres Français. As for the Malouin privateers as a whole, Crowhurst has 
calculated that they generated a net profit of 14,021,365 LF between October 
1806 and May 1814, but it must be highlighted that this figure was inclusive of 
losses amounting to 3,923,000 LF.1206 
 
Rather than being driven by ‘a romantic search for adventure or greed for fat 
prizes’,1207 the bulk of the local captains were far more likely driven by a desire 
to escape a life of endemic poverty and unemployment.1208 As has been already 
noted, the presence of a greatly expanded garrison, a large refugee community 
and – during the winter of 1799-1800 – several thousand Russian soldiers (see 
chapters two and five) placed considerable pressure on the Channel Islands’ 
food supplies. Indeed, it was only thanks to skilful management on the part of 
the military authorities, as well as the exploitation of the wartime privileges 
enjoyed by the local merchants, that the bailiwicks were able to avoid the riots 
which occurred in London and the south of England.1209 Moreover, despite the 
vibrant Gaspé cod trade having encouraged more and more Jerseymen to 
establish themselves in the Newfoundland settlements,1210 this trade could not 
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absorb all the surplus mariners in the Channel Islands.1211 Since their only 
viable employment options were either to join the privateering crews or enlist in 
the Royal Navy,1212 Crowhurst has argued for the existence of a ‘third way’ in 
terms of the motivations of privateers throughout both Great Britain and France.  
 
According to Crowhurst, the ‘auxiliary navy/fortune-hunters’ dichotomy remains 
inadequate, as is the stereotype that the vast majority of privateers and their 
armateurs were wealthy members of the mercantile class. Employing the 
corsairs of St. Malo as a case study, he has argued that the majority of 
privateers during the Great French War emerged out of ‘a large reserve of 
hardy, experienced seamen’ who sought an opportunity to solve ‘the difficulty of 
continuing any other form of economic activity’ during time of war.1213 However, 
as shall become clear later in the chapter, this is not to dismiss the value of the 
individual privateer to the State which he served; as Starkey states, all 
commerce raiders, regardless of their motivation, ‘sought to profit from the 
seizure and legal condemnation of other people’s property’. This ensured that 
the State enjoyed, in its turn, the benefits of the ‘debilitating effects that 
captures had on the enemy’s commerce’,1214 and Crowhurst’s ‘third way’ 
acknowledges the reality that most privateers were motivated neither by desire 
for riches nor patriotic fervour, but by a belief in privateering as legitimate 
employment.1215 This is similar to the situation which prevailed in the Royal 
Navy during the Napoleonic War: impressment, threat of prosecution – and, to a 
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lesser extent, wages – all outranked patriotism and the chance of prize-money 
as inducements to join the Service.1216 
 
The Economic Impact of Privateering 
 
As highlighted by Meyer, the majority of privateer captains, when confronted by 
a superior force, ‘generally saw flight or capitulation as the only realistic lines of 
conduct’; however, a number of Channel Islanders1217 developed well-deserved 
reputations as ‘fighting captains’.1218 Unfortunately, the coverage of these men 
within local scholarship has all too often matched Black’s model of ‘novelistic, if 
not partisan’ history, the focus being placed on ‘celebratory tales and exemplary 
narrative…suiting those who like their scimitars gleaming’.1219 In place of a 
detailed analysis of the privateers’ contribution to the wider naval war, traditional 
accounts have been dominated by the most dramatic aspects of their careers, 
providing blow-by-blow accounts of their engagements. Thus, Saunders tells us 
that under Duval’s command, the 100-ton Vulture – despite being armed with 
only four guns – ‘became the terror of the mercantile trade in the Bay of Biscay’,  
and inflicted such losses that the Bayonne merchants fitted out a brig (180 tons, 
sixteen guns) specifically to hunt her down. Likewise, his account of Duval’s 
conduct during the resultant action is rememiscent of that of Nelson at 
Copenhagen; advised by his officers to surrender, Duval is supposed to have 
replied ‘surrender be damned! As long as I have a leg to stand on, we’ll fight. 
After that, you can do as you like’.1220 
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In terms of their ability to act as a military force, the primary objective of the 
Channel Islands privateers – as with commerce raiders of all nationalities – was 
to inflict damage upon the enemy’s economic powerbase, and thereby disrupt 
their ability to wage war. Although this will be investigated in greater detail at a 
later point, the nature of ‘strategic blockade’ demonstrates that the geographic 
situation of the Channel Islands provided the British with a key advantage in the 
context of localised economic warfare (see chapter seven). Even with the pre-
war extension of the chemins ferré1221 having provided good quality roads 
between France’s channel ports and the interior, the use of coastal convoys 
remained the most efficient means of moving equipment, food and troops to 
Brest, Cherbourg, Granville and St. Malo.1222 By far the most busy shipping 
lanes were those passing between Le Havre and Brest1223 and through the 
Race of Alderney to St. Malo, Granville and St. Brieux,1224 and as highlighted by 
Morieux, the Channel Islands were ideally placed so as to allow the local 
privateers to interrupt this traffic.1225 However, while Gordon highlighted local 
commerce-raiding ventures as representing a continual drain on militia 
manpower,1226 the potency of the Channel Island privateers was surely greatest 
during the Chouannerie, since the extent of insurgent activity rendered Brest all 
but cut off from Paris (see chapter nine).1227  
 
As for the actual impact of the Channel Islands privateers on French coastal 
traffic, this can be appreciated only if a picture can be built up of the volumes 
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and types of cargoes seized.1228 Certainly, the wealth of experience possessed 
by the Islands’ privateer captains – together with their ability to operate in 
concert with vessels from other British ports1229 – led to considerable damage 
being inflicted upon the French mercantile fleet.1230 Moreover, while it is true 
that the capture of large prizes may have been rare for the Islanders, who 
‘aimed to avoid a fight wherever possible’,1231 those that were taken often 
respresented significant losses for the enemy. During the period March-May 
1793, the Jersey privateers claimed as prize the vessels Indispensable (500 
tons) and L'Heureux (400 tons) laden with sugar, rice, tobacco and timber,1232 
as well as an unnamed French sloop laden with brandy and wine.1233 Similarly, 
September 1806 saw the Guernsey privateers account for the Union schooner 
of Baltimore, laden with sugar and coffee; a chassé-marie with a cargo of cider 
and coal; and the French lugger Uraye, with a cargo of brandy and wine.1234 
However, the seizure of such cargoes did not simply represent losses for the 
mercantile fleets of France and her allies – who received compensation from 
government1235 – they also compounded the serious food shortages facing St. 
Malo, Brest, and the hinderlands which they supported.1236 
 
Furthermore, it must not be forgotten the seizure of large shipments of enemy 
food supplies was a considerable boon to the Channel Islands themselves, 
particularly with respect to the need of the local authorities to ensure a viable 
food supply. As has been highlighted, many of those who embarked on 
                                                 
1228 Raban, 'Channel Island Privateering’, 287-99 
1229 PLG, Uncatalogued, Brock, Le Mesurier and Co. to Carteret Priaulx, April 23rd 1805 
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1231 Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, p. 70; Meyer, ‘The Channel Island Privateers’, pp. 183-184 
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1233 The Times, May 1st 1793 
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1235 Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, p. 6 
1236 S. Marzagalli, ‘French Privateering during the French Wars’, in B.A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine 
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privateering ventures did so in order to escape from a life of poverty:1237 even 
before the vast influx of refugees from western France1238 drove up food prices 
(see chapter five), discontent over the cost of basic necessities was often raised 
in the States.1239 When, for example, British government proposed that supplies 
might be sent from the Channel Islands to the royalist armies in France, Craig 
replied that although a ‘good supply of both beef and port’ could be spared, the 
local flour stocks were so low that ‘not a sack’ could be given over.1240 Thus, 
while 1795 witnessed the first attempts on the part of the British government to 
provide aid to the inhabitants,1241 the Channel Islands’ privateers can be seen to 
have helped to supplement the consignments received. This becomes clear 
when it is remembered that Fort Regent was intended to store 12,500 rations of 
rice and 2,000 rations of sugar,1242 both in order to provide the daily rations of 
the garrison troops and supply the population in the event of an invasion.  
 
Finally, even though the majority of the Bailiwicks’ privateers were suited only 
for preying on small, lightly armed or unarmed craft, such captures were vital for 
reasons other than simply achieving the objective of disrupting the enemy’s 
economy.1243 Not only did the seizure en masse of French fishing ships hamper 
the provisioning of her armed forces at the commencement of war, but it must 
be remembered that such vessels were often employed in espionage,1244 for the 
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January 20th 1808 
 214 
smuggling of arms,1245 or were commandeered by the authorities to serve as 
troop transports.1246 As highlighted by Morieux, the War of the Austrian 
Succession had witnessed the confirmation of a de jure neutral status for 
fishermen,1247 meaning that were to be allowed free passage unless found to be 
smuggling, transporting warlike stores, or conducting espionage.1248 However, 
while the Channel Islands’ privateers were, on several of occasions, forced to 
liberate illegally-seized fishing boats,1249 the reality is that, whatever the ‘official’ 
agreements reached between combatants, fishermen continued to be employed 
in covert activity (see section iii).1250 As such, even after Don permitted a 
licensed oyster trade between Cancale and Grouville, French boats were 
required to rendezvous with a British warship and offload onto Jersey boats, so 
as to prevent their ‘getting any intelligence of consequence from the shore’.1251  
 
The Comparative Effectiveness of the Privateers 
 
However, while the Channel Island privateers were clearly able to inflict 
considerable damage upon French commercial shipping, it must also be 
ascertained as to whether they posed a sufficient threat to rival corsairs and 
warships. Again, the experience of previous conflicts would suggest that the 
answer should be in the affirmative: during the Seven Years War, the losses 
suffered by French merchants operating between Ushant and Bordeaux had 
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been so extensive that nine frigates had been deployed in the area to neutralise 
‘les mauvaises corsairs de Guernsey et Jersey’. Mauvaises was indeed an apt 
description: during both the Seven Years War and the American Revolutionary 
War, the Channel Islands corsairs had, collectively, accounted for a significant 
proportion of the prizes taken. Excluding those captured in concert, 332 enemy 
vessels had been condemned to British privateers during the Seven Years War, 
while this figure had risen to 1,005 vessels during the American Revolutionary 
War. Of these prizes, a total of 152 and 435 were condemned to captains 
operating out of the Channel Islands during each conflict, representing 45.8% 
and 42.6% of the respective totals.1252 
 
Since the Channel Islands occupied what was effectively a ‘front-line’ position, 
their privateers were most potent in the early stages of the conflict (i.e. the early 
months of 1793 and the immediate aftermath of the breakdown of the Peace of 
Amiens in 1803).1253 In order to reach the lucrative hunting grounds in the Bay 
of Biscay, the vast majority of British privateers were required to spend many 
days, or even weeks, fighting against the prevailing westerly and south-westerly 
winds. By contrast, while the Channel Island privateers were required to battle 
these same winds in order to reach Ushant, they could also take advantage of 
the prevailing winds to raid virtually the whole western coast of the Cotentin 
Peninsula, ambushing French shipping on the run up-Channel to La Havre and 
the Seine Estuary.1254 Indeed, while Jersey’s mercantile losses between 1803 
and 1805 are estimated as having amounted to two-thirds of her civilian 
shipping and 900 of her sailors,1255 this situation was by no means one-sided; 
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not least because the local privateers ‘rendered infinite service’ in concert with 
the Royal Navy’s scouts.1256 In petitioning for letters of marque, Carteret Priaux 
argued that ‘vessels fitted out in this place will…thereby do our County a service 
which on all occasions we could wish to have in our power to promote’,1257 and 
the accuracy of this claim is attested to by the number of prisoners delivered up 
by the privateers for interrogation by D’Auvergne.1258 
 
In light of Don’s observation that it was ‘impossible constantly to blockade the 
eight ports on the French coast from Cherbourg to St. Malo’, the Channel 
Islands can thus be seen to have provided the British government with two key 
advantages. Firstly, even when weather conditions or pressure on resources 
made it impossible to maintain a formal blockade of the Breton-Norman coast, 
the local privateers might still be relied upon to ‘greatly interrupt the enemy’s 
coasting trade, and prevent almost any mercantile communication with St. Malo 
[and other key ports]’.1259 Secondly, it must be remembered that privateers 
could be commissioned far more quickly than warships:1260 one month after the 
breakdown of the Peace of Amiens, intelligence revealed that St. Malo still 
possessed ‘no vessels-of-war ready for sea’, yet the port had already begun 
‘fitting out privateers on a larger scale than usual’.1261 Consequently, the local 
privateers were ideally placed to provide direct assistance to the Royal Navy in 
its efforts to disrupt enemy naval preparations; both by means of intercepting 
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enemy vessels attempting to enter port1262 and by exploiting their crews’ 
intimacy with the waters off the Normandy coast to operate areas inaccessible 
to ‘regular’ warships.1263 
 
The ability of the Channel Islands privateers to seize a consistently greater 
number of prizes than any other port (or group of ports) in the British Isles can 
be explained by the nature of their targets.1264 Prior to the Peace of Amiens, the 
Channel Island privateers seized a total of 181 prizes, with much of the credid 
being granted to vessels fitted out at the expence of the bailiwicks’ respective 
chambers of commerce.1265 However, only fifteen prizes condemned 
uncontested to Channel Island captors prior to 1809 were ships-of-war or armed 
merchantmen;1266 the vast majority of the remainder were fishing vessels and 
unarmed coastal traders.1267 As shall be demonstrated in the investigation of 
the Channel blockade, this should not distract from the importance of such 
seizures from a strategic perspective (see chapter seven), however, it must be 
remembered that the rules for the condemnation of vessels were not favourable 
to the privateers. While the captain of a privateer or letter-of-marque vessel had 
to prove active participation in the seizure of the enemy vessel, the captain of a 
ship-of-war or hired vessel need only prove that they had been in sight of a 
capture in order to be entitled to a share in the prize.1268 Consequently, while 
the Anglo-Irish MP Edmund Burke may have compared the Channel Islands 
                                                 
1262 TNA, ADM 1/6032, Intelligence Received on March 24th 1794 
1263 SJA, L/A/38/A1, Entry for August 30th 1800 
1264 Of the 284 prizes condemned to Channel Island vessels during the Seven Years War and the War of 
the Austrian Succession, only nineteen (6.7%) were corsairs; and fifty-seven (20.1%) were ships armed 
en guerre et merchandises (possessing a letter-of-marque) 
1265 SJA, L/A/38/A1, Letter to Unnamed Recipient, August 30th 1800; and TNA, WO 55/1549/6, Doyle’s 
Report re. Guernsey and Alderney’ undated 
1266 Meyer, ‘The Channel Island Privateers’, pp. 180-182 
1267 Raban, ‘Pierre Labey’, 319 
1268 C. Van Bynkershoek, P.S. DuPonceau, (trans.), J. Perkovich (ed.), A Treatise on the Rule of War, 
(Clake, New Jersey, 1810) p. 145 
 218 
privateers to ‘a Second Rate Navy’,1269 the reality was that captains of Royal 
Navy vessels were quick to challenge a privateer captain’s claim to exclusive 
right to a capture.1270 Likewise, while the local authorities may have perceived 
the Channel Island privateers as being able to act in concert with the Royal 
Navy for the benefit of the nation,1271 the privateers themselves were often seen 
as a hindrance by the latter’s officers. Not only did they provide serious 
competition for prize-money – one of the few genuine attractions for joining the 
Royal Navy1272 – but the privateers were also resented because of the often 
violent manner in which the crews resisted impressment, particularly in the case 
of Channel Islands’ crews.1273 Furthermore, it was by no means uncommon for 
privateer captains to supplement their sporadic success by illegal means: either 
by operating under invalid letters of marque,1274 involvement in the smuggling 
trade,1275 or by committing acts of piracy.1276 
 
‘The Tale of the Tape’: Size and Armament 
 
As has already been said, the bailiwicks possessed neither the resources nor 
logistics to fit out any vessels to compare with the 300-ton ships deployed by 
armateurs in ports such as Bristol1277 or Bordeaux;1278 however, such vessels 
might occasionally be acquired by capture or purchase. Perhaps the best 
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example from the Great French War is the 486-ton privateer L’Invention: a 
French vessel captured by the British on its first cruise and sold to Carteret 
Priaulx at a prize auction, she had been built in May 1801, and carried a total of 
twelve 12-pdr and four 9-pdr guns.1279 Yet this was an exceptional case: even 
the 108-ton Neptune – one of the largest of the Channel Island vessels – 
mounted only 4-pdr and 6-pdr guns,1280 and few British privateers, of any size, 
ordinarily mounted ordnance significantly larger than a 12-pdr gun or 12-pdr 
carronade.1281 As for the French, while their armateurs were occasionally able 
to fit out exceptionally large vessels such as the Napoléon (one brass 40-pdr, 
twenty-five 32-pdr carronades), the reality was that vessels such as 
Bougainville (ten 6-pdrs, two 4-pdrs, ten swivels) were far more typical.1282  
Moreover, the bulk of enemy privateers were little different from their Channel 
Island counterparts, being designed to prey upon fishing vessels and coastal 
traders, not engage in broadside-to-broadside confrontations with warships.1283 
 
Indeed, if a sample is taken of the French privateers captured over the course 
of the war – regardless of whether they fell victim to the Channel Islands’ 
privateers or to other vessels – it is clear that a significant proportion would 
have posed little real danger to the mauvaises corsairs de Jersey et Guernsey. 
The Annual Register, for example, lists several vessels which seem scarcely 
better armed than Jersey’s diminutive ‘cockleshell’ privateers:1284 Le Cerberre 
(six long guns), Neptune (four long guns), L’Inattendu (two long guns), Le 
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Vengeur (two swivel guns) and La Pluton (one long gun).1285 Furthermore, the 
existence of privateers such as L’Éclair, Le Troisieme Ferrailleur and L’Inconnu 
demonstrate that many French corsairs placed a far greater reliance on volume 
of firepower rather than weight of shot. Of the thirty-two guns mounted by 
L’Éclair, twenty of these were 1½-pdr swivel guns, and the remaining twelve 
were only 6-pdr long guns.1286 Similarly, although both Le Troisieme Ferrailleur 
and L’Inconnu mounted fourteen guns each, these comprised twelve 4-pdr long 
guns and two 12-pdr carronades in the case of the former,1287 and twelve 4-pdr 
long guns and two 8-pdr long guns in the case of the latter.1288 
 
In terms of size, the Channel Islands privateers also appear to have been larger 
on average than their French counterparts: of the fourteen corsairs captured by 
the former between 1793 and 1814, these ranged in size from the Amité (60 
tons) and Hirondelle (80 tons) to the Sans Peur (13 tons), Courageux (15 tons), 
Ajax (17 tons) and Bonne Ésperance (18 tons).1289 More importantly, even 
though the Channel Islands deployed an average of only seventeen privateers 
per annum during the course of the Great French War,1290 many of the French 
corsair fleets appear to have suffered similar patterns of ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ with 
respect to their numbers. Jersey, for example, sent out ten privateers in 1798 
and sixteen in 1800, but this figure fell to only seven vessels in 1803 and just 
two in 1805;1291 a trend which can be seen to have been likewise experienced 
in St. Malo. Unfortunately, the records for the latter port are rendered less 
accurate by the fact that we have access only to the number of vessels 
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registered, not the number of vessels that embarked on cruises, but the overall 
picture remains useful. While thirty-one privateers were registered in St. Malo 
between September 1796 and September 1797, this fell to only ten between 
September 1802 and September 1803; similarly, between 1807 and 1813, the 
number of privateer registrations fell from twenty-five to thirteen.1292 
 
The Privateers as an Instrument of Psychological Warfare 
 
From this analysis, it is clear to see that the French and Channel Islands 
Privateers were largely comparable: however, it must be remembered that their 
principal role was not to fight a protracted gunnery duel, but to disrupt and 
intimidate enemy commercial traffic.1293 Indeed, the French example proves that 
commerce raiders did not have to be numerous in order to have a powerful 
influence over enemy tactics; few of the corsairs were at sea at any one time, 
yet they encouraged widespread fear amongst British merchantmen.1294 In the 
Channel Islands too, it was reported that the local fishing fleet experienced 
frequent raids by a large fleet of very small vessels,1295 while local merchants 
issued frequent demands for convoy protection as a result of the threat of the 
Malouin corsairs.1296 Likewise, a report submitted by Saumarez in June 1803 
revealed that ‘in consequence of the numbers of privateers fitting for sea in the 
ports of St. Malo and Cherbourg [he had] found it necessary to station all the 
small vessels under my orders to cruise to intercept them’.1297 In addition to 
actual incidences of attack, repeated scouting of the various ports along the 
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Breton-Norman coast revealed a high level of activity. In February 1793, eight 
privateers were fitting out at Cherbourg, totalling 214 tons burthen and carrying 
58 swivels and 28 long guns between them,1298 while in June 1796, twelve 
privateers were sighted at Dunkirk, each mounting twelve to twenty guns.1299 
 
In light of these intelligence reports, it is necessary to ‘focus on how resources 
are used, with all that this means in terms of issues of fighting quality, unit 
cohesion, morale, leadership, tactics, strategy and other factors’.1300 As Black 
has observed, psychology has a considerable role to play in analysing this 
aspect of military history, and while it has been demonstrated that privateers 
inflicted considerable damage in economic terms through the taking of prizes, 
their value as a ‘terror weapon’ should not be overlooked.1301 This was 
particularly true of the French corsairs in the wake of Trafalgar, since in addition 
to Napoleon’s considerable investment in the rebuilding of his navy,1302 Britain’s 
commercial traffic remained a tempting target for those French privateers which 
proved able – all too often – to slip the British blockade1303 Between 1809 to 
1814, it is estimated that ‘1,674 convoys sailed to and from England, protecting 
57,448 voyages of merchant ships and government-hired transports’,1304 and it 
is evident that the guerre de course remained a central element of the French 
maritime strategy. Indeed, armateurs such as Robert Surcouf – in spite of the 
highly variable success in terms of prize-taking (see above) – continued to 
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advocate for commerce-raiding as a tactic which might yet force Britain to 
submit, or at least sue for a negotiated peace.1305  
 
Indeed, while Duffy is correct in summarising the guerre de course as being a 
strategy which ‘at times cut deep inroads into British commerce, [but] never bit 
hard enough to bring Britain to its knees’,1306 the French corsairs continued to 
exert considerable pressure on ‘weak links’ in Britain’s mercantile marine. This 
stroke fell particularly hard upon the Channel Islands, and especially during the 
winter months, when it was hardest for an effective blockade to be maintained 
over the Norman ports from which most of the corsairs operated.1307 In October 
and November 1807, the Malouin and Granville privateers were reported as 
especially active,1308 while records for 1810 and 1811 shows the diversity of the 
ships targeted. During this period, the Coursier of St. Malo captured the 100-ton 
brig Belle Ann of Jersey, bound for Madeira with a cargo of dry cod, apples and 
brandy,1309 while an unnamed privateer attacked the Chesterfield packet 
between Guernsey and Weymouth.1310 A third enemy vessel – a cutter which 
had ‘approached flying English colours’ – attacked the hired cutter Queen 
Charlotte while it was carrying dispatches relating to the blockade of 
Cherbourg,1311 and the Chesterfield packet was attacked again in November 
1811, being taken in the Race of Alderney.1312  
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In light of this change in French tactics, one great advantage offered by the 
Channel Islands privateers in the post-Trafalgar era was their ability to carry out 
reprisal attacks in response to the guerre de course. Quite apart from the 
above-mentioned weakness in the blockade, it was also impossible for the 
Royal Navy to maintain a comprehensive watch on the open sea, and any 
vessel(s) which slipped the net (see chapter seven) would give little indication 
as to their destination.1313 Prior to the development of the radio telegraph, it was 
possible for a privateer to operate for weeks in a ‘fertile spot’ without detection, 
as long as they continued to be successful in  preventing the escape of their 
prey.1314 This enabled the Channel Islands privateers to act as additional ‘eyes’ 
of Britain’s naval forces,1315 and supplement the Royal Navy’s force of hired 
civilian vessels,1316 several of which were likewise hired from members of the 
bailiwicks’ merchant companies.1317 Their importance can be shown by 
examining the record of the Malouin corsairs: between 1806 and 1812, St. Malo 
never had less than fifteen privateers registered in any year, and a total of 112 
prizes were captured or ransomed at a cost of only sixty-four of their own 
number.1318 Moreover, the city appears to have continued to prosper through 
privateering ventures during this period, the prizes taken by its corsairs between 
October 1806 and May 1814 bringing in a net profit of 14,021,365 LF. 
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An Uneasy Alliance: The Privateers and the Royal Navy 
 
In terms of their being able to assist the Royal Navy in competing for and 
maintaining control of the seas, the Channel Island vessels possessed one key 
tactical advantage over the naval vessels with which they worked. Although 
almost all small privateers were of shallow draught and light construction,1319 
rendering them ideal for pursuing isolated enemies into coastal or littoral waters 
(see chapter seven), the Channel Island privateer captains were also veterans 
of the local smuggling trade,1320 and were described as having an intimate 
knowledge of ‘every creek, inlet and bay in which an enemy might seek to 
hide’.1321  As such, these vessels were of considerable value to the Royal Navy 
as scouts, and while D’Auvergne’s cruisers regularly reconnoitred the enemy 
ports – principally St. Malo, Solidor, Cancale, Granville, St. Germain, Portbail, 
Carteret, Vielette and Cherbourg1322 – both Don and Doyle were active in hiring 
armed cutters and luggers to augment his force.1323 Indeed, while we can only 
speculate as to how many of these hired vessels had been previously used as 
privateers, it would certainly be naïve to suggest that they had not. Even if a 
vessel in possession of a letter-of-marque was hired by the Royal Navy, it would 
seem that the vessel was permitted to continue to operate under those same 
terms whenever it was not conducting naval business. 
 
Similarly, when cruising in local waters, the Channel Islands’ privateers greatly 
outperformed their Royal Navy counterparts in terms of their knowledge of the 
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hazardous tides, currents and reefs which screened the approaches to the 
Islands. As has been already mentioned (see chapter three), these natural 
barriers had served to disrupt the attempted invasions of 1778 and 1781, but 
they could be just as hazardous to friendly ships. Several vessels on both sides 
were lost in the Race of Alderney,1324 and ultimately, the level of skill required 
when negotiating many of the shallows and channels around the Islands could 
be acquired only after many years at sea.1325 However, for all the advantages 
which the Channel Islands privateers brought to the British in strategic terms, it 
could well be argued that the willingness of the Royal Navy to cooperate with 
them was little more than a ‘marriage of convenience’.1326 In the eyes of both 
the Admiralty and many serving officers, privateers came to be resented both 
for their competing with the Navy over prizes and for their apparent luring of 
trained seamen away from the Service. This issue was even more keenly felt in 
the Channel Islands since, as has been already mentioned, the constitutional 
position of the Bailiwicks (see chapter one) rendered native inhabitants immune 
from impressment.1327 
 
As has been increasingly highlighted in recent scholarship, no aspect of the 
history of the Royal Navy during the Great French War is less accurately 
depicted or more poorly understood than that of the means employed by the 
Royal Navy and the British government to recruit its seamen.1328 Post-war 
reformist literature often depicted members of the press gang as ‘oversized, 
                                                 
1324 Jamieson, ‘The Return to Privateering, p. 227 
1325 SJA, A/A1/2, Letter of January 2nd 1807 
1326 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 96 
1327 St. Vincent to Lord Grey de Howick, June 20th 1803 and July 11th 1803, reproduced in D. Bonner 
Smith (ed.), Letters of Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of St. Vincent whilst First Lord of the Admiralty 
1801-1804, 2 Vols (London, 1927) Vol. II, pp. 313-315 
1328 J. Dancy, 'British Naval Administration, pp. 49 and 54; and N. Slope, ‘Serving in Nelson’s Navy: A 
Social History of Three Amazon-Class Frigates Utilising Database Technology, 1798-1811’ PhD Thesis, 
(University of West London, 2006) pp. 4-5 
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brutal men...under the direction of a sadistic lieutenant’1329 who ‘rampaged 
through port towns, indiscriminately snatching able-bodied men’,1330 and were 
‘as ready to cut a throat as eat their breakfast’.1331 Likewise, the traditional 
image of the Quota Acts portrays the local authorities as having resorted to 
‘clearing out the jails’, and causing ships’ companies to be ‘infected’ with 
tramps, beggers, idlers, gaolbirds, social misfits and riffraff’.1332 Consequently, 
the proportion of pressed men serving in the Royal Navy during the Great 
French War has long been overestimated – Lewis having given a figure as high 
as fifty percent1333 – but this has been challenged in more recent years by both 
Dancy and Slope. According to the former, the press gang accounted for only 
sixteen percent of British seamen who served between 1793 and 1801,1334 and 
only twenty-seven percent of those who served during 1801;1335 while the 
latter’s study of three Amazon-class frigates during 1798-1811 resulted in an 
estimate of thirty-six percent.1336 
 
However, even if the nature and the extent of the Royal Navy’s reliance upon 
impressment may have been exaggerated, it should not be assumed that a 
majority of reports of violence relating to the press gang were ‘embellished’ or 
fabricated wholesale by liberal reformers.1337 In 1803 alone, reports emerged of 
at least ‘seventy-five riots and affrays’ as a direct result of press gang activity, 
with particularly violent encounters taking place at Barking, Newcastle and 
                                                 
1329 J. Dancy, The Myth of the Press Gang: Volunteers, Impressment and the Naval Manpower Problem of 
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1335 Dancy, The Myth of the Press Gang, p. 147 
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Sunderland, as well as at Portland Bill, whereafter two lieutenants were court-
martialled – and acquitted – of willful murder.1338 Likewise, while allegations of 
false impressment of sailors from the Channel Islands appear to have been a 
common occurrence during the Great French War,1339 attempts to circumvent 
the Islanders’ ‘special relationship’ had been recorded as early as the American 
War of Independence.1340 Moreover, since the mechanism of impressment was 
designed to recruit skilled seamen,1341 it is unsurprising that the high rate of 
volunteering amongst Channel Islanders failed to convince desperate captains 
that the inhabitants were conspiring to deny them access to a vital source of 
experienced mariners.1342 Indeed, many naval officers also suspected the 
Channel Islands of being employed as a place of refuge for ‘hundreds of British 
seamen who resort thither [to] take advantage of the indulgence shewn to the 
inhabitants [with respect to impressment]’.1343 
 
Fortunately, the authorities in the Channel Islands openly acknowledged the 
fact that the permeability of their borders made the bailiwicks a haven for 
deserters from both branches of the British armed forces. In order to assist the 
Royal Navy, a bounty of 20s was awarded by the States of Jersey for each man 
brought in,1344 while D’Auvergne declared that no vessel should be considered 
as having ‘reasonable objection...to being visited for deserters’,1345 and that all 
                                                 
1338 Davey, In Nelson’s Wake, p. 23; and Duffy, ‘The Foundations of British Naval Power’, p. 69 
1339 TNA, FO 95/612/17, D’Auvergne to Nepean, July 29th 1799; SROI, SA 3/1/7/18, Saumarez to 
Nepean, June 3rd 1803; SA 3/1/7/20, Nepean to Saumarez, April 23rd 1806; and TNA, ADM 1/226, 
Commander, HMS Albacore, to D’Auvergne, January 8th 1811 
1340 TNA, FO 95/612/14, Lord Weymouth to Lieutenant-Governor of Jersey, January 19th 1778, enclosed 
in D’Auvergne to the Board of Admiralty, June 24th 1799 
1341 Dancy, 'British Naval Administration’, pp. 56 and 62 
1342 St. Vincent to Lord Grey de Howick, May 24th, June 20th and July 11th 1803, reproduced in Bonner 
Smith (ed.), Letters of Earl St. Vincent, Vol. II, pp. 314-315 
1343 St. Vincent to Lord Grey de Howick, April 25th 1803, reproduced in Ibid, p. 286 
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vessels calling at Jersey should be searched.1346 Furthermore, a considerable 
number of deserters were discovered to have taken refuge in the Islands after 
having fled either from transports or from garrisons in Britain,1347 with several 
such men re-enlisting in the comparatively ‘safe’ regiments posted to garrison 
duty in the bailiwicks.1348 However, while the British authorities may have been 
wholly within their rights to attempt to recover these men, it is evident that the 
Channel Islanders remained anxious of the possibility that unscrupulous naval 
officers might take advantage of the situation as offering an ideal cover for 
illegal impressment operations. Ultimately, the begrudging respect shown by the 
Royal Navy to the Channel Islands’ de jure immunity from impressment1349 
meant that violent clashes were far less frequent than in Britain, but attempts to 
recover deserters often served as flashpoints for disturbances.  
 
With respect to local violence in relation to impressment, one of the most 
prominent examples is provided by the ‘violent outrage’ committed in June 1803 
by the crew of the Union privateer of Guernsey against Captain Dobrée and the 
officers and men of HMS Hazard.1350 After the former had failed to heave to and 
submit to a search, the latter had fired several warning shots and chased her 
into St. Peter Port;1351 however, upon boarding the privateer, Captain Dobrée 
and his officers were attacked with ‘pieces of wood and iron‘, and their boat was 
hauled ashore and burned.1352 Moreover, when Dobrée sought to bring charges 
against the ringleaders of the riot, he himself was brought before the Royal 
                                                 
1346 TNA, FO 95/612/14, D’Auvergne to the Board of Admiralty, June 24th 1799 
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1348 Ibid, Letter of February 10th 1810 and A/A1/4, Letter of May 3rd 1811 
1349 St. Vincent to Lord Grey de Howick, April 25th 1803, reproduced in Bonner Smith (ed.), Letters of 
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1350 SROI, SA 3/1/7/18, Nepean to Saumarez, June 6th 1803 
1351 N. Rogers, The Press Gang: Naval Impressment and its Opponents in Georgian Britain (London, 
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1352 GSG, A/IV/80/16, ‘Correspondence between Captain Dobrée, Sir James Saumarez and the 
Admiralty’, June 1803 
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Court on a charge of ‘violating the privileges of the Island’, and fined a total of 
£30 before bail was posted.1353 A similar incident had occurred in June 1799, 
when Captain Lord Proby of HMS Danaë (sloop, 20 guns) had endeavoured to 
conduct a search of a Guernsey privateer for ‘known deserters’. Not only did he 
come under fire from the vessel while approaching and find himself ‘treated with 
gross insults’, but the Island’s ‘civil police’ proved to be ‘intimately connected 
with the privateers’ and ‘chose to interpret the visit of the Danaë’s boat as 
intended to impress their crews’.1354 
 
The Final Assessment 
 
Although those officers who found themselves reliant upon impressment to 
maintain a full complement for their ships may have looked upon privateers as 
draining valuable manpower away from the Fleet, it cannot be denied that these 
civilian commerce raiders performed an essential service. This was particularly 
true during the years following Trafalgar, when Napoleon relied increasingly on 
privateering as a means to restrict Britain’s supply lines;1355 in 1807 alone, 
some 559 British vessels were lost to the corsairs, while in 1810, this figure 
peaked at over 600 ships.1356 In addition to adopting the convoy system as a 
counter to these predations (see chapter seven), the Royal Navy also made a 
‘vigourous attempt to check enemy privateering activity at source’, and her 
frigates enjoyed particular success with respect to capturing enemy corsairs 
operating in the vicinity of Cherbourg and Ushant.1357 However, in order to ‘take 
the war into French coastal waters’, it was necessary to rely on the combined 
                                                 
1353 TNA, ADM 1/222, Dobrée to Saumarez, June 19th 1803  
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 231 
efforts of the Channel Island privateers and the small naval vessels 
commanded by D’Auvergne and Saumarez (see chapter seven). Indeed, while 
it is true that relatively few enemy ships were captured in comparison to the 
actual number that set sail, and that convoys proved a far more effective form of 
protecting British trade,1358 this should not lead us to dismiss the privateers’ 
importance within British naval strategy. 
 
As will be demonstrated through the discussion of the Channel blockade (see 
chapter seven), control of enemy trade was one of the most important, but also 
one of the most difficult, objectives facing the Royal Navy,1359 since a sustained 
blockade placed a heavy operational toll on a large number of vessels. While it 
is true that ships such as HMS Victory were ‘long-term’ investments for the 
Navy – Nelson’s flagship first saw action at Ushant in 1778, and between 1808 
and 1812, served as Saumarez’ flagship in the Baltic – their construction and 
maintenance consumed a vast quantity of resources. A third-rate 74-gun ship 
like HMS Triumph (1764) required 3,028 loads1360 of timber, while a first-rate 
100-gun ship like HMS Royal George (1756) required 5,760 loads,1361 and 
much of this seasoned wood was imported from Germany, Scandinavia and the 
Baltic.1362 Unfortunately, the complementary duties of blockade and convoy 
were tedious, monotonous and often thankless tasks, with little opportunity for 
advancement or promotion;1363 thus, although rich prizes were exceptional, the 
prospect of glory and wealth often tempted frigate captains to neglect their more 
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1359 Starkey, ‘A Restless Spirit’, p. 128 
1360 One ‘load’ = Fifty cubic feet. 
1361 R.A. Church, Depletion of the Sylvian Sea: Seventeenth Century English Shipbuilding, (Online, 
United States of America, 2008) p. 25 
1362 R. Morriss, The Royal Dockyards during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, (Leicester, 1983) 
pp. 73-74; and Morieux, ‘Diplomacy from Below’, 90 
1363 Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, pp. 38 and 72 
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‘mundane’ duties in favour of ‘prize hunting’.1364 By contrast, the privateers 
relied solely upon prize-taking as a means to turn a profit from their ventures: 
thus, their entire time at sea was devoted to searching for and engaging with 
the enemy, or – as more often the case – retaking captured vessels that were 
en-route to French ports under prize crews.1365 
 
Indeed, while it is true that the Channel Islands privateers were prolific in the 
taking of prizes, it is necessary in summing up to highlight that a considerable 
number were friendly ships re-taken from the enemy. According to the records 
of Parisian armateurs, the period from 1803 onwards saw as many as 75% of 
their prizes being recaptured before they reached the safety of the French 
coast,1366 and the ‘tugs of war’ which could ensue over individual prizes was 
considerable. One of the most extreme cases occurred in July 1803, when the 
Dutchman Jacobina, carrying a cargo of sugar, cotton and coffee, was seized 
by the Guernsey privateer Friends Goodwill. Only three days later, while being 
sent to the St. Peter Port under a prize crew, she was re-captured by the 
French corvette L’Adventure, who attempted to escort the vessel back to St. 
Malo. However, both of the vessels were intercepted by HMS Rosario (sixth-
rate, 20 guns), with L’Adventure abandoning her prize, and allowing Jacobina to 
be brought into a British port.1367 As for their ability to counteract the threat of 
French corsairs, there is no doubt that the Islanders did enjoy some success in 
this regard, even though this was a task which more usually fell to the more 
powerful warships of the Channel Squadron.1368  
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Consequently, while British merchants may have genuinely feared that ‘swarms 
of French privateers were hovering off the British coast’,1369 much of the threat 
was in fact neutralised. In terms of a direct comparison, it is useful once again 
to draw on the cases of Jersey and St. Malo, the two ports for which statistics 
are most readily available. Crowhurst records that French corsair activity 
peaked in 1797 during the Revolutionary War, and again in 1807-8 during the 
Napoleonic War,1370 with the Malouins capturing or ransoming a total of sixty-
four prizes for the loss of only twenty-seven ships. As for the Jersey privateers, 
it can be seen that these inflicted a vastly disproportionate level of damage 
upon the French mercantile fleet; often because of the fact that enemy crews 
are recorded as having abandoned their vessels rather than risking a protracted 
gunnery duel.1371 in 1798, for example, only ten Jersey vessels are recorded as 
having embarked on cruises, but they captured twenty-nine prizes totalling 
1,400 tons burthen, while in 1800 – Jersey’s busiest year – saw sixteen 
privateers deployed and twenty-five prizes taken, totalling about 1,500 tons 
burthen.1372 However, it must be remembered that the Islanders’ fortunes varied 
significantly from vessel to vessel: in 1793, for example, Alligator (Philippe 
Hamon), captured six French ships totalling 450 tons, while the Hazard (Elie 
Messervy) took no prizes.1373 
 
Finally, while it is impossible to know the true monetary value of the prizes 
seized by the local privateers without extensive analysis of the HCA records1374 
– something which is far beyond the scope allowed by this thesis – the 
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importance of their operations should not be easily dismissed. While it is true 
that ‘sporadic attack could never be so efficient as an organised system of 
operation’,1375 the activities of the Channel Island corsairs – like those of their 
counterparts from British ports – can be seen nonetheless as having contributed 
significantly to the success of the war at sea. In spite of perceived competition 
over prize money and allegations of their diverting experienced seamen from 
naval service,1376 the privateers’ ‘predatory war’ was viewed by St. Vincent as 
having produced ‘an incredible effect’ upon the enemy.1377 Indeed, their 
captains and crews often provided crucial information relating to enemy 
preparations: either by passing on reports of their own observations to naval 
vessels,1378 or by bringing in small groups of prisoners for interrogation by the 
military authorities.1379 More importantly, their ability to prey upon the entire 
French coast from Dunkirk to Bordeaux1380 not only reinforced their reputation 
as ‘the despair of France’, but also permitted the Channel Islands’ privateers to 
play an active role in the local naval blockade.  
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Chapter Seven – Making and Breaking the Blockade 
 
While it is evident that the Channel Islands remained ‘a safe haven for 
privateers and a smugglers’ paradise’1381 and that the local commerce-raiders 
enjoyed considerable success (see chapter six), it would be a mistake to focus 
on the privateers alone as an instrument of economic warfare. As Crowhurst 
observed, the waters around the Channel Islands proved fruitful hunting-ground 
vfor vessels of the Royal Navy; fifteen enemy corsairs being taken by them near 
Guernsey, two off Jersey, two off the Casquets, two near Alderney and one off 
Chausey.1382 Likewise, the early years of the war witnessed several successful 
frigate engagements in the Channel and the Western Approaches,1383 while 
Warren fought two successful actions off the Breton coast in 1794, and 
Strachan inflicted considerable losses on Breton-Norman coastal trade 
throughout 1795.1384 Moreover, despite being unable to provide support for 
large squadrons or safe anchorage for large ships-of-war, the geographic 
position of the Channel Islands could be readily exploited as a means of 
enhancing the blockade of the adjacent French coast. Both D’Auvergne and 
Saumarez frequently deployed their small vessels against the corsairs operating 
out of St. Malo and Granville (see chapter six),1385 as well as to monitor – and if 
possible, attack – the large number of convoys which sought safety in the 
harbours of Brest and Cherbourg.1386 
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Although such considerations were of fundamental importance to blockade 
warfare, the benefits offered by the Channel Islands did not derive solely from 
their geographical location. As with the local privateers, the scouts engaged by 
D’Auvergne (see chapter three) demonstrated a number of advantages over 
many of the naval vessels posted to the Channel Islands station. Most important 
within the context of the blockade, these hired craft were able to pursue the 
enemy into coastal and littoral waters, often leading to their gaining valuable 
intelligence concerning enemy preparations (see chapter eight). Moreover, the 
Channel Islanders were valued for their unrivalled knowledge of local waters: in 
1795, it was announced that Jersey pilots would receive a bounty for enlisting 
on board Royal Navy vessels,1387 while from 1807, all Channel Island pilots 
were granted both Admiralty commissions and peacetime half-pay.1388 Indeed, 
their superiority to other naval pilots had been well-established during the 
intervening years: Monsieur Le Gallais – appointed to the Jersey signal stations 
in 1807 (see chapter three) – was reportedly ‘considered by the [local] naval 
officers as one of the best pilots belonging to this Island’.1389 Similarly, in an 
application of May 1803, Saumarez requested Admiralty pilots for vessels 
cruising Le Havre, St. Marcou, Cancalle Bay and St. Malo, but declared that 
‘[Guernsey] and Jersey will furnish pilots for the other parts of the station’.1390 
 
With respect to a demonstration of the advantage which local pilots conferred 
upon vessels on the Channel Islands station, the best example is provided by 
the ‘Action of October 20th 1793’, precipitated by Saumarez’ squadron having 
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been intercepted near Guernsey by a superior French force.1391 In order to 
ensure the escape of his smaller vessels, Saumarez decided to lure the enemy 
into a chase, and asked his pilot, Jean Breton, if he believed it possible to guide 
HMS Crescent through a ‘most dangerous and intricate channel’ off Guernsey’s 
western coast, and which had never been navigated by a frigate. The French, 
fearing that they would run aground, abandoned the pursuit, however, Le 
Breton – displaying ‘a masterpiece of professional skill’1392 – succeeded in 
taking Saumarez’ vessel through the reef, and was presented with a silver gilt 
medal by the Lieutenant-Governor.1393 Likewise, during a cruise of July 1803, 
the lack of an experienced pilot led Saumarez to abandon an attempt to capture 
‘a large frigate’ then at anchor in the Outer Road at Cherbourg, the hazardous 
approach to the port being enhanced by ‘fog and variable winds’.1394 However, 
further proof of the value of the Channel Islands pilots is provided by official 
reports relating to intelligence-gathering and espionage: in October 1794, for 
example, ‘a mission of confidential service’ induced Waugh to ‘procure one of 
the ablest and best-informed pilots that [Alderney] can furnish’.1395  
 
As advantageous as the Islanders’ maritime knowledge may have been to the 
Royal Navy, the prevalence of local smuggling presented the British 
government with a serious dilemma. Although the inhabitants might protest that 
the privileges granted to the Channel Islands under the Constitutions rendered 
such activities legal (see below), they nonetheless threatened to weaken the 
efficacy of the British Channel blockade. As late as 1813, the London-based 
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merchant Samuel Arbouin complained of the large quantities of contraband 
French brandy which continued to be landed on the Devon coast by Guernsey 
smugglers, and further alleged that several ‘Bonapartists’ had gained sanctuary 
in the Island by exploiting tenuous claims to ‘native’ status.1396 Later that same 
year, it was reported that Guernsey had become a waypoint for the smuggling 
of ‘silks and other manufacturing’, and that Bonaparte’s cause was being sorely 
aided by ‘the resultant export of British gold’.1397 In spite of such frustrations, the 
latter years of the Great French War nonetheless found the British government 
able to exploit the smugglers to their own advantage, and particularly in the 
wake of the Milan and Berlin Decrees. At this time, plans were set in motion to 
undermine Napoleon’s Continental System by recruiting the Channel Islands’ 
smugglers as a force of blockade runners,1398 a strategy which the Emperor had 
himself sought to employ. 
 
Finally, while this chapter is intended to demonstrate the strategic value of the 
Channel Islands as a support for the blockade of the adjacent French coast, it 
must be emphasised that the nature of such support was in no way comparable 
to that offered by bases such as Malta. First and foremost, while they offered an 
ideal base for privateers, scouts and other small craft, the lack of a fortified 
deep-water harbour and the hazardous nature of local navigation rendered the 
Channel Islands almost totally inaccessible to large ships-of-war. In addition, 
although the trans-Atlantic cod trade and privateering were amongst the most 
significant local employers (see chapter six), local shipbuilding was almost 
entirely nonexistent during the Great French War, at least in terms of the 
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services which might be provided in a dedicated shipyard. While Cox has 
estimated that as many as one hundred shipwrights may have been working in 
the Channel Islands by 1804,1399 the bulk of these were engaged in little more 
than making rudimentary repairs to the vessels anchoring in St. Helier, St. 
Aubin or St. Peter Port. It was not until the 1820s that the first dedicated 
shipyards been established in both Jersey and Guernsey, after which the 
Channel Islands witnessed several decades of rapid expansion, with shipping 
and shipbuilding emerging as the second-largest employer.1400 
 
The Bailiwicks and the Navy – The Support Available 
 
As was illustrated during the Quiberon Expedition of 1795 (see chapter nine), 
the most basic requirement of a fleet employed on blockade duty was ease of 
access to a point of supply. Hoping that this might permit Moira to funnel 
additional British troops into Quiberon, Warren had set up a blockade of 
Belleisle; however, he conceded that this position was tenable only if Bridport’s 
fleet could be ‘relieved by another, so as to blockade L’Orient’. Similarly, 
although he was able to replenish his supplies of bread and water from the 
islands of Houat and Hoëdic, this recourse was described by Warren as being 
‘insufficient’ to sustain his forces, and a lack of beer, meat and other fresh 
provisions contributed to an outbreak of scurvy.1401 Unfortunately, with respect 
to meeting the needs of a blockading force, this was one area in which the 
Channel Islands were able to provide only a token level of assistance; at least 
until after 1808, when Spain’s entry into the Peninsular War opened the South 
                                                 
1399 Cox, ‘The Transformation of St. Peter Port’, p. 298 
1400 Crossan, ‘Guernsey, 1814-1914’, p. 19; and Podger, ‘Ship-Building in Jersey’, 234-235 
1401 Warren to Spencer, July 29th and 31st 1795, reproduced in Corbett and Richmond (eds.), Papers of the 
Second Earl Spencer, Vol. II, pp. 92-94 
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American markets to Guernsey’s merchants.1402 As has been already noted, the 
Bailiwicks had faced a potential food crisis during the 1790s, and it is 
reasonable to suggest that only skilled management and the successes of the 
local privateers prevented the outbreak of riots similar to those witnessed in 
both Britain and France (see chapters five and six). 
 
Aside from the difficulties of supply and provisioning, the Bailiwicks were also 
deficient in terms of being able to offer a blockading squadron a base at which 
to refit and repair. In addition to the abovementioned lack of any shipyards, it 
was not until 1808 that the harbour of St. Peter Port was deemed sufficiently 
well fortified as to ‘afford a complete shelter and safety to any vessels [caught] 
in the severe south-easterly gales’.1403 As for the anchorage at Grouville, while 
this was ‘defended by banks and rocks from most quarters of the compass’, the 
bay was so shallow as to be impractical for the large vessels deployed on 
blockade duty. Once D’Auvergne’s flagship and his flotilla of gunboats were 
anchored therein, it was estimated that the bay might accommodate no more 
than ‘one [additional] frigate, two ship-sloops and two brigs’,1404 meaning that 
the majority of vessels under Saumarez’ command remained exposed in 
Guernsey Roads.1405 Even so, his squadron remained a significant threat to the 
French:1406 in 1804, for example, HMS Cerberus intercepted a convoy bound for 
Cap de la Hague, capturing Le Chameau (300 tons burthen, four long 6-pdrs, 
two swivels).1407 Two months previously, the naval brig Liberty and the private 
vessel Roulette had fallen in with a French convoy of twenty-seven sail off Cap 
                                                 
1402 Cox, ‘The Transformation of St. Peter Port’, pp. 169 and 177 
1403 GSG, A/IV/80/1, Letter of August 3rd 1808 
1404 Warren to Spencer, August 7th 1796, reproduced in Corbett and Richmond (eds.), Papers of the 
Second Earl Spencer, Vol. I, pp. 272-274 
1405 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of August 11th 1807 
1406 Ibid, Entry for October 28th 1803 
1407 Selby to Saumarez, January 26th 1804, reproduced in Leyland, (ed.), Dispatches, Vol. I, pp. 257-258 
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de la Hague, and driving off her escort,1408 had secured the capture of three of 
the enemy vessels, several others being pursued on shore and wrecked.1409 
 
In every element of its operations the recources of the Royal Navy were 
stretched to the limit: as many as one in four vessels on the Brest blockade 
were under refit at any time,1410 while for the navy as a whole, only two-thirds of 
vessels were ever on station at any one time.1411 Off all aspects of naval duty, 
blockade duty was perhaps to most exacting: Collingwood, for example warned 
that the ships and men under his command were exposed to ‘more danger than 
a battle once a week’.1412 Patrol off the Breton-Norman coast was particularly 
hazardous: HMS Amythyst was scrapped after striking the Les Hannois and Les 
Grunds reefs;1413 HMS Deux Amis was caught in a ‘severe gale of wind’1414 off 
the coast of Jersey and was driven onto rocks;1415 while HMS Rambler 
encountered a storm in the Race of Alderney,1416 and was feared lost.1417 
However, the most serious incidence involving vessels specifically posted to the 
Channel Islands station occurred on November 16th 1801, when D’Auvergne 
reported that several of his gunboats had been caught in a hurricane while 
returning to Plymouth for refit. According to the official report, many of the 
vessels had been lost or severely damaged: at least two – the William and Lucy 
                                                 
1408 It is reported that the convoy had been provided with an escort comprising ‘a brig and several other 
armed vessels’, but no indication is given of the strength of this force. 
1409 SROI, SA 3/1/7/19, Entry for November 25th 1803 
1410 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 188  
1411 J. Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al Qaeda (London, 2004) 
pp. 37-38 
1412 Greenwood, ‘James, Lord de Saumarez’, p. 254 
1413 TNA, WO 1/604, Le Mesurier to Small, January 1st 1796 
1414 TNA, FO 95/612/5, D’Auvergne to Nepean, April 3rd, 1799 
1415 Although repaired, HMS Deux Amis was wrecked off the Isle of Wight on May 23rd 1799 
1416 TNA, FO 95/612/41, D’Auvergne to Nepean, September 2nd, 1800; and HO 69/5/55, Nepean to 
D’Auvergne, September 5th, 1800 
1417 Ultimately, HMS Rambler succeeded in returning to Portsmouth, but she had been totally dismasted. 
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and the Friendship – were abandoned by their crews, while a third vessel was 
driven ashore and captured on the Normandy coast.1418 
 
Irrespective of the evident difficulties faced by the Royal Navy in terms of being 
able to make use of the bailiwicks as a point for refit or supply, contemporaries 
remained adamant as to their strategic value. Warren, in spite of his 
reservations concerning the suitability of Grouville Bay as an anchorage, argued 
that the installation of permanent moorings would solve the problem of ships’ 
cables being damaged by the reefs that lay offshore.1419 Similarly, Don 
described Guernsey Roads as ‘the great naval station for ships-of-war allotted 
for the protection of these Islands’,1420 and warned that – should the French 
gain control of St. Helier, St. Aubin and St. Peter Port – they might become the 
base of operations for ‘between two and three hundred armed vessels’.1421 
Although it is likely that Don was referring only to craft similar to the flat-
bottomed gunboats which had been constructed at Le Havre and Cherbourg 
throughout 1794,1422 it should be remembered that the Channel Islands were 
well-suited as staging-posts for smaller vessels. While large ships-of-war 
requiring refit were faced with no option but to return to their home ports in 
England,1423 the majority of vessels on the Channel Islands station were able to 
make minor repairs in either Jersey or Guernsey,1424 returning to Britain only as 
a last resort1425 or in order to re-supply.1426  
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1419 Warren to Spencer, August 7th 1796, reproduced in Corbett and Richmond (eds.), Papers of the 
Second Earl Spencer, Vol. I, pp. 272-274 
1420 SJA, L/F/106/A/1, Don to Saumarez, August 16th 1806 
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1423 Morriss, The Channel Fleet, p. 167 
1424 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of November 15th 1807 
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From ‘Blue Water’ to ‘Brown Water’ – A Shifting Strategy 
 
Ultimately, the involvement of the Channel Islands as a support for the blockade 
of the Breton-Norman coast arose out of a gradual transformation of British 
maritime strategy over the course of the Great French War. It is true that the 
heavy losses inflicted on the French navy in the fleet actions of the 1790s and in 
the lead-up to Trafalgar did not – as demonstrated by Allemand’s escape from 
Rochefort in January 1808 and that of Willaumez from Biscay in 18091427 – 
bring an end to the maritime contest. However, Napoleon’s increasing reliance 
upon the guerre de course (see chapter six) led to the Royal Navy to undergo a 
transformation ‘from a big ship, blue water navy into a small ship, brown water 
navy’,1428 the intention being that these smaller vessels would be so numerous 
as to keep watch on every part of the enemy coast. Even by Trafalgar, the 
frigate had already surpassed the ship-of-the-line as the most numerous class 
of ship in the Royal Navy, accounting for fifty-three percent of its total force, but 
these were increasingly supplemented by a host of smaller vessels, particularly 
sloops, brig-sloops and gunboats.1429 In addition, Knight has highlighted the 
emergence of the brig as the Royal Navy’s ‘maid-of-all-work’: in 1804, only 
thirty-three such vessels had been in commission, but by 1810 there were 169 
on the Navy List, with 155 still in commission in 1814.1430 
 
Although these small vessels were not designed to engage directly with enemy 
warships, their speed and wide range enabled them to play a crucial role in the 
                                                 
1427 Davey, In Nelson’s Wake, pp. 278-279 and 281 
1428 M. Duffy, ‘Review of Q. Colville and J. Davey (eds.), Nelson, Navy and Nation: The Royal Navy and 
the British People, 1688-1885 (London, 2013)’, IJMH 26 (2014), cited in Knight, ‘British Defensive 
Strategy at Sea’, p. 93 
1429 Davey, In Nelson’s Wake, p. 32 
1430 Knight, ‘British Defensive Strategy at Sea’, p. 93 
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maintenance of the blockade. As was highlighted during the examination of the 
invasion scare of 1794 (see chapter three), it was impossible for the British to 
keep a permanent watch on enemy ports, and the ‘loose blockade’ – while likely 
to tempt the enemy out of port – was a risk-intensive strategy. For example, the 
French attempt to mount a landing in Galway Bay in support of the United 
Irishmen’s Rebellion (1798) had been facilitated by the fact that the British 
squadron then blockading Brest had been driven off-station by gales from the 
south-west,1431 allowing nine French vessels1432 to slip the net.1433 Likewise in 
1799, Bruix’ took advantage of fog and contrary winds to slip through the British 
blockade of Brest,1434 while in 1801, a violent storm scattered the watching 
British ships and allowed Gantheaume’s squadron1435 to escape port1436 and 
head for the Mediterranean.1437 On such occasions, it was the patrolling 
frigates, brigs, cutters and sloops which were often relied upon to ascertain the 
strength and likely destination of the escaped vessels (see chapter eight), and 
as February 1795, this had led to the commanders of ‘cruisers’ being instructed 
to ‘avoid seeking ‘the capture of single ships...or any action…not absolutely 
requisite for the security of [the squadron]’.1438 
 
However, it must be also highlighted that the shift to a ‘brown water’ strategy 
was also necessitated by the need for Britain to secure the safety of its maritime 
supply lines; between June 25th and November 9th 1809 alone, fifteen separate 
                                                 
1431 NMM, KIN/25, ‘Intelligence Received from HMS Caesar’, October 2nd 1798 
1432 Their strength was given as ‘[either] one ship-of-the-line and eight frigates or two ships-of-the-line 
and seven frigates’ 
1433 NMM, KIN/25, ‘Orders from Admiral Kingsmill to the Commander of HMS Caesar’, October 4th 
1798, and Nepean to Kingsmill, November 2nd 1798 
1434 Morriss, The Channel Fleet, p. 347; and TNA, WO 1/606, Waugh to Dundas, July 28th 1794 
1435 Including Formidable, Indivisible, Indomptable (80 guns); Constitution, Dix Aout, Dessaix and Jean 
Bart (74 guns); Creole and Bravoure (40 guns) 
1436 NMM, COR/8, ‘Extract of Intelligence from Captain D’Auvergne’, January 31st 1801 
1437 Morriss, Naval Power and British Culture, p. 22 
1438 ‘Instructions for the Conduct of Ships Appointed to Obtain Intelligence of the State of the Enemy’s 
Naval Force at Brest’, February 5th 1795, reproduced in Ross, Saumarez Correspondence, Vol. I, p. 145 
 245 
convoys passed through the Danish Straits, numbering 2,210 ships.1439 The 
protection of these and other convoys was a duty for which small, fast escort 
vessels were ideally suited,1440 but in order to provide crews for her growing 
‘small-ship’ navy, the British were obliged to undertake a redistribution of 
manpower. At the end of the French Revolutionary War, 38,000 seamen had 
been stationed off the Breton-Norman coast aboard seventy-five warships, but 
by September 1809 – at the height of the Baltic Campaign – this had fallen to 
only 7,000 seamen aboard thirty ‘much smaller’ warships.1441 However, while 
the long-term success of Britain’s maritime strategy remained dependent upon 
‘destroying the Colonial resources of [her] enemies, and adding proportionately 
to [her] own’,1442 naval commanders protested at their ships and crews being 
diverted in this manner.1443 Indeed, even when intelligence provided by 
D’Auvergne’s agents1444 had indicated the very real possibility of a French 
invasion of Ireland,1445 Bridport complained bitterly when he learned that part of 
his force – then blockading Brest – was to be detached to provide a ‘tactical 
reserve’ against such an expedition.1446 
 
The Channel Islands’ Hired Vessels 
 
In order to understand the manner in which the Channel Islands were able to 
supplement the deficiencies suffered by the Navy in terms of its ‘cruisers’, it is 
                                                 
1439 Davey, In Nelson’s Wake, p. 248 
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1444 TNA, WO 1/922/5, D’Auvergne to Dundas, ‘Translation of Intelligence from Brest’, December 30 th 
1796; WO 1/922/9, ‘Fighting Order for Hoche’s Expedition, Naming Officers and Ships’, December 30 th 
1796; and FO 95/605/102, D’Auvergne to Windham, September 9th 1798 
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necessary to turn again to the theories advanced by Corbett; in particular, what 
he describes as his ‘spade and rifle’ approach to naval strategy. According to 
this model, it remains ‘impossible to develop an aggressive line of strategy to 
the full without the support of the defensive’, even when a commander is ‘the 
most committed devotee of attack’.1447 Within this framework, it is possible to 
see that the auxiliary vessels on the Channel Islands station – whether under 
the command of Saumarez or D’Auvergne – were in a position to act as the 
Royal Navy’s ‘spade’ in the Channel theatre. Moreover, as was highlighted at 
the beginning of this chapter, the inhabitants’ maritime experience was 
invaluable to the Service; their unrivalled knowledge of local waters rendered 
them excellent pilots,1448 while even smugglers served as a potential source of 
critical intelligence (see chapter eight).1449 However, while it is true that the 
majority of Royal Navy personnel were volunteers1450 and that many Islanders 
were likewise attracted by the promise of a bounty,1451 their immunity from 
impressment (see chapter six) obliged commanders to resort to other means of 
exploiting this valuable source of skilled manpower.  
 
During the first months of the Great French War, the chief method employed by 
the Royal Navy for the ‘indirect’ recruitment of Channel Islands’ seamen was 
that of negotiating for the hire of local vessels as a means of augmenting local 
maritime power. In January 1793, for example, Brown advised that he had 
engaged a cutter to undertake temporary patrol duties off the coast of 
Guernsey, and also indicated that – should it prove impossible to send 
                                                 
1447 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, pp. 33-34  
1448 SJA, A/A1/2, Letter of January 2nd 1807 
1449 Douch, Flogging Joe’s Warriors, p. 15 
1450 Dancy, ‘British Naval Administration’, p. 62 
1451 TNA, ADM 1/221, Letter of December 7th 1795; HO 69/17/16, ‘Petition by the Chamber of 
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additional vessels from Britain – that he could ‘always find [local] luggers and 
cutters ready to be employed upon the [same] terms’.1452 Likewise, although it 
had been already decided that a force of two cutters and two sloops were to be 
provided for the defence of the Channel Islands, Dundas advised both the 
Lieutenant-Governors that, ‘should [they] both be of opinion that…these vessels 
would be insufficient’, then he would have ‘no objection’ to meeting the cost of 
their hiring ‘a lugger or two’.1453 Falle appears to have taken full advantage of 
this caveat – a letter of March 19th 1795 making reference to the hired lugger 
Pitt1454 – but separate negotiations between himself and Dundas led to the 
recommendation that several other civilian vessels might ‘be fitted without much 
difficulty or expense as armed ships.1455  
 
By engaging in a closer examination of the terms on which these various civilian 
vessels were hired, it is evident that a significant value was placed upon their 
ability to fulfil a range of functions, including blockade duty,1456 patrol and 
reconnaissance,1457 and convoy escort.1458 For example, when the copper-
bottomed ship Peggy was hired from a group of Jersey merchants to serve as a 
troop transport and scout, it was agreed that the owners should receive £480 
per month for the duration of the contract, in addition to an ensurance policy of 
£2,000 against her being burnt or captured.1459 In the same year, D’Auvergne 
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drew £370 from Dundas and Nepean in order to pay for the hire of the lugger 
Lottery,1460 and though she was hired primarily for La Correspondence (see 
chapter nine), similar payments continued throughout the War in relation to the 
scout service. In July 1806, Don’s accounts reveal that a portion of the £1,804 
drawn from government that month was marked for the hiring of two armed 
cutters,1461 while in November 1807, two schuyts were hired for a combined 
cost of £804.1462 Even during the latter years of the War, similar vessels 
accounted for a considerable portion of local expenditure: in 1810, six unarmed 
scouts were hired at a cost of £1 9s per boat, per day, while in 1811, five armed 
vessels were hired at a bounty of 10s per ton, and £5 per man.1463 
 
The Channel Islands and the Blockade of Ports 
 
With respect to the Channel Islands’ involvement within the blockade of the 
Breton-Norman coast, their strategic value can be seen to have been at its 
height after 1797, when intelligence revealed that the French government 
intended to ‘send only small convoys along the shore’.1464 As well as being able 
to hug the shore and sail under the cover of coastal batteries, these convoys 
were also able to escape the attentions of larger warships by hiding amongst 
reefs, and several of the vessels on the Channel Islands’ station enjoyed 
repeated success in these waters. In April 1799, for example, it was reported 
that ‘the cruisers of this station’ had forced a convoy bearing grain and flour 
from St. Malo to Brest ‘to shelter behind the rocks on the Breton coast’, enabling 
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D’Auvergne to send Lord Proby in HMS Danaë to intercept it.1465 Likewise in 
early 1800, the hired brig Aristocrat (brig, 18 guns) captured both the French 
privateer L’Aventure and the gunboat No. 57,1466 while the Fairy (sloop, 16 
guns) and Harpy (brig-sloop, 18 guns) ‘enticed’ the French vessel La Pallas 
(frigate, 38 guns) away from the protection of the shore, and in spite of the 
‘unequal contest’, secured her surrender.1467 Furthermore, in December 1809, 
HMS Sharpshooter (brig, 14 guns) and a hired scout anchored in Grouville Bay 
recaptured the British merchantman Calista from the privateer Grand Napoleon, 
which attempted to reach St. Malo by hiding among the La Motte rocks.1468  
 
Despite these successful littoral operations – a trait shared by the local 
privateers1469 – it was stressed that the commanders of hired vessels that they 
were to make every attempt to avoid sustaining ‘unnecessary damage’ in 
carrying out their duties.1470 This reflected the value of these vessels in making 
up the Navy’s shortfall in auxiliary craft: particularly with regards the problem of 
maintaining a watch over the smaller ports along the Breton-Norman coast, 
such as Solidor, Cancale, St. Germain, Portbail, Carteret, Dielette and 
Granville.1471 In September 1800, for example, D’Auvergne informed St. Vincent 
that he had dispatched two sloops to accompany the Lion frigate in supporting 
the blockade of St. Malo and Granville and disrupting communication between 
Brest and Cherbourg.1472 Moreover, while Trafalgar stripped the Channel 
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Islands of ‘the ‘special strategic significance’ that they had enjoyed during the 
1790s and early 1800s’,1473 France’s increasing focus upon the guerre de 
course – both involving privateers and naval ‘raiding squadrons’1474 – ensured 
constant employment for local vessels. Throughout the winter of 1809, the 
armed scout Rose was engaged in reconnoitring the enemy’s strength between 
Carteret and St. Malo,1475 and in 1811, joined the armed scout Friends in a 
cruise to Frehel, St. Malo, Granville and Chausey.1476  
 
However, while such activity was aimed primarily at the protection of local trade, 
the support given by local vessels to the blockade of ports such as Cherbourg 
and Granville also had the additional effect of safeguarding the Channel Islands 
against possible invasion.1477 In June 1803, for example, the Insolent (gun-brig, 
fourteen guns) – then stationed off Jersey – was detached to support the Liberty 
(brig, sixteen guns) and the Eling (schooner, fourteen guns)1478 in a cruise 
against St. Malo and Granville. At this time, it was reported that a force of 
armed transports sufficient for 6,000 men was then under construction 
Granville, with 15,000 men and between thirty and sixty transports being sent 
thither from St. Malo. According to Doyle, rumours that the gunboats were 
destined for Boulogne were ‘plainly a ruse de guerre to throw us of our 
guard’,1479 and although the War of the Fourth Coalition forced Napoleon to 
commit all available manpower to the Rhine frontier, the Channel Islands 
remained on the alert.1480 Similarly, when a force of twelve gun-brigs, six 
luggers and a sloop escaped Brest in August 1804, two vessels of Saumarez’ 
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squadron forced them to put into Brehat,1481 and although D’Auvergne’s 
gunboats failed to intercept them, the former despatched the cutters Sylph and 
Duke of Clarence to ‘check their further progress’.1482 
 
Indeed, while November 1805 may have seen Doyle express his belief that ‘the 
late glorious naval victories’ had greatly reduced the threat from the Continent 
(see chapter three), D’Auvergne’s scouts continued to submit ominous reports 
of naval preparations along the Breton-Norman coast.1483 During the spring of 
1806, a large number of vessels were confirmed as refitting in the inner harbour 
at Brest, after the blockading cruisers had incorrectly assumed that they had 
escaped seaward,1484 and such preparations continued even in the face of an 
apparent ‘paucity of finances’.1485 In October, for example, the French ship-of-
the-line Regulus and two large frigates were reported to have got safely into 
Brest on the 3rd, while Revenge and Syriene, despite being greatly affected by 
scurvy, were safely anchored at Brehat. In addition, the 48-gun frigate Italienne 
was making ready for sea at St. Malo, wherein repairs were being undertaken 
on two other 48-gun vessels – Neriade and Belone – as well as the corvette 
Milan.1486 That the French enjoyed a degree of success with these smaller ships 
is demonstrated by the fact that both the Syriene and Italienne were reported as 
having returned to operational service in January 1808, and had been sighted 
preying upon both British and Channel Islands’ shipping.1487 
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The ‘Strategical-Commercial Blockade’ 
 
As advantageous as possession of the Channel Islands may have been from 
the perspective of the ‘channel blockade’, their geographic position can be seen 
to have achieved its greatest significance within the context of the above-
mentioned ‘strategic blockade’. While the inability of the Royal Navy to maintain 
a constant watch over the ports between Cherbourg and St. Malo left the 
Channel Islands open to attack from multiple points,1488 the proximity of the 
local squadrons to so many small ports was also a considerable weakness for 
French coastal trade. As was highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, the 
potential for the Channel Islands to serve as a base from which a strong force of 
frigates and cruisers might readily intercept enemy convoys and ‘distress the 
enemy exceedingly’ had been recognised as early as 1793.1489 Indeed, it may 
be argued that Saumarez himself had given a clear demonstration of the ease 
with which vessels cruising between the Channel Islands and the naval bases 
along Britain’s south coast might gain the opportunity to put Moira’s suggestion 
into action. En-route to Guernsey in March 1793, Saumarez had captured a 
100-ton French brig laden with salt after chasing her through the Race of 
Alderney, while his other vessels1490 had intercepted two smaller French 
vessels, though it is unclear if these too were captured.1491  
 
The ability of small squadrons of larger vessels to exploit the Channel Islands’ 
station in this fashion can be seen to have become highly influential during the 
period of most widespread royalist activity (see chapter nine). Even after the 
                                                 
1488 SJA, L/F/95/A/2, Don to Spencer, May 22nd 1806 
1489 SJA, L/F/08/A/26, Moira to MacBride, December 26th 1793’ 
1490 HMS Drake (brig-sloop, 14 guns) and HMS Cockatrice (cutter, 14 guns) 
1491 SROI, SA 3/1/2/4, Letter of March 18th 1793 
 253 
defeat of the Vendéan royalists had put an end to any hope of long-term 
success against the Republican forces, the chouans of Brittany continued to 
seriously disrupt land-based communications with Brest and other key ports.1492 
Consequently, the French were obliged to transport almost all essential supplies 
by means of coastal convoys1493 – almost all of which passed within range of 
the Channel Islands1494 – and D’Auvergne and Saumarez were quick to seize 
the initiative.1495 In 1804, for example, Saumarez’ squadron captured the Brave 
(16 guns, 100 men), the Jeune Henri (12 guns, 64 men), an unnamed privateer 
out of Cherbourg, and four gunboats of unknown origin, as well as being 
credited with the destruction of a number of gunboats operating in the Race of 
Alderney, including five vessels near Flamanville.1496 Unfortunately, as is the 
case with the victims of the Bailiwicks’ privateers (see chapter six), it is 
impossible to accurately estimate the proportion of French convoys which 
succeeded in running the blockade.  
 
In spite of such analytical limitations, it is evident that both Saumarez’ and 
D’Auvergne’s forces were instrumental in restricting the flow of naval stores into 
the Channel ports; especially after Trafalgar, when such supplies were 
instrumental for Napoleon’s implementation of the guerre de course. In the 
autumn of 1806, vessels of Saumarez’ squadron twice forced Le Salamandre 
(store-ship, 26 guns) to abandon an attempt to victual Brest,1497 while in July 
1809, Surly (cutter, 12 guns) and Escort (gun-brig, 12 guns) – both of 
                                                 
1492 TNA, FO 95/605/29, D’Auvergne to Windham, December 19th 1795; and FO 95/612/23, D’Auvergne 
to Napean, November 18th 1799 
1493 TNA, FO 95/605/18, D’Auvergne to Windham, July 27th 1795; and HO 69/4, Nepean to D’Auvergne, 
April 23rd 1798 
1494 De La Case, Comte, Journal of the Private Life and Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon at Saint 
Helena, Four Vols. (London, 1824) Vol. III, p. 12 
1495 TNA, FO 95/605/9, D’Auvergne to Windham, April 6th 1795; and FO 95/605/18, D’Auvergne to 
Windham, July 27th 1795 
1496 Ross, Saumarez Correspondence, Vol. II, p. 86 
1497 Ibid, Vol. II, pp. 89-90 
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D’Auvergne’s squadron – each intercepted a convoy making for St. Malo.1498 
Similarly, the hired scouts performed a vital service in terms of policing trade 
routes: not only by assisting in the capture of enemy vessels and the disruption 
of trade between Brest and St. Malo,1499 but also by engaging in anti-smuggling 
operations. In March 1801, for example, the Aristocrat1500 seized the British 
merchant vessel Rachel in the act of making for St. Malo with a cargo of 489½ 
quarters of oats, barley, malt and pease. Curiously, her papers showed the 
vessel as having cleared for Liverpool, and when asked to explain himself, the 
Master claimed to have mistaken Cap Techel for the Isle of Man, and gave the 
‘very improbable, not to say impossible’ explanation of having been ‘driven 
thence from the Western Isles of Scotland by successive gales’.1501 
 
Moreover, while the successes achieved by the vessels on the Channel Islands 
station may have been primarily against coastal transports and smaller 
merchant vessels, their importance was enhanced by the fact that regular 
patrols off the northern coast of France were not instituted until 1806. Indeed, 
Crowhurst highlights that out of fifteen enemy merchantmen captured in this 
area by British warships between 1793 and 1813, eight were taken between 
1806 and 1813, and three in 1793 ‘during the initial mopping-up of enemy 
vessels’.1502 However, while the primary duty of the vessels assigned to the 
Channel Islands was the defence of the bailiwicks and the security of local 
trade,1503 it is clear that their officers were active nonetheless in the taking of 
prizes, and particularly enemy privateers. Between March 1795 and March 
                                                 
1498 SJL, LSF C397.5, Bib Ref: 326760, ‘From ‘The Jersey Magazine or Monthly Recorder’, July 1809’ 
1499 NMM, COR/7, Movements at the Port of Brest, August 8th 1800 
1500 Though referred to by D’Auvergne as a ‘cutter’, the Aristocrat appears in Admiralty records as a 
lugger (1794-8) and a brig (1799-1801) 
1501 TNA, FO 95/612/86, D’Auvergne to Nepean, March 8th 1801  
1502 Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, p. 73 
1503 TNA, PC 1/121, D’Auvergne to the Exchequer, June 10th 1802 and SROI, SA 3/1/7/18, ‘Orders 
Received from HRH the Commander-in-Chief and Admiral St. Vincent’, July 6th 1803 
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1800, at least eight French ships are recorded as having been captured by 
either Royal Navy scouts or hired vessels operating out of the Channel Islands, 
including two brigs taken by HMS Pilote (brig, 14 guns)1504 and a sloop captured 
by HMS Royalist (lugger, 8 guns).1505 Of the remaining five vessels, four – a 
cutter, two luggers and a schooner – were privateers, while the fifth was an 
English vessel which had been taken by the cutter and was being escorted back 
to a French port (possibly St. Malo) under a prize crew.1506  
 
The Inter-Insular Signal System 
 
Unlike their support of the Royal Navy’s blockade of the ports along the Breton-
Norman coast, the Channel Islands’ ability to assist in the implementation of a 
‘strategical-commercial blockade’ was enhanced by the construction of the 
telegraphic signal system. While the evolution of this communications network 
has been already explored in some detail (see chapter three), its actual 
operational effectiveness has been considered only insofar as the stations were 
able to provide the local authorities with intelligence concerning a potential 
assault.1507 This was, however, only one of the justifications given for the 
development of the signal system: while Kavanagh may be incorrect in having 
identified the Chamber of Commerce as the ‘prime movers’,1508 it is true 
nonetheless that the system’s main purpose was to protect local mercantile 
shipping. For example, during the conversion of the existing signal posts to the 
telegraphic system, it was ordered that the new masts should be supplied with 
                                                 
1504 TNA, HO 69/3, Nepean to D’Auvergne, March 15th 1795; and ADM 1/221, Letter of August 18th 1795 
1505 TNA, PC 1/117B, ‘Declaration of the Master and a Passenger of the Sloop Bon Amis’, December 1796 
1506 TNA, HO 69/11/22, Le Mesurier to D’Auvergne, June 13th 1796; HO 69/17/32, Thoreau to 
D’Auvergne, undated, 1796; HO 69/5, Nepean to D’Auvergne, April 9th 1799; and FO 95/612/33, 
D’Auvergne to Nepean, March 25th 1800 
1507 SJA, A/A1/4, Letter of September 20th 1811 
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the English Naval Code, rather than the local Code used hitherto.1509 In order to 
facilitate efficient communication with the squadron in Guernsey Roads, the 
officers and men stationed at the various posts were instructed to familiarise 
themselves with ‘Sir Home Popham’s Telegraphic Dictionary’,1510 and Don 
ensured that up-to-date editions of the Code were regularly supplied.1511 
 
Further evidence as to the intention for the signal system to function as a 
support to Britain’s control of the local trade routes and sea-lanes can be 
inferred from the manner in which the network was expanded. As has been 
already mentioned, the Channel Islands’ original posts had been capable of 
acting as little more than a chain of ‘warning beacons’ in the event of an 
invasion.1512 However, both the fortification of Cherbourg1513 and Napoleon’s 
increasing focus on the guerre de course1514 forced Don and his colleagues to 
recognise the necessity of ensuring that efficient communication might be 
carried on between all the Channel Islands. Even so, extending the inter-insular 
system was a slow process: for example, while the original trials had highlighted 
the ‘utmost importance’ of the Sark station,1515 construction was still ongoing in 
November 1807.1516 Moreover, it was later discovered that the location chosen 
for the post was not fit for purpose, necessitating the construction of a new 
station on a site ‘[visible from] Grosnez Point, Guernsey Roads, Fort George 
and Alderney’.1517 As a result of such modifications, it was estimated that 
messages might be passed between Jersey and Guernsey in under fifteen 
                                                 
1509 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of August 11th 1807 
1510 SJA, A/A5/2, May 3rd 1809 
1511 SJA, A/A1/5, Letter of April 10th 1812 
1512 Stead, A Picture of Jersey, p. 74 
1513 De La Case, Conversations of the Emperor Napoleon, Vol. III, pp. 2-3 
1514 TNA, ADM 1/226, D’Auvergne to Crocker, January 23rd 1811 
1515 SJA, L/F/106/A/2, Don to Saumarez, August 16th 1806 
1516 Ibid, Don to Doyle, November 15th 1807 
1517 SJA, A/A1/1, Letters of March 28th 1808 and March 29th 1808  
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minutes,1518 while official tests indicated that the squadron in Guernsey Roads 
might be apprised of an enemy leaving port in less than half an hour.1519  
 
It is evident, therefore, that the greatest advantage offered by the Channel 
Islands signal system was its ability – as observed by Don in a report of 1807 – 
to render both the Channel Islands and the south coast of Great Britain almost 
wholly invulnerable to a surprise attack.1520 Both he and Doyle expressed 
complete confidence in the efficiency with which any enemy vessel fortunate 
enough to slip through the Royal Navy’s blockade might be ‘picked up’, and the 
ease with which ‘any important intelligence [could] be conveyed from one Island 
to the other’.1521 Furthermore, they emphasised that the system would give 
them access ‘within a few minutes, [to] the opinion of any of the officers of the 
Navy’ engaged in patrol of the local waters’,1522 information which could be used 
to plan a coordinated defence (see chapter three). Even so, the completion of 
the expanded signal system did not mark the end of attempts to improve local 
communications; following his appointment as Superintendent of Telegraphs for 
the Channel Islands, Peter Archer Mulgrave proposed that the stations be 
converted to the Chappe1523 system.1524 This ‘ingenious’ plan was supported by 
D’Auvergne, who argued that it would ‘considerably strengthen’ the local 
defences by ‘uniting our means against the enemy’,1525 and later praised the 
                                                 
1518 SJA, L/F/95/A/35, Don to Doyle, July 2nd 1808 
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1520 TNA, PC 1/3794, Don to Anon, ‘Secret and Confidential’, September 5th 1807 
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1522 SJA, A/A1/1, Letter of August 17th 1807 
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1525 SJA, A/A2/1, Letter of August 15th 1810 
 258 
extent to which it had enabled the local troops to be directed with ‘precision and 
celerity’ in the event of an assault.1526 
 
Finally, it must be noted that the effectiveness of the post-1806 Channel Islands 
signal system – particularly in terms of its enabling communication between the 
Islands and the squadrons patrolling local waters – helped to offset a significant 
problem faced by the Royal Navy. Throughout the first decade of the Great 
French War, the pressures on the resources of the Service meant that the 
Bailiwicks went for long periods without direct contact with the Fleet; for six 
months during 1797, HMS Minerva (frigate, 38 guns) had been the only British 
frigate to visit Jersey.1527 Likewise in the autumn of 1794, Small lamented the 
absence of both MacBride’s squadron and D’Auvergne’s flotilla, and complained 
that HMS Eurydice (frigate, 34 guns) – despite her being ‘the only ship-of-war 
on the station’ – had been ordered to depart.1528 The signal system also served 
to compensate for the difficulty of providing convoys for the local merchant 
shipping, troop transports and supply ships;1529 a role which, as has been 
already mentioned, was often performed by the vessels of Saumarez’ 
squadron.1530 Since this required the Channel Islands’ naval defence to be 
temporarily diminished1531 the Admiral lodged a formal protest, claiming that he 
would be unable to both ensure the safety of the local merchants and maintain 
watch over the enemy.1532 
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The Smuggling Trade – Between the Devil and the Deep 
 
For much of the eighteenth century, the Channel Islanders’ flagrant participation 
in the smuggling trade had been a source of embarrassment to the British 
government. However, as Morieux points out, the authorities had been ‘hard-
pushed to punish these abuses’:1533 not least because of the fact that the 
bailiwicks’ traditional status as ‘free ports’ was interpreted by the local 
mercantile elite as lending legitimacy to local smuggling operations.1534 So 
entrenched was the practice of smuggling that on outbreak of war, the local 
military officers seriously considered employing the captains and crews as an 
auxiliary defensive force. In Guernsey, for example, Colonel Dundas instructed 
the Sheriff – the Executive Officer of the Royal Court – to ‘sound the captains of 
cutters employed in smuggling’ and ascertain as to their willingness to assist in 
the defence of the Island in the event of invasion. The response would certainly 
seem to indicate that the smugglers regarded the authorities – at least during 
wartime – as ‘the enemy of my enemy, since the Sheriff reported that ‘ten 
captains and nearly 400 men [of] determined courage’ had volunteered their 
services. Consequently, it was proposed that these ‘desperadoes’ should, in the 
event of an invasion, be seconded to aid the troops of the garrison: each man 
should be ‘armed with cutlasses and bayonets’ and placed under the command 
of the Major Lewis of the 64th Regt. of Foot.1535 
 
Throughout the Great French War, the issue of the perceived legality of the 
local smuggling ventures was to remain a source of considerable tension 
                                                 
1533 Morieux, ‘Diplomacy from Below’, 97 
1534 Cox, ‘The Transformation of St. Peter Port’, p. 40 
1535 TNA HO 98/24, Col. Thomas Dundas to Sir David Dundas, February 1st 1793 
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between the Channel Islands and the British government.1536 Although 1800 
may have seen Jersey’s Chamber of Commerce finally disavow ‘all unfair 
practices tending...to defraud or injure His Majesty’s revenues’, this was by no 
means an admission of defeat on the part of the local merchants. According to 
the terms of the carefully-worded agreement, the Members of the Chamber 
professed themselves ‘willing to bind themselves under any reasonable 
securities and penalties’, but that they would challenge any ‘infringement of the 
civil rights of the inhabitants’.1537 One such perceived threat was the attempt by 
the British government to install a ‘Commissioner of the Customs’ to oversee 
the implementation of any agreed regulations,1538 a move which was greeted 
with open hostility on the part of the inhabitants. Despite being empowered to 
compel the local authorities to assist in the discharge of his duties, it is clear 
that the ‘Commissioner’ was undermined by corruption at the highest level; in 
Guernsey, for example, the Bailiff and two Jurats were discovered to be 
orchestrating large shipments of contraband to Devon and Cornwall.1539 
 
In 1805, a more vigourous attempt was made by the British government to limit 
the potential damage caused by the Channel Islands’ smugglers: this time by 
seeking to expand the terms of the Smuggling Acts so as to render the Channel 
Islands as de facto, if not de jure, party to their provisions. According to the 
Secretary of State, the local authorities were obliged to enforce these statutes 
‘in the same manner as they would do any other acknowledged law of the 
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Islands’,1540 but again, this assertion appears to have been made in ignorance 
of the Channel Islands’ legislative independence (see chapter one). Certainly, 
the perceived attempt to circumvent their ‘special relationship’ once more 
aroused much opposition, and petitions were lodged with the Privy Council via 
the States Assemblies. In Jersey, the Chamber of Commerce protested that the 
terms of the Smuggling Acts threatened to ‘annihilate the ancient charters and 
privileges of the Island, [and] strike at the very existence of the Trade from 
which is derived its dearest interests’.1541 Likewise in Guernsey, representatives 
of the leading merchant families protested that the Smuggling Acts possessed 
no force in the bailiwick unless accompanied by an Order in Council.1542 Indeed, 
it was not until 1809 that the Guernsey Chamber of Commerce at last made 
solemn pledges to ‘[put] an effectual end to all contraband trade...by 
denouncing those who may hereafter attempt to engage in it’.1543  
 
Despite the fact that the inhabitants’ indulgence in smuggling and their defence 
of its legitimacy may have been founded on a piece of legalistic historical fiction 
(see chapter two), the potential consequences of alienating the Bailiwicks’ 
smugglers had been made all too apparent in previous disputes. For example, 
when the first attempt had been made to establish a system of customs houses 
in the Channel Islands in 1767, the French government had responded by 
creating a number of free ports, triggering a flood of local gold into the Parisian 
banks.1544 In addition, although Jamieson argues that financial losses resulting 
of the Channel Islands’ smuggling operations became untenable after 18001545 
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1542 TNA PC 1/3470, ‘Statement of the Royal Court of Guernsey to Cockell’, November 29th 1805 
1543 GSG, A/IV/80/1, Letter from Government House, January 19th 1809 
1544 Podger, ‘Nest of Vypers’, p. 155 
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– three years after the abandonment of the Gold Standard1546 – the British 
authorities were faced with little option but to tolerate their activities. Not only 
were goods produced in the Bailiwicks exempt from import duties – a 
categorisation which was often applied to French imports ‘matured’ in the 
Channel Islands1547 – but the profits were frequently siphoned into legitimate 
British businesses and local privateering ventures.1548 Most importantly, from 
1806 onwards, the Bailiwicks’ smuggling operations were acknowledged as a 
as offering a potential counter to the Milan and Berlin Decrees, as long as the 
local merchants could be convinced of ‘the boon of smuggling into France’.1549  
 
Although Doyle may have enjoyed some success in this endeavour, it is clear 
that many local smuggling rings continued to direct their attention to existing 
clients in Great Britain. For example, the records of Carteret Priaux and the 
Randle Brothers – two of Guernsey’s most prominent merchant families – 
reveal that their operations remained focused primarily on Devon and Cornwall. 
Between November 1806 and February 1807, these two families were 
responsible for the landing of 1,250 ankers of assorted spirits, twelve ‘sixes’ of 
brandy, twenty hundredweight of tobacco, six hundredweight of pepper and a 
chest of Suchong tea.1550 It should be noted, however, that all of this activity 
was carried out in the wake of predictions by Carteret Priaulx’ agents that the 
steps taken by the British government would either ‘cripple the trade of 
Guernsey’,1551 or would result in the termination of ‘the old mode of the spirit 
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business’.1552 Consequently, with respect to their opposition to the enactment of 
anti-smuggling statutes, the principal motivation of the local merchants and 
commercial bourgeois shall always remain a matter for speculation. It is simply 
impossible to determine whether their appeals to their rights and privileges 
under the Constitutions were based on a genuine desire to promote the 
economy of the Channel Islands as a whole, or simply a means by which to 
justify a highly lucrative, but wholly illegal, trade.1553  
 
The Use of Smuggling as a Method of Subversion 
 
Regardless of the motivation of the local mercantile community during their 
ongoing ‘battle of wills’ with the customs service, their relationship with the 
British government was turned on its head in the wake of Napoleon’s 
declaration of the ‘Continental System’. As was stated at the beginning of this 
chapter, the Channel Islands provided a means by which contraband goods 
could continue to be transported across the maritime border, and the British 
were quick to take full advantage of this loophole. By an Order in Council of 
December 18th 1807, the Lieutenant-Governors were empowered to issue 
licenses permitting trade between the Channel Islands and ‘any port of France 
from Caen or Morlaix inclusive’.1554 More importantly, not only could this trade 
be carried out by neutral vessels, but unarmed French vessels of less than 100 
tons burthen were likewise to be given ‘every possible encouragement’ and left 
unmolested by either naval officers or privateers.1555 By employing those 
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Frenchmen ‘well known to some of the most respectable merchants’,1556 the 
British were able to exchange ‘sugar, coffee, corn, indigo, Jesuit’s Bark’ and 
other colonial goods1557 for the additional food supplies on which the Channel 
Islands remained so dependent (see chapter five). 
 
Furthermore, in spite of the vigorous manner in which the British government 
sought to stamp out smuggling in the Channel Islands, this was merely an 
extension of a financial policy resulting from the rising cost of the war and the 
abandonment of the Gold Standard. While Don issued warnings against 
Alderneymen landing illicit goods in Jersey in 1806,1558 and Doyle and Le 
Mesurier both pledged to suppress smuggling in Guernsey in 1809,1559 the 
reality was that this illicit trade was recognised as being of great utility to the 
British government. Not only were the Bailiwicks’ fishermen, with their de facto 
neutral status, ideally placed to smuggle British goods into France in 
contravention of the Continental Blockade,1560 but from the very earliest years of 
the war, French cartel ships had attempted to source illicit consignments from 
the Islands.1561 Indeed, the tobacco runners of Alderney – including those of 
French origin1562 – had proved a vital source of intelligence, as emphasised by 
the fact that Le Mesurier proposed a reward of eight or ten pounds for any 
smuggler providing him with accurate reports of French activity.1563 Similarly, 
many of the efforts made to assist the royalist insurrections in Brittany, 
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Normandy and the Vendée – particularly the supply of money and arms – were 
conducted via old smuggling methods (see chapters eight and nine).1564  
 
Consequently, as suggested by D’Auvergne’s complaint concerning ‘rogue’ 
agents within La Correspondence,1565 the ‘suppression’ of the Channel Islands 
smugglers appears to have been primarily a case of redirection rather than 
annihilation. It may be argued, of course, that the Continental System never 
seriously threatened Britain’s economic stability: according to Olson Jr., the 
British government imported 1,306,441 quarters of grain from the Continent at a 
time when annual grain consumption was 10,000,000 quarters.1566 Similarly, 
Gregory stresses that British occupation of Madeira provided the merchant fleet 
with a crucial staging post and a lever with which to ‘prise open the South 
American markets’.1567 However, while Crouzet also concedes that ‘complete 
closure of the Continent to British goods by France was [only ever] a 
pipedream’, he also maintains that ‘a partial closure could have serious effects’ 
in relation to social disorder and economic stability.1568 As such, it remained 
necessary for the British to seek a means of dismantling of the Continental 
System: not only for the purpose of sowing discord between France and her 
allies, but also to provide an additional insurance policy with respect to 
protecting the integrity of the British economy. 
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Napoleon’s Use of the Channel Islands Smugglers 
 
However, the nature of the Channel Islands’ involvement in economic warfare 
was ultimately a double-edged sword, since it was not only the British who 
attempted to make use of their advantageous position and the skills of their 
smugglers. Napoleon can be seen to have also made a concerted attempt to 
procure the assistance of the Channel Islanders in subverting the British 
blockade, preying upon the above-mentioned opposition to the Anti-Smuggling 
Acts.1569 Mirroring the actions of the Ancien Regime in 1767, the Emperor 
sought to encourage British and Channel Islands’ smugglers to transfer 
operations to French ports, and between 1810 and 1814, declared both Dunkirk 
and Gravelines to be free ports.1570 As in 1767, the objective of this move was 
to weaken the British economy by engineering a flood of British gold into French 
banks,1571 and certainly, the losses of gold resulting from this tactic were 
severe. According to Daly’s figures, 1,876,617 guineas were smuggled into 
Gravelines in the first nine months of 1811, while 1,607,119 guineas arrived 
during the course of 1813.1572 However, such losses were counterbalanced by 
the flexibility of the British credit system and the robustness of native agriculture 
and manufacturing,1573 and it is also possible that a significant proportion of the 
contraband currency found its way into the coffers of Wellington’s army. 
 
While Daly’s investigation has added much to our understanding of Napoleon’s 
efforts to undermine the British war effort, an investigation of the smuggling 
activities taking place in the Channel Islands highlights the extent to which 
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French recruitment of British smugglers existed before 1810. For example, 
agents were able to exploit a serious loophole which emerged in the aftermath 
of the extension of the retaliatory Orders in Council to the Channel Islands. 
While Governor Le Mesurier pledged eventually to put an end to smuggling in 
Alderney,1574 it appears that the original Orders – lodged with the respective 
Greffiers of the States of Jersey1575 and Guernsey1576 in late 1807 – were not 
extended to the third island. Consequently, as reported by Lieutenant Leabon of 
the 67th Regt. of Foot, ‘it was generally understood that the people of 
[Guernsey] had transferred the illicit trade to [Alderney], where they found 
agents to superintend this smuggling’.1577 However, the Island also became a 
backdoor for French agents: in 1808, for example, Doyle reported that eight 
members of the 67th Regt had deserted, and had been borne away to 
France’.1578 A few months later, Don sent word to Hatton – his counterpart at 
Alderney – warning him that two French spies had recently fled Jersey, and 
were suspected to be using the former island as a staging-post from whence to 
make their escape.1579 
 
The Final Assessment 
 
Overall, it may be clearly seen that the Channel Islands – both before and after 
the watershed year of 1805 – proved able to involve themselves effectively in 
the wider context of the economic war. While it is important not to over-estimate 
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the impact on the Channel blockade, possession of the bailiwicks can be seen 
to have provided the British with a significant strategic advantage over the 
enemy. Certainly, naval vessels and privateers operating out of the Channel 
Islands could never expect to receive the same degree of direct support that 
they might receive from bases in the Mediterranean,1580 and even local hired 
vessels were often obliged to put into British ports for repairs.1581 However, it 
must be noted that small vessels could at least use Guernsey Roads as an 
anchorage for taking on fresh water and other essentials, reducing their time 
off-station and narrowing the ‘window of opportunity’ during which an enemy 
force might ‘slip’ out of Cherbourg or other ports (see chapter nine).1582 For this 
reason, the local commanders took great pains to ensure that the captains of 
any ships reported absent from their station were brought to account,1583 and 
ensured that additional vessels were ordered to patrol between the Channel 
Islands and the French coast when the blockade was weakest.1584 
 
Not only has it been demonstrated that the Channel Islands’ vessels were able 
to participate in support of the Royal Navy’s principal blockade activities, but it 
can be argued that they provided an essential subsidiary service. It is true that 
many contemporary critics of the privateering trade accused captains and 
armateurs of focusing too readily upon the taking of ‘easy prizes...of small 
tonnage and little value’.1585 However, when one considers the importance of 
blockade warfare within Britain’s maritime strategy,1586 it becomes clear that the 
                                                 
1580 Greenwood, ‘James, Lord de Saumarez 1757-1836’, pp. 256-258; and ADM 1/222, Saumarez to 
Nepean, July 18th 1803 
1581 TNA, FO 95/611, D’Auvergne to Windham, December 10th 1799 
1582 SROI, SA 3/1/7/18, Elias Gaudin to Saumarez, May 30th 1803 and Entry for July 6th 1803; and SJA, 
L/F/106/A/1, Don to Saumarez, August 16th 1806 
1583 SROI, SA 3/1/7/19, Entry for October 24th 1803 
1584 Ibid, Entries for October 27th 1803 and November 1st 1803 
1585 Raban, ‘Channel Island Privateering’, 287-299 
1586 Best, War and Society, p. 145 
 269 
captures made by the Bailiwicks’ vessels – and by those commerce-raiders 
from other ports – were significant nonetheless. As Raban states, the Navy 
simply could not spare the resources needed to suppress the convoys preyed 
upon by the Channel Islands’ vessels,1587 while the latter were also able to 
chase down convoys that sought refuge in shallow waters.1588 In effect, the light 
vessels based in the bailiwicks were able to act as a ‘force multiplier’ for the 
main blockade, inflicting pressure upon the French mercantile fleet1589 and upon 
those communities dependent upon coastal trade.1590 Indeed, it can be 
reasonably concluded that the depredation of the Islands privateers (see 
chapter six), together with the local scouts and cruisers, contributed directly to 
the crippling rise in food prices in areas such as the Charente1591 and the 
hinderland of Cherbourg and Brest.1592  
 
In addition, while the impact of the Channel blockade was lessened by France’s 
continental hegemony and resultant access to the resources of ‘client states’, 
attempts to transport these supplies by sea remained under threat as long as 
the Channel Islands remained in British hands. As Dumouriez highlights, the 
danger posed by the local privateers and scouts to the convoys delivering naval 
stores, arms and ammunition to Brest1593 forced the French to provide armed 
escorts to all coastwise traders1594 and trans-Atlantic convoys.1595 Hand-in-hand 
with the disruption of the enemy’s maritime supply routes and the interception of 
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her mercantile fleet, possession of the Channel Islands also permitted the 
British government to exploit the local smugglers as a means to circumvent 
Napoleon’s Continental System. While this stratagem was by no means a 
complete success – towards the end of the War, it is evident that many local 
smugglers proved willing to operate out of Gravelines and Dunkirk1596 – it is 
clear that the Channel Islands provided an effective conduit for facilitating 
clandestine British trade. In addition, the members of Jersey’s Chamber of 
Commerce reported that the clandestine licensed trade with the opposite coast 
had brought in a handsome profit for the island’s merchants, with one estimate 
suggesting a more than one hundred percent return on investment.1597 
 
Finally, while it is tempting to view the latter part of the Great French War as 
being dominated by a struggle between French strength on land and British 
strength at sea, such a view ignores the fact that the French Navy continued to 
pose a threat to British commercial and mercantile traffic.1598 Although 
Villeneuve’s inability to unite with the Brest Fleet had been a deciding factor at 
Trafalgar, the survival of that force as a ‘fleet in being’ obliged the Royal Navy to 
maintain its blockade of that port.1599 In addition, it must be remembered that 
the period 1805-15 saw Napoleon expend considerable resources in an effort to 
restore the French Navy to its previous strength,1600 with over forty large 
warships being recorded as under construction at various ports by the time of 
his exile to Elba.1601 Consequently, although Trafalgar may have heralded a 
decline in the importance of the Channel Islands as a bulwark against a 
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potential invasion of Britain, it had little impact on their significance within the 
wider context of the war at sea.1602 Moreover, the proximity of the bailiwicks to 
the Breton-Norman coast – although leaving them vulnerable to assault even by 
a force deprived of the support of a battle fleet (see chapter three) – ensured 
that the Channel Islands remained highly valued as a conduit for the gathering 
of intelligence, especially with respect to enemy naval preparations.1603 
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Section III – Clandestine and Covert Operations 
 
Chapter Eight – Intelligence-Gathering: Reconnaisance and Espionage 
 
As highlighted by Davies in his recent revisionist study of military intelligence 
during the Peninsular War, it has been all too often assumed that this aspect of 
warfare became significant only after the development of mechanised 
transportation and the development of the electronic telegraph. However, 
although it is true that neither the government nor the military ‘struggled’ to 
establish new intelligence-gathering networks only when new conflicts broke 
out, investment in this area, even in peacetime, ‘represented a large portion of 
government expenditure’.1604 Indeed, although no attempt was made by the 
British government to create a department with the specific task of collecting 
foreign intelligence,1605 the 1780s saw considerable charges made to the Civil 
List in relation to ‘Secret Service Business’. Between 1782 and 1794 the 
average annual outlay of the Foreign Office with respect to overseas 
intelligence-gathering was estimated at £25,000, while the Home Office 
expended a total of £50,571 between June 1791 and March 1795. However, it 
must be noted that the latter was concerned primarily with the collection of 
information relating to domestic security concerns; as demonstrated by the fact 
that the combined ‘Foreign Secret Service’ outlay for the two departments in 
1790 totalled only £26,221 0s 6d.1606 
 
Throughout the 1780s, an embryonic British ‘Secret Service’ was thus active in 
many parts of France: in 1789, the government was obliged to issue formal 
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denunciations of a rumour that a considerable amount of capital was being 
expended to ‘forment disorder in the Capital and Provinces’.1607 However, in 
addition to the information provided by these sources, it had been customary for 
diplomats and envoys to act as intelligence officers in all but name, with consuls 
being used during 1792 as a means to gain information on preparations 
undertaken by the French and Spanish navies.1608 Unfortunately, much of the 
intelligence received was of only limited reliability,1609 and as Knight observed, 
this problem was never fully overcome; not only did ministers never possess a 
coherent intelligence picture, but the reliability of sources was difficult to assess, 
and information was often misinterpreted.1610 Consequently, at the outbreak of 
the War of the Second Coalition, Duffy has described the British government as 
having felt ‘uncomfortably naked’ at their lack of intelligence concerning the 
status of the Brest Fleet in 1799.1611 Likewise, Davey has highlighted that a 
breakdown in the relationship between Sir Sidney Smith and Lord Keith in 1803 
was triggered by a series of ‘infrequent and increasingly bizzare reports’ sent in 
by the former, leading Keith to dismiss subsequent intelligence as ‘touched up’ 
and ‘based on the tales of shopkeepers’.1612 
 
Aside from the difficulties involved within the basic task of intelligence-
gathering, Knight has also pointed out that British ministers ‘[never] came near 
to understanding the erratic minds of those who took strategic decisions’ in 
France, and particularly during the Directory (1795-99).1613 As highlighted by 
both Cobban and King, this was the principal context within which the Channel 
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Islands could be exploited as an ‘intelligence hub’, since their proximity to the 
Breton-Norman coast allowed the bailiwicks to serve as a ‘natural centre for the 
collection of virtually ‘all the news’ from that quarter.1614 More importantly, the 
ability to use the Channel Islands as a staging post meant that reports received 
from land-based agents under D’Auvergne’s direction could be more promptly 
compared with those received from patrolling frigates and scouts, enabling the 
Admiralty to better assess the reliability of intelligence.1615 In late August 1796, 
for example, D’Auvergne forwarded two separate reports on the enemy force at 
Brest:1616 one, dated the 17th, gave a total of ten ships-of-the-line, eight frigates, 
two razées and five corvettes; the other, dated the 25th, recorded nine ships-of-
the-line, one razée, five frigates and one brig. This information closely matched 
that submitted by Sir John Warren at Falmouth at the beginning of the month: 
scouting Brest on August 3rd, he reported having seen ‘ten sail-of-the-line, two 
razées, six frigates, four corvettes, and a Danish ship-of-war’.1617 
 
The importance of exploiting the natural advantages offered by the Channel 
Islands with respect to intelligence-gathering was rendered more evident after 
1803, the latter half of the Great French War characterised by a widening of the 
gulf between British and French operations. This was typified by the 
development of the Depillon semaphore, installed along the whole of the 
Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts and, according to Knight, ‘much more visible 
and capable of sending any message than the [contemporary] British 
system’.1618 Moreover, Napoleon’s successes during the War of the Third 
Coalition placed ever-greater restrictions upon Britain’s continental intelligence-
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gathering methods, with Hall’s assessment of the situation in 1807 being 
particularly pessimistic. While acknowledging the presence of ‘friendly agents’ 
throughout Europe, he concluded that ‘there is little to suggest that [they 
achieved] any great success’, pointing out that even D’Auvergne’s agents were 
criticised for producing ‘deficient’ reports.1619 Perhaps the worst failure had 
occurred in 1799, when Bruix’ squadron had escaped from Brest: although it 
later emerged that accurate information had been obtained, this had been 
‘buried in a mass of contradictory reports’,1620 and D’Auvergne was obliged to 
place a ‘new and intelligent person’ on the Brest station.1621 
 
Likewise, while the dissemination of intelligence may have allowed the British 
government to draw upon a range of sources and ensure that at least some 
reports would reach their destination,1622 the effectiveness of this policy 
depended the cooperation of departments and personnel.1623 Unfortunately, as 
was evident in both the Mediterranean and the Vendée, where tensions arose 
between both ministers and agents, it is evident that ‘internal jealousies’ led all 
too often to a breakdown of the system.1624 In the Channel Islands, perhaps the 
clearest demonstration of the extent to which such petty rivalries might 
handicap effective intelligence-gathering occurred in late 1794, following the 
appointment of D’Auvergne as director of La Correspondence (see chapter 
nine).1625 Not only did Falle regard this network as a rival to that which he had 
been operating for almost two years (see below), but the fact that his new 
colleague answered directly to Whitehall, rather than to himself as Lieutenant-
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Governor (see chapter one),1626 was interpreted by the latter as a direct 
challenge to his authority. Ultimately, cooperation between the two officers was 
ensured – D’Auvergne being granted permission to use Mont Orgueil as a 
headquarters for his activities (see chapter nine) – but the dispute had been 
ended only after an appeal had been made to Dundas to act as mediator.1627 
 
Initial Exploitation of the Channel Islands 
 
With respect to the Great French War, the earliest attempts to make use of the 
Channel Islands as a base for intelligence-gathering were undertaken in 
December 1792, principally at the suggestion of Falle, then Lieutenant-
Governor of Jersey.1628 Amid growing fears of hostilities with the Republic, he 
had sought permission to establish a local intelligence network,1629 and had 
been instructed to send ‘suitable persons conversant with shipping’ to 
reconnoitre St. Malo, L’Orient, Rochefort, Cherbourg, Brest, Bordeaux and 
Granville.1630 However, the importance of these operations was also recognised 
by the other local commanders: in May 1793, Craig reported that he had ‘with 
great difficulty succeeded in getting a young man to St. Malo and back 
again’,1631 while Le Mesurier had recruited a man to ‘boldly carry a flag of truce 
to Cherbourg’. With respect to the latter agent, not only was it intended that he 
should obtain ‘extraordinary intelligence’ which might be transmitted to Jersey 
and Guernsey, but he was also tasked with locating four islanders then under 
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arrest in Cherbourg, who might provide information pertaining to the attitude of 
the inhabitants towards the National Convention.1632 
 
Although it must be acknowledged that these initial operations were undertaken 
by only a handful of agents – Falle being particularly scrupulous with respect to 
their selection1633 – the intelligence thus obtained was of crucial importance in 
terms of corroborating information received from other quarters. As highlighted 
by Davies, it is necessary to draw a distinction between general reports on the 
enemy’s preparations and intentions – which he terms as ‘strategic intelligence’ 
– and more detailed information concerning the enemy’s strengths, arms and 
morale, which he terms as ‘operational intelligence’.1634 By early 1793, the 
British had built up a great deal of the former type: Nepean stating that he 
possessed a list of ‘the whole navy of France’,1635 while copies of French 
newspapers obtained by the Admiralty provided the names and armament of 
vessels in various ports. However, it was through the Channel Islands – and 
specifically Alderney – that sufficient ‘operational intelligence’ was obtained as 
to enable the accurate analysis of this information, and the assessment of the 
actual preparedness of the French Navy for war.1636 For example, although La 
Gazette de France of March 16th 1793 listed fifty-four ships-of-the-line and 
twenty-five frigates as being stationed in Brest,1637 a member of a cartel arriving 
in Alderney the following week revealed that no more than twenty-five of these 
vessels were ready for sea.1638  
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In addition to obtaining information relating to the enemy’s preparations for war, 
it was also recognised that the Channel Islands might offer the British an 
opportunity to obtain a more accurate picture concerning the stability of the 
Western Provinces. As has been already highlighted, those émigrés who had 
taken refuge in the Channel Islands during late 1792 and early 1793 found 
themselves treated with considerable hostility,1639 especially after Falle’s 
discovery of a cache of arms intended for delivery to the royalist armies (see 
chapter five). However, while it had been necessary for the British government 
to disavow any involvement with the insurgency, it must be remembered that 
the émigré leaders regarded the Channel Islands as their most convenient 
refuge,1640 and that ‘every émigré and sailor brought…stories of exciting 
happenings on the Continent’.1641 Although many of these reports were tainted 
by rumour and hearsay, the nature of intelligence-gathering meant that – as 
highlighted during the response to Bruix’ escape from Brest – even the most 
experienced British spymasters were restricted to ‘dealing in probabilities rather 
than certainties’.1642 No potential source of information could be ignored, and in 
May 1793, Craig dispatched an agent to the coast of Brittany, instructing him ‘to 
obtain the most exact information of the state of that part of the country, [and] to 
make himself perfectly master of everything that is going on at Brest’.1643 
 
Amongst the émigré community, there appears to have been no shortage of 
volunteers willing to assist in the opening of communication with their 
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compatriots,1644 however, as Craig acknowledged, their success remained 
dependent on favourable conditions and luck as much as ability.1645 Indeed, 
with the exception of the abovementioned ‘intelligent man’, almost all attempts 
by Craig’s agents met with failure, and he remained ‘almost wholly ignorant’ of 
the situation in Brittany beyond the hinterland of St. Malo.1646 Even so, the 
limited information obtained through these initial attempts at communication did, 
on occasion, provide sufficient evidence to corroborate reports received by the 
British government from other quarters with respect to dissatisfaction in 
Brittany.1647 Indeed, while Craig’s report of May 5th indicated that ‘the 
commotion on the coast of Brittany has subsided’, and that it was ‘uncertain’ as 
to whether the adjacent areas of Normandy had witnessed any widespread 
disturbance, indications of general discontent seemed well-founded.1648 Since 
at least the beginning of March, reports had been received from Paris 
concerning the hostility of the inhabitants of the Western Provinces towards the 
levée en masse, with estimates placing the number of recruits raised at only 
60,000 recruits instead of the projected 300,000.1649  
 
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the ad hoc employment of the 
émigrés and royalists – while certainly a necessity prior to the formal creation of 
La Correspondence (see chapter nine)1650 – was an inexact process, and risked 
an overreliance on spurious sources.1651 During the spring of 1793, for example, 
a large number of émigrés arriving at Jersey spoke of the ‘dizzying successes’ 
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enjoyed by a former republican officer who was said to have defected to the 
royalists,1652 and who was later described by De Beauchamp as ‘un pretendu 
Gaston, personnage fabuleux’.1653 Indeed, while the legends surrounding 
Gaston were likely based on the actions of a real person, any truth in the 
rumours were obscured by absurd exaggerations; for example, he was said to 
command 200,000 men, to have captured Nantes, and to be marching on 
Orleans and even Paris.1654 Consequently, the episode demonstrated the 
importance of the Channel Islands as a centre for the collation and analysis of 
intelligence,1655 since the local authorities made a concerted effort to obtain a 
true picture of the suitation, sending two agents to Brittany to make contact with 
Gaston.1656 Moreover, Craig dismissed reports that Gaston had attacked 
Nantes, and doubted that he could be in command of even 35,000 men;1657 
indeed, after consultation with several ‘intelligence persons’, it was decided that 
Gaston could not possibly muster more than 10,000 or 20,000 men.1658 
 
The Channel Islands as an ‘Intelligence Hub’ 
 
Such advantages as were offered by the Channel Islands in relation to solving 
the problems of intelligence-gathering become especially clear when one 
considers the restrictions placed upon the Royal Navy, both before and after 
Trafalgar. While the naval victories of 1793-1805 have been often portrayed as 
having ensured British maritime supremacy,1659 they did not eliminate the 
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potential threat posed to her merchant convoys, either from the Brest Fleet or 
from opportunistic raiding squadrons and privateers engaging in the guerre de 
course (see chapter seven).1660 For example, the Baltic convoys supplied 
Britain with two-thirds of her grain imports, as well as crucial stocks of timber, 
hemp, pitch and tar for the repair of her ships,1661 and the necessity of ensuring 
their safe passage stretched the Royal Navy to its limits.1662 This was especially 
true with respect to its auxiliary craft, which were often viewed as being too few 
in number to fulfill the numerous duties demanded of them, such as the 
escorting of convoys and transports, the support of the Channel blockade, the 
patrolling of trade routes, and the carrying of dispatches.1663 Just as Saumarez 
complained in November 1805 of having been forced to part with several 
vessels of his squadon,1664 so the repetition of this situation on naval stations all 
around continental Europe served only to increase the importantance of the 
prompt communication, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence. 
 
In addition to the problem of sourcing sufficient vessels to act as the ‘eyes of the 
fleet’,1665 the collation of intelligence was further hampered by the fact that 
hazards such as fog, heavy seas or contrary winds often made it impossible for 
contact to be maintained either with friendly vessels or the enemy.1666 As a 
result, while it is true that the Channel Islands provided a ‘relay station’ for the 
naval scouts, ensuring the more regular transmission of reports (see below), 
they also provided the British government with access to a variety of other 
                                                 
1660 TNA, WO 1/925/27, D’Auvergne to Shere, October 20th 1806; WO 55/1549/6, ‘Doyle’s Report re. 
Guernsey and Alderney’, undated; and SJA, A/A1/6, Letter of November 13th 1811 
1661 Crouzet, ‘The British Economy at the Time of Trafalgar’, p. 13 
1662 Black, Naval Power, pp. 99-100; and Morriss, Naval Power and British Culture, p. 9 
1663 SJA, A/A1/2, Letter of January 2nd 1807; and TNA, ADM 1/224, D’Auvergne to Pole, March 18th 
1809 
1664 TNA, WO 1/605, Doyle to Hobart, November 24th 1805 
1665 Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, p. 112 
1666 Black, Naval Power, p. 109; Duffy, ‘British Intelligence’, 607; and Morriss, The Channel Fleet, p. 
405 
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sources of intelligence. Their free port status was of particular value in this 
regard, since although it led to considerable friction between the inhabitants and 
the customs authorities (see chapter seven), the Channel Islands’ position 
facilitated contact with numerous individuals who were persona non-grata in 
Britain. Not only did fishermen and merchants from neutral and enemy countries 
regularly arrive in the Channel Islands – either of their own free will or as a 
result of being detained by naval patrols1667 – but smugglers also served as a 
valuable source of information, particularly if they were French or Dutch in 
origin.1668 Indeed, even if these civilians were unable to supply detailed 
information concerning the enemy’s actual preparations,1669 Wellington’s 
experience in the Peninsula proved that they might still provide advanced 
warning of enemy intentions in the event of an attack.1670  
 
The importance of securing the earliest possible intelligence of enemy 
preparations was emphasised in mid-1796, when Dalrymple expressed 
concerns that ‘the people of this Island are so stuck in indolence and security 
that I fear they will take the alarm too late’.1671 It would appear that his concerns 
were justified: earlier that same month, intelligence had been received to the 
effect that Hoche had assembled 15,000 men at St. Malo, it being observed that 
‘the object of his expedition is avowedly against Jersey’.1672 Although a false 
alarm, subsequent information received from one of D’Auvergne’s agents would 
seem to indicate this concentration of troops having been intended for the 
abortive Expedition to Ireland. According to a report received by D’Auvergne in 
                                                 
1667 NMM, MSS/84/014/1, ‘Orders from the Lord High Admiral’, June 12th 1803 
1668 TNA, TNA HO 98/41, Le Mesurier to Nepean, March 1st 1793; and ADM 1/6034, ‘Report from 
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1669 Hall, British Strategy, p. 47  
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September 1796, a forced levy of fishermen and seamen was being carried on 
‘with full vigour’ on the neighbouring coast, while a force of corvettes, escorts 
and transports was being assembled at Brest.1673 Moreover, as was noted in 
the discussion of the local fortification programme (see chapter three), the 
records of the French government reveal that the plans for the Expedition 
included a proposal to distract the attention of the Royal Navy by means of a 
diversionary assault against either Jersey or Guernsey.1674  
 
Another occasion when intelligence received via the Channel Islands served to 
alert the British government to a planned enemy expedition occurred in 
September 1801, when it was reported to that a significant naval force was 
once again being assembled at St. Malo. On the same day that the preliminary 
terms of peace were being signed in London (see chapter five), D’Auvergne 
reported that ‘three frigates, five or six gun-brigs, the same number of cutters, 
and thirty-eight gun-vessels’ were already prepared for sea, while as many as 
twenty other vessels were being ‘prepared with great activity’. In addition, his 
agents provided detailed information of a forced levy – similar to that which had 
been enforced in Brittany the previous year1675 – highlighting that ‘four men out 
of nine are taken from each fishing boat on the coast of Normandy’, their 
masters being pressed into service as pilots.1676 Giving his opinion of this 
intelligence, Gordon informed his colleagues that he believed it to be ‘tolerably 
accurate’, and concluded that there was ‘no doubt’ that the French intended to 
carry out ‘a general attack on His Majesty’s Dominions’.1677 Such a view was 
                                                 
1673 TNA, PC 1/117B, Substance of the Information Received from Bertin, September 12th 1796 
1674 AN AF III, 420, Dossier 2355, Directory to the Minister of Marine, December 15th 1796; and AN AF 
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1676 TNA, WO 1/608, ‘Extracts of Intelligence from the Prince of Bouillon’, September 30th 1801 
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given credence by several other sources: the Admiralty having been advised 
that ‘three frigates, one corvette, and two brig corvettes’ fitting out at Le Havre, 
and that sixteen ships-of-the-line – each with 400 men aboard – were 
assembled at Brest under Dordelin and Humbert.1678 
 
However, while Davey has argued that it provided ‘significant amounts of 
accurate intelligence’ to the Commanders of the Western Squadron,1679 it is 
impossible to downplay the potential seriousness of the failure of 1799, or 
disagree with Duffy’s description of the episode as a ‘disaster’.1680 Although 
D’Auvergne was not solely to blame for Bruix’ escape,1681 the fact remains that 
poor intelligence analysis had allowed twenty-six ships-of-the-line to roam at 
liberty,1682 with only the threat of a storm – during which three French ships 
collided1683 – having prevented their engaging the British fleet.1684 It is true that 
much of the evidence pointed to Ireland as the intended target: a ‘frequent and 
diligent communication’ was maintained between the French government and 
the Irish rebels,1685 and Bruix had openly described Ireland as ‘easy prey’.1686 
However, as Knight has observed, the British government all too often made the 
mistake of assuming that French intentions mirrored what they themselves 
would do in the same situation,1687 and forced to decide between reinforcing the 
Mediterranean or Ireland, they naturally ‘swallowed the bait’.1688 Fortunately, the 
French were unable to capitalise on the situation: on May 6th, D’Auvergne 
                                                 
1678 TNA, ADM 1/6035, ‘Intelligence from Brest and Le Havre’, September 16th and 25th 1801 
1679 Davey, In Nelson’s Wake, p. 60 
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reported having ‘no doubts’ that the enemy’s true destination was either Cadiz 
or Cartenega,1689 and although Bruix’ Franco-Spanish fleet1690 succeeded in 
reaching Toulon, they were quickly blockaded by St. Vincent.1691 
 
The Channel Islands Scouts – Types of Hired Vessels 
 
At the time of the Great French War, the term ‘cruiser’ was generally used to 
refer to any of the plethora of smaller vessels employed by the Royal Navy to 
carry out all those duties for which a ship-of-the-line or frigate was too large, 
cumbersome or slow. Consequently, while they may have been unable to stand 
in the line of battle or play even in a supporting role in major fleet actions,1692 
these vessels were viewed nonetheless as being vital for the success of 
maritime operations. However, opinion was divided as to what the precise role 
of the ‘cruiser’ should be: while Nelson and some of his contemporaries saw 
these vessels as an additional instrument of control and power projection, the 
orthodox opinion conceived of their principal role as being to serve as ‘the eyes 
of the fleet’.1693 With regards to the ‘cruisers’ based in the Channel Islands, 
these vessels can be seen to have undertaken both roles, taking advantage of 
the fact that St. Malo could be reached from both Guernsey and Jersey in a 
single tide, and Cherbourg from Alderney in three hours or less if conditions 
were favourable.1694 Consequently, there was ample opportunity for local armed 
scouts such as the Friend, Rose, Duke of York and Albion to both conduct 
                                                 
1689 TNA, FO 95/609, D’Auvergne to Huskisson, Letter of May 6th 1799 
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‘passive’ reconnaissance missions in support of the Royal Navy’s operations1695 
and to engage in power projection activities such as the threatening of enemy 
coastal shipping and trade (see chapter seven).1696 
 
As such, it is evident that the local commanders were quick to follow the Royal 
Navy’s lead in hiring local civilian craft to augment the local naval force and 
compensate for the inability of the Channel Squadron to provide dedicated year-
round support to the defence of the bailiwicks. However, a close examination of 
the types of craft employed demonstrates that they were fully aware of their 
advantages as reconnaissance vessels, as well as their specific strengths with 
respect to local operations.1697 The first type of craft, the lugger, is described by 
Ashelford as having been particularly favoured by D’Auvergne, both because of 
its being easily handled in rough conditions and a fast sailor when running 
before the wind.1698 Moreover, their sturdy construction made them well-suited 
both to the task of conveying confidential agents to and from the opposite coast 
and, in the course of this service, ‘annoying the alongshore trade of the enemy’, 
since they proved able to ride out the rough weather which so often delayed the 
operations of La Correspondence.1699 Even so, it appears that these vessels 
were intended primarily to carry aid to the royalists, not the collection of 
intelligence; while they had ‘rendered essential services in former years’, 
D’Auvergne admitted that they were ‘of heavy expense to government’ if 
engaged solely in reconnaissance.1700  
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1698 Ashelford, In the English Service, p. 61 
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By contrast, the cutter was a far more versatile: carrying fore-and-aft rigs and 
multiple headsails, this vessel was designed to be able to travel at speed whilst 
sailing both into and before the wind.1701 As can be seen from the orders given 
by Saumarez to the captains of various cutters attached to his squadron while 
on the Channel Islands station, this adaptability made them ideal for fulfilling the 
dual role of scouts and interceptors. Not only might these vessels ‘give the 
earliest information’ of any attempt to slip through the blockade, but their speed 
and manoeuvrability enabled them to harass or otherwise delay the enemy until 
such time as reinforcements could be dispatched.1702 In 1804, for example, the 
Duke of York (cutter, 8 guns) was ordered to accompany HMS Charwell 
(corvette, 2 guns, 14 carronades) in a cruise off Cape Carteret ‘for the purpose 
of intercepting and destroying the enemy’.1703 Likewise, following the escape of 
an enemy force from Carteret, the Duke of Clarence (cutter, 6 guns) was 
detached in company with the Sylph (brig-sloop, 18 guns) and Conquest (gun-
brig, 14 guns) with orders to destroy the flotilla or check its progress.1704 Finally, 
it is also evident that the cutter was ideally suited to act as a rescue craft: in 
1809, for example, the Queen Charlotte (cutter, 8 guns) successfully recovered 
the Jersey smack Property, which had foundered, dismasted, off Corbiere, the 
crew being forced to abandon ship.1705  
 
The final type of hired vessel which saw widespread service in the Channel 
Islands was the schuyt: a flat-bottomed barge of Dutch design which came to 
the particular attention of the British government following the failed Walcheren 
Expedition (1809). During the course of the subsequent parliamentary debate, 
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Brownrigg highlighted that a number of schuyts had been employed to 
considerable effect by the Duke of York, the vessels being used primarily to 
land troops deep inland, behind French lines, and thus threaten the enemy’s 
supply chain.1706 However, the potential value of the schuyt with respect to the 
requirements of the Channel Islands scouts was recognised far earlier in the 
War, particularly in light of their shallow draft, light construction, and ability to be 
powered by oars as well as sails. As D’Auvergne observed, they were ideally 
suited to the demands of clandestine operations along the dangerous Breton-
Norman coast, since they were far less vulnerable than conventional auxiliary 
craft to the risk of being becalmed or running aground.1707 Similarly, Gordon 
argued that the vessels could be ‘armed and provided by the inhabitants of this 
Island on much easier terms than [vessels] in England’,1708 thus helping to 
lessen the expence incurred to the British government. 
 
Intelligence-Gathering as an Aspect of Everyday Duties 
 
As highlighted by Cobban, the pre-war years had been characterised by a belief 
amongst ministers that Britain would be able to remain aloof from events on the 
Continent, and little, therefore, had been done to improve either military or naval 
intelligence-gathering.1709 Consequently, complaints were voiced during the 
early months of the war – both in the Channel Islands and in London1710 – 
concerning the lack of information relating to the situation on the Continent, with 
the Jersey Chamber of Commerce fearing that the outbreak of war would catch 
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1707 BL, Add MS 37866, D’Auvergne to Windham, December 1st 1799 
1708 TNA, HO 98/9, Gordon to Pelham, March 20th 1803 
1709 Cobban, ‘Channel Islands’ Correspondence’ 38 
1710 TNA, HO 98/3, Napean to Falle, March 13th 1793; and HO 98/41, Le Mesurier to Nepean, February 
19th 1793 and Le Mesurier to Dundas, March 17th 1793 
 289 
the Islands off guard.1711 Such was indeed the case: while a considerable 
investment had been expended on intelligence-gathering during the 1780s, the 
peacetime reliance on diplomats and meant that the declaration of war found 
the British at a disadvantage (see above).1712 As late as 1811 – and in spite of 
various attempts to improve the situation – Don declared his frustration at the 
sporadic nature of detailed intelligence from the French coast, and the 
frequency with which ‘Acts of God’ thwarted his scouts.1713 Moreover, while the 
ability of D’Auvergne and his agents to source detailed intelligence was 
demonstrated consistently,1714 the former was entrusted with several other 
crucial duties, including management of both the Comité de Secours (see 
chapter five) and La Correspondence (see chapter nine). 
 
While it will be demonstrated that the Channel Islands played a prominent role 
in the collection of intelligence through clandestine and covert means, it must be 
remembered that a good deal of useful information was obtained during the 
course of ‘ordinary’ naval operations. Valuable through the services of 
‘confidential agents’ may have been (see chapter nine), they by no means 
possessed a monopoly over intelligence-gathering; rather, the task was 
incorporated into virtually every aspect of naval life involving contact – direct or 
indirect – with the enemy.1715 The value placed in such ‘passive’ intelligence-
gathering by the British government is evident from the orders given to 
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D’Auvergne and Saumarez on their being posted to the bailiwicks, since both 
men were instructed to take every opportunity to acquire new information 
regarding the enemy. Alongside the task of making contact with insurgent 
groups in the western provinces of France, the former was ordered to make use 
of this communication as a means by which to ‘obtain early information of 
hostile movements of the enemy’.1716 Likewise, although the main justification 
for Saumarez’ being posted to Guernsey Roads was that of ensuring the safety 
of the Channel Islands and the security of their mercantile fleet, it was made 
clear that he should ‘endeavour to obtain such information of the enemy’s 
forces, as circumstances will admit’.1717 
 
Consequently, although much extant scholarship has analysed the Channel 
Islands’ intelligence role from the perspective of covert operations, it is also 
important to give due consideration to the fact that the Islands were ideally 
situated to facilitate ‘opportunistic’ reconnaissance. To a certain extent, it is 
possible to understand why this aspect of local intelligence gathering has been 
neglected, since naval activity around the Channel Islands was hampered by 
treacherous weather and sea conditions, as well as by the lack of a fortified 
deep-water harbour. Yet in spite of such limitations, ample evidence exists of 
the vessels of both Saumarez’ and D’Auvergne’s squadrons – particularly those 
classed as auxiliaries or scouts – having engaged in surveillance in the course 
of their ‘regular’ duties. For example, following his capture of the French frigate 
Réunion (see chapter seven), Saumarez took the opportunity to reconnoitre the 
                                                 
1716 Balleine, The Tragedy of Philippe D’Auvergne, p. 57 
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port of St. Malo,1718 and while providing an escort for a convoy of troop 
transports destined for Jersey, found himself able to observe enemy 
preparations at Granville.1719 Similarly, although they were engaged primarily for 
local patrol duty,1720 D’Auvergne often used his hired vessels to obtain reports 
concerning developments at St. Malo, Solidor, Cancale, Granville, St. Germain, 
Portbail, Carteret, Vielette and Cherbourg.1721 
 
Perhaps one of the best examples of ‘passive’ reconnaissance having been 
used effectively in combination with ‘clandestine’ intelligence is provided by the 
reports which were received in the Channel Islands at the time of the planned 
invasion of 1794 (see chapter three). According to information communicated 
by Captain Paterson, who had been engaged in a cruise off Le Havre, the 
frigate La Seine (42 guns) was already prepared for sea, and was expected to 
be soon joined by two new 36-gun frigates, three armed brigs, a cutter, a lugger 
and between twelve and fifteen gunboats. In addition, he estimated that as 
many as fifty merchantmen recently arrived from the West Indies had been 
converted to transports, and that some 10,000 men were to be embarked for 
Great Britain, Jersey, Guernsey or Ostend, although ‘the people seemed to 
disagree as to the precise object’. Finally, in giving specific details with respect 
to the gunboats, Patterson observed that each of these vessels carried ‘four 
heavy pieces of ordnance’, and also made reference to ‘an extraordinary ketch 
of sixteen or eighteen guns’, constructed in such a fashion so as to allow two 
mortars to be mounted amidships.1722 
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In order to assess the accuracy of this intelligence, it will be necessary to 
compare it to information received from other sources, however, the reliability of 
the abovementioned information may also be demonstrated by comparing 
Paterson’s reports to the details available in surviving French sources. As was 
mentioned in the earlier discussion of the attempted invasion of the Channel 
Islands (see chapter three), Rossignol’s secret correspondence includes a list of 
those vessels which had been assembled at Le Havre, Cherbourg and Nantes 
by February 17th 1794. Although there are some minor inconsistencies in terms 
of armament, such variances were only to be expected, and are not so 
significant as to indicate that Paterson was mistaken in his observations of the 
scale of French preparations. For example, the list received by Rossignol 
indicates that six gunboats – each mounting either three or five 24-pdr guns –
were already assembled at Le Havre a month before Paterson made his 
observations, and also mentions the presence of a ‘bomb-vessel’ named 
Salamandre. Moreover, it is reasonable to suggest that the latter was the 
‘extraordinary ketch’ mentioned by Paterson, since although she appears in 
Rossignol’s correspondence as mounting only six 6-pdr guns, she is described 
as mounting two 12-pdr mortars amidships.1723  
 
As to the extent to which the details supplied by D’Auvergne’s contact were 
confirmed by evidence gathered from other sources, it is important to note that 
Jersey’s Greffier had caused an official warning to be printed in The Times at 
least two days before Paterson’s observations were received. According to this 
letter, ‘an express addressed to one of the first houses in the City’ had indicated 
that a French invasion of Great Britain was to be preceded by an assault on the 
                                                 
1723 SJA, L/F/08/H/9, ‘List of Gunboats’, February 17th 1794 
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Channel Islands, and that an army of 10,000 men was being assembled at St. 
Malo for the purpose.1724 Likewise, Paterson’s report can also be seen to have 
been in accordance with information provided by a prisoner-of-war named John 
Whittmore, who had been incarcerated at both Dunkirk and Calais, had visited 
Paris, and had afterwards escaped to Jersey from Le Havre. Although the 
information which he provided with respect to the armament of the vessels 
assembled at that port was at considerable variance with that given by 
Patterson and included in Rossignol’s correspondence, the general picture is 
similar. He described having seen two new frigates ready for sea, two frigates 
and two gunboats on the stocks, twenty gunboats, two brigs, eighty transports, 
and – once again – the presence of a vessel ‘fitted with mortars, her foremasts 
made to lower when in action’.1725 
 
Human Intelligence – Captured Vessels and Prisoners of War 
 
Aside from information obtained by naval officers acting ‘in the line of duty’, the 
Channel Islands also provided a conduit for information obtained through the 
capture of vessels and prisoners; in the majority of cases, a process which was 
linked to the ‘power projection’ form of intelligence-gathering. While the local 
hired vessels were highly active in this regard – the armed cutter Duke of York 
being deployed to seize coastal traders and recapture any British vessels which 
had fallen into French hands1726 – it was also an aspect of intelligence-gathering 
in which privateers were able to flourish. In essence, the concept of ‘human 
intelligence’ was grounded upon the principle that useful information could be 
obtained through the questioning of prisoners-of-war and the inspection of 
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captured or ransomed ships.1727 Consequently, although the culture of 
‘interrogation’ during the Great French War was drastically different to that 
which surrounds the practice in the modern era, it was still desirable to take 
enemy combatants alive. As has been already demonstrated, multiple sources 
of intelligence were often in conflict, and the testimony of a single prisoner – 
even one who was not classed as an ‘enemy’1728 – might prove decisive in 
determining the course of action taken by a commander in the field. 
 
While the British government was quick to recognise the utility of the Channel 
Islands as a centre for the interrogation of hostages and prisoners, it must be 
remembered that this aspect of intelligence-gathering was, and is, an inexact 
science. Although often leading to the securing of detailed information 
concerning both enemy preparations1729 and the general state of affairs on the 
Continent,1730 the securing of prisoners might be achieved only at the cost of a 
disproportionate investment of time and resources. For example, while the 
successes enjoyed by the Jersey-based Aristocrat in early 1800 resulted in the 
capture of a large number of sailors and civilians, one of the enemy vessels had 
surrendered only after a chase lasting more than five hours.1731 Moreover, there 
was no guarantee that prisoners would be secured: although succeeding in 
recapturing a Portuguese brig from her French prize crew, the captain of the 
Railleur (sloop, 14 guns) reported that only one enemy sailor had been 
captured, the rest escaping in a rowboat.1732 Similarly, while it was an ‘open 
secret’ that neutral vessels were widely employed in the carrying of contraband 
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and secret correspondence, such items were usually the first to be thrown 
overboard or destroyed in the event of a crew being compelled to surrender.1733  
 
In light of such factors, it is understandable that the Admiralty should have 
preferred officers to concern themselves with the task of ‘dealing with the 
enemy in home waters’ rather than opportunistic prize-taking,1734 yet on rare 
occasions when the latter resulted in an intelligence coup. The capture of Le 
Club de Cherbourg (cutter, 10 guns) provides a valuable example, since 
Saumarez’ interrogation of her crew revealed not only that the French were 
assembling a force of eighteen sail-of-the-line at Brest, but also that these 
vessels were fitting out in preparation for making a rendezvous with an 
additional force at Quiberon Bay.1735 That such information was both valuable 
and accurate was confirmed soon after Howe’s departure with the Channel 
Fleet; having fallen in with an American vessel out of L’Orient, he was informed 
by her captain that the latter had passed in sight of a French fleet of seventeen 
sail-of-the-line. Furthermore, it is evident that the capture of Le Club de 
Cherbourg led to the thwarting of a potentially significant French expedition: 
having been discovered by Howe’s frigates, Admiral de Galles retreated to Belle 
Isle, where his forces succumbed to ‘a spirit of mutiny’.1736 
 
As for the risk that intelligence-gathering was at all times susceptible to 
corruption and fabrication, this was counterbalanced by the fact that a truthful 
picture of the enemy’s intention could be obtained only through the combination 
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1736 W. James and F. Chamier, The Naval History of Great Britain, from the Declaration of War by 
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of military and civilian sources.1737 Consequently, on those occasions when 
prisoners were secured for interrogation, the Channel Islands offered the British 
government a significant advantage in relation both to the obtaining and 
analysis of information. While it could not be assumed that captives would 
answer truthfully to the questions put to them, it must be highlighted that Jèrriais 
and Guernésiais were closely related to the Norman patois, and that the 
majority of Islanders spoke French rather than English.1738 In addition, a 
significant proportion of enemy prisoners landed in the Channel Islands shared 
the local inhabitants’ hostility towards the Republic: not only did they carry on 
commercial business with the Channel Islanders during peacetime,1739 but they 
also regarded themselves as being ‘Breton’ or ‘Norman’, not ‘French’.1740 As a 
result, just as D’Auvergne’s fluency in French and familiarity with Breton and 
Norman customs influenced his appointment as co-ordinator of the Comité de 
Secours see chapter five),1741 so they made him ideal for overseeing the 
interrogation of prisoners originating from those provinces.1742 
 
In addition to this advantage in securing intelligence, the Channel Islands also 
served the important function of providing a secure ‘relay station’ for prisoners-
of-war destined for further questioning in Britain. Although Saumarez’ records 
contain a number of good examples, perhaps the most notable is the capture of 
the French frigate Réunion, an action which resulted in the capture of around 
160 prisoners, all of whom were brought into Guernsey.1743 While this remained 
the greatest single success for Saumarez’ squadron in terms of the number of 
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1740 Morieux, ‘Diplomacy from Below’, 118 
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prisoners taken in a single action, both he and his subordinates continued to 
bring in large numbers of prisoners throughout the War. In 1804, for example, 
they accounted for the capture of the Brave (16 guns, 100 men), the Jeune 
Henri (12 guns and 64 men), four gunboats and a Cherbourg privateer, as well 
as the destruction of an unknown number of gunboats.1744 In addition to the 
successes enjoyed by ships-of-war, the Islands’ privateers also brought in their 
own share of prisoners, although the nature of prey (see chapter seven) meant 
that the number of captives rarely rose into double figures.1745 Furthermore, it 
was often the case that the interrogation of prisoners taken by the local 
privateers ended with their release and repatriation,1746 since fishermen and 
members of other ‘protected’ groups could be detained only if explicitly 
evidence was found to link them to smuggling or espionage.1747 
 
However, the employment of the Channel Islands as a ‘holding centre’ for 
enemy prisoners highlights an aspect of ‘human intelligence’ which, though 
already alluded to, has not yet been examined in detail; the extent to which 
information might be obtained from one’s own prisoners-of-war. As long as the 
Channel Islands remained in British hands, they represented a vital refuge for 
those soldiers and seamen who were fortunate enough to find the means to 
affect their escape from Brittany or Normandy (see above).1748 Indeed, while the 
work of La Correspondence after 1794 was mainly concerned with the 
smuggling of arms and other supplies to the royalist insurgents (see chapter 
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nine),1749 the network also served to facilitate the rescue of British prisoners-of-
war and their repatriation via Jersey. In the majority of cases, such assistance is 
likely to have been limited to the provision of sanctuary and the loan of a small 
boat,1750 but several reports exist of the chouans having actively participated in 
the rescue of British prisoners-of-war, breaking them out of prison or ambushing 
convoys or marching columns.1751 Moreover, such assistance appears to have 
been willingly given: for example, three Jerseymen – crewmen from the 
Newfoundland convoy intercepted in June 1794 (see chapter five) – spent nine 
months among the chouans following their escape from Dinan Castle, being 
‘clothed and treated with much attention’.1752 
 
While it is true that the length of time required for a prisoner-of-war to get away 
safely to the Channel Islands might prevent much of their intelligence from 
being employed in any specific manner, it is clear that they nonetheless 
provided a valuable source of information. In late January 1795, for example, 
several prisoners were successfully conveyed to Jersey by the chouans 
commanded by Boishardy, among them a Captain Norris, who had been some 
months a prisoner in the hulks at Brest. Not only did this officer bring 
intelligence that the fleet which had sailed from thence on Christmas Day 
consisted of thirty-five sail-of-the-line and twelve frigates, but he observed that 
their ‘manner of working’ indicated their being ‘badly manned’. In addition, he 
reported that both the Revolutionnaire (Premier Rang, 110 guns) and an 
unnamed 80-gun vessel had, in attempting to get under sail, been driven upon 
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some rocks ‘with the loss of a major part of their crews’.1753 Finally, repatriated 
prisoners-of-war proved to be a source of much-needed reports on the general 
situation on the Continent; both with respect to the economic situation of the 
country1754 and the disposition of the people towards the government and its 
approach to the War.1755 
 
The Channel Islands as a Base for Clandestine Operations 
 
Turning to the question of the bailiwicks’ value as a base for espionage 
activities, it is here that it is possible to address more closely the deficiencies in 
the British intelligence machine and the operation of the ‘secret service’. In 
effect, it is the intent of the remainder of this chapter to prove that the 
possession of the Islands by the British crown enabled the authorities – both 
locally and at Westminster – to compensate for the many deficiencies which 
were identified above. As with the Islands’ engagement with the support of 
reconnaissance carried out by the Royal Navy and hired vessels, local 
geography was a significant factor in terms of facilitating the clandestine 
activities carried on from the bailiwicks. For example, the Chausey Isles 
provided a useful staging-point from which confidential agents might be landed 
on the French coast,1756 as did Sark and the Paternoster Reef, from whence 
two French spies escaped the Islands in 1808.1757 However, while D’Auvergne 
was able to establish a widespread network of agents, guides, pilots and 
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boatmen,1758 all supported by a number of safe-houses,1759 he was forced to 
overcome a number of obstacles. Not only did the attention of the garde-côtes 
and the gendarmes often force operations to be abandoned,1760 but contrary 
winds and tides also caused problems, and it was by no means unusual for the 
landing of an agent to be delayed by several days as a result.1761 
 
Even if the operations of La Correspondence were often disrupted through a 
combination of enemy vigilance and ‘Acts of God’, one of its strengths was its 
ability to draw upon the vast wellspring of manpower offered by the large 
number of émigrés resident in the Islands (see chapter five). While a few 
prominent figures – de Pointbriand, de Couesbouc and du Boishamon – 
returned to France in order to take up leading roles amongst the chouans or 
royalists (see chapter nine)1762 – D’Auvergne’s network continued to draw in a 
number of highly experienced personnel. For example, ‘De Veaucouleur’ is 
recorded as having served as a lieutenant in the French Navy, while ‘Sauson’ 
had served for many years in the Commissariat at Brest, and ‘Pallierne’ was 
awarded ultimately with a Colonelcy in the British Army.1763 Indeed, the attitude 
of the émigrés serving with La Correspondence stands in stark contrast with 
those men who enlisted in the various émigré regiments formed in preparation 
for the Quiberon Expedition.1764 According to Nicholas, the émigrés who 
volunteered for service in these corps ‘all wanted to be officers, and none 
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contemplated being a serving soldier’,1765 while Balleine has argued that their 
being mustered for drill was little more than an administrative exercise to 
prevent corruption.1766 
 
As ineffectual as the émigré regiments may have been, it is evident that those 
who volunteered to serve in La Correspondence were dedicated to assisting the 
British in gathering intelligence. Referring to ‘Hue’, chief guide for the Breton 
sector, D’Auvergne recorded that this agent had ‘served with great fidelity from 
the beginning of the War’ and rewarded him with a monthly pension of 111 
Livres. Likewise, three of the Breton guides over whom ‘Hue’ exercised 
command were listed as having been invalided in the course of their duties, with 
a fourth, identified as ‘Macé’, had been killed soon after offering his home as a 
safe-house for La Correspondence.1767 Moreover, Balleine states that the Police 
Register of La Manche listed 160 boatmen ‘presumed to be in English pay’, 108 
persons ‘devoted to the Prince of Bouillon’, and 132 others as suspected of 
being in touch with him.1768 However, the advantage gained by the British as a 
result of being able to operate émigré agents out of Jersey lay not only in the 
efficiency with which information might be relayed to Whitehall,1769 but in 
D’Auvergne’s ability to conduct preliminary analysis of the reports which he 
received.1770 As highlighted by Davies, the sheer volume of information 
acquired might just as easily exacerbate as reduce the confusion experienced 
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by commanders with respect to the enemy’s intentions, and it was vital that 
analysis was carried out at all levels.1771 
 
Stabilising the Intelligence Network 
 
As has already been mentioned, Britain’s intelligence services during the 1790s 
often suffered from poor co-ordination between government departments1772 
and – as shown by the rivalry which sprang up between Falle and D’Auvergne – 
jealousy and competition between personnel.1773 However, the latter half of the 
Great French War saw considerable improvement to the situation: not only did 
D’Auvergne and Don form a highly effective working relationship, but the 
‘voluminous intelligence reports’ which they supplied could be compared 
against those generated by a number of other networks.1774 Moreover, while it 
was often the case that the speed of transmission might lead to information 
being ‘out-of-date’ by the time that it was relayed back to Whitehall,1775 it must 
be remembered that intelligence operations out of the Channel Islands required 
far more detailed planning and organisation. Indeed, while ministers complained 
of occasional errors with respect to the information being forwarded by 
D’Auvergne’s agents,1776 the fact that their efforts were focused on a 
comparatively small area meant that such mistakes were atypical. In addition, 
Don was able to engage in close co-operation with both Doyle in Guernsey and 
Menzies in Alderney,1777 maintaining a detailed correspondence which enabled 
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a more prompt review of intelligence and a collaborative assessment of matters 
pertaining to internal and external security.1778 
 
Although the historiography of D’Auvergne’s mission to the Channel Islands 
may sometimes appear to drift rather too close to the ‘hero-worship’ which 
formerly characterised studies of Nelson,1779 it is important not to underestimate 
the impact which he had on local intelligence operations. As can be seen from 
the evidence presented in this chapter, his organisational abilities served to 
increase the volume of intelligence received concerning the situation in the 
Western Provinces, while his familiarity with the region provided an additional 
level of insight with respect to the analysis of reports. Even before the outbreak 
of war, D’Auvergne had seized on several opportunities to build up contacts on 
the Continent, convalescing in the Channel Departments in 1784, visiting St. 
Malo, Le Havre and Cherbourg in 1787 and 1788, and making a second tour of 
the maritime provinces in 1792.1780 In addition, while Balleine may be correct in 
his assertion that Falle resented his cousin’s independence from local military 
authority (see above), it is clear that D’Auvergne had every intention of co-
operating with his colleagues, regardless of where his ultimate responsibility lay. 
We have already seen, for example, that the he was one of the primary 
advocates of the initial creation of the Islands’ telegraphic communications (see 
chapter seven), the reactivation of that system in 1804,1781 and the various 
improvements made during Don’s tenure.1782 
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The importance of the Islands’ commanders’ efforts to co-ordinate their 
intelligence operations was most clearly demonstrated during periods of 
heightened invasion threat. As was highlighted by Don in a letter of 1807, 
considerable ignorance prevailed concerning the value of the Channel Islands: 
referring to remarks which had been reportedly made by General Robertson to 
the Duke of York, the Lieutenant-Governor declared them ‘erroneous in every 
essential point’.1783 Indeed, it is clear that Don and his colleagues were able to 
keep the British government and the Admiralty well-informed on the subject of 
enemy preparations; reports sent in by D’Auvergne in 1796 being used to verify 
information received from Warren concerning preparations undertaken in St. 
Malo, Rochefort and Bordeaux.1784 Similarly, April 1797 saw reports arrive at 
the Admiralty from Gordon’s agents, the contents of which warned that 
‘dispositions were being made for the Dunkirk Flotilla all along the coast, from 
Cherbourg down through Ainse, St. Malo and Granville’.1785 Finally, both August 
1810 and September 1811 saw Don enter into detailed correspondence with the 
Home Office, detailed plans being drawn up for the reinforcement of the 
Channel Islands in consequence of intelligence concerning enemy maritime 
preparations which, it was feared, would be directed thence.1786 
 
However, while it may be true that the various spies and agents operating out of 
the Channel Islands were able to provide the British with a reasonably steady 
stream of intelligence, the reality was that the frequency and quality of reports 
was often poor. As was highlighted during the analysis of the Channel Islands’ 
signal system, its expansion during Don’s tenure as Lieutenant-Governor of 
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Jersey was prompted by the fact that he was left for several weeks without 
detailed updates from his contacts on the French coast. For example, no 
intelligence appears to have reached the Island from that quarter during the 
whole of January 1807,1787 November 1807,1788 or August 1812,1789 and the 
second of these incidences provided the impetus for accellerating completion of 
the construction of the Sark relay station. Even so, it was sometimes the case 
that the delays experienced by individual agents were actually beneficial to the 
British government; in November 1807, for example, one of Don’s agents was 
forced to anchor in the Isles de Chausée, and he took the opportunity to 
undertake additional surveillance. In addition to observing preparations at 
Granville, St. Malo, St. Coulomb and St. Brieuc, the agent’s reports confirmed 
Napoleon’s intentions to abandon the Italian Campaign in favour of a focus on 
the Channel and Portugal.1790 
 
The Reliability of La Correspondence 
 
In closing this examination of the role of the Channel Islands as an aspect of the 
British government’s intelligence machine, it is necessary to engage in a 
specific discussion of the difficulties experienced by D’Auvergne in terms of 
ensuring the accuracy of the reports submitted by his agents. Crowhurst’s 
assessment is sceptical at best: he argued that for many agents, ‘it was easier 
[for them] to write a general report that would supply information of a sort and 
maintain the supply of funds than risk arrest as a spy by seeking detailed 
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news’.1791 However, while it is certainly true that false or inaccurate reports were 
by no means rare, it must be remembered that the French authorities were 
engaged in an active campaign of misinformation; one which facilitated the 
respective escapes of both Bruix and Gantheaume in 1799 and 1801 (see 
chapter seven).1792 Indeed, although La Correspondence had provided the 
British with accurate intelligence concerning Hoche’s Expedition to Ireland (see 
below), D’Auvergne’s agent at Brest was, in 1799, wholly deceived by a false 
trail, leading – unsurprisingly – to his being quickly replaced by ‘a new and 
intelligent person’.1793 Ultimately, even if the frequency of ‘uncertain and 
contradictory reports’1794 meant that D’Auvergne was obliged to expend a great 
deal of effort in ensuring that only intelligence which could ‘absolutely be relied 
upon’ was forwarded to London,1795 successful and trusted agents continued to 
receive significant financial compensation.1796 
 
Although British intelligence operations may have been disrupted by a lack of 
co-operation,1797 and while foreign networks such as that run by the Queen of 
Sicily were plagued by mediocrity,1798 the image which survives of La 
Correspondence is reasonably positive. As has already been highlighted, the 
infrequent nature of intelligence reports may have been a source of frustration, 
providing impetus for the expansion and modernisation of the Islands’ 
telegraphic signal system, but blame was only rarely laid at the feet of the 
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agents themselves.1799 Rather than accuse his subordinates of incompetence – 
an implication made by officers such as St. Vincent – D’Auvergne’s personal 
remarks concerning his agents may be reasonably comparable to comments 
made by Wellington with respect to Colquhoun Grant. Just as ‘Cock’s’ death at 
Burgos (1812) was lamented by Wellington as a serious blow to his intelligence 
network in the Peninsula, so D’Auvergne can be seen to have been sorely 
affected by the capture and execution of De Veaucouleur. So highly rated was 
this particular agent – particularly with respect to the conveyance of information 
to and from the chouans – that D’Auvergne gave orders that his widow was to 
‘receive his pay for a twelve month after his death, as is the usage in our Navy 
to persons losing their lives on service’.1800 
 
Not only is it clear that D’Auvergne placed a great deal of faith in those who 
served under him, but there is ample evidence to suggest that this faith was 
generally well-placed. Turning once again to the planned Expedition to Ireland, 
it should be highlighted that ‘Pallierne’ succeeded in infiltrating the headquarters 
of both Bernadotte and Hoche, and sent back a number of detailed reports to 
Jersey before being finally forced to flee.1801 In addition, while the British 
government may have expressed caution concerning some of D’Auvergne’s 
reports – mainly due to the continual problem of contrary reports arriving from 
other sources1802 – such doubts did not necessarily result in the dismissal of the 
information received. This was demonstrated most clearly in 1797, when news 
reached Jersey from one of D’Auvergne’s agents concerning the assembly of a 
squadron of ten gunboats at Le Havre and Cherbourg, together with a flotilla of 
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transports at St. Malo. Gordon not only informed his superior that he believed it 
‘extremely probably that the intelligence is well-founded’, but he also sent 
copies of the relevant reports to the Admiralty without awaiting further 
instruction, and ordered that supplies be sent out so as to enable seven 
hundred men of the active militia to be encamped.1803 
 
However, while the prevailing opinion of D’Auvergne’s agents – both locally and 
at Whitehall – may have expressed confidence in the accuracy of his reports, 
the reality is that there were times when a number of individual naval officers 
looked upon his intelligence with considerable incredulity. Given that reports 
concerning the movement of the enemy were often in conflict,1804 it is not 
surprising that such attitudes existed, but St. Vincent’s letters reveal just how 
strong the scepticism could become. Writing to Spencer, the Admiral said of 
D’Auvergne’s intelligence, ‘it must be very defective indeed if the number of 
ships at Brest in readiness for sea is not ascertained daily’,1805 a view which he 
repeated in correspondence with Keats and Berkeley. Referring to reports 
received from D’Auvergne’s agents at Brest, St. Vincent declared that ‘what 
degree of credit is to be given to it I am not a competent judge’,1806 and even 
went so far as to claim that the information sent by D’Auvergne ‘militates so 
strongly against our observations that...I think it must be erroneous’.1807 With 
respect to such disagreements, it is necessary to bear in mind that a skilled 
commander, even when faced with contradictory intelligence from multiple 
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trusted sources, ‘was usually provided with sufficient information to react as if 
he had advanced warning of the enemy's intentions’.1808 
 
The Channel Islands Intelligence Network – An Asset or a Hindrance? 
 
As Davies observed, successful intelligence gathering was dependent on four 
critical points: the correct intelligence had to be requested; collection could not 
be flawed or compromised; analysis had to be accurate; and dissemination 
could not be delayed’.1809 In light of the evidence presented in this chapter, it is 
certainly possible to conclude that the Channel Islands performed a highly 
valuable role within Britain’s intelligence network, contributing greatly to the 
latter category. In addition, while it is true that the reliability of the information 
provided by D’Auvergne’s agents may have at times been called into question, 
the majority of their reports can be seen to have been of considerable 
assistance to a highly stretched Royal Navy (see chapter seven). Moreover, the 
other forms of intelligence-gathering facilitated through Great Britain’s 
possession of the Channel Islands – specifically routine naval reconnaissance 
and ‘human intelligence’ – proved to be far more reliable than information 
generated through espionage. Consequently, these additional sources of 
intelligence many be regarded as having compensated for the shortcomings in 
the embryonic British secret service, especially in light of the efficiency of the 
communication between the Channel Islands and Great Britain.  
Moreover, while D’Auvergne’s agents may have maintained a generally 
accurate picture of French naval preparations – particularly with respect to 
multiplicity of small ports along the Breton-Norman coast – the same cannot be 
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said of the intelligence produced from his dealings with the royalists.1810 As has 
been highlighted, the British government was often frustrated by the mass of 
contradictory information sent over by the counter-Revolutionary leaders, while 
the ‘General Gaston’ affair typified those occasions when agents were obliged 
to invest time and manpower investigating leads which, though acknowledged 
as being almost entirely spurious, could not be dismissed. Consequently, in 
spite of the Channel Islands having proved a considerable asset to the British 
government within the context of intelligence-gathering, the potential for the 
royalists to be exploited in this context was never fully realised. Even when 
communication between Jersey and France became ‘as regular and normal as 
the postal service in England1811 – the émigrés proving a source of ‘zealous’ 
volunteers1812 – the gathering of intelligence from the royalists was deemed 
subordinate to their utility as fifth columnists and guerillas.1813 
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1811 King, ‘Jersey: Centre D’Espionnage’, 434 
1812 TNA, WO 1/925/45, D’Auvergne to Windham, May 5th 1806 
1813 King, ‘The British Government, Émigrés and Royalists’, Abstract 
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Chapter Nine – The Counter-Revolution: La Vendée and Chouannerie 
 
Throughout the Great French War, the nature of the Channel Islands as an 
outpost on a key border territory rendered them highly vulnerable to invasion, 
especially following the comprehensive early successes of the Republican 
armies and the rapid restoration of the navy (see chapter three).1814 Even in the 
aftermath of Trafalgar, France’s warships and corsairs continued to menace 
Britain’s commercial traffic, the Royal Navy’s blockade of the Channel ports 
being able to limit, not entirely prevent, the escape of small raiding squadrons 
(see chapter seven). Moreover, in a period of social upheaval and economic 
distress, typified by the emergence of radical and reformist political groups (see 
chapter five), it is unsurprising that the fear of spies,1815 fifth columnist activity 
and armed insurrection was almost as great as that of invasion itself.1816 
Indeed, while dismissed by the British authorities as ‘a mad enterprise’ driven 
by ‘idle talk and boasting’, the Despard Plot (1802)1817 – like Hoche’s Expedition 
to Ireland and the United Irishmen’s Rebellion (1798) – reinforced fears that a 
foreign invasion might well be supported by a domestic uprising. In this context, 
covert operations conducted via the Channel Islands were highly attractive, 
since they not only represented an opportunity to target ‘subversive doctrines’ at 
source,1818 but also had the potential to seriously disrupt the enemy with only 
the minimum investment.1819 
 
                                                 
1814 Cormack, Revolution and Political Conflict, pp. 251-252 
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1816 Colley, Britons, pp. 325-326 
1817 TNA, FO 95/615, Letters of July 23rd, September 21st and 26th 1802 
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In terms of the rationale behind the British government’s decision to involve 
itself in the royalist insurgency, it must be emphasised that their relations with 
both the Bretons and Vendéens were at all times dictated by a careful blend of 
pragmatism and practicality. Although D’Auvergne’s correspondence includes 
frequent references to his contacts as ‘the true friends of the House of 
Bourbon’,1820 no commitment was made with respect to the restoration of the 
Ancien Régime as a condition of peace.1821 Moreover, as King observed, it was 
only at the time of Moira’s Expedition – less than one year after the declaration 
of war – that the British government can be reasonably considered to have 
displayed any confidence in ‘the strength and dependability of the royalist army’ 
with respect to joint operations.1822 With the exception of the Quiberon 
Expedition – for which they were persuaded to offer logistical support and assist 
in the consolidation of a successful landing (see below) – this marked the 
greatest attempt by the British to provide aid to the royalists.1823 Otherwise, the 
extent of the government’s interest in the insurgency was limited to its potential 
for fifth columnist activity to destabilise the Western Provinces,1824 chiefly by 
causing disruption to naval and military preparations in the Channel Ports1825 
and ‘intercept and interrupt all unprotected communications’.1826 
 
However, in spite of the failure of both Moira’s Expedition and the Quiberon 
Expedition, the lessons learned had a significant impact, both in terms of the 
British government’s approach to the insurgency and the use of the Channel 
                                                 
1820 TNA, FO 95/611, D’Auvergne to Windham, November 4th 1800; and FO 95/617, D’Auvergne to 
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Islands as a conduit for aid. Most importantly, despite the zeal with which 
Puisaye and others sought to mould their followers into a conventional army,1827 
the ease with which the émigré regiments had been crushed by the republicans 
proved that the royalists could be effective only if employed as irregular 
troops.1828 The only exception to this rule concerned those émigré regiments 
which had been raised in the Channel Islands: these had taken no active part in 
the landing at Quiberon, and were thus allowed to remain in being as a garrison 
reserve until October 1796,1829 when they were transferred to England.1830 In 
addition, the failure of Moira’s Expedition served to convince the British 
government of the royalist leaders’ distorted view of the insurgency,1831 since it 
revealed an apparent expectation amongst the émigrés that D’Auvergne would 
possess a ‘supernatural knowledge’ of the situation.1832 Thereafter, all aid sent 
to the insurgents – whether destined for the Vendée or Brittany – was 
predicated upon the exploitation of the royalists’ potential to act as a potent 
psychological weapon and a means of disrupting the social and political order of 
the western provinces.1833  
 
Indeed, while the counter-Revolution may have proved ultimately to be little 
more than a hindrance to the Republic, the response by the French authorities 
demonstrates the seriousness with which it was treated, and particularly as a 
potential threat to the stability of the Western Provinces. Throughout 1799, 
reports were received at Jersey concerning the mass arrest of suspected 
                                                 
1827 King, ‘The British Government, Émigrés and Royalists’, pp. 317-322 
1828 Warren to Bridport, July 3rd 1795, reproduced in Corbett and Richmond (eds.), Papers of the Second 
Earl Spencer, Vol. II, pp. 80-81 
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April 29th 1796 (Castries) 
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1833 Hutt, Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution, Vol. I. p. 133 
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rebels, and Brittany was described as being in ‘a state of anarchy’, while 
General de Division Dufour was reported as having passed through Nantes at 
the head of one of the 200-strong colonnes mobiles.1834 However, such 
measures never came close to achieving the ‘destruction’, ‘extermination' 
'pulverisation' or 'depopulation' which they promised to visit upon the rebels;1835 
as Broers observed, ‘mass slaughter took place over so prolonged a period that 
it did not really amount to mass slaughter’.1836 Consequently, the threat of 
insurrection in the region continued unabated, and in late October, D’Auvergne 
declared that ‘every report’ in his possession indicated that the rebels were ‘in 
better and more formidable array than they have ever yet been’.1837 As a result, 
it was decided to make an attempt to land a consignment of supplies on the 
French coast,1838 but although 2,000 stand of arms and 100 kegs of ammunition 
were delivered, the arrival of the Republicans prevented the delivery of seventy 
kegs containing 35,000 rounds of ball cartridge.1839 
 
Moreover, the psychological impact of their support for the royalist insurgency 
can be seen to have long outlasted the involvement of the British government in 
the affairs of the Western Provinces.1840 After the Peace of Amiens, a number of 
critical blows were dealt to the operations of La Correspondence: the leaking of 
the Cadoudal-Pichegru Plot (1804),1841 the emergence of a number of 
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 315 
‘renegade’ chouans in London1842 and, most seriously of all, the betrayal of 
Prigent by Bouchard in 1808.1843 Even so, the fact that the Channel Islands 
remained in British hands led the French government to fixate upon the image 
of ‘a platform of anti-Napoleonic intrigue [only] twenty kilometres from the 
French coast’,1844 Jersey being described by Le Moniteur as a refuge for 
‘hundreds of brigands, assassins [and] firebugs’.1845 Likewise, although several 
political manoeuvres1846 had induced the majority of émigrés to return to France 
or lay down their arms,1847 those that remained in exile continued to pose a 
threat, with Prigent being identified as ‘the principal agent of the clandestine 
correspondence with Jersey’.1848 Finally, even though French countermeasures 
forced D’Auvergne to suspend La Correspondence in May 1807, Puisaye 
persuaded Castlereagh to recommence operations just five months later, albeit 
as an organisation committed to espionage.1849 
 
Practicalities of Succour – The Central Role of the Channel Islands 
 
Although bracketed under the umbrella of ‘covert operations’, the role of the 
bailiwicks as a conduit for counter-Revolutionary activity was a de facto open 
secret; indeed, this aspect of their strategic value was one of the justifications 
for the planned French invasion of 1794 (see chapter three).1850 However, in 
spite of the number of émigrés who volunteered to undertake missions to the 
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 316 
Continent, initial attempts suffered from poor organisation; in addition to his later 
dispute with D’Auvergne (see chapter eight),1851 June 1793 saw Falle come into 
conflict with Craig. While the latter had become convinced that St. Malo would 
offer little resistance, and that the Bretons possessed both ‘a fanatical spirit of 
religion’ and an ‘incredible detestation of their new priests’, the former continued 
to send his own agents to the region, to the ‘embarrasment’ of Craig’s 
operations.1852 The elimination of such professional disagreements was critical 
for maximising the potential for success, but all the more so because of the fact 
that the leaders of the various insurgent groups ‘hated each other as much as 
they hated the republicans’.1853 Consequently, while the émigrés bombarded 
Westminster with grandiose plans for the insurgency,1854 the British government 
refusing to countenance the provision of more than 4,700 men in total,1855 since 
large-scale collaboration would require a port,1856 while much of the Normandy 
coast was ‘unfavourable’ for even small-scale landings.1857 
 
Although such difficulties could not be overcome by the badgering of ministers, 
the theoretical ability to exploit the geographic position of the Channel Islands 
enabled the British government to answer their most ardent critics among the 
royalist leadership.1858 In his attempts to ensure viable communication between 
the two parties, D’Auvergne was able to draw upon the services of several 
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highly experienced pilots, often veterans of the prototype network which had 
been established by Falle in 1792.1859 For example, the Chief Guide for Brittany 
– identified by the code-name Hue – was described as having ‘served with great 
fidelity since the beginning of the War’, and the wage which he was allotted in 
D’Auvergne’s accounts was significantly greater than that paid to any of his 
colleagues.1860 Furthermore, when faced with Puisaye’s unreasonable 
expectations vis-á-vis the scale of British assistance and reinforcement (see 
above), the émigré community of the Channel Islands represented a potential 
alternative source of manpower. By March 1794, around 800 émigrés were 
reported as serving in British pay as part of the Jersey garrison,1861 with 667 
serving in Castries’ Regiment alone by 1796.1862 In addition, between 600 and 
1,000 refugees from both bailiwicks were induced – not without difficulty – to 
serve in the four Corps d’Émigrés intended to support the Quiberon Landings by 
means of a diversionary attack.1863 
 
While the argument for maintenance of the Channel Islands as a forward base 
was founded upon the assumption that their possession improved the efficiency 
of communication between the British government and its allies in the Western 
Provinces,1864 this did not always translate into reality. In addition to delays 
caused by inclement conditions (see chapter eight), it is evident that Carrier was 
keeping the French government well-informed as to British operations in the 
region.1865 As early as March 1795, D’Auvergne voiced concerns that ‘the coast 
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is now so extremely guarded by sea [that we cannot] with our feeble means 
present ourselves there’,1866 while the following year saw him present the 
following ultimatum to Windham. ‘I cannot too much impress it on Your 
Excellency’, he wrote, ‘how fruitless all our endeavours in this quarter will be, 
unless something more respectable in point of force than my light vessels, 
assists us to keep these pirates in order’. 1867 In addition, the letter included 
thinly-veiled accusations against Strachan and Smith – it being implied that they 
had placed their own interests ahead of their orders to assist his agents – but 
such complaints may well have been driven by D’Auvergne’s lack of 
opportunities to secure his own share of prize money.1868  
 
However, it is evident that D’Auvergne well understood both the limitations with 
which the Service was confronted and the effectiveness of French counter-
measures. For example, when Sir Sidney Smith proposed to establish an 
advanced post on the Chausey Islands, D’Auvergne observed that the nearby 
French coast was ‘so much guarded’ that any vessels attempting to cross from 
thence would be under constant threat of attack.1869 Even from the relative 
security of the Channel Islands, the vessels of La Correspondence were all too 
often intercepted; in May 1796 alone, three attempts to convey supplies from 
Jersey to the chouans were thwarted by a squadron based at St. Malo. Though 
‘contemptible in [its] enumeration’, it was nonetheless ‘disproportionably 
superior in force’, to the vessels under D’Auvergne’s command,1870 and the 
latter declared that he had been ‘[deprived of] the possibility of landing scarcely 
                                                 
1866 Hutt, Chouannerie and Counter-Revolution, Vol. I, p. 219 
1867 TNA, FO 95/605/50, D’Auvergne to Windham, May 5th 1796 
1868 TNA FO 95/612/28, D’Auvergne to Nepean, February 14th 1800; and BL, Add MS 37867, 
D’Auvergne to Windham, February 26th 1800 
1869 TNA, FO 95/605/41, D’Auvergne to Windham, March 3rd 1796 
1870 TNA, FO 95/605/50, D’Auvergne to Windham, May 5th 1796 
 319 
a single grain of gunpowder’.1871 Likewise in June 1797, D’Auvergne begged 
that an additional frigate might be assigned – at least temporarily – to the 
protection of his vessels, since a recent attempt to convey a group of Breton 
agents to the opposite coast having been abandoned after a patrolling enemy 
squadon had ‘forced them back and chased them [to Guernsey]’.1872 
 
Similarly, although strategy of asymmetric warfare employed by the chouans 
proved highly effective in disrupting Republican operations in the heavily 
wooded areas of Brittany and the Maine,1873 the French were able to contain 
and limit their impact with the minimum expenditure of manpower. For example, 
while Rossignol’s ‘Army of the Coast of Brest’ included a total of 43,000 troops, 
only 7,000 of these – 16.28% – ever engaged in counter-insurgency operations 
in the eastern part of Ille-et-Vilaine. Moreover, even after Hoche was permitted 
to strip Fougères, Vitré, La Guerche, and Châteaubriant of troops in order to 
enable him to crush Charette’s forces south of the Loire, the remaining regulars, 
national guards and militia proved sufficient to prevent the royalists from making 
any significant impact north of the Loire.1874 By late 1795, the extent to which 
counter-insurgency operations had succeeded in quietening the chouans1875 
was reflected by the response to angry complaints from Puisaye concerning the 
paucity of supplies landed on the French coast.1876 As was noted by both 
D’Auvergne and Falle, in spite of every effort having been made by their 
confidential agents,1877 it was often the case that the royalists were prevented 
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from reaching the rendezvous, or that the supplies were intercepted by the 
Republicans while being unloaded.1878 
 
Co-Ordination of Counter-Revolutionary Activity 
 
As effective as French counter-measures may have been, a far more serious 
problem with which D’Auvergne was confronted in his attempts to translate the 
expectations of the royalist leaders into reality was the difficulty of establishing 
co-ordination between the various parties. While traditional scholarship on both 
sides has portrayed the insurgency as a united movement, the reality is that 
tensions between individual leaders ran so deep that it was almost impossible 
for them to cooperate,1879  even in defence of their own interests.1880 Indeed, the 
Vendée may have seen ‘the whole [region] mobilised against the Republic’, but 
the Chouannerie never amounted to more than a localised war of coups-de-
main and ambuscades’, with large swathes of the province remaining firmly 
under the control of the Republic.1881 Thus, while D’Auvergne reported that the 
failure of Quiberon had nonetheless left the chouans ‘undiminished’ in spirit,1882 
and that the individual chiefs continued, even in 1797, to call for a ‘prince of the 
blood’ to act as their overall leader,1883 he readily conceded that they were 
wholly dependent on outside support. In the months following Quiberon, it was 
reported that the chouans were sustained by rumours of victories secured by 
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Charette and Stofflet,1884 while in later years, their hopes were said to rest 
solely on the prospect of aid from Britain and the royalist exiles.1885 
 
As to divisions amongst the leaders of the insurgency, D’Auvergne’s reports 
reveal just how rapidly these served to undermine any hopes that the British 
may have entertained that the chouans or royalists could be utilised as anything 
more than prospective fifth columnists or guerrillas. Even by January 1796, ‘an 
unfortunate schism’ was reported amongst the Breton leaders,1886 and by 
October 1798, such ‘jealous motives and intrigues’ had become so widespread 
that intelligence described the chouans as ‘hordes of disorderly banditti’1887 
committing murder and robbery ‘without the least remorse’.1888 In 1800, the 
situation amongst the chouans reached a nadir: while ‘letters for stores and 
money’, continued to be brought from the Continent, D’Auvergne reported that 
the chiefs were ‘[dismayed by] their partial insurrections and inability to oppose 
the formidable and united mass that hath come against them’.1889 However, as 
early as 1793, Balcarres had argued that British efforts to assist the chouans 
could be realised only if a solution were found to ‘the total want of military 
subordination among them, their want of confidence in their leaders’, and the 
fact that none of the latter could claim overall command of the insurgency.1890  
 
Although their ability to achieve temporary local superiority and destabilisise 
both civil and military affairs by means of effective asymmetric warfare ensured 
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the longevity of the Chouannerie (see above), decisive victory – as illustrated by 
the War in the Vendée – depended upon conventional operations.1891 Moreover, 
even when the Bretons were able to unite their scattered warbands and meet 
the Republicans in strength, they could only keep each band operational for as 
long as the pressures of rural existence permitted the rank-and-file to abandon 
their farms.1892 Finally, mention must be made of the lack of unity amongst the 
royalist dispora, since although more than 3,600 émigrés – many veterans of 
British and Austrian service1893 – volunteered for Quiberon,1894 and D’Auvergne 
received countless petitions from men eager join the insurgency, 1895 the latter 
in particular have long been characterised as ‘all chiefs, no braves’.1896 It is 
evident, therefore, that many of the émigré leaders had failed to learn anything 
from the disasters of 1792-3, when the royalist armies had been undermined by 
an ‘unseemly competition for prestigious commissions’ and ‘an arrogant 
conviction that the invasion of France would be a promenade’.1897 
 
The Strength of the Insurgency – Manpower 
 
While recent studies of the royalist insurgency have emphasised the social 
origins of the movement, particularly the desire to preserve local identity in the 
face of oppressive edicts such as the levée en masse,1898 the importance of 
charismatic leadership should not be ignored. Mention has been already made 
of ‘General Gaston’ (see chapter eight), but Charette can be seen as having 
acquired a similarly legendary reputation, both on the Continent – where he 
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drew recruits from as far afield as Normandy1899 – and in Britain, where his 
exploits were lauded in the press.1900 For example, one obituary claimed that 
Charette had been left with only ‘400-500 adventures’ in 1793, but had recruited 
thereafter as many as ‘15,000 [or] 20,000 men’,1901 and when news of his 
‘defeat and sacrifice’ reached Jersey, the émigrés adopted the view that he had 
been undermined by ‘the penury of his officers’, rather than by any personal 
failings as a commander.1902 However, while the importance of providing the 
royalist insurgency with charismatic leadership was clearly acknowledged –  
D’Auvergne, for example, declared that ‘a new and a skilful leader’ might yet re-
ignite the Vendée1903 – later uprisings in that region1904 were never reported as 
involving more than a few thousand men.1905 
 
With respect to the actual number of men that the Vendéens were able to unite 
under their banner, the estimates provided by scholars on both sides of the 
Channel have been reasonably consistent. While D’Auvergne was furnished 
with reports that the royalists numbered 60,000,1906 80,000,1907 or even 165,000 
men1908 Balleine and De Venaton both concluded that their true strength could 
not have been more than 50,000.1909 Moreover, a study carried out at the 
Centre Vendéen de Recherches Historiques estimated that only 30,000 infantry 
and 1,200 cavalry were engaged in the Virée de Galerne, accompanied by 
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15,000 to 60,000 non-combatants.1910 However, even if the Grande Armée 
which crossed the Loire was only 35,000 strong,1911 that begs the question as to 
why they would have conducted a truce  when the Army of the West possessed 
only 24,000 effectives1912 and around one sixth1913 of the Army of the Coast of 
Brest was engaged in fighting the chouans.1914 Again, it must be emphasised 
that the claims of the royalist leaders were often at odds with reality: according 
to Carrier, Charette commanded no more than 3,000 men in 1794, with the total 
Vendéens strength set at 20,000 men.1915 Similarly, Hutt has estimated that 
only 4,000 men responded to Charette’s muster of June 1795,1916 while 
intelligence received by D’Auvergne that same year indicated that the principal 
Vendéen leaders1917 commanded only 65,000 men between them.1918 
 
In their attempts to provide succour to the Chouans, the British were likewise 
deceived as to the influence commanded by individual leaders, many of whom 
were – in common with their counterparts in the Vendée – garnered reputations 
founded upon a conflation of fact and popular myth. Cadoudal, for example, is 
described by Balliene as ‘a born strategist’ possessing ‘amazing powers of 
leadership’, and who, at the peak of his powers, was supposed to have been 
acknowledged as chief by ‘all the chouans in Brittany’.1919 However, if this was 
ever the case, it certainly did not outlast the attempted assassination of 
Napoleon in December 1800, since the following years saw D’Auvergne receive 
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numerous complaints with respect to Cadoudal’s conduct. In January 1802, for 
example, he was charged with having left his comrades ‘without subsistence 
[or] asylum out of the country’, as well as having ‘deceived [them] by unrealised 
promises’,1920 while other chouans, hopeful of the prospective amnesty (see 
above), accused him of having sought to ‘provoke mischief in the neighbouring 
provinces’.1921 However, British attempts to support the chouannerie were 
hampered further by the chouan leaders’ habit of vastly over-exaggerating their 
strength; Solerac having claimed that he might call upon as many as 30,000 
men,1922 and it being reported that Beauchamp had rallied 10,000 chouans in 
support of the Vendéen royalists.1923  
 
Despite such exaggerated estimates, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
British aid to the chouans was based on the premise that the latter numbered 
not more than a few thousand men. Even during Quiberon, Warren spoke of 
Tineniac as commanding no more than ‘8,000 chouans’,1924 while the amount of 
supplies granted to D’Auvergne for transmission to Brittany – like those he had 
endeavoured to send to Charette1925 – indicate that the British government 
placed little faith in the claims of Beauchamp or Solerac. In March 1794, for 
example, D’Auvergne reported having received 3,200 muskets,1926 while a 
return of March 1796 revealed that his stores at Mont Orgueil contained 100 
blunderbusses, 5,500 muskets, 460 pistols and 3,500 sabres.1927 Moreover, by 
1800, it was acknowledged that the Breton insurgency was on the decline: for 
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example, Châtillon1928 was said to command no more than 2,000 men, only one 
third of whom possessed muskets, while even with the support of his ‘divisional 
chiefs’, Cadoudal was reckoned to be able to muster only 3,000 men.1929 As for 
the other leaders mentioned in this report, estimates of their individual forces 
ranged from as few as 800 to as many as 3,000 men, lending support to 
Sutherland’s argument no more than a few thousand chouans joined the 
Vendéens during the Virée de Galerne.1930 
 
The Difficulties Surrounding Intelligence 
 
As was highlighted in the discussion of the role played by the Channel Islands 
within the context of intelligence-gathering, one problem frequently encountered 
by D’Auvergne, and complained of by Ministers, was the contradictory nature of 
reports received concerning the royalists (see chapter eight).1931 Both the over-
ambition and arrogance of the various royalist leaders and the inability of the 
insurgents to act in concert can be seen to have contributed to breakdowns in 
the gathering of intelligence concerning the state of affairs in the Western 
Provinces. During his negotiations with Balcarres and Craig with respect to the 
proposition of an armed intervention in support of the Virée en Galerne, Moira 
observed that ‘nothing can be done [without] an answer from the royalists, but 
which all our plans must be regulated’.1932 During Moira’s Expedition, for 
example, a large force of British troops was mustered at Guernsey,1933 but until 
such time as reliable intelligence could be gained from Brittany – particularly 
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with respect to the best route by which to make contact with the royalists, there 
was no prospect of them being landed.1934 The deciding factor was simple: 
while Moira agreed that ‘the force of the Republicans...has been much 
exaggerated’,1935 and that the coast was ‘naked from Granville to St. Malo’,1936 
his orders forbade him to take any action unless convinced that ‘a landing might 
be affected with security and advantage’.1937 
 
Unfortunately, due to the ‘embryonic’ nature of the British secret service – 
particularly during the first few years of the Great French War (see chapter 
eight) – there was no definitive method by which to verify the accuracy of the 
insurgents’ stated needs. Confronted with a never-ending demand for arms, 
powder, and money from both the Vendéen generals and the chouan leaders, 
D’Auvergne’s final decision as to the worthiness of each application was often 
based as much on the character of the agent from whom it was received as the 
availability of corroborative evidence.1938 For example, having met with Le 
Comte de la Rocque, then carrying despatches to Britain on behalf of the 
chouan leader Frotté, D’Auvergne described the former as being ‘[unlikely] to 
exaggerate upon light grounds the position or the means of his associates’ or 
‘[engage in] deception through false or exaggerated reports’.1939 Even when it 
was possible to secure independent evidence to corroborate reports received 
from the insurgents or their emissaries, episodes such as the ‘Gaston’ affair 
reflect the fact that the British government remained, in the early years of the 
War, ignorant as to the identity of the royalist leaders.  
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Perhaps the best illustration of the manner in which poor British attempts to aid 
the royalists – at least during the early years of the Great French War – were 
compromised by a shortage of accurate intelligence is provided by the Virée de 
Galerne in late 1793. Having crossed the Loire in October, the Vendéen forces  
marched through Maine to the Channel coast,1940 and news of their progress, at 
least for a time, raised the British government’s hopes of being able to provide 
the insurgents with large-scale support. As highlighted at the beginning of this 
chapter, the landing of supplies on the French coast – at least in anything other 
than relatively small quantities – was generally considered impossible without 
first securing a port or bay which might be exploited as a beachhead. St. Malo 
was regarded as ideal for the purpose, but in spite of having agreed with 
Balcarras’ view that ‘the capture of that town would be very advantageous’, 
Moira admitted of his having insufficient intelligence to allow for a judgement as 
to ‘the rational prospect of success in an [assault]’.1941 However, he felt that 
even the entire strength of the royalist army would prove insufficient, and that 
the preferred strategy would be to seize one of the smaller bays on that part of 
the coast.1942 
 
Even when convinced that he was in a position to act in accordance with his 
orders and affect a landing ‘with security and advantage’ (see above), Moira’s 
efforts to support the royalist forces continued to be undermined by incomplete 
or inaccurate intelligence. Balcarres, for example, reported that the cutter which 
he had sent to scout for two French ships-of-the-line supposedly patrolling in 
the vicinity of St. Malo had failed to locate the enemy, and also that efforts to 
send ‘two gentlemen’ to make contact with both the chouans and Vendéens had 
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been thwarted by bad weather.1943 Similarly, reports of the disposition and size 
of the Republican forces were highly inconsistent: while Solerac reported that 
there were 10,000 men at Granville, Trellon reported that the garrison of that 
town amounted to no more than 5,000 men, with a further 10,000 men marching 
to reinforce them.1944 Most serious of all were the erroneous reports concerning 
the supposed capture of Rennes by the Vendéen forces,1945 since they served 
to encourage misplaced hopes that the royalists would be able to return to the 
coast and link up with a British landing.1946 In addition, even if the inaccuracy of 
such reports was ultimately brought to light, the hope which they inspired with 
respect to the potential success of the royalist armies meant that the British 
continued to be distracted by rumours of their being engaged against Caen and 
other towns in the Cotentin.1947 
 
Failures within La Correspondence 
 
Although the potential for the ‘malfunction’ of La Correspondence as a means of 
intelligence-gathering has been already discussed (see chapter eight), its 
effectiveness with respect to enabling the provision of aid to the insurgency was 
likewise fallible. Often, the impact of French counter-measures and the ever-
present disruption caused by the prevailing weather and sea conditions1948 were 
compounded by the unreliability of individual personnel1949 and the inability of 
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the royalists to secure and hold a permanent landing-place.1950 However, 
D’Auvergne’s correspondence reveals two far more serious problems: on the 
one hand, the suspected presence of French agents in St. Helier; and on the 
other, the infiltration of La Correspondence and the recruitment of several 
personnel as double agents. During the Peace of Amiens, and amid the 
concerns over the conduct of Cadoudal (see above), he warned the British 
government that a spy named ‘Chessy’ was passing the names of suspected 
members of La Correspondence to the Directory.1951 However, as with his 
counterparts in Paris, D’Auvergne had established a number of important 
security measures, giving orders that that the identity of his agents should be 
disclosed only to senior military officers, and that dispatches should be 
delivered ‘without recourse to any other part of the Island’.1952 
 
The necessity for these countermeasures was exacerbated by the intimacy of 
life in the Channel Islands: as D’Auvergne observed, St. Helier’s relatively small 
population meant that his agents were ‘missed in a few hours absence’, and 
that ‘nefarious knaves give notice of [their] every movement’.1953 Seeking to 
prevent a case of ‘careless talk costing lives’, D’Auvergne ordered that no 
French person involved in La Correspondence was to be permitted to visit St. 
Helier, but that all were to be sequestered in Mont Orgueil.1954 Though he had 
previously claimed that his ‘intimate acquaintance with the country, language 
and inhabitants will give me great opportunity of procuring information on all 
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occasions’,1955 D’Auvergne did not perceive the same ability in those French 
émigrés whom he employed. Rather, he justified his actions by stating that ‘the 
indiscretion of that volatile people, the French’ led to him hearing the 
supposedly secret missions of his agents discussed openly in the taverns of St. 
Helier.1956 Indeed, surviving intelligence reports indicate many of these agents 
as having been far from discrete: referring to the royalists’ failure to capture 
Granville in 1793, D’Auvergne accused Solerac of having been ‘turned’ by the 
Republicans and having fed false information to his erstwhile comrades.1957 
 
As was touched upon during the discussion of suspected ‘subversive’ elements 
within the Channel Islands’ émigré community (see chapter five), the most 
serious failure within La Correspondence came about as a result of the capture 
of Bouchard and his subsequent betrayal of Prigent. While the latter was 
described by Summerscale as a ‘mediocre agent’ who ‘collapsed before the 
police like a neophyte’,1958 Guerrin has argued that such a view is unfair, and 
that Prigent’s swift and detailed confession was both a ‘logical and human’ 
reaction in a man faced with the prospect of both torture and death.1959 Even so, 
the consequences of this episode provide clear evidence, not only of the fragility 
of La Correspondence as an organisation, but also the damage which might be 
inflicted if even a single agent could be induced to desert the royalist cause, 
especially since their treachery would not be immediately obvious. In the case 
of Bouchard and Prigent, for example, D’Auvergne not only made several failed 
attempts to contact the two agents, but when the former returned to Jersey, 
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failed to realise that Bouchard had bought his freedom by agreeing to lure 
several leading members of La Correspondence into a trap.1960 Although this 
did not bring an end to the passing of intelligence from the French coast to the 
Channel Islands,1961 it did result in the activities of La Correspondence being 
severely curtailed during the latter third of the Great French War.1962 
 
However, on several occasions, La Correspondence appears to have been 
compromised by indiscretions on a more ‘structural’ level: in an attempt to 
ensure the efficient flow of aid to the insurgents, D’Auvergne and his associates 
established a number of safe-houses on the Continent.1963 Unfortunately, the 
above-mentioned indiscretions of individual agents meant that these properties 
were apt to be compromised, with severe losses in terms of equipment, as well 
as the arrest of any personnel unfortunate enough to be hiding therein. In late 
1794, Dundas was informed that ‘a treacherous pariah’ had betrayed the depot 
to which he had been conducted, and the resultant capture of thirty barrels of 
powder and a few stand of arms1964 was a coup for the Republicans, who were 
said to be reduced to bartering their powder for bread.1965 Likewise, the need to 
rely on local guides in order to ensure contact with the insurgent leaders was 
likewise a source of duplicity; in 1799, it was reported that agents of the Princes 
were attempting to subvert control of La Correspondence by ‘exciting jealousy’ 
between them.1966 While this threat appears to have been neutralised, the 
following years witnessed more regular breakdowns, and by mid-1800, 
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D’Auvergne was warning that ‘our communications have been much intercepted 
by the indiscretion of the persons that have lately passed’.1967 
 
The final area in which British support for insurgency activities appears to have 
been compromised on the Continental side of the chain is related to the 
provision of money. Given Puisaye’s vision for the Catholic and Royal Army of 
Brittany, the royalists were constantly demanding bullion – either in Sterling, 
Dollars or Louis d’Or1968 – with which to pay their troops, and even after 
Quiberon, Puisaye presented D’Auvergne with a demand for the equivalent of 
£28,000 per month.1969 Such demands were entirely divorced from reality – in 
October 1796, for example, Puisaye received only 700 Livres1970 – and even 
though much larger amounts were often sent, including a sum of between 
15,000 and 20,000 Louis d’Or which was earmarked for Chatillion in February 
1800, these were often left unaccounted for.1971 Despite the fact that money 
received from Britain also enabled the royalists to purchase arms and supplies 
from French sources and bribe Republican troops into deserting,1972 it is evident 
that a considerable proportion of the funds were embezzled by the insurgent 
leadership. Hutt, for example, has referred to a dispatch by which Puisaye was 
informed that £6,000 had been sent across to Jersey, but over a month passed, 
and Puisaye complained that he had received a mere 1,000 Louis d’Or.1973 
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Success of Assistance 
 
As Kirke observed, it would be ‘impossible and unprofitable to give in detail all 
the various descents...made upon the French coast’:1974 not least in light of 
King’s observation that La Correspondence became ‘as regular and normal as 
the postal service in England (see chapter eight).1975 However, while it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in a comprehensive numeration of all 
the supplies which were sent to the royalists, it is possible to provide at least a 
partial assessment of the success with which consignments were delivered from 
Jersey. D’Auvergne’s declaration that he was ‘ready to give [the royalists] 
anything at their disposition which they can receive’ would certainly appear 
sincere, as does his insistance of having been ‘zealous’ in his attachment to the 
duty entrusted to him.1976 However, while it is true that he was often successful 
in orchestrating the landing of considerable quantities of supplies, the reality is 
that the efforts of both D’Auvergne and his agents were reliant upon too many 
variables beyond their control. Although December 1799 saw an attempt to 
deliver more than 1,000 stand-of-arms and 60,000 rounds of ball cartridge to 
Mercier’s chouans,1977 such an operation was exceptional; in the majority of 
cases, only small consignments were landed, or else the opportunity was lost or 
the supplies intercepted. 
 
Most importantly, the correspondence which has survived serves to illustrate 
the extent to which the attempts to carry out the landing of supplies were often 
thwarted – or at least limited – by the fundamental necessity of operating in 
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optimum sea conditions and under cover of darkness. In March 1796, it was 
reported that ‘a confidential gentleman’ had succeeded in delivering 105 
muskets and 178 quarter-barrels of powder to an unidentified party in the 
interior of Brittany, and that it was intended to make two similar attempts ‘when 
the Moon permits’.1978 However, it is clear that such opportunities remained 
infrequent even during the long winter nights: in January 1800, D’Auvergne 
reported that ‘the advanced state of the Moon did not permit us to land any 
other effects but a few quintals1979 of powder, and a few cavalry swords,1980 and 
that attempts to make contact with Prigent in February 1801 were likewise 
disrupted.1981 Similarly, although November 1799 saw the chouans under 
Mercier successfully take delivery of 600 stand-of-arms, 30,000 rounds of ball 
cartridge, and suffient powder for 15,000 to 20,000 rounds, it was noted that ‘a 
violent storm’ had disrupted the landing, preventing the offloading of the 
remainder.1982 In addition, D’Auvergne observed that his efforts to land even 
small consignments would remain largely ineffectual ‘unless the royalists come 
themselves in moderate numbers to the shore’,1983 or were able to appoint 
‘persons of enterprise’ with whom he might make contact.1984 
 
Consequently, while the British government may have had some success in 
utilising the Channel Islands as a base from which to provide aid to both the 
royalists and chouans, the success of this endeavour was limited at best. The 
vigilance of French patrols,1985 the inconsistency of British military support,1986 
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the all-too-often dangerous local sea conditions,1987 and in-fighting between key 
personnel1988 all combined to prevent the provision of the kind of support that 
was anticipated at both ends of the network. Certainly, the stores which became 
stockpiled in Jersey prove that the British government treated insurgent groups 
in the Western Provinces as a serious investment; as late as September 1799, 
D’Auvergne received a consignment of 6,000 lbs of gunpowder and 2,000 stand 
of arms ‘to be sent to the French coast as you shall judge proper’.1989 Similarly, 
his stores in November 1799 amounted to 1,830 French muskets with 116,000 
rounds, 5,535lbs of powder in 123 barrels, four French cannon – two 8-pdrs and 
two 4-pdrs – and two 8½-inch sea mortars, all amply supplied with both solid 
and case-shot.1990 However, despite the potential importance of these supplies 
– in autumn 1795, only one in every three chouans is believed to have 
possessed a firearm1991 – D’Auvergne and his associates were simply unable to 
meet the expectations of the royalist leadership. 
 
However, even if the provision of aid via the Channel Islands did not result in 
Puisaye being able to realise his dream of an army of fifty divisions,1992 this 
aspect of La Correspondence can still be regarded as having enjoyed sufficient 
success to be of strategic value to the British. Throughout the 1790s, the 
potential threat of a royalist insurgency remained a significant distraction to the 
French authorities,1993 and in order to ensure the maintenance of control in the 
Western Provinces, it was necessary for tens of thousands of troops to be 
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continually diverted from other frontiers.1994 Even though the prospect of a 
major British-backed conventional operation in either the Vendée or Brittany 
ended in 1795 – Quiberon having destroyed ministerial confidence in any such 
scheme – the subsequent activities of the chouans served to harass the 
relatively small Republican garrisons north of the Loire.1995 However, perhaps 
the most important success enjoyed by the Channel Islands as a conduit for 
subversive warfare was the introduction into the French economy of counterfeit 
Assignats;1996 an aspect of La Correspondence for which, unfortunately, little 
meaningful documentation appears to have survived. In general, the majority of 
correspondence making reference to the smuggling of forged currency refers 
simply to the amount dispatched or landed in each consignment,1997 with the 
occasional mention of the intended recipient.1998  
 
Despite a paucity of documentary evidence, the extent to which this simple 
economic subterfuge threatened to destabilise the Republican regime can be 
seen to have played a significant role in creating the conditions within which 
insurgent activity could continue to flourish. Although the first consignments 
were intended as payment for the chouans in lieu of coinage or bullion, the 
flooding of France with forged paper currency served to exacerbate the chronic 
inflation which had been reported as early as 1790. Indeed, March 1795 saw 
D’Auvergne’s agents land over thirty million Livres worth of counterfeit assignats 
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alongside 2,000 muskets and 100 to 200 barrels of powder,1999 and Puisaye 
and his associates expressed their fervent belief that ‘this war of assignats 
alone...is capable of destroying the Republic’.2000 Indeed, while the efforts of 
D’Auvergne and La Correspondence to stimulate and supply a truly effective 
counter-Revolutionary force may have ultimately failed, the collapse of 
economic confidence amongst provincial authorities served to compound 
tensions with the authorities in Paris.2001 Consequently, it can be clearly seen 
that the British government was able to exploit localised insurgency activity long 
after they had been wholly disabused of any pretentions amonst the royalist 
leadership that British aid might facilitate a large-scale insurrection and the 
overthrow of the Republic. 
 
Indeed, despite the fragmentary nature of the Chouannerie and the inability of 
Charette and his colleagues to extend their influence beyond the Vendée, the 
authority of the Republic was not made secure in the Western Provinces until 
long after the Peace of Amiens.2002 Consequently, although incidences of 
armed insurrection were largely conditional upon the peasant leadership 
‘transferring whatever ephemeral loyalties they had once felt from the 
Revolution to Royalism’, continued investment in the royalist movement 
continued to make sound strategic sense.2003 Both the Committee for Public 
Safety and the Directory remained fearful of the potential for such activity to 
destabilise their control over the Western Provinces; Carrier having reported 
that the British intended to use the Channel Islands as a base for an Anglo-
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Émigré invasion, and thereby unite with a rising in the Morbihan.2004 Previously, 
he had warned of the necessity of safeguarding the principal ports against 
infiltration by British spies, observing that émigrés from both Jersey and 
Guernsey were engaged in clandestine activity in the region.2005 That these 
concerns were based on more than the abovementioned psychological impact 
of the royalist insurgency is evidenced by the fact that the British were in 
possession of accurate intelligence to the Secretary at War concerning the 
defences of Cherbourg and Brest.2006 
 
‘A History of Wasted Opportunities’? 
 
Ultimately, the success enjoyed by the British government in relation to 
sustaining the counter-Revolutionary movement – both as a means by which to 
disrupt the French war effort and destabilise the Western Provinces – should 
not distract from the reality of the situation. Even when the Western Provinces 
were described as being ‘unquestionably ripe for a revolt’, and Craig declared 
that the royalists might ‘be masters of [St. Malo] within in a week’,2007 relations 
between the British government and the royalists remained a ‘marriage of 
convenience’. Thus, King not only argued that the potential of the royalist cause 
was never fully appreciated, but also that the history of La Correspondence was 
one of ‘wasted opportunities’ arising from ‘half-hearted efforts’ on the part of the 
British government. Indeed, she went so far as to conclude that ‘if one quarter 
of the [resources] which were wasted [in Flanders and the West Indies] had 
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been directed towards furthering the insurrection either in Brittany or the 
Vendée, the history of the French Revolutionary War – and by extension, the 
Napoleonic War – would likely have been very different.2008 However, from the 
evidence presented above, it is clear that such a conclusion rests upon an 
unrealistic view of what might have been achieveable, even had it been for the 
British to assist the royalists in securing a port or other beachhead, or make use 
of their armies in the context of ‘conventional’ operations. 
 
In assessing the success of the British government’s use of the Channel Islands 
as a platform from which to provide assistance to the royalists and the chouans, 
it is necessary to emphasise the fact that the British government was always 
sceptical of the potential of the insurrection. Indeed, even when confronted with 
the news that the royalist army – supposedly 30,000 strong – had ‘annihilated’ 
the garrison of St. Malo in pitched battle2009 and lain siege to Granville2010 –  
intelligence which served as the catalyst for Moira’s Expedition – the British 
stance remained on a ‘reactionary’ footing. Thus, although the most recent 
intelligence from Brittany appeared to indicate that the Republicans had drawn 
upon ‘every reinforcement that St. Malo and the vicinity is capable of furnishing’, 
Balcarres warned that it would still be unwise to overcommit British strength in 
support of the royalists. Indeed, referring to the hypothetical ‘worst case 
scenario’, he concluded that the ‘probable consequence’ of the British forces 
being compelled to retreat would be the ‘crushing to pieces [of] the Vendéen 
army’, with the Republican regime being ‘fixed more firmly in their seats that at 
any time before’.2011 Thus, although Moira’s Expedition has been long been 
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regarded as having represented the British government’s best chance of linking 
up with the royalists,2012 sensitivity to the risks of failure led to the initiative being 
lost and Balcarres’ warning becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
 
Moreover, while it is possible to appreciate the rationale behind King’s 
conclusion that the history of the British government’s involvement in the 
counter-Revolution constitutes a history of ‘wasted opportunities’, such a view is 
only truly possible with the benefit of hindsight. As Sutherland observed, any 
form of armed insurrection, whether in the Vendée or in Brittany, remained 
conditional upon the peasant leadership transferring their loyalties from the 
Revolution to Royalism.2013 Consequently, as has been already mentioned, the 
nature of both the counter-Revolution in general and the Chouannerie in 
particular was far closer to that of a brush-fire than a universal conflagration, 
and outbreaks of large-scale disorder and rebellion remained highly localised 
affairs.2014 In addition, it must be remembered that in spite of ‘the sacrifices of 
the gallant Charette, Stofflet, Scipineau and such of the other chiefs who have 
perished’,2015 none of these individuals was ever able to claim overall control of 
the entire royalist insurgency. Indeed, the impossibility of uniting this fractured 
movement was acknowledged by D’Auvergne as early as October 1798, when 
he informed Windham that the raising of Brittany and Maine could be achieved 
only by ‘the presence and high influence of a French Prince with great and 
evident means to support it’.2016 
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Even if the British government can be said to have missed the opportunity to 
exploit the counter-Revolution in the manner which King suggests, this should 
not lead us to downplay the importance of the insurrection as a psychological 
weapon. Not only does Carrier’s correspondence indicate that the French 
government treated the potential for a British-backed royalist insurgency as a 
significant threat (see above),2017 but the terror which was inspired by the 
chouans was considerable. In April 1795, provisions were already short at 
Quimper,2018 and by July, the success with which the chouans were 
‘intercepting convoys, stopping couriers and destroying bridges’ was such that 
Brest was described as being ‘almost entirely cut off by land from the rest of the 
province’.2019 In December, D’Auvergne reported that the hinterland was in a 
state of ‘general confusion and extreme misery’, with Granville ‘almost in a state 
of blockade’ and Avranches suffering want of supplies,2020 and later intelligence 
received from his agents at Brest indicated that this situation continued even 
after the suppression of the Vendée. In late November 1799, for example, it was 
reported that ‘forty tons of gunpowder and two hundred stand-of-arms had 
arrived thence under the guard of sixty infantry’, and that a convoy had been 
dispatched from Nantes ‘loaded with grain and flower for the fleet’, then 
‘reduced to three months’ provisions, exclusive of bread’. 2021  
 
Consequently, although it proved impossible for the British government to 
intervene in the counter-Revolution on the scale demanded by Puisaye and his 
colleagues, their involvement in the Western Provinces should be seen 
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nonetheless as a strategic success. It is true that the uprising in the Vendée 
was crushed by the colonnes infernales,2022 but final victory over Charette and 
his colleagues came at a significant cost to the Republicans, both in terms of 
manpower and equipment.2023 Moreover, every success achieved by the 
Vendéens – however minor – served to give encouragement to the chouans 
and, as demonstrated by the collapse of the planned invasion of the Channel 
Islands (see chapter three), compromise French military and naval operations in 
other areas. Consequently, while D’Auvergne can be seen to have enjoyed only 
limited success in facilitating the transmission of supplies to the Continent – 
either for the use of the Vendéens or the chouans – it is possible to argue that 
the strategic importance of this aspect of his duties was not defined by its 
material success. Even after the events of 1804 dealt a fatal blow to the British 
government’s confidence in the royalists, fears of an alliance between the two 
obliged the French authorities to devote much-needed manpower to patrolling 
of the coast and intercepting enemy agents.  
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Chapter Ten – Conclusion 
 
Despite being spared almost entirely from hostile contact with the enemy, it is 
clear that the Channel Islands’ involvement in the Great French War was far 
more complex than might at first be assumed. Fortunately, in seeking to provide 
an overview of the development of the bailiwicks’ involvement in the British war 
effort, the evidence presented herein would suggest that the period under 
investigation may be broken down into a number of key phases. The first of 
these, spanning 1792-94, covers such crucial issues as the arrival of the 
émigrés and the abortive invasion under Rossignol; events which served both to 
emphasise the vulnerability of the Channel Islands and their potential value as a 
conduit between Britain and the French coast. The second phase, lasting from 
1794 to 1806, was dominated by the development of the Channel Islands region 
as a ‘zone of control’ on the Anglo-French maritime border, and also witnessed 
the zenith of their exploitation as a nerve-centre of espionage and commerce-
raiding. Finally, the years 1806-15 witnessed the emergence of the Channel 
Islands as a chain of fortified outposts: the modernisation of the military roads, 
the creation of the ‘second generation’ inter-insular signal system and the 
completion of Fort Regent and Fort George representing the culmination of Don 
and Doyle’s vision for local defence. 
 
In addition to these phases of development, it is possible to highlight several 
critical moments at which the intersection of several of the issues investigated 
within this thesis caused significant change either to life in the bailiwicks or the 
ability of the British to exploit the Channel Islands in strategic terms. The closing 
months of 1793 provide perhaps the clearest example of such a juncture: while 
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French military preparations led the local authorities to view the émigré 
community as a security risk, the demands for intelligence also resulted in their 
exploitation as a ‘recruitment pool’ for confidential agents. In addition, while this 
initial threat passed without incident, it was appreciated that the invasion had 
been abandoned only due to the outbreak of counter-Revolutionary violence, 
thereby providing a justification for using the Channel Islands as a depot for aid 
to the insurgency. Likewise, it is possible to see Gordon’s death in April 1806 as 
another crucial intersection, since the lack of disruption which arose in relation 
to the progress of local defensive improvements serves to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of his reforms in terms of maintaining social and political control. 
Moreover, the appointment of Don as his successor led to closer collaboration 
between the authorities in the bailiwicks, while his effective working relationship 
with D’Auvergne and other naval officers enabled the Channel Islands to remain 
relevant within the context of blockade warfare and intelligence-gathering. 
 
Despite being spared from hostile contact with the enemy, the bailwicks 
emerged largely unrecognisable from the Great French War, the influx of 
refugees and garrison troops having triggered a series of demographic and 
cultural shifts. Likewise, local defensive needs served to accelerate – and 
ultimately fulfil – a program of reforms which had lost impetus during the lengthy 
peace following the American Revolutionary War. Moreover, it must be 
emphasised that the preceding analysis serves to guard against any temptation 
to dismiss the Channel Islands as a mere historical curiosity, or to cast doubt 
upon the nature of the threat which faced them from the Continent, either before 
or after the traditional historiographical ‘watershed’ of Trafalgar. In the eyes of 
both the British and French authorities, the bailiwicks were regarded as 
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occupying an important ‘front line’ position, and while commentators such as 
Shebbeare may have been prone to hyperbole,2024 their assessment was by no 
means inaccurate. Nonetheless, it is important that a sense of perspective is 
maintained, and that any conclusions drawn with respect to the strategic value 
of the Channel Islands during the conflict observe the same degree of nuance 
which has characterised the main body of this study. 
 
The Islands as a Military Outpost and Strategic Asset 
 
Throughout the Great French War, the successive commanders in the Channel 
Islands were consistent in their efforts to champion the strategic value of the 
bailiwicks; however, none displayed a greater level of zeal in this regard than 
Don and Doyle.2025 While the former declared his confidence that the local 
militia – if called to arms – might match the abilities of any regular troops,2026 the 
latter sought to solicit financial aid by claiming that ‘His Majesty’s Ministers 
cannot but regard these Islands as valuable to England’.2027 More importantly, 
such an attitude reflected the stance adopted by the local civil powers when 
faced with the need to allay government fears concerning the nature of the 
Channel Islands as a potential security risk. When the invasion scare of 1794 
gave rise to rumours that the bailiwicks might fall prey to the Republican 
ideology, the States responded by declaring the inhabitants’ ‘inviolable 
attachment to the best of Kings and to the British government’.2028 Similarly, the 
potential ‘fall-out’ of the violent clashes between the local privateers and the 
press gang during the Napoleonic War was deflected by an appeal to the 
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‘character of loyalty which their ancestors have ever possessed, and which...the 
present inhabitants eminently glow with’.2029   
 
However, while it is evident that the civil and military authorities were united in 
their advocacy of the Channel Islands as a strategic forward base, it was also 
acknowledged that any advantages which might be derived from their remaining 
in British hands were strictly limited. In spite of the significant sums of money 
which were invested in the defence of the bailiwicks (see chapter three), it 
would be naïve indeed to conclude that the British regarded the possession of 
the Channel Islands as being critical to the success of their wider military and 
naval objectives. Even Don and Doyle – both conscious of the continued threat 
posed to the bailiwicks and the likely consequences of their falling into French 
hands2030 – did not lose sight of the fact that the strategic potential of the 
Channel Islands remained dependent on a number of factors beyond their 
control.2031 Although the importance of the Channel Islands within the context of 
intelligence gathering and commerce raiding was readily acknowledged both 
locally and in London,2032 the difficulties which D’Auvergne had encountered 
during the winter of 1794 provided a clear demonstration of the limitations which 
impacted upon local maritime operations. 
 
Indeed, the haphazard nature of the Channel Islands’ direct participation in 
Britain’s war effort was no better demonstrated than in relation to the attempts 
made to use the bailiwicks – or more specifically, Jersey – as a conduit for 
providing assistance to the royalists. In spite of the fact that a large stockpile of 
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arms, munitions and other supplies was established at Mont Orgueil,2033 the 
inclement weather and the close attention of the enemy all too often led to the 
failure of the attempted ‘supply drops’.2034 This, in turn, meant that later efforts 
to sustain the insurgency in the Western Provinces were justified purely through 
appeals to their value as a ‘fifth column’, since even D’Auvergne appears to 
have lost all confidence in the royalists as a potential ‘conventional’ force.2035 
Likewise in the context of blockade warfare, it has been illustrated that the 
Channel Islands – lacking as they did the infrastructure and resources offered 
by bases in the Mediterranean – were able to perform a meaningful role only 
within the ‘strategical-commercial’ blockade.2036 Not until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when Alderney was developed as a base for steam-
powered gunboats blockading Cherbourg,2037 were similar attempts made to 
expand St. Helier and St. Catherine into ‘deep water’ harbours.2038 
 
The Economics of Warfare 
 
Such a conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that even the combined effort 
of the civil and military powers in both Bailiwicks was insufficient to solicit 
anything more than a token investment from London. While a number of senior 
British Ministers can be seen to have recognised the threat to the Islands as 
being both genuine and significant, such views appear to have been tempered 
by an assumption that French operations against the Islands would never 
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represent more than a means to an end. For example, when provided with 
intelligence of French naval preparations in the summer of 1796, it was 
concluded that the enemy intended to seize either the Channel Islands or the 
Îles de Saint-Marcouf.2039 However, the opinion amongst officers ‘on the ground’ 
appears to have been somewhat more cautious: Warren, for example, predicted 
that the intended operations would prove to be only ‘a false attack...to cover a 
surprise’ and, more specifically, ‘a great stroke...upon Ireland, Corsica, 
Gibraltar, or the West Indies’.2040 Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that 
this view was seemingly vindicated by the erroneous nature of many warnings 
concerning the imminence of a French attack;2041 such reports failing to account 
for the enemy’s inability to overcome the very hazards which so often thwarted 
the activities of La Correspondence.2042 
 
Even so, the fact that the degree of financial support directed towards the 
Islands by the British government amounted to only a fraction of the former’s 
total defence costs should not lead us to suggest that the Islands were 
perceived as expendable. Rather, it should be taken as an indication of the 
extent to which – even when confronted with apparently vital issues of security 
– the local commanders appear to have been loath to demand large sums from 
Britain’s coffers. For example, not only did Don express no objections to being 
granted an allowance of only £3,000 in 1806 – at a time when a single Martello 
Tower cost £1,500 – but he expressed his intent to draw upon these funds ‘only 
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as wanted’.2043 Similarly, when approaching the States with his plan for the 
military roads, Doyle argued that it would be sufficient for the British to provide 
‘a few thousand pounds judiciously expended’,2044 and that the remaining costs 
could be met through local means. Moreover, although the local military 
authorities were able to call upon the support of the Master-General of the 
Ordnance2045 in their efforts to push forward the fortification of the Islands, this 
did not result in the denigration of established local laws. Indeed, not only did 
the military rely upon the consent of the civil powers when carrying out 
defensive improvements,2046 but with respect to the raising of funds, public 
subscription2047 was encouraged as an alternative to taxation.2048 
 
It is clear, therefore, that while the Islands were considered to be valuable as an 
outpost, the overriding objective of both the local and national authorities was to 
ensure that the defence of the Bailiwicks was governed by pragmatism and 
economy. This stands in stark contrast to the image promoted by historians 
writing in the immediate aftermath of Waterloo, who sought to depict the 
Bailiwicks in glowing terms, describing them as being able to ‘bid defiance to a 
besieging army’ and having become ‘impregnable, [save through the] certain 
sacrifice of a host of foes’.2049 In addition, it also serves to caution against the 
adoption of vainglorious claims such as those made by Davies, who openly 
laments that Fort Regent was never given the opportunity to ‘show its prowess’ 
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by means of ‘a glorious siege, victory, or proud failure’.2050 Although it is true 
that large numbers of men, material and funds were granted to the Channel 
Islands during the course of the War, this thesis has demonstrated that such 
investments were subject to the needs of Britain’s forces in other theatres and 
on other fronts. At no point were the Bailiwicks permitted to consume resources 
which could be better employed elsewhere: as illustrated by the fact that 
garrison regiments in the Islands were frequently withdrawn for ‘active’ service 
or reinforced with raw recruits,2051 while additional naval reinforcements were 
often delayed, if not refused entirely.2052  
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
While the individual elements of this thesis are not, in and of themselves, 
original subjects for research, it is hoped that the preceding investigation has 
served to shed additional light on the strategic advantages derived by the British 
Government from their possession of the Channel Islands. Each of the 
preceding chapters has both augmented and synthesised existing research 
undertaken by a number of key scholars and has illustrated that – at least within 
the strictly defined context of the Channel theatre – the bailiwicks may be rightly 
regarded as having been of significant military value. However, it must be noted 
that this thesis has raised three questions which remain unanswered, and which 
may provide a starting point for further research on both a local and national 
level. Firstly, the involvement of the Channel Islands in the Great French War 
resulted in numerous economic, social and political shifts, the consequences of 
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which reached far beyond the defeat of Napoleon, influencing local life well into 
the nineteeth century. Unfortunately, as may be observed from the coverage of 
issues such as smuggling, privateering, the military roads and troop healthcare, 
this thesis has discussed these changes solely in relation to their military 
significance. Only an additional, dedicated study will reveal the true extent of 
their impact on the civilian population, and expose the manner in which wartime 
reforms helped to cement prosperity for the Channel Islands in peacetime. 
 
The second unanswered question relates to the redistribution of credit for the 
defence of the Channel Islands: an issue which – in spite of having driven this 
investigation in its early stages – was ultimately relegated to secondary 
importance by other considerations. At several points within this study, it has 
been argued that a local variant of ‘Nelsonian mystique’2053 has distorted our 
view of the Channel Islands’ role in the Great French War; D’Auvergne, Don 
and Doyle having dominated, respectively, Franco-British, Jersey and Guernsey 
historians’ accounts of the period. While the preceding study has highlighted 
that their successes were often reliant upon the efforts of their colleagues and 
subordinates – such as, in the case of Don, the man-management abilities of 
Humfrey – the fact remains that such contributions remain largely concealed 
beneath the shadow of the ‘Great Triumvirate’. Even within the ‘narrative’ 
framework of this thesis, Don, Doyle and D’Auvergne have remained the 
dominant figures, while even men such as Conway and Gordon have featured 
as members of a ‘supporting cast’. However, it is hoped that the breadth of 
topics covered within this study – and more specifically, the use of previously 
                                                 
2053 Voelcker, Saumarez vs. Napoleon: The Baltic, 1807-12, p. 22 
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undervalued archival material – shall enable research to be more easily 
conducted into the careers of those who have been unfairly obscured. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge the fact that this thesis has investigated 
the strategic and tactical position of the Channel Islands solely from the 
perspective of Britain and the bailiwicks themselves. Although some ‘external’ 
sources – such as intercepted French military documents, Parisian newspapers, 
and intelligence reports from foreign agents – have been employed, it remains 
the case that the ‘reality’ of French intentions towards the Channel Islands 
remain unproven. In spite of numerous reports concerning troop mobilisation 
against the bailiwicks,2054 and the condemnation of the Islanders within the 
pages of Le Moniteur,2055 no attacks ever came to fruition. Unfortunately, 
without undertaking a more extensive investigation of French archival sources, 
it is impossible to determine whether the Channel Islands were ever truly in 
danger of invasion, or whether these supposed attacks were a mere feint 
designed to distract the attention of the Royal Navy. While it must be admitted 
that such an investigation would add another level of nuance to the subject of 
this thesis, it would not change the overall conclusion that the Channel Islands 
enhanced a number of aspects of the British war effort. Likewise, it does not 
matter whether the French government ever truly desired to seize the Channel 
Islands; the reality is that they convinced the British that this was their intent, 
and that considerable resources had to be devoted to their protection. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2054 TNA, WO 1/923/407, Intelligence from St. Malo, undated, 1801 
2055 Ashelford, In the English Service, p. 115 
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Appendix A – The Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey 
 
Bailiwick of Jersey 
 
Jersey 
Minquiers Reef (Uninhabited) 
Écréhous Reef (Uninhabited) 
Les Dirouillies (Uninhabited) 
Les Pierres de Lecq (Uninhabited) 
 
Bailiwick of Guernsey 
 
Guernsey 
Alderney 
Sark 
Herm 
Jethou (Private Island) 
Brecquou (Private Island) 
Lihou (Private Island) 
Burhou (Uninhabited) 
Casquets (Uninhabited) 
Ortac (Uninhabited) 
Renonquet (Uninhabited) 
Crevichon (Uninhabited) 
Grande Amfroque (Uninhabited) 
Les Houmets (Uninhabited) 
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Appendix B – Governors, Lieutenant-Governors and Commanders-in-Chief of 
the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey, 1793-1815 
 
Governors of Jersey 
 
1772-1795 – Field Marshal Henry Seymour Conway 
1795-1796 – Field Marshal Sir George Howard 
1796-1807 – Marquess Townshend 
1807-1820 – Earl of Chatham 
 
Lieutenant-Governors of Jersey 
 
1782 – Lieutenant-Colonel Philippe Fall 
1797 – Lieutenant-General Andrew Gordon 
1806 – General Sir George Don GCB GCH 
1814 – General Sir Thomkyns Hilgrove Turner GCH 
 
Commanders-in-Chief of Jersey2056 
 
1782 – Colonel Richard Whyte 
1793 – Colonel James Henry Craig 
1793 – Rt. Hon. Lord Balcarres 
1795 – Lieutenant-General Andrew Gordon 
 
 
                                                 
2056 The posts of Lieutenant-Governor and Commander-in-Chief were amalgamated upon Lieutenant-
General Gordon’s appointment to the former office. 
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Governors of Guernsey 
 
1770–1797 – Field Marshal Sir Jeffery Amherst, 1st Baron Amherst 
1797–1807 – General Charles Grey, 1st Earl Grey 
1807–1827 – Lieutenant-General George Herbert, 11th Earl of Pembroke  
 
Lieutenant-Governors and Commanders-in-Chief2057 of Guernsey 
 
1784 – Lieutenant-Colonel William Brown 
1793 – Major-General Thomas Dundas 
1793 – Colonel James Henry Craig 
1793 – Major-General John Small 
1796 – Lieutenant-General Sir Hew Dalrymple 
1803 – Major-General Sir John Doyle Bt, GCB, KC 
 
Hereditary Governors and Commanders-in-Chief of Alderney 
 
1744-1793 – John Le Mesurier II 
1745-1763 – John Le Cocq (Acting) 
1793-1802 – Peter Le Mesurier 
1802–1828 – General John Le Mesurier III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2057 The posts of Lieutenant-Governor and Commander-in-Chief were combined during Major-General 
John Small’s term of office. 
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Appendix C – List of Vessels Stationed at Le Havre, Cherbourg and Nantes for 
the Invasion of the Channel Islands, February 17th 17942058 
 
List of Gunboats at Le Havre 
 
L’Ethna (three 24-pounder guns) 
La Foudre (three 24-pounder guns) 
La Terrible (three 24-pounder guns) 
La Fulminante (three 24-pounder guns) 
La Tempête (three 24-pounder guns) 
La Citoyenne (five 24-pounder guns)  
La Salamandre (six 6-pounder cannon and two 12-pounder mortars)2059 
 
List of Gunboats at Cherbourg 
 
La Chalier (unknown number of 24-pounder guns)  
Le Furet (two 24-pounder guns)  
L’Eclair (three 18-pounder guns) 
Le Chat (three 18-pounder guns)   
Le Sinon (three 18-pounder guns)  
La Mouche (three 24-pounder guns) 
La Souris (three 24-pounder guns) 
 
 
 
                                                 
2058 Extracted from SJA, L/F/08/H/9, ‘List of Gunboats Assembled in France for the Proposed Invasion of 
the Channel Islands’, February 17th 1794 
2059 Described as a ‘Bomb Vessel’ rather than a ‘Gunboat’ 
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List of Armed Transports at Nantes: 
 
Le St. Jacques (one 36-pounder and two 8-pounders)  
La Victoire (one mortar of unknown calibre, two 12-pounder cannon)  
La Magdelaine (one 36-pounder and two 8-pounders)  
La Cadiche (one 36-pounder and two 8-pounders)  
La Grande Julie (one mortar of unknown calibre, two 8-pounder cannons) 
La Blanche (two 18-pounders and two 8-pounders) 
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Appendix D – Comparative Schematic of the Conway Towers 
 
 
 
 
Source: W.H. Clements, Towers of Strength: Martello Towers Worldwide 
(London, 1998) 
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Map A – The Channel Islands in Relation to the French Coast 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.jimbsail.info/ 
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Map B – The French Channel Coast from Le Havre to Ushant, 1793 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/81, Chart by W. Faden, 1793 
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Map C – The Department of Manche, 1801 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/90, Map of Part of France and the Channel 
Islands, Published in Venice, 1801 
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Map D – The Department of Ile-et-Vilaine, 1801 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/90, Map of Part of France and the Channel 
Islands, Published in Venice, 1801 
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Map E – Detail from the ‘Bouillon Map’ by James Stead, 1799 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Lord Coutances Library, Société Jersiaise 
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Map F – Map of the Town of St. Helier, 1800 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SJA, L/F/120/A/126, ‘Plans of the Town of St. Helier in 1800 and 1860, 
Illustrating the Growth of the Town and the Development of the Harbour, 
Presented to J. Poindestre by Thomas Le Breton in 1862’ 
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Map G – Plan of Fort Regent as Proposed in 1787 
 
 
 
Source: Davies, ‘Early Proposals’ 513 
 
 
Map H – Outline Map of Fort Regent Superimposed Over Original Proposed 
Sketch, Date Unknown 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Davies, ‘Early Proposals’ 515 
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Map I – Detail from the Le Gros Map of St. Helier, 1834 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SJA, P/09/A/148, Photographic Slide of Le Gros’ Map of St. Helier 
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Map J – Completed Fortifications in St. Aubin’s Bay, 1817 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/100, Engraved by Samuel J. Neele, from a 
Survey Carried Out to Illustrate Plees, An Account of the Island of Jersey, 1817 
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Map K – Completed Fortifications in St. Ouen’s Bay, 1817 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/100, Engraved by Samuel J. Neele, from a 
Survey Carried Out to Illustrate Plees, An Account of the Island of Jersey, 1817 
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Map L – Completed Fortifications in Grouville and St. Clement, 1817 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/100, Engraved by Samuel J. Neele, from a 
Survey Carried Out to Illustrate Plees, An Account of the Island of Jersey, 1817 
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Map M – Completed Fortifications in Bouley Bay and Rozel Bay, 1817 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/100, Engraved by Samuel J. Neele, from a 
Survey Carried Out to Illustrate Plees, An Account of the Island of Jersey, 1817 
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Map N – Map of Alderney Showing Completed Military Roads 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/105, Engraved by R. Mudie, 1839 
 
 
Map O – Map of Guernsey Showing Completed Military Roads 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/105, Engraved by R. Mudie, 1839 
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Map P – Map of Jersey Showing Completed Military Roads 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Detail from SJA, L/F/120/A/105, Engraved by R. Mudie, 1839 
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